



































Ute Holl’s Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics discusses the cinematic apparatus
as an interface between mind and machine. Rather than simply a medium 
for representing altered states, cinema is considered as a cultural technique of
trance. Close investigations of the Soviet avant-garde connect Dziga Vertov 
to Russian psycho-reflexology and V.M. Bechterev’s theory of trance. 
The anthropological tradition of cine-trance is viewed in the context of 
feed-back, as conceived of by Jean Rouch, as well as of the New American 
Cinema, following Maya Deren and Gregory Bateson, in conceptualizing the
reiteration of time, space, and movement, to prove that feedback is the basic
strategy of cinematic transformations. Holl’s influential stance suggests that
cybernetics is not only an instrument of control, but that the homeostatic 
forces of film are steps to an ecology of the cinematic mind that finds it 
origins in the nineteenth-century laboratory techniques of measuring the 
senses, movement and behaviour. 
Ute Holl is Professor of Media Studies at the University of Basel, Switzerland. 
“Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics will change the way you see the cinema’s past. Through an
impressive synthesis of psychology, cybernetics, anthropology and the cinematic arts, it 
reveals how cinema was born in the scientific laboratory and grew into a machine for
 controlling, but also emancipating, mental life. Providing a powerful historical account that
brings Maya Deren in contact with Vladimir Bekhterev, amongst others, the book shows
how cinema ultimately came to shape us into its own image.”
‒ Film and screen scholar Pasi Väliaho, who has written a new Preface to the English edition
of Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics.
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Goldsmiths, University of London
Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics is driven by a refrain. The paths and forks 
of the book’s reflections always return to a primal scene, a “ritual”, as Ute 
Holl calls it, which keeps appearing in different guises: the “passage into the 
darkness of the cinema” that begins as soon as the lights of the movie theatre 
are turned off. This primal scene retains its familiarity to us. Despite the fact 
that televisual screens have rendered their occurrence as virtually superflu-
ous, we can still remember and experience those anticipatory moments of 
becoming enveloped into the movie theatre’s artif icial blackness before the 
f ilm projector begins its duty of casting movements of light and shadow 
on the screen’s blank surface. Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics reminds 
us how this “passage” bears particular anthropological signif icance. The 
movie theatre’s darkness is one in which the faces of our loved ones become 
covered with the strangest masks, and we grow either closer or more alien 
to ourselves.
Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics can be read as a detective story: Who 
turned off the lights? What happened when the darkness fell for the f irst 
time? The book engages a range of actors from the later 19th century and 
the f irst part of the 20th to divulge the necessary clues. Readers should be 
notif ied, however, that its protagonists are not the usual (male) f igures of 
early cinema and the Hollywood movie industry but instead scientists as 
well as scientif ic and experimental f ilmmakers. Rather than the Lumière 
brothers, Alfred Hitchcock, Steven Spielberg, the Wachowskis, etc., the 
dramatis personae that for the most part populate the following pages 
include Maya Deren, Jean Painlevé, Jean Rouch and Dziga Vertov, in addition 
to numerous (more or less well-known) f igures from the history of the life 
sciences as well as anthropology, including Margaret Mead and Gregory 
Bateson, Etienne-Jules Marey, Gustav Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz, 
Vladimir Bekhterev, and the Harvard psychologist of German origin, Hugo 
Münsterberg, who published one of the f irst theoretical studies on the 
“photoplay” in 1917. Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics takes the reader to 
a journey that spans a range of different sets (seen as if from a bird’s eye 
view, through a virtual camera flying over different locations): Bali (where 
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Mead and Bateson did their f ieldwork with f ilm cameras and typewriters), 
Albert Londe’s photographic studio at the Salpêtrière in Paris, Marey’s 
physiological station in Bois de Boulogne, the international symposium 
of neuroscientists and psychologists at Wittenberg College, Ohio, in 1927, 
Deren’s house in Los Angeles where Meshes of the Afternoon (1943) was 
f ilmed…
Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics in a sense rewrites f ilm history. Its stakes 
are nothing less. But instead of debating the historical record (who did what 
when), the book’s implicit concern is on how these questions should be 
posed. Rather than merely telling stories about how cinema was conceived 
by various inventors and has been used by artists and entrepreneurs, Cin-
ema, Trance and Cybernetics is preoccupied by what the medium of f ilm 
has done to us, how the cinema has changed us. That is what the mystery of 
darkness is about. The book thus refocuses the lens through which we look 
at the past; it adjusts our conceptual understandings and approaches. Under 
Holl’s scrutiny, cinema doesn’t appear as a medium of mass entertainment, 
not even as a particular aesthetic form per se, but above all as an “anthropo-
logical machine” the stakes of which involve articulations between human 
and animal, conscious and unconscious, or speaking being and living being.1 
Above all, Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics explores the f ilm medium’s place 
and meaning in the scientif ic and technological upheavals of the twentieth 
century that came to radically reshape our composition.
A key thread of the book’s narrative fabric is to show how cinema was 
born out of the spirit of the experimental scientific laboratories developed in 
the nineteenth century. “The unknown avant-gardists of f ilm history”, Holl’s 
cogent observation goes, were in fact “natural scientists”. It was the forerun-
ners of modern neurology, physiology and psychology that first came up with 
techniques of probing perception and consciousness, and above all the “li-
men” that separates conscious mental states from non-conscious ones. After 
initial experimentations in the lab, commercial and artistic applications, 
which capitalized on cinema’s liminal psychology, followed. Jean-Martin 
Charcot’s and Albert Londe’s visualizations of the movements of so-called 
hysterical female bodies at the Salpêtrière in Paris, for instance, provided 
the breeding ground for Lillian Gish’s performances in David Griffith’s f ilms. 
Gustav Fechner’s three-year state of trance, which the founder of psychophy-
sics induced himself into with excessive experiments on afterimage effects, 
amongst other things, might just as well describe the somnambulists flocking 
to watch Griff ith’s dramas, or alternatively today’s video game players.
Throughout Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics one can hear the echo 
of Friedrich Kittler writing in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (originally 
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published in 1986 in Germany): “Since its inception, cinema has been the 
manipulation of optic nerves and their time”.2 Kittler’s insight was to show 
how technological recordings and reproductions of acoustic and optical 
“data” have critically changed the “state of reality.”3 For Holl, likewise, 
cinema performs an experiment on our being; on what can be sensed, im-
agined and dreamt. Conceptually, Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics is f irmly 
grounded in the German-speaking tradition of media and f ilm theory, 
and proves what this tradition of scholarship is capable of doing with its 
vigorous mixing of philosophical thought with a sustained inquiry into and 
critique of cinematic (and other medial) modes of being and thinking. Film 
comes here across as a cultural technique the research of which, to borrow 
Bernhard Siegert’s words, “amounts to an epistemological engagement with 
the medial conditions of whatever lays claim to reality.”4
Cinema had its throne as the medium of the 20th century capable of 
dictating how we are able to perceive and conceptualize the world. Cinema 
had the power, to paraphrase Kittler’s words, to “define what really is.”5 Holl 
investigates this power by deftly drawing conceptual parallels between 
cinema and cybernetics, parallels that have largely remained to be explored, 
one might surmise, simply because they perhaps aren’t the most obvious. 
Whilst cinema, at f irst sight at least, comes across as a technology of the 
industrial era, belonging to the family of mechanical apparatuses that 
includes the steam engine, the bicycle, the train, and the clock, cybernet-
ics is an invention of the Second World War, of (electronic) signals and 
computation. Whilst cinema was originally conceived by the Scientist and 
then quickly appropriated by the Capitalist, cybernetics belonged in its very 
beginnings to the General, that is to say, to the military-industrial complex. 
Norbert Wiener’s “anti-aircraft predictor” (built in 1948) was one of the f irst 
incorporations of the cybernetic idea of modeling and controlling a system’s 
behavior and particularly its future states. How does this compare with film, 
a technology we normally associate with storage rather than anticipation, 
pure recording rather than feedback? The common denominator can be 
found in the etymology of “cybernetics”, that is to say, governance and 
control. Both cinematic and cybernetic systems link living beings with 
machines and in so doing administer and regulate human cognition and 
behavior, or in other words, the movements of bodies and souls. Both 
“feedback” into our nervous systems and brains. “The cinema is thus a good 
place to examine cybernetic processes, since the links between nervous 
systems and apparatuses have constantly been synchronized, aligned, and 
optimized in its history”, Holl writes. Synchronization and optimization of 
the senses and psychic life coupled with the mechanics of the film apparatus 
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– this is the operating function of the feedback loop between the spectator 
and the screen that is established in the dark of the movie theatre.
Cinema’s power, then, is not merely located in the contents of its imagery, 
however moving, luring or explicit, but in the exchanges, repetitions and 
relays that take place between the movie machine and our nervous sys-
tems and brains. Cinema is a machine for controlling and regulating our 
impulses, sensations and emotions. But above all – and this is the point 
that recurs in Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics like Karl Marx’s ghost in our 
neoliberal nightmares – cinema is a machine for shifting and displacing 
the consciousness, and for “inducing trance”. Combining f ilm experience 
with the trance state is the second key innovation of the book, in addition 
to refocusing on cinema through the lens of cybernetics.
“Trance”, Holl writes, “as a dissolution or diversion of the conscious-
ness under the impact of certain technologies, is the gap in f ilm theory.” 
Much ink has indeed been spilled on the unconscious mechanisms of f ilm 
spectatorship; on the dream state induced by f ilm viewing, on the mirror-
ings, misrecognitions and identif ications that arguably take place in the 
movie theatre’s darkness. In the f ilm theory of the 1970s, the moviegoer was 
even reduced to an infantile of sorts. Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics does 
point towards a similar kind of loss of control in the spectator’s position 
as soon as the lights in the movie theatre are turned off. But rather than 
mere regression, the idea of trance designates here how the spectator’s 
self-regulatory system yields control to external forces – the sheer force 
of movement, light and shadow on the silver screen taking charge of inner 
physiological and mental events. This means the emergence of alternative 
bodily and psychic states, affective and emotional conditions, within the 
individual. In this respect, Holl’s analysis can be seen to converge with 
recent attempts at re-conceptualizing cinematic subjectivity, which seek 
analogies between the f ilmic apparatus and hypnosis in particular.6 Here, 
the power of cinema is considered in terms of suggestion, even possession, 
which opens our minds, not simply to external control and machination, 
but also to new dispositions and capacities.
In this respect, trance indeed appears in what follows as an ambiguous 
concept, a concept with at least two faces. On one side, it is a question of 
“command and control” – the movie machine’s steering of our nerves and 
psyches like the God sending orders by means of rays of light to Daniel Paul 
Schreber (the [in]famous case of paranoia “treated” by the psychiatrist Paul 
Flechsig and theorized by Sigmund Freud, and later Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari). But on the other side, trance gestures towards ruptures, erratic 
tics and f its within the dominant order of things.
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We might get a better grasp of this ambiguity by taking a brief look at the 
Hauka movement, which began among the Songhay people in Niger in 1925 
and was popularized for the Western audience in Jean Rouch’s ethnographic 
f ilm The Mad Masters (Les Maîtres fous, 1955). Rouch’s cinematic works play 
a key role in Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics, as they, according to Holl, 
tinker “with the technology until new imaginary spaces start to emerge, 
in which mental states are realized that are non-integrated.” The Hauka is 
a famous example of such “non-integrated” as well as ambivalent states. 
The participants would dance and become possessed by the spirits of their 
European colonizers – military off icers, administrators, governors, and so 
on. The proceedings would be physically intense, as Paul Stoller describes:
The pulsations ripple like waves through Istambula’s [a Hauka medium’s] 
body. He extends his arms and spins around like a top. He grunts and 
howls. Saliva f lows like lava from his mouth. Barbara Mossi and the 
general join him. The tempo is quite fast; the beat is intense. One by 
one the Hauka throw their bodies in the air, landing on their backs with 
thumps.7
Possession means here complex acts of mimicry whereby Hauka medi-
ums would not only imitate the gestures, fashions and manners of their 
“civilized” colonizers, but also the ways in which the colonizers aped the 
“savage” colonized. It means dialectical play with identities at an uncertain 
threshold between them and us, self and other. Michael Taussig calls this 
kind of performance “mimetic excess” – excess whereby the hegemonies of 
domination can at least momentarily be suspended, perhaps even annulled, 
and which provides “opportunity to live subjunctively as neither subject 
nor object of history but as both, at one and the same time.”8
Could cinema be capable of holding such subjunctive and excessive 
powers? Can it give rise to spectators who are “possessed” instead of being 
“possessive”? Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics will not give readers any 
def initive answers; who could? But by probing into the cinema’s and our 
psyche’s liminal states, the book makes a strong case for reconceptualizing 
what the politics of cinema can mean. This is a gesture that several of the 
book’s German companions have shunned – their inquiries into how dif-
ferentiations and separations are brought about often forgets the question 
as to how orders of things could be changed, that is to say, the question of 
political agency. Simultaneously, it avoids reiterating the well-rehearsed 
critiques of “ideologies” and “representations” so dear to Anglo-American 
scholarship. Liminal states hold the germ of excess and transgression – this 
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is how we might encapsulate the “surrealist” politics of cinema that Cinema, 
Trance and Cybernetics outlines.
Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics shows that the passage into the darkness 
of the movies definitely compels us to let foreigners in. When the f ilm ends, 
the lights are turned on, and we hurry towards the exit, the spirits of the 
silver screen gradually leave us, dissipating into the air. But during those 
90 minutes or so, we have, potentially at least, been possessed to mime 
ourselves and the world around us differently. Thanks to the movies, the 
spirits will always be here, with us, in us.
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 Preface to the English Translation of 
Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics
Returning to Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics, my study on cinema as a 
cultural technique of trance and transformation, on the occasion of its 
translation into English some f ifteen years after the German edition, I 
was surprised to discover that the book exposed new and unexpected 
impacts in a fundamentally changed media environment. Under the new 
circumstance it has, as it were, become a new book. The study’s research 
into historical relations of anthropology, psycho-physiological studies and 
experimental f ilm culture produces unforeseen ramifications in the light of 
recent developments in media technology and media practices. Therefore 
it will def initely contribute to the f ields of media theory and specif ically 
cinema studies, albeit differently than when it was f irst published.
Cinematic perception, in fusing single frames into an imaginary continu-
ity of moving images had, according to Marshall McLuhan’s diagnosis, been 
a useful vehicle to travel from the mechanical Gutenberg Galaxy into the 
20th century’s Turing Universe of an electronically composed perceptive 
continuum. In the current condition of digital data processing, cinematic 
perception might turn out to be even more indispensable in the attempt to 
come to terms with the reorganisation of our senses under a 21th century’s 
regime of electronic media. The algorithms that organize data for moving 
images cannot be perceived for themselves, but only in what we perceive 
as effects, which appear due to transformations of streams of data between 
electronic devices. Since cinema itself has once and for all left its classical 
setting in movie theatres to spread across electronic meshes and across 
individual or shared screens, its specif ic entanglement of physical cultures 
and wishful hallucination returns as an issue with ever more insistence. 
Former meshes of the afternoon have turned into omnipresent meshes, 
into a permanent mode of trance, as it were, disorganizing and disturbing 
what we perceive as presence or absence.
It is only now, since technical devices, cultural bodies and physical 
behaviour have progressively merged, that my book’s basic argument has 
become common experience: The act of cinematic perception connects a 
whole set of elements, technical as well as cultural, topological as well as 
historical orders, so that the f ilmic image can never be located as such but 
only considered in its effects, on different screens, in different viewing 
cultures. The book Cinema, Trance and Cybernetics proposes a genealogy 
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of cinematic experience which, as I see it, turns out to explain even more 
of the ambivalences of communication and control in social and personal 
media today than it had done for the critique of the old mass medium 
which was still the dominant type of viewing f ilm’s when the book was 
written. Rereading my study I was astonished to f ind that in the light of 
the latest developments of technical devices its assumption that technical 
media carry the threat of social trance and oblivion, while also providing 
perspectives of cultural transgression and the transformation of alterities 
proved sustainable. Or rather, it seems much clearer today than when 
Hollywood’s model of the cinema was considered classical, its apparatus 
homogeneous and its impact compulsory. In today’s cinematic devices 
from personal pads to gigantic screens on urban architecture, the issue 
of feed-back, of senso-motoric integration or disintegration of bodies and 
screens – or cameras for that matter – is obvious to every user. The history 
of the cinema as an interface is a central thread in the book.
Venturing back into the psycho-physiological experiments of the 19th 
century, I set out to discover a common history of technique, laboratory 
studies of behaviour and desire. In this sense, the book seemed risky in a 
methodological perspective. In a fortuitous encounter of luck and serendip-
ity I found these f ields connected in the work of experimental f ilmmaker 
Maya Deren. Following her biographical cues, I traced the genealogy of 
cinematic experiments into the psycho-physiological laboratories of the 
19th century and discovered close bonds between scientif ic experiments 
of psychologists and scientists on the one hand and the studies of trance, 
possession and altered states on the other. At their interface, major and 
resilient f ilmic topoi emerged, the mad scientist as well as the hysteric 
clairvoyant. Cinema’s history in the f ield between avant-garde f ilm, 19th 
century experimental psychology and anthropology had been discussed 
before. But a study on trance and feed-back in cinematic perception also 
shows that not only plots and content derive from cinema’s prehistory, but 
also their technical adaptations to the minds of the 20th and now, differently, 
to the minds of the 21st century.
Maya Deren’s work does not only link the f ields of psychology, anthropol-
ogy and experimental cultures, she was also acquainted with a concealed 
network of counter-psychological thought. Through her personal relations 
to Soviet Psychology I discovered the strange networks of knowledge 
established by Vladimir Bekhterev, who turned out to link experimental 
practices connected to names like Paul Flechsig, Jean-Martin Charcot, 
Dziga Vertov, Walter Cannon and f inally Jean Rouch and Gregory Bateson. 
Cybernetics as historically established feed-back relations or interfaces 
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between the nerves, the senses and the minds on the one hand and technical 
devices on the other – a context concisely called cinema-eye, kino glaz by 
Vertov –, relations that at the same time escape the conscious perception 
of users seems to be a very old project, which is taking possession of newer 
cultures of seeing and listening only now, in the presence of personal and 
personalized screens.
Maya Deren’s invitation to follow the Voudoun divinity Legba into the 
darkness and towards the cross-roads of cultures and ecstatic practices also 
led my studies. The path of research has thus lead from cinema’s darkness 
into the f licker-lit set-ups of laboratories and to utopian and dystopian 
models of technical devices connecting instruments and physical bodies. To 
day, the darkness of the movie houses is only a memory of a trance technique 
which is about to disappear. When writing the book, gramophone, f ilm 
and typewriter had just been replaced by Walkman, digital video formats 
and personal computers. The culture of I-pods, smart phones and pads as 
well as of streamed data which form into personal audio-visual viewing 
dispositives was just on the verge of breakthrough. Once they reached their 
subjects, they increasingly reduced them to consumers. Deren’s call for ap-
propriating technical skills and devices in the service of revolutionary and 
ritual cultural forms seems to be right on time now. Gregory Bateson had 
hoped that the notion of gods meant nothing far out but the implementation 
of ecological thought against the competition of capitalist society. I kept 
returning to this hope in the presence of ever more drastic exploitation of 
people and continents. What sort of hybrids we have become under the rule 
of the new and colder race of gods – as William James had predicted – will 
have to be inferred as extension of the book at hand.
As opposed to the studies of the Canadian School of media theory, 
contemporaries of Maya Deren she had not really taken notice of, Deren’s 
thinking was concerned with syncretistic and unknown cultures rather 
than with the decline of a Western world of literacy. And compared to 
the Canadian School her work was inspired by feminist attitudes. Film 
studies, and specif ically in Germany, insisted that cinema is a form of 
thinking liberated from the obligation of assuming philosophy’s single and 
disembodied spirit – Geist – in favour of the multiplicity of heterogeneous 
forms combining different views, gazes, bodies and minds. In this feminist 
culture of f ilm studies to which my research owes its foundations, Deren’s 
work provided crucial forms of knowledge. This farewell to the formation 
of a singular form of mind will also have to be reconsidered in the presence 
of cinemas on multiple screens.
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Now that feed-back loops between technical devices, cultural and 
physical bodies have merged as an every day experience, the book’s basic 
assumption does not seem as risky as it used to: The f ilm’s images are not 
projected elsewhere, but come into effect in the cultural conduct of societies 
as well as of single subjects. The ontology of the f ilmic image has to be 
studied in our own forms of behaviour. As subjects, we prove to be interfaces 
of historical and cultural techniques as well as of discourses of sanity and 
legality as they are modif ied by the historical modes of cinema’s aesthetic 
procedures. But even in the presence electronic data processing, cinematic 
experience will allow us to reflect, perceive and negotiate our culturally 
hybrid status. In terms of media theory this implies that it is not the search 
for simple materiality which will prevent us from following endless routines 
of hermeneutic odysseys, but the perception of historical relations between 
material and cultural techniques, conscious or unconscious.
Apart from all such new and unforeseen impacts, rereading Cinema, 
Trance and Cybernetics now had another effect which might qualify as 
a central concern of media studies’ methodology: Wistfully I remember 
the audacious research and writing in the wake of Friedrich Kittler’s 
provocations, with or against the vortex of his own work. This is true for 
interdisciplinary conjunctions and conjectures as well as for political con-
clusions related to strategies of subjectivation in technical environments. 
These approaches once were alien to academic studies. Even if I thought of 
my research as proceeding in a strictly discourse-analytically structured 
manner, it was at the time considered risky and rejected by classical Ger-
man f ilm studies. Today, this work is read as basic research into cinema’s 
aesthetic history. If nothing else then, the book is a good example of the 
pleasure that is connected to venturing into a f ield that is not academically 
established, or the excitement of inventing a new set of questions. Thus, 
the forms of research which are now called New German Media Theory 
were mostly establish at the crossroads of existing discourse networks 
and mostly at night. It was about exposing interrelations of disciplines and 
cultural practices, deliberately without being caught in the trap of technical 
determinism. This might, after all, qualify as the central concern of media 
studies’ methodology.
If there was an initial goal of the text at all it would have been to describe 
cinema as an experience of producing new perceptual forms and habits, new 
forms of conduct and behaviour which would allow for social homeostasis 
– call it peace or not – to be realized beyond disciplinary means. While 
German media theory seems to be inevitably linked to technologies of war 
and disciplinary data processing, my studies were at the time very much 
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motivated by the will to f ind inventive and emancipative forms of media 
practices, to discover new forms of communication capable of resisting the 
regimes of control, and to reconstruct a discourse history of the unconscious 
in cinema, which would expose the tiny messianic force of an equilibrium 
between human beings and apparatus. It is here that the book seems have 
developed its most antiquated facet.
The book is itself a node in a larger network of studies, and while it is im-
possible to name all the names necessary to explain its edges, there are some 
that have specif ically formed its meshes: the feminist f ilm theory of Heide 
Schlüpmann, and Friedrich Kittler’s media theory, two antagonistic posi-
tions which become really explosive if their forces are joint. Jutta Hercher 
introduced me to Maya Deren’s cinema work. Bernhard Siegert rescued 
the research project early on dropping terms like cultural techniques. That 
the book exists at all is owed to Rike Felka and Erich Brinkmann who took 
the risk of publishing it in the f irst place, and to the editors of the New 
German Media Theory who chose it to become part of a great series. That 
the English version exists at all is owed to the brilliance and elegance of 
Daniel Hendrickson, himself a man at the cross-roads of the arts.
I am extremely happy that the book will be published towards the 100th 
anniversary of Maya Deren who was born on April 29th, 1917.
legba – life – is the link between the visible mortal world and the invisible immortal realms. he is the 
means and avenue of communication between them. (…) since he stands at the cross-roads, he has 
access to the worlds on either side, as if he were on both sides of the mirror surface which separates 
them. – maya deren, 1953. in: Divine Horsemen. The Living Gods of Haiti, new york 1973. p. 97.
la Cybernétique n’est pas une super-science, le cybernéticien n’est pas un super-savant: ce sera 
bientôt un spécialiste comme les autres, installé en un carrefour, mais non pas pour faire la loi. – 
g.Th. guilbaud 1957. in: What is Cybernetics?, london 1959. p. 28.
 In the Beginning
In the beginning is the darkening. Indiscernible. Drifting into twilight. 
Attention gets lost in the space. Darkness comes back through the depths. 
Shapes and boundaries blur. Inside and outside are indistinguishable. 
Desert, void, blind land between sundown and night. Like closing the 
eyes. Departing from oneself. Back to the beginning. And then radiating, 
shimmering, brightness, reflections, f lickering. The trickling of light.
Effecting the passage into the darkness of the cinema in such a way that 
the spectator does not perceive it, this is the art of the f ilm projector. The 
ritual is prescribed, the use of light and sound in temporal succession is 
f ixed. First the footlights and the stage lights are dimmed, then the light 
in the audience is brought down and slowly the f irst curtain is opened – at 
the same time the projectionist in the booth gets the f ilm rolling, turns 
on the lamps, opens the shutter, and turns on the sound, which fades in to 
replace the music in the theater. The projection beam shoots through the 
room, the studio credits become visible, which is synchronized to transition 
in the waves of the receding curtain. “The spectator should never see the 
bare screen. This is why the f irst decorative curtain, synchronized with 
the architecture of the space, only opens as the projection starts, revealing 
the action of the f ilm.” (Hochmeister, Handbuch für den Filmvorführer) The 
technical instruction means that the picture in the cinema, the action, the 





The history of experimental research in technological devices and how 
these devices have transformed human perceptual structures provides 
a way to look at cinema as a laboratory for the feelings and sensations 
provoked by technology, which form the basis of all histories of the screen. 
Film critics, even without treating the apparatus as a fetish in their analy-
ses, have examined the technical aspects of the cinema as objective and 
describable data striving to become a form of expression that can no longer, 
or not yet, be called language, and that can only manage to claim syntax 
and grammar for short historical episodes. But placing the cinema in the 
history of devices and technologies that were developed in psychological 
laboratories since the middle of the nineteenth century, devices that were 
used to measure and simulate mental functions and emotions, also means 
understanding cinema as an illustrative system that expresses and alters 
perception and the corresponding nerve-psychological relations in bod-
ies as it transmits its impulses. Viewed from this perspective, the various 
faculties of cinematic technology – recording, editing, and projection – can 
also be seen in a different and unfamiliar light: as opportunities to place 
spectators, the subjects of perception, into new relations, in which they only 
consciously f ind themselves after they have already given themselves over 
to the transformation caused by this cinematically constructed perceptual 
relation.
Forms of space, time, and motion, the basic forms of perception, are just 
as relative in the technology of cinema as is subjectivity in the cinema, 
the self-perception through images. The cinematic apparatus produces 
a special kind of trance in which we are distracted, at least for the dura-
tion of a screening, from our own routines and in which all we can do is 
submissively follow our consciousness – or we have to leave the space of 
the cinema, but this goes far beyond what constantly appears in Godard 
as “Entrance”, “En trance.” Through the single images stored on celluloid, 
through the flickering between light and darkness in the projection, cinema 
is aligned with the nervous functions as a series of impulses. If we view 
cinema as a psycho-physical machine, this not only shows images to be 
rhythmic impulses, it also shows that certain brain functions can be trig-
gered by means of cinematic tricks. All these reactions, which take place 
underneath the level of perception that is capable of conscious decision, can 
best be described, following Walter Benjamin, as reactions of the optical 
unconscious.
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In a psychological history of cinema, reflexology appears as the f irst 
great vision of an external aggregate that neurophysiologically gathers and 
transmits human feelings. Reflexology thus becomes a vision of exchang-
ing experience, collectively and reversibly – possibly also as collectively 
regulating human emotions, sensations, and experiences with apparatuses. 
In the cinema, at least as we know it, this vision appears under capitalist, 
hierarchical, monolithic, and fatuous conditions, and it is not possible to 
speak of a general and reciprocal exchange of forms of perception. Cin-
ema production, aside from small islands of cultural sponsorship, video 
networks, and ecstatic collective super8 evenings, is subject to industrial 
systems of production and utilization. It is meant to make money and 
secure privileges, and so no one is surprised that almost all Hollywood 
f ilms that thematize the recording and transfer of experience represent 
this technology – and thus in the end also their own – as a vision of horror. 
Even in Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days, in which a cerebral “f ilm” can even 
serve to explain away acts of violence, mental images are merely treated 
as a bad drug.
The history of chronometric psychology and psycho-motor activity as 
a history of bodily dispositifs developed in connection with the political 
strategies of the nineteenth century continues in the cinema with its 
fascination for all impulses and movements. In dance and as in trance, we 
are enthralled by the illusion of movement itself, which appears as an effect 
of on-screen technology, long before any concrete network of meaning has 
been construed. If the technology of cinema is examined under this aspect, 
then it is not as the simple paranoia of the moviegoer, but as a double one. 
In the cinema, in which our interiority is interconnected with an exterior 
apparatus, what we see is also our own shuddering and twitching, according 
to the set up, according to the f ilm genre. What we call our own feelings 
can be objectif ied and adapted to the technological state of time in cinema. 
Camera and editing techniques accelerate our bodies’ own frequencies of 
shivering, vibrating, and flickering. So a f ilm like Jan de Bont’s Speed can 
function as an update of the old, archaic desire for motion perception. Or 
a f ilm like Lars von Trier’s Breaking the Waves can create the most ancient, 
almost Augustinian desire to confront the Eternal Thou of God through 
optical traps by altering perspectives and viewpoints, even before the mean-
ing and the motif of the victim have become established as the logic of the 
film narrative. And Matrix catapults us into non-human synchronies of new 
spatio-temporal coordinates, in which divine omni-vision is intertwined 
with the compound vision of insects. The monsters and the monstrances 
in cinema are our own eyes.
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If f ilm were less of a plutocratic production form, nerves and f ilm tech-
nology could enter into reciprocal communication, and what Vladimir 
Mikhailovich Bekhterev maintained for nervous activity in general could 
also be applied to the cinema: that not only does the human being have 
to adapt psycho-physically, but that there is “also a modif ication of the 
external conditions, that is, an ancillary adaptation of external conditions 
to internal conditions.”1
With the technological unconscious, the condition of which is record-
ing and projecting discrete single images on f ilm, the gaze unconsciously 
moves in the pictures and the shots of the photographic surface. This is 
the beginning of f ilm criticism. Siegfried Kracauer saw this photographic 
quality of images, which depict the external world in its unposed, random, 
fragmentary reality, as the very essence of cinema.2 Hugo Münsterberg 
pointed out that this surface is not only exhibited in its melancholy, absti-
nent visual clarity, as Kracauer had envisioned for ideal photography, but 
that the photographic production of the film image also indicates a material, 
meaningless, but functional side, which in turn spurs on a dramaturgy and 
a way to draw the attention beneath the threshold of conscious perception: 
“The shading of the lights, the patches of dark shadows, the vagueness of 
some parts, the sharp outlines of others, the quietness of some parts of 
the picture as against the vehement movement of others all play on the 
keyboard of our mind… ”3
All three basic functions of film technology, camerawork, editing, and pro-
jection, can thus also be seen as psycho-physical technologies, as consciously 
treating perception and reality at the same time, but which entirely evade 
conscious perception, “a conscious manipulation designed to create effect”, 
as Maya Deren put it.4 The basis of all film technology is cutting up, recording, 
and projecting single images. And this is the technological consequence from 
the old chronometry in physiology and psychology. After a unified time-frame 
was incorporated as the basis of all experiments in the laboratories of the nine-
teenth century, this led in the twentieth century to an interest in expanding, 
compressing, or accelerating this timeframe, or even in letting it run backwards 
and in loops, leading the spectator astray. But all the illusionary techniques 
of the cinema, which is also “the truth 24 times per second”, have to relate to 
the spatio-temporal parameters of basic neurophysiological research. The 
exceptions, construing reality in a different way and recording movement in 
time differently, may not be called cinema and cannot technically be screened 
in cinemas: such as focal-plane shutters which do not cut up the flow of time, 
but recording flowing colors and forms on a running track and representing 
the intensities of the world as rubber mat distortion.
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Cinema belongs to the trance techniques of our culture because it sys-
tematically treats and shifts the normative and imaginary time frames, in 
which we remain subject to conscious daily production, in all the disciplines 
of our bodily knowledge.
Camerawork not only ensures discrete single images, which allow for 
the shaping of movements in the illusion of movement, but at the same 
time it treats – by means of various optical tricks and their combination, 
through focal lengths, depths of f ield, apertures, camera angles, camera 
speeds, and camera movements – space and, as a result, time. In extreme 
wide-angle lenses every movement comes to the camera unnaturally fast, 
while in telephoto lenses they hardly budge from their place. Through 
various camera tricks, as Münsterberg has synoptically described, various 
perceptual functions can be initiated. Cinema could thus be euphorically 
understood as an apparatus that technologically transmits experiences 
from one individual to the next.
The model of connecting and conveying psychic energies in all directions, 
which Bekhterev had proposed in Petersburg reflexology, allowed, even 
more than Münsterberg’s American psycho-technology, for depictions to be 
understood as a complex of signals that, while running through the tracts 
of the central nervous system, can convey and associate feelings, allowing 
people to become energetic signal carriers, accumulators, and transformers. 
Dziga Vertov continued these Petersburg experiments in his cinema. There 
are echoes of many of Vertov’s optical constructions in later experimental 
films. For instance, the abstraction and isolation of the illusion of movement. 
Detached from objects, f igures, or identif iable persons, movements were 
conveyed as moments of motion assembled in the f ield of vision. There is an 
“across” to be seen on the screen, the bearer of which remains unclear or can 
be assembled from various objects. Human routines of movement, as they 
had advanced through cinematography in the medical clinic to scientif ic 
opinions, were reversed, distorted, fragmented, and doubled in experimental 
f ilm with the same camera and editing techniques, so that the cultural 
meanings attached to them had to be exposed as constructions. In this sense, 
experimental f ilmmakers, by manipulating the manipulation of perception, 
also liberated the body from the webs of historical and political discourse.
The discrete quality of images on the filmstrip, which allows us to analyze 
and synthesize movement thanks to cinematography, is the prerequisite for 
placing the body in certain iconographic or symbolic orders. The prehistory 
of the cinema in psychological cinematography shows that cinema could 
be used for medical diagnoses and at the same time serve as a sign system 
for social relationships and political circumstances. Psychic qualities could 
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suddenly be read in recorded physical movements. But its usage in the 
relation between doctor and patient is only one particular case of cinema 
as social technology. Wherever a f ilm is shown, perceptual structures are 
cross-linked over surfaces, and in the trance of non-perceivable functions, 
social conventions are forms that still have to be traced back again to their 
origins and their technological conditions.
The technology of montage lies at the border between conscious and 
unconscious transmission in cinema. This is why the weight of ideology 
critique was imposed on montage whenever it was necessary to differentiate 
the methods of a f ilm either as methods of information or of propaganda. 
“Editing/montage forms the battlef ield in the history of cinema on which 
the f ight about the so-called f ilmic and its language was/is carried out.”5 
In fact, this opposition, which historically goes back to the Russian and 
American f ilm pioneers, was for many years the ideological dividing point 
in f ilm criticism. The debate about “editing” or “montage” is a relict of f ilm 
theory from a very cold war, but is simple and sustainable like all products 
from this time.
“Montage is noticeable as montage, editing tries not to be noticed”, is 
how Harun Farocki summarized the east-west formula for (at that time 
still West) Berlin students.6 In the case of montage, as in the case of the illu-
sion of movement in cinema, the differentiation, being between conscious 
and unconscious technologies, does not concern the problem of cinema’s 
allure. The level of the technological trick, of the illusion of movement 
and of the rhythm of montage, and on the other hand the level of images, 
their modeling of light, and their iconography are complementarily taken 
into account in montage, supplementing or contrasting. Roughly speaking, 
Farocki’s formula means that the Americans, starting with Porter’s Great 
Train Robbery and Griff ith’s Birth of a Nation, tried to unite heterogeneous 
elements as unnoticeably as possible into an omni-visionary perspective. 
The spectator is meant to be stimulated, but not to notice the technological 
circumstances under which a big “US” can be seen as a matter of course 
on the belts of the soldiers or the sheriff whenever death is not far off. (It is 
this “US”, which Thomas Pynchon responds to with the paranoid “THEM”, 
that became all of our YOU THERE under the conditions of cinema). In 
the American model of “editing”, psycho-technological rhythm and 
photographic surfaces produce the sensations, tensions, and moods of a 
perception into which logics of meaning and signif ication are introduced 
as messages, and through which they can be reinforced. Whether the will 
of the producers is guided by market forces, production codes, national 
interests, or other possible missions is a question for the second step of f ilm 
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analysis. The means to get there, however, are set up beneath the threshold 
of consciousness and have no actual intention to rise above it.
The avant-garde films from the Soviet Union, called “Russian films” in the 
twenties, dialectically produced a conscious clash of different images, from 
which some third thing was meant to emerge and which was conceived as 
a substitute for thinking. Of course Eisenstein, Dovzhenko, and Pudovkin 
realized that f ilm had to avoid conscious perception in order to be f ilm, 
but they nonetheless claimed that their montage was a method by which 
relations could become deliberate in their dialectic, since they provided their 
own expression. The cinema was meant to be a mirror in which ideological, 
false, bourgeois thinking encountered and corrected itself as other. In this 
respect, even the optical metaphysics of Tarkovsky or Kieślowski belong to 
this tradition. In the term dialectic images, as Walter Benjamin coined it, this 
concept even applies beyond any f ilm theories as a historico-philosophical 
attempt to prop up the hegemonic intellectual movement on the foundation 
of its technological pre-conditions. Thinking could thus not only be moved 
from an initially external principle, but also sedated or exploded.7 The actual 
optical unconscious in cinema, however, the deception and intoxication of 
perception as principle, which Vertov had his sights on, was also suspect 
in Soviet cinema, for most directors as well as for the state agencies that 
scrutinized and censored every f ilm project in writing.
The difference between the Russian and American techniques, between 
montage and editing, are not entirely subsumed in the opposition between 
the conscious and unconscious manipulation of perception. In both East 
and West, rules were provided that were meant to teach correct montage, 
and all these rules served the goal of not tearing the spectator out of his 
or her f ilm trance. Whether it was supposed to be teaching an “I SEE”, the 
“US”, or dialectical thinking in this trance was the subordinate problem for 
those working at the editing table on both sides of the Curtain. It is certainly 
true that over the course of time those techniques that are conspicuous as 
changes in the f ield of vision – and that interrupt the trance – disappeared 
from the repertoires of the editors: multi-screen, split-screen and different 
dimensions for the screen, such as Eisenstein had wanted,8 iris wipes, but 
also time lapse, black frames, and all the operations that the spectator 
is aware of as intrusions into perception. By contrast, technologies that 
simulate and stimulate involuntary activity in the brain, as Münsterberg 
described, for instance light slow motion, lighting effects, certain estrange-
ment effects through graininess or layering, split focus shots, the use of 
different focal lengths, etc., belong to the standard repertoire of tricks for 
all camera operators and editors.
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Specif ications for rules, however, have always been contested. Karel 
Reisz, whose basic historical handbook The Technique of Film Editing f irst 
appeared in the f ifties and in many languages, on both sides of the border 
that was still considered “iron”, served as an introduction for students, 
editors, directors, and theorists, but initially had to admit that anarchy in 
editing was completely feasible in early silent cinema:
The only thing which decided the order of shots was the desire to achieve 
the most satisfactory results. […] The medium was extremely flexible in 
that there was no physical reason why one should not cut from practically 
anything to anything else.9
The experimental phase, in which everything could be edited anywhere if 
there was only time to tinker with it, was then standardized, above all due 
to economic restraints. At the end of the twenties Reisz established national 
conventions for how to manipulate attention:
In many of Griff ith’s f ilms one is aware of the constant changing camera 
angles and it requires a certain amount of practice and adjustment to 
accept the jerkiness of the continuity without irritation. Eisenstein, far 
from wanting a smoothly flowing series of images, deliberately set out to 
exploit the conflict implied at the junction of any two shots. Against this 
it must be said that the German f ilm-makers of the late twenties, using 
a much more fluid camera technique, often made deliberate attempts to 
achieve a smooth-flowing continuity.10
Continuity and connection, heavily loaded terms anyway, to this day have 
to serve in editing technique for something that is constantly changing. If 
the f irst spectators were shocked by close-ups being edited in, because they 
thought they were looking at limbs that had been cut off, by the end of the 
twenties discontinuous scenes, edited like jazz music, in which musicians 
and instruments elided into one another – like in Murnau’s Sunrise – were 
no longer disturbing, but were the necessary variety that promised to be 
entertaining. At the beginning of the thirties people were astounded by 
sync sound, and the graphic dance montages of Berkeley, in which bodies 
were arranged serially according to their limbs, were already a part of mass 
entertainment. Changing montage rhythms made Jules Dassin’s Naked City 
in 1948 the forerunner of f ilms that relied less on story than on the rhythmic 
montage of urban landscapes and movements. In 1960 Hitchcock acceler-
ated the performance of reception with the 70 cuts of the shower curtain in 
30 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
Psycho, setting new standards for the stimulation that was expected in mov-
ies. The West was discovering the montage techniques from the twenties in 
the East, material time-space montage, which had disappeared there due to 
the demands of Stalinism. The “visible cut”, montage that was introduced 
against the cultural imperialism of Hollywood, could only elucidate until it 
itself became invisible from habit. Who was still disturbed by the “wrong” 
cuts in Breathless, who even noticed them anymore? Even Lars von Trier’s 
cubist montage in The Kingdom, of shots that are incompatible according to 
traditional spaces in time, and which showed that even at the beginning of 
the nineties, in the age of MTV, there were still conventions that could still 
be shockingly transgressed, has already become standard in commercial 
f ilm production. And also a standard of what we have been trained to 
expect – and demand – in terms of speed in the cinematic experience. The 
only thing that is still disturbing is anything that does not make use of the 
acceleration of stimulation: Straub/Huillet and all those whose f ilms we no 
longer see in the cinemas for just that reason.
Even montage that tried to be conscious as an operation remains unno-
ticed as a technique. Often the effect on the spectator from the screen is no 
longer a feeling of surprise, without her immediately becoming aware of the 
breach in the conventions of perception as a breach against technological 
conventions. This montage shows that genres are combinations of techni-
cal rules, which produce certain combinations of feelings. If these genres 
are mixed, they therefore also produce new, literally artif icial mixtures 
of feelings in the cinema, which have caused people to be surprised at 
themselves, but also disturbed, and which have not always immediately 
been so well received.
Speaking about Une Femme est une Femme, Godard says:
Les comédies sont jamais f ilmées en gros plan, elles sont toujours f ilmées 
en plan général. Et alors là, quand elles sont f ilmées en gros plan, elles 
deviennent pathéthiques. Alors, il exprime des sentiments dans une 
situation comique, c’est le beau dans le f ilm. Mais, pour ça, le f ilm n’a 
pas marché.11
Genre means that space and time in f ilm unconsciously guide the “mood” 
in the sense of the old psychology of Wilhelm Wundt.
The attempt to describe the cinema as the extension of a dispositif that 
usurped human minds and psyches as movement-chronograph and at the 
same time as a rhythm machine is supposed to replace the dichotomy 
between the conscious and the unconscious manipulation of perception. 
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Cinema is always manipulation beneath the level of conscious perception, 
otherwise no motion would be possible in the 24 still images per second. 
But cinema is also conscious manipulation and the conscious desire to be 
manipulated of our senses, in order to adapt to external circumstances and 
to relativize and change external circumstances through f ilm. Films can 
be analyzed consciously, perhaps not right in the cinema, but afterwards, 
when we, to quote Thomas Mann, “have dried off” – not only ideologically 
and iconographically, but also physiologically and emotionally.
Cinema is what it is, a message that can be consciously perceived by 
anyone who wants to receive it.
A message received by whoever it comes to:
“To Whom It May Concern.”

2. Cybernetics
… nor can we be sure that a considerable part of what we observe is not an 
artifact of our own creation. An investigation of the stock market is likely to 
upset the stock market.
– Norbert Wiener , 1963
At the beginning was the question of the particular reality of the cinema and 
the question of the subject and its transformation through the links between 
perception and technology in the cinema. At the end a variety of networks 
have been extended in which historical cinematic perception can be seen 
as psycho-physical training and the as implementing social technologies 
by using devices. The history of cybernetics as the science of multifaceted, 
regulating, balancing, and communicative processes can be used – and not 
only because it historically crisscrosses the history of cinema – to theorize 
communication as automatic and automating, a communication that, in 
the cinema, cannot be understood as the experience of the senses alone. 
This may come back to haunt us.
The cybernetic process in the cinema would then be a matter of changing 
perception in the cinema and regulating this perception through the effects 
of f ilm, even before the meanings of these effects are even formed. The 
cinema is thus a good place to examine cybernetic processes, since the links 
between nervous systems and apparatuses have constantly been synchro-
nized, aligned, and optimized in its history. This means that a feedback 
process had already emerged in the research, before any f ilm screening, as 
a gradual ref inement of the trance in the act of seeing movement.
The cinema is also a good object for examining cybernetic processes 
since the work of every f ilmmaker consists in using time manipulation 
and other cinematic techniques to re-apply a recorded series of events 
back to that series of events itself, and through such operations to bring the 
future of the messages into the imagination of the dreaming spectator. The 
spectator’s trance attests to loops of self-adaptation where the perception 
in the cinema is located.
On the other hand, the cinema is a highly inappropriate object for a 
cybernetic hypothesis because it neither has any clear signal, nor is it one. 
In order for cinema as cinema to become a signal in statistical mechanics, 
and thus for it to be predictable, it must also be reduced to the flickering 
and fluttering of light and darkness, such as occurred in laboratories and 
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as it became a highly and potentially also dangerously stimulating art form 
in the flicker f ilms. For cinema to be a signal, it must distance itself from 
the photographic reality that makes it possible to see movement in the 
cinema as “human” movement in the sense of the old technological media.
From the history of neurological cinematography we can learn which 
interfaces between human being and apparatus were developed and in-
dustrialized in the nineteenth century, and which were therefore deserted, 
became a wasteland. But the boundaries of the cinema apparatus that would 
allow us to designate a circuit diagram or a neurological network in the f irst 
place are not clear. So the great aspirations of a cybernetic examination of 
the cinema run the risk of methodologically appearing as a bluff or as pure 
metaphor. Back to the beginning.
The issue that gets everything going was that of unconsciously changing 
our own movements, and thus of externally transforming our own person 
by means of an apparatus. The amazement that accompanies this issue was 
the great pleasure we take in such bad stories, if they were worked well as 
cinema. The interest in examining this ultimately industrial way of getting 
our minds to dance arose from the parallel between these techniques and 
the ritual trance techniques from other cultures, which promised a less 
convoluted way of encountering the gods in this engrossed state.
At the beginning was a methodological comparison between watching 
movies and the physiological proprioception in dancing. In dance a body 
perceives itself as other, and at the same time external stimuli are perceived 
as one’s own. In dancing the various, fragmented components of the body 
are connected through sensors in the muscles and joints into a whole, which 
regulates itself in complicated balancing acts. In certain situations this 
self-regulation can get out of control, ending up completely under orders 
from outside: in the tarantella, in Saint Vitus dance, in possession. Then 
proprioception becomes someone else’s perception taken as one’s own. The 
boundaries between these states cannot be def ined, they are gradations of 
shifts between I and the other, between I as another, which constantly take 
place in every social relationship, in every space of rhythmic and structured 
order. In the cinema the exposure of the body, the mutual metaphorizing of 
internal perception and external perception, is all the more intense since it 
can be introduced, as the result of a hundreds years of research on nerves, 
reactions, and reflexes, in a quite targeted way.
Looking to the prehistory of cinema in the psycho-physiological laborato-
ries we can see that models developed in the laboratory of how the mind and 
the psychology of the senses works exactly corresponded to the structure 
of cinematic perception. The chronometric apparatuses in the laboratories, 
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which sought to measure mental accomplishments and even their dysfunc-
tions as a function of time intervals, were continued in structurally similar 
ways in the chronophotographs and the cinematographs, as if the devices 
had only been temporarily readjusted. The neurological models of nerve 
impulses themselves, which in turn were intermittent, were also the result 
of the experiments in the realm of chronoscopy. According to these models, 
ideas arose in the brain through the perception and association of single 
impulses, just as illusions in the cinema were produced by intermittent 
images. The neuronal models of perception and the practical neurology 
of the cinema apparatus had the same historical origin in the laboratory.
The question of the equipment and apparatuses that were used to 
examine, localize, and even artif icially simulate and regulate mental 
functions thus became an essential way to approach this entire work. The 
strategies of the researchers were manifest in the technical equipment, 
and the interests of the individual researchers and institutes remain in 
them. In the devices themselves, as Londe’s various photo cameras show, 
the possibility of manipulating time and perception is manifest, whether as 
an implement or as interconnectibility. And the polymorphy of the human 
body is also reduced in these devices to particular interfaces and modes 
of transmission, to particular tracks and experiences. This is a reduction 
not only in a negative sense, but also as concentrating, intensifying, and 
strengthening, for beautiful and high-frequency sensations can be played 
out on these interfaces that otherwise do not exist in the landscape.
The history of laboratories is at the same time a history of sustained 
intervention in bodies that, fragmented and subjected to rhythm, were 
themselves altered in the course of the research. This began in experimen-
tal medicine by brutally wiring up organs and apparatuses, nerves and 
recording technologies, in which frogs and rabbits and dogs were wired 
into death dances. With time and in compensating for the injuries the 
connections became f iner, more distanced, retreating to the surface of 
bodies, on which the effects and symptoms of even nervous disturbances 
were supposed to be read. The devices conveyed the functions of the old 
ideas of the mind in the old apparatuses from the laboratories – including 
in the apparatuses from the photo labs. Using new procedures, nerves were 
tested for the qualities of their circuits, their priming, and their chemical 
and mechanical transmission methods, their interconnectibility, and for 
the symptoms of their activity on the body’s surface. Bodies were no longer 
material protective covers for the the soul, but were themselves states shot 
through with nerves, in which the mental activity of a human being and 
the reality of the world entered into a neuronal and energetic metabolism. 
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The experiments in neurophysiology and perception psychology in the 
nineteenth century had showed that perception could be explained and 
controlled physically, not mentally, even completely so, as the trio infernale 
Du Bois-Reymond, Helmholtz, and Brücke swore that they could prove. In 
physiology, devices were developed in turn with which bodily movements 
could be perceived, recorded, and controlled more precisely, and it was 
at exactly this crossroads of the research that the cinema emerged in the 
Parc des Princes of the Bois de Boulogne as the unconscious of a wired-up 
landscape, which could look at human beings from everywhere. And if 
people now looked at pictures of landscapes from this crossroads, then they 
saw their unconscious hidden in them.
But right from the beginning, what the observation of perception was 
registering was not only the disturbance of the observed, but also distur-
bances of the observer. Gustav Theodor Fechner’s trance was one of the f irst 
modern feedback trances, described as riding and being ridden, by devils, by 
gods, by rays that he had looked at too long during his optical experiments. 
Occasionally the feedbacks of perception in the experiment separate into 
two complementary delusional orders: in the neurologist Flechsig and the 
patient Schreber, who saw himself as watched by sun rays while at the 
same time the nervous system was being cartographed in Flechsig’s clinic 
as a centralized system. Or Bekhterev’s neuromedial utopia in which all 
bodies united into one decentralized messaging network that was taken 
for a real possibility by Stalin’s paranoia, a possibility that made him quite 
unnecessary as general secretary.
The routine studies of perception on the one hand and the experiences 
from the disturbances, from the perceptions that had gone wild on the 
other, can be measured by means of devices, scales, and regular stimuli 
to the nerves, regulated in a neurological noise reduction and combined 
into inductions of sensations and feelings. These elements are the building 
blocks of cinema perception, in which the artif icial seeing of movement and 
rhythmic exchange of images and shots control the attitudes of expectation 
and attentiveness in reception. The history of these trance states produced 
in the experiment f inally ends in Rouch’s obsession with the camera and 
Deren’s cinematic experience of voodoo possession, both of which were 
not entropic states, but states in which the cinematic regulation of social 
behavior was shown to be psycho- physical.
Filmed dances and danced cinematography apply the dispositif of cinema 
to itself time and again, which means to the events recorded, and they 
also link the two sides of experimental psychology from which cinema-
tography can be assembled. On the one hand the movement of perception 
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was researched in the history of science and its artif icial regulation was 
improved upon – one highpoint of this development was the symposium 
“Feelings and Emotions” in Ohio, at which this research, mediated by 
Bekhterev and Cannon, who could not be mediated there, reached back 
into the early history of cybernetics.
On the other hand, the movement of the body was itself examined in just 
the same tradition. Using instantaneous photography and cinematography, 
human movements and expressions were depicted so that they could be 
further processed, treated, and most likely would have been endlessly 
projected on one another in the primal scene of Salpêtrière if the female 
and male hysterics had not f inally refused to play along. Medical diagnoses 
as well as artistic depictions of certain states were the result of the recording 
technologies that transform time and that could thus dissect the individual 
in order to subject this depiction, and thus the subject itself, to new and 
immemorial causal relations.
On the one hand perception of the human body was made alien to the 
human mind with cinematography, on the other hand human vision was 
itself transformed by cinematography. Two sides of a process that made it 
impossible to distinguish any more between, for instance, the representa-
tion of cinematically depicted bodies on the screen on the one hand and 
the cinematic perception of these bodies in the space of the move theater 
on the other. Even without producing clear emotional attributions, the 
representation of a body in slow motion shows both certain unforeseen 
qualities of the body depicted and certain unforeseen possibilities for the 
spectator’s perception. The bon mot that a cinematic image is created by 
fusing retina and screen – in the cinema, in the head, or in the body – now 
had to be extended.
Bodily movements and emotions fuse like dancers and the dance in 
or through the image. At any rate, this takes place somewhere that is not 
supposed to exist according to the instructions given to the projection. 
They fuse with technical effects, with other, now divided individuals, or 
with themselves as others.
It is astonishing that, in a system that complies to a certain degree out of 
paranoia, differences can still be shown at the structural level. In neurology, 
in cybernetics, and in the cinema there are quite different basic models 
of the mind and the bio-socius, or rather, of how cinematic technology is 
applied: a hierarchical model of self-control on the one hand, and operative, 
reversible, feedbacking connections on the other, in which an exchange 
of experiences could be organized and at the same time technologically 
put together and newly put to use. A vision that constructs a genealogy of 
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experience, from Fechner, through Helmholtz and Bekhterev up to Can-
non and Wiener, that have designated such processes within the body as 
homeostatic, and referred to similar processes in connection with other 
bodies or other aggregates as feedback. The anarchic f ilm people, misusers 
of apparatuses, experimental f ilmmakers like Vertov or Rouch sought, by 
linking the depiction of ritual with a ritual of depiction, to turn the medium 
as a homeostatic world process into a remedy. Maya Deren, her f ilms, and 
her theories of rituals have shown that cinema technology must be used 
in its genuinely technological sense in order to reshape the function of the 
absolute control of the cinematic into a homeostoatic “beyond” of cinema. 
The alternatives are not quite so banal, of course. An inventive genius like 
Albert Londe had on the one hand f ixed a clinical order in psychiatry with 
his apparatuses that was as rigorous as it was artif icial, and on the other 
hand had used his time-tricks in serial photography to cause the glamorous 
actresses of Paris to jump even higher and even more weightlessly.
Cybernetics in the cinema is thus a process that cannot be f ixed. For-
tunately it is only used – unlike the f irst cybernetic steering machines, 
regulated by centrifugal force, which were supposed to bring ships safely 
across the sea – to navigate the ocean of feelings and sensations. Fortu-
nately? Only? Ocean?
The cybernetic cinematic process has its relay in the Darkness of Projec-
tion. This will be thoroughly discussed, the situation will get brighter, and 
the cinematic circles will withdraw back into the subroutines of the mind, 
of the apparatus, and of the industry.
Back to the beginning.
3. Knots
In the beginning is the darkness of the projection. Early f ilm theorists, for 
instance Münsterberg, Mauerhofer, Kracauer, or Arnheim,1 analyzed the 
strange state that spectators indulge in as part of f ilm perception. Since 
the shutter strobes the projected beam in an established rhythm while the 
Geneva drive intermittently transmits individual frames, moviegoers are 
sitting in darkness for nearly half of the projection time, while their optical 
nerves are stimulated to the beat of these mechanics. Hugo Münsterberg 
was the first to draw the parallels between film perception and experiments 
of isolated acts of perception in psychological laboratories. Hugo Mauer-
hofer, a psychologist, biographer of Hesse, and emigré in exile in Britain, 
analyzed the transformation in psychic reception behavior of moviegoers 
in four phases, diagnosing a state similar to that of daydreaming. Accord-
ing to Mauerhofer, the only proper object of scientif ic f ilm theory is the 
psyche itself, since every f ilm critique, due to unconscious perception in the 
cinema, is nothing more than a more or less inept report about individual 
fantasies.2
Films are not simply seen. They transform the subject in the cinema. The 
consciousness that, according to Kracauer, withdraws from the scene in the 
cinema3 itself appears to the f ilm critic as one that is under the influence of 
a technologically evoked lull. Under the spell of early German experimental 
psychology, represented in the Major Film Theories by the persons of Hugo 
Münsterberg and Rudolf Arnheim, students of Wundt and Wertheimer 
respectively,4 examining the technologies that manipulate perception 
made up a large part of American f ilm theory. References to historical 
trance techniques came from French f ilm theory. Raymond Bellour was 
the f irst to systematically equate f ilm perception with hypnosis.5 But as a 
relation of domination, that is, as gaze, seeing can only be classif ied and 
criticized once the physiological conditions of its movement are discovered 
as technologies, technologies that establish social orders while themselves 
remaining invisible. Films are not simply seen, they allow for seeing.
Seeing or being seen: blind spots and blackouts from the very begin-
ning. Joseph Plateau, who carried out the f irst experiments on strobo-
scopic seeing, long before there even was f ilm or cinema, went blind after 
experimenting on himself to study retinal afterimages. The experiment 
was not differentiated enough: his phenakistiscope, literally eye-deceiver, 
had actually already showed him that it was not positive afterimages, but 
successive, albeit discrete single images that were the necessary condition 
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for seeing stroboscopic movement. But he wanted to know more precisely, 
so he used his own retina. For too long.6
Plateau, however, was not the only one not to see that it was not after-
images that were the reason for seeing motion. Some of the classic f ilm 
theorists wanted nothing of it either: Eisenstein and even Bazin considered 
f ilm viewing as a question of positive afterimages on the retina. The f ilm 
theory of the psychologists knew better. Watching a f ilm taps into functions 
in the brain. What was and remains contested is how. Recent research has 
explained seeing oscillopsia as an abbreviation system in cortical “image 
processing”, a model in which old ideas of reflex arcs meets newer ideas from 
data processing.7 For virtual reality researchers, who are simply interested in 
the connections between humans and machines, the frequency of 24 frames 
per second is just a symbiosis that works well.8 How these mechanical 
hallucinations work would f irst have to be investigated in a long series of 
experiments.
At the beginning of the century there were two competing theses to 
explain seeing motion: one that was based on Talbot’s Law and unnoticed 
phase failure, and one based on “identity deception.” The protagonists of 
this were Carl Marbe and the Wundt student Paul Linke, who shot experi-
mental f ilms as proof of his hypotheses, f ilms that could be considered the 
predecessors of the works of Otto Fischer or Hans Richter. Linke’s f ilms, 
however, were only screened at medical and psychological congresses.
Max Wertheimer had published the f irst complex experiments on seeing 
motion in 1912, showing that this is an independent and direct experience 
like seeing luminosity or color. He reported on one of his experiments 
with oscillopsia in which he wanted to test the pure viewing of motion, 
and describes the physical reactions of the test subjects, who designated 
what they saw as “across”, although at the same time they saw that noth-
ing was moving across. “The exact facts of the case are: the crossing, the 
insistent movement from a to b is clear and unambiguous, forcefully there 
and thoroughly continuous, yet nothing went across the white and nothing 
went across the stripe.”9 The more precisely perception was experimentally 
examined in the subjective, the more objective the optical phenomena 
appeared, which had no object whatsoever. The experience of cinematic 
vision was only a further development of the psychological experiments 
with the tachistocope.
Münsterberg, in his 1916 f ilm book The Photoplay, had declared the 
circuits and accomplishments of the brain responsible for cinematic 
perception. A f ilm theory can be derived from this tradition that bases its 
cultural critical or psychoanalytical interpretations of f ilms on examining 
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the psycho-physical effects of cinema as an apparatus. The relationship 
between the experience of reality and the production of reality can be re-
defined according to the results of experimental psychology, and contains, 
at least as far as concerns the phenomenon of “movement”, a calming effect 
that is not restricted to the movie theater. Experience can be had artif icially 
and it is indistinguishable from non-artificial experience. In the experiment 
it was even possible to show that form and movement in seeing are not 
separable perceptions, that luminosity (and not form) carries the perception 
of motion, or also that the physiological processes in the brain that process 
the seeing of movement in the cinema are oscillopsia, that is, the same as 
it is in natural seeing of motion.10 So something is indeed moving, even if it 
is only the brain that is affected.
Since the experience of movement in the cinema can thus not be dis-
tinguished from the experience of real movement – while the depiction of 
spaces, forms, or shapes, as Arnheim has suggested, can be distinguished 
from their physical reality without any trouble – then seeing in the cinema is 
a more complex perceptual experience than can be grasped by the concept 
of representation. While light, spaces, perspectives in f ilm can be analyzed 
as representations as they can in painting, movement belongs to a differ-
ent order of perception. In the cinema movement is not represented, but 
presented, the artif icially produced experience of seeing motion is thus 
authentic, “not the re-experience, but the experience of motion.”11
This magic of the cinema, which Wertheimer’s student Rudolf Arnheim 
pointed out in 1933, is based on a technical decision, not on a technical 
necessity, for ultimately the movements of acoustic phenomena can be 
directly recorded as movements.12 The cinema by contrast produces by 
storing a further illusion of perception in discrete single images:
[Film] does not render motion by motion but gives an illusion of it by 
means of immobile images shown in sequence – a procedure that is 
possible because of the way our eyes work, a magnif icent substitute, but 
something fundamentally different from the rendering of motion by 
motion. Why, then, did we have to resort to illusory movement?13
The historical answer to Arnheim’s question f irst comes out of the labora-
tories: since cinematography was invented to analyze movement by taking 
apart a temporal continuum by means of a variety of procedures, every 
new development of the apparatuses was initially done in this tradition: 
practical human decisions. It f irst became uncanny in the history of science 
when the models of human perceptual psychology evidenced similarities 
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with these mechanisms: the special synthesis of cinematic data would 
correspond, it turned out, to particular achievements of the brain when 
seeing motion. In other words: If god didn’t play dice, he had been playing 
with the stroboscope from the very beginning. In the 1970s Arnheim would 
expand on his early essays on cinematic technology in the light of new 
research, with the astounding discovery that all seeing of motion, even 
observing birds in the f ield with the naked eye, was in principle like that 
in the cinema:
All motion perception is basically stroboscopic.[…] When a bird f lies 
through my f ield of vision, its physical displacement is continuous. What 
I see of the f light, however, derives from a series of recordings by the 
individual receptors or ‘receptive f ields,’ in the retina.14
This made the artif iciality of viewing cinema even more complex. The 
functions of the apparatuses assume an alliance with the functions of the 
nervous system. But the spectator needn’t know anything about this to see 
motion in the cinema.
Cinema from the viewpoints of psycho-technology, as Münsterberg had 
named his applied psychology, had to be examined precisely as a social 
technology when its tricks were unconscious, such as in the transformation 
of single images into a flow of moving images. Or the perception of motion 
independent from the perception of a form: Wertheimer’s phi phenomenon. 
Already in 1913 experiments in which white stripes were edited in between 
f ilm images showed that, despite the frequency of 24 images per second, as 
is common in f ilm projection, no flow of motion emerged as a cinematic 
illusion, since the light impulse of the light f ields suppressed the perception 
of the previous images.15 The darkness in the cinema is initially neither the 
metaphorical re-staging of Plato’s Cave,16 nor a mere refuge for lovers without 
a room. The darkness in the cinema is above all a perception-physiological 
necessity for viewing films. And for just that reason, as Benn describes it, it is 
intoxicating. Just as Kracauer had suspected, darkness dismisses conscious-
ness from f ilm perception.17 A phase of nerve stimuli slips in between f ilm 
projection and reception that only a visitor from the Gutenberg Galaxy like 
Walter Benjamin could affably call it “distraction.”18 Since control by the 
apperceiving consciousness is systematically undermined in cinema by the 
technical equipment, it would be more precise to call this distraction trance.
Trance, as a dissolution or diversion of the consciousness under the 
impact of certain technologies, is the gap in f ilm theory. Here physiology 
enters the humanities, challenging the idea of the subject to its very 
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limits. At this point physiological sensibility comes back into aesthetic 
theory, from which philosophy had separated it and held it at bay. Trance 
emerges from the connection between the intoxication of the senses 
and technological noise. Cinema addresses the bodies that the spirit 
has left.19
But it also trains them. Precisely because once new media like photog-
raphy, f ilm, or the gramophone had differentiated bodies into every more 
specif ic identity forms, the old philosophical order of the mind, which 
could not be imagined as anything other than male and somehow pasty, did 
not simply dissolve into pleasurable intoxication. The new media brought 
with it new orders of bodies, wishes, and desires. As soon as voice, faces, 
movements, the gentlest trembling and the faintest coughing could be 
stored in media archives and thus examined and classif ied as bodily signs, 
that was the end of simply subverting the order through sensuality. The most 
sensual disturbances were themselves indicators from which the orders of 
illnesses, of the genders, then also of classes, cultures, or subcultures could 
be constituted.
The only way left to subvert the imaginary and the symbolic orders, the 
imagination and representation, is to experiment with media transformabil-
ity itself. To transform oneself through technological tricks. Transformation 
in the Occident, however, was reserved for either the Orphics20 or the lords 
at the Last Supper. The transformation of women, other than from virgin to 
divine bride, induced by the tongues of angels, belongs to the uncanny in 
occidental discourse.21 Technological brides betray their secrets especially 
when they do not present themselves as natural, mythical, or esoteric, but 
when the technical procedures with which they are produced are clearly 
shown to be part of the production of art. When the flecks of oil are still 
sticking to the machinists’ work coats. When the girls are maculata. From 
Germaine Dulac, the f irst female avant-gardist in 1920, up to Pipilotti Rist 
and her digital expositions in 2001, anyone who does her own projecting 
with technical devices and technological savvy has been considered objec-
tionable. Ultimately they are airing the dirty little secret that the formation 
of identities presumes quite a bit of work and technical know-how. So the 
dark side of cultural technologies as transformational technologies comes 
to light. That the subject in ecstasy can experience its own self-dissolution, 
its depersonalization, or, painfully as in the case of Marina Abramovic, its 
dismemberment, does not simply mean that cultural boundaries are thus 
violated and cultural laws have been breached. The fundamental functions 
of cultural technologies are also confirmed by this. They are danced into 
the physiological real, domesticated in the symbolic realm of the production 
44 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
of reality. Cultural technologies are mediations of the law, but they only 
work when they can promise the subject – fragile, divided, powerless – a 
new integrity for its submission. When it experiences itself in the joy of the 
dance and the trance, it doesn’t notice anything of cultural technologies; 
when it notices the cultural technologies, it experiences itself as other and 
falls apart. In between the two is where female scholars and machinists 
experiment.
The fact that the machinists’ effect is at the same time affect, the conse-
quence and the pursuit of their artistic methods, is one of the oldest insights 
of experimental culture. In his text on the Marionette Theater, Heinrich 
von Kleist described the relationship between cultural technologies and 
souls as being dance-like, at any rate not as directly mechanical, but as a 
relationship between various transformations: “Somewhat artif icial” is 
the relationship between puppeteers and the dancing puppets, says the 
leading dancer of the opera, explaining this as an engineer: like that of 
numbers to their logarithms. The path taken by emphasizing the puppet 
in the intermedial relationship between machine, puppeteer and puppet is 
not only the effect of the technical construction, but of the whole spiritual 
complication, of psycho-physical dispositivs avant la letter, in which the 
functions of perception, of consciousness, and of the soul appear as a 
parable, the ends of which – author, narrator, subject – disappear in the 
endlessness of the function “making dance.” A secretive line is the trace 
of this interference:
It is nothing other than the path to the soul of the dancer, and Herr C. 
doubted that it could be proven otherwise that through this line the 
puppeteer placed himself in the center of gravity of the marionette; that 
is to say, in other words, that the puppeteer danced.22
Ego and consciousness pursue one another hyperbolically in the tracks and 
loops, the meshes and circles of medial constructions, and so the trance 
can merge with the knowledge of how it came to be.
The f ilm avant-gardists of the twentieth century let themselves become 
fascinated by archaic trance techniques and transgressions time and 
time again. African, Pacif ic, Caribbean cults became visible for the f irst 
time outside their ritual spaces on 16mm film. The information that this 
“visibilité” could deliver into the heart of the colonial powers thus suddenly 
appeared as the dark collaboration of f ilming ethnologists. In the trance 
f ilms of Jean Rouch and Maya Deren techniques become visible that seek 
to surrender knowledge not to power, but to powerlessness. Such trance 
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f ilms experiment with feedback that no longer allows for any distinction 
between puppeteer and puppet, between dance and dancer: cinematically 
initiated entropy. “Going native” as fading out the messages of indigenous 
informants – through feedback, through joining the ritual and ruthless 
integrity of the technical medium. But the subversive usage of technology 
does not automatically guarantee this entropy. The relationship between 
the decomposing strategies of the avant-gardes and the mapping adminis-
trations is shockingly parasitical.
The American experimental f ilms of the 1940s examine the emotional 
effects of cinematic processes. But precisely the 16mm technology to 
which they owe their art had only been developed and ref ined because 
of the Second World War. Not only were 16mm f ilm cameras and material 
easier to get after being discarded by the Off ice of War Information, 
new f ilm forms were being invented in the f ield at lightening speed. 
Almost all of the big Hollywood directors had worked making newsreels 
in the army. John Ford, for instance, was shooting The Battle of Midway 
when an explosion ripped the f ilmstrip from the sprockets, producing 
a skewed exposure of the material. This new form of newsreel realism 
was legitimated in that it made the technical device itself visible. What 
experimental f ilm theorists called for years later as a strategy against 
Hollywood f iction had already been realized by chance in the f ield under 
f ire.23 The intoxication is the effect, was the message of the medium. 
Effects of apparatuses and not of meaning stood at the beginning of 
all experiments in cinematic space. In 1964 Marshall McLuhan would 
explain this as a characteristic of the electronic age: “Concern with ef-
fect rather than with meaning is a basic change of our electric time, for 
effect involved the total situation and not a single level of information 
movement.”24
So if the effects of the electronic age place us in the synthetic totality of 
a dance, we must f irst stumble into the process in order to be able to get 
any insight into the foundations and chasms of subjectivity. A disturbing 
experience. Subject and apparatus are reciprocal perturbations in the 
sense of neurobiology. Changes in the structure of one’s own system, 
which is not caused, but is provoked by another system or the surround-
ings – cinema is not always and everywhere, but wherever the work of 
f ilmmakers encounter the functions of the apparatus and the perception 
of the spectator, unsettling one another in the process. According to the 
f indings of neurobiology, the human being should be seen as a being that 
not only operates a complicated communication system directed outward, 
but also directed inward, proprioception.25 The body moves, and from 
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this movement emerge systematic procedures that can be understood 
as involuntary activity. The body keeps its various functions in a labile 
equilibrium, when the individual cells and nerves precisely communicate 
with one another. Every movement is an expression that is fed back in 
order to coordinate new movements. “A ballet dancer is a virtuoso of 
proprioception.”26 If this inner communication goes well, a human being 
moves elegantly and dancingly. Speaking in terms of neurobiology one 
might say, if it goes well a human being is danced by her self. Maya Deren 
described it in 1948 for the voodoo dancers using the metaphor of the 
marionette:
They danced as if they were marionettes tied to the drums by invis-
ible strings of sound. They are not dancing with one another, nor are 
they dancing to the drums, nor do the drums accompany them. Their 
movements are sound made visible and their voices are, in turn, the 
transf iguration of their movements back into human sound.27
If it goes well, what gets developed and enhanced in the cinema is our 
own thinking in the rhythm of images and f ilms. But it is also clear that 
this kind of message transmission does not stop at the limits of the body 
or the sense organs, and that the quality of transmission can be improved 
or inhibited by various external circumstances. Designating it as psychic 
only means reducing long processes and complex relationships to a single 
switchpoint. The machinists in art have a more wide-ranging approach. 
They also attempt to switch themselves in to the self-guidance of inner 
messaging systems in order to mobilize proprioceptors and effectors, 
curves and arabesques, emotions and feelings, thus disturbing an inner 
system so that its vibrations react to this in their own way. Examining the 
cinema cybernetically therefore does not simply mean writing the history 
of controlling and steering sense perception and unconscious structures of 
watching under the conditions of cinematography. Rather, cinema should 
be pursued in the sense of the perturbation of Walter Benjamin’s wish: 
“The most important social function of f ilm is to establish equilibrium 
between human beings and the apparatus.”28 There are describable and 
historical relationships and interactions between the technology of cinema 
and human perceptual functions. But this is not simply as rhizomatic as 
Deleuze and Guattari wanted to claim when they wrote that the mari-
onettes strings are attached “to a multiplicity of nerve f ibers.”29 Strings 
and knots do not simply grow like mushrooms. A proper knot is a science 
of its own.
4. To Whom it May Concern
The sciences are novels about heroes such as Hegel, Freud, Lacan. 
The authors are the titles.
– Hubert Fichte, 1980
“We have decided to call the entire f ield of control and communication 
theory, whether in the machine or in the animal, by the name Cybernetics, 
which we form from the Greek κυβερνήτης or steersman”, wrote Norbert 
Wiener when he was reporting on the creation of this epistemological 
program in 1947.1 At the time it was assumed in the military that form-
ing a theory of communication would need precise neurological and 
mathematical research, which was supposed to be able to prognosticate 
reactions and future developments in a system. During the Second World 
War Wiener had not only worked on the project of an electric calculator 
as a “form of communication apparatus concerned more with messages 
than with power.” Kept awake with massive doses of Benzedrine, which, 
as he reported it, caused him to tremble, since he was afraid of blabbering 
about war secrets, he had calculated the predictability of the trajectories 
of f ighter planes. While at f irst the human element, the seemingly incal-
culable reactions and emotions of pilots and shooters, was supposed to 
be excluded from technological warfare, later the human being and the 
machine were merged into a joint venture of medicine and electronics. 
Wiener, along with Arturo Rosenblueth, had shown that nerves and 
electronic machines were compatible, and if they were wired together 
they could cause messages to be transmitted.2 The goal of navigation, 
however, was not sure. Guilbaud, a thoughtful historian of cybernetics, 
added:
…les machines supérieures, les plus evoluées, les plus récentes, celles 
qui jouissent de la remarquable propriété d’adapter leur fonctionne-
ment aux variations du monde extérieur, les machines ‘réflexes’ ont leurs 
constructeurs mais non leurs architectes.3
When Wiener spoke of communication, it was about how information 
could be optimally codifying and transmitted, whether that be by means 
of technological devices or by impulses within the nervous system. For 
cyberneticists – and the ethnologists not get around to this until later 
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– cultural modif ication or cultural transformation is dependent on the 
cultural technologies that carried the information. For Wiener it had to 
do with the hardware of social relations, and he wrote straight out: “Com-
munication is the cement of society.” Nonetheless, cybernetics in Wiener’s 
sense is always a science of culture and indeed one of conjecture, for the 
messages that are saved, processed, and sent are collective; they go beyond 
the individual and his capacities, though they still guide his path:
Society has a memory of its own, far more durable and far more varied 
than the memory of any individual belonging to it. In those societies 
which are fortunate enough to possess a good script, a large part of this 
communal tradition is in the writing, but there are societies which, with-
out writing, have preserved a whole tradition in the form of a technique 
of ritual memorization of tribal chants and histories.4
It is called “script” in order to emphasize the functional unit of technology, 
protocol, and provision in the historical media of storage and transmission, 
which must be true of “writing” as well as for archaic and future social 
techniques.
In 1947 Norbert Wiener wrote: “The world may be viewed as a myriad of 
To Whom It May Concern messages.”5 They only need to be transmitted. 
The question was, in which form. 1947 is the year in which the technological 
analog media that had started displacing the monopoly of writing around 
1880 are def initively obsolete, and the f irst digital apparatuses are making 
new paradigms in art and science overdue.
The f ilm research on behavior, as anthropology or as documentary f ilms, 
was lagging behind the avant-garde after the war in the laboratories of MIT 
and the Harvard Medical School, for the research on interlinking humans 
and machines, in addition to visible patterns of behavior, had also brought 
to light what was calculable in human bodies as trembling and jerking. After 
cinematography had made nervous twitching visible for the f irst time in the 
1880s, the program at MIT examined the pattern of these human tremolos. 
After the war, examining human behavior no longer meant studying the 
norms of practice, but the involuntary nervous reactions, the trances and 
the staggering, in their regularity and their recurrence.6 This also concerned 
the ethnologists.
To whom it may concern. This research was the requirement for the many 
trance experiments and media rituals that young men and women from 
good homes had carried out as romantic escapes into the exoticism of what 
would later be called the Third World. What they sought as indigenous, 
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original, and authentic in the rituals of the colonies and the bodies of 
the colonized, the involuntary intoxication, was precisely the object of 
the avant-garde research into their own cultures. Western science and 
medicine mapped the body anew according to a logic of contact noise and 
of intoxication, and bodies were wired up to new apparatuses, creating 
new entities.
In the fall of 1947 Artaud declared war on the organs. Deleuze and Guat-
tari, who continued working on this reorganization, invoke Gregory Bateson 
when they use the term “plateau for continuous regions of intensity.”7 For 
Artaud, organs create the connection between divine will and the capitalist 
abuse of bodies.8 At the end of 1947 many young French people also flee 
from this abuse. Alfred Métraux and Michel Leiris also travel to Haiti, with 
the desire “to take one’s revenge on a life with which one was not satisf ied.”9 
(Traveling the other way around, André Breton had been stationed in Haiti 
on his way back to Paris in 1945, had been feted by the revolutionary youth, 
and was expelled after the fall of the country’s government.) The young 
engineer Jean Rouch goes back to Africa, where he had already studied and 
f ilmed rituals of possession during the war. The experimental f ilmmaker 
Maya Deren, when she travels to Haiti in 1947, senses the flip side her own 
culture on her own body. Her f ilm study of minoritarian cultures ends for 
her part in becoming-minoritarian, albeit minoritarian like a goddess. 
Madonna-minority.
All of them described their travels as crises provoked in their own identity, 
as desired transformation. Heiner Müller, who designated people like John 
Cage and himself as the “revenge of dead Indians”, much later pointed out 
the diff iculties of producing art looming in the power imbalance between 
cultures and subcultures. The technologies of production have already 
attached themselves to the body before the artist even chooses his weapon: 
“I didn’t know then, but already foresaw that one cannot remain an Indian 
if one wants to do something with art. We all shoot from the hip, and in 
art doing something means doing away with something, beginning with 
oneself.”10 This goes for everyone, researchers or artists, who work with 
technological images.
In a sciences’ history of the cinema, which examines the preliminary 
neurological works on cinematic perception, parallels to pre-cybernetic 
research and researchers quickly appears of its own accord. The artistic 
induction of feelings and emotions that takes place in the cinema and the 
technical motion of gazes are cybernetic regulations of an apparatus that 
links living beings with machines. The name of this apparatus is cinema 
in the broadest sense, from the moment in which it is technologically 
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realized in the shoot, to the emergence of a new space in projection and 
the transmission of this space to the spectator’s perception.
What remains as a larger problem in the hypothesis of a cybernetics in 
the cinema is, f irst, to establish the character of the goal at which something 
should be directed in the f irst place. A physiologist noted that the aims of 
technical control systems are evident, while those of biological systems are 
metaphysical.11 The cinema is somewhere in between. The subject and object 
of control cannot be distinguished. Technologically, self-perception in the 
social is in control, stabilizing or destabilizing according to the f ilm. The 
goal can be ref ined in each case only if we see the history of cinema as the 
invention of devices. A remark by the early f ilm theory Hugo Münsterberg 
gave direction to the many vectors of cybernetic processes between specta-
tors, the image, the apparatus, and the f ilm artists: “To picture emotions 
must be the central aim of the photoplay.”12 For all its ambiguity, this means 
that feelings should be presented and depicted, at any rate expressed: put 
into the image.
A second problem that the hypothesis of a cybernetics of the cinema 
repeatedly led to the edge of a breakdown consists in the fact that images, 
even technical images, are not simply signals. Film images especially 
mix all kinds of other signal-like qualities – such as luminosity, contrast, 
depth of f ield, or movement – into every shot as the material and technical 
parameters of the image’s effect, alongside the trance-producing rhythm of 
intermittent projection. Only then is the motif of a depiction emotionally 
modif ied. The f ilm images are thus multilayered complexes made up of 
technical, iconological, historical, and sensual components. How they 
can only be forcibly placed into an epistemological feedback process of 
illustration, and how they make amends for this, is the subject of the f irst 
chapter.
The question of “f ilm and possession” was the starting point for this 
research. The meaning of nerve agitation in various cultural trance tech-
niques leads to examining the cinema in this neurological context as well. 
This can be assembled into a history that was directed, more than intended, 
toward a cybernetic f ilm theory – in a literal sense. At the same time, 
however, this book forcefully documents how this cybernetics constantly 
breaks away from all theories and systematics that can be described in 
f ilm history.
The chapter “Discretions” examines depiction as a social technique 
using the example of Gregory Bateson’s pre-cybernetic speculations about 
constructing images and meanings in anthropological f ilms by means of 
his footage of trance dances in Bali. Not only Bateson, with whom Deren 
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proposed a joint f ilm project in Haiti, but also Norbert Wiener himself, who 
asked the research couple Mead-Bateson to comment on the sociological 
uses of cybernetics models during the Macy conferences, drew connections 
between the question of social technologies, which was so virulent in the 
1940s, and a theory of communication.
Against this historical backdrop, Maya Deren proposes the practice of 
a technology of depiction that is simultaneously an artistic and a social 
process. Film can become ritual technology if the rules of transformation 
are set.
In the second chapter, “Depersonalizations”, possession is placed in 
a diachronic context. Deren’s comparison of hysteria and possession in 
Haitian voodoo is placed into relation with her f ilm theory and her practi-
cal f ilm transformations of the coordinates of space, time, and perception. 
The precondition of all of her art is that Deren is familiar with the essence 
of technical procedures. For all her discretion, what she nonetheless forgot 
is: Knowledge about the rules of transformation do not necessarily protect 
the subject from being infected itself, in other words, from becoming 
possessed.
One of Deren’s more fortunate doppelgängers is Jean Rouch, an engineer 
in street and bridge building, who developed the method of ciné-trance in 
Africa, the technological correspondence between f ilm and possession. 
Using the example of his f ilm Les maîtres fous, “the mad masters”, about 
the cult of the Haouka in Accra, I will present Rouch’s reflections of “f ilm 
feedback as anthropological return gift”, and his practice of using f ilm 
footage as an art of transformation: “Deviations.”
It is not by chance that the threads of research about possession and 
suggestions coincide at a place that also forms one of the primal scenes 
of f ilm: Salpêtrière, where Albert Londe developed new cameras with 
which doctors like Charcot could bring some order into the confusion of 
hysterical gestures. With these cameras, they could then present themselves 
as the masters of madness. Not only Sigmund Freud, but also Vladimir 
Mikhailovich Bekhterev was a spectator at these stagings, the mastery of 
which was based on a technology: “Compressions.”
The second part of the book looks into the prerequisites for all these 
cultural technologies of trance in the history of sciences. The cinema 
appears there as part of the history of psychology and its experiments, 
localizing the soul in the nervous system and establishing the connec-
tion between human beings and machines, as it also def ined art for the 
electronic age: the birth of cinema from the laboratories of the neuro-
physiologists. The apparatus of the cinema appears in the line of medical 
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apparatuses that standardized rhythm and movement as indexes for 
human mental life and, the other way around, could induce human mental 
life artif icially. This is the German pre-history of cinematic perception: 
“Mental Apparatuses.”
Because the mind was by now accessible in the form of physiological 
data, the physiometers, their psychically labile patients, clients, custom-
ers began to make new bodies and body movements to measure for the 
impacted people or the audience. This is the French pre-history of cinema: 
“Psycho-Motor Activity.”
From the institutes of the psycho-physiologists come the f irst profes-
sionals to use f ilm to derive diagnoses from the body movements depicted 
there: “Psycho-Drama.” Their most loyal spectators were the Surrealists, 
while their most merciless perfectionists were the doctors in the Third 
Reich.
Among the classic f ilm theorists, at least two come directly from the 
psychological laboratories: Hugo Münsterberg and Rudolf Arnheim. With 
his book The Photoplay, Münsterberg wrote the f irst American f ilm theory. 
In contrast to German and French f ilm theory, the American theory can be 
described as one that complies with the wish of everyone to be connected: 
“Psycho-Technology.”
Another f igure had only indirect influence on f ilm history: Vladimir 
Mikhailovich Bekhterev, Münsterberg’s colleague in St. Petersburg/
Leningrad. In Deren’s works he turns up mediated by her father’s psycho-
logical advisor, Salomon Derenkovsky. Bekhterev developed the theory and 
practice of a “collective reflexology” from his areas of specialty – hypnosis, 
possession, and suggestion – in which the circumstances of transmission 
can be imagined as an ideal and within society as a whole: a f irst vision-
ary neurological media theory: “Psycho-Reflexology.” His research at the 
Psychoneurological Institute also shows him to be the man behind Dziga 
Vertov’s man with a movie camera. Translated more precisely, the title of 
his f ilm sounds like an experiment at the Psychoneurological Institute: The 
man observed by the cinematic apparatus.
The f inal chapter uses Vertov to sketch out the possibilities for a col-
lective human knowledge through cinema; “The truth gained by means 
of f ilm.”
Correspondences, coincidences, and good spirits that always turned 
up when doubt took the upper hand kept the gaps and chasms in the 
history of science together as a novel. Walter B. Cannon was at f irst only 
conceived as a supporting character, as the medical mentor and colleague 
of Norbert Wiener, and therefore belonged in the introduction. But then 
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he also turned out to be a researcher in comparative neurology of voodoo, 
and thus turns up in the chapter “Trance-Technology.” Finally, according 
to the congress protocol from a 1927 symposium in Ohio, he posed two 
questions to the speaker Vladimir Bekhterev, thus playing a signif icant 
role in the chapter “Psycho-Technology.” As an avant-gardist in the area of 
medical illustrative techniques, he developed new radiological procedures. 
Cannon died later from an excess of radiation from the laboratory, just like 
a certain Blanche Wittman, the very f irst star, inaccessible, an “astre” in 
the cinematic sky.
To Whom It May Concern.
Jean rouch, Shooting from the Wheelbarrow. Private Collection.




Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead: Bali, New York
Gregory Bateson: “Norbert Wiener, when he had a problem, used to sit with the 
wind blowing on a curtain.”
Margaret Mead: “I thought that was von Neumann.”
Most ethnological research trips ended quite literally at the knowledge 
of the gods. Not only those of writers like Leiris and Artaud, but also the 
anthropological journeys of Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead to Bali and 
that of Maya Deren to Haiti. Film footage of rites and rituals was supposed 
be made at a distance, in the field. Nevertheless, an unexpected interference 
of cultural effects appears between the ones f ilming and the objects of their 
anthropological investigations. Although the research reports were only 
meant to convey information about the foreigners, they are also always 
protocols about unhoped for and unexpected experiences with one’s own 
culture and with its technological conditions, with the boundaries and 
consequences of one’s own knowledge.
Over the course of their cinematographic research about trances and 
dances, both Bateson and Mead, as well as Maya Deren, suddenly see 
themselves exposed to a magic, the origin of which they do not know how to 
interpret, but which can be explained as a result of their own misjudgment 
of western cultural technologies. Looking for coherent cultural patterns, 
such as those Margaret Mead sought to take as the basis for a new anthropol-
ogy starting in the forties,1 the researchers, with their image of the other, saw 
themselves directly with the conditions of their own subjectivity. Those who 
did not keep a sharp eye out for the difference between mirror and image in 
their observations, between technological image and cultural imagination, 
could easily believe themselves to be wrapped up in the business of spirits 
and gods.
Transformations in a cultural space that the anthropologists call “inte-
grated”2 – whether ritual or simply cinematographic – are never missed by 
their subjects, even if they can sometimes come into effect with astounding 
time shifts. Students at Brown University experienced this during a lecture 
about ethnographic f ilm. Their professor, the anthropologist and documen-
tary f ilmmaker Karl Heider, was screening Margaret Mead and Gregory 
Bateson’s Balinese f ilm material when he suddenly reduced the projection 
speed from 24 to 16 frames per second. The still twitchy movements of young 
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dancers and young women in trance were expanded into long undula-
tions on the screen. At the same time Margaret Mead’s commenting voice 
dropped an octave, as if she were tying to prove the thesis that all cultural 
coding is also always a transformation, carried out on her own body and 
using the example of the most signif icant ethnological binary. The “grande 
dame” of American anthropology, who had written her most important 
books about the cultural differentiation of gender, sounded like a man. 
What was thus shown in the “acoustic mirror”3 was a distorted acoustic 
image of Margaret Mead, unclear in the cultural context but nonetheless 
identif iable. A real fake.
Karl Heider justif ied his harsh manipulation of the playback speed in 
the name of texts that Mead and Bateson themselves had written about 
the conspicuous calm and even, slow rhythm of Balinese culture. Rituals, 
ceremonies, and educational methods on Bali, as the two anthropologists 
had shown, were all aimed at interrupting emotionally cumulative, that 
is, increasingly sensational processes in social relations, and at regulat-
ing emotional states in terms of uniform stability and non-competitive 
behavior.
What Heider provided for his students to see, manipulated in this way, 
in fact matched the normal speed of Balinese dancers and rituals, since 
Bateson, in order to economize on the expensive f ilm material, had shot 
certain parts of his footage at 16 frames per second. Margaret Mead had 
simply edited these in between the remaining material later. In a regular 
projection, the presumably calm dancers hysterically f loundered around 
on the screen during these sequences. The regularity of the f ilm projector 
could only present either the cultural integrity of the anthropologist or that 
of the Balinese, and when Heider pulled back the tempo of the mechanism, 
thus violating the correct cultural identity of the anthropologist, he put 
the f ilm apparatus at the service of Balinese culture. Its transformation in 
the cinema occurred consciously and for pedagogical reasons. As a good 
reader of Mead, the speed was signif icant for him, and not just the schema 
of the course of movement: “Mead’s voice drops an octave or so but it is still 
understandable, and the Balinese pace can be appreciated.”4 Now it was 
exactly the goal of Mead and Bateson’s research trip to use new inscription 
methods to transform themselves in the f ield of Balinese culture. Their goal 
caught up with them in the end, but only belatedly, involuntarily, and with 
Heider’s technological help.
Ethnographic f ilms for the purposes of research had already existed in 
the prehistory of cinema. In 1895 the doctor and anthropologist Félix-Louis 
Regnault, together with the cameraman Charles Comte, prepared chrono 
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photographic recordings of people walking, attributing their walks and 
gaits to different races: a running African, three striding Arabs, an African 
woman with her child tied on her back, a person from the South Sea islands 
climbing a tree – in comparison with a French soldier incidentally, who 
manages it just as quickly without any help. Regnault’s recordings of a 
Wolof woman making pots are considered the beginnings of ethnographic 
f ilm. Based on these images, which were photographed in the middle of 
Paris at the “Exposition Ethnographique de l’Afrique Occidentale”, he wrote 
a revised cultural history of pottery making. Shortly thereafter, in 1898, 
Alfred Cort Haddon recorded images, f ilms, and sound on wax cylinders in 
the service of the Cambridge Expedition to the islands of the Torres Strait 
which were meant to document the psychological, social, and religious 
particularities in the islanders’ behavior. In 1901 Baldwin Spencer recorded 
a kangaroo dance by the Aboriginals in Australia and is thus considered 
a pioneer among anthropological f ilmmakers. Films were also made by 
physiologists, psychologists, and even commercial travelers and merchants 
such as Augustin Krämer from Hamburg and adventurers such as Hans 
Schomburgk, in order to gather data and information on f ilm about the 
cultures and colonies to be developed, but until the forties of the twentieth 
century it was the portable typewriter that remained the scientif ically 
recognized instrument of all anthropologists working in the f ield. The 
camera was relegated to illustrating the theses put down in writing. As 
late as 1974, Margaret Mead expressed regret in her manifesto-like Visual 
Anthropology in a Discipline of Words5 that whole cultures were disappearing 
without ever being recorded and documented. Ethnologists, according to 
Mead, in contrast to all the other disciplines in the natural sciences, would 
not adopt the most advanced research technologies, thus allowing the whole 
realm of visual anthropology to come under the influence of f ilm artists, 
whose recordings were in no way in the service of science.6 Margaret Mead 
had good reason to criticize this development, since it was she, along with 
Gregory Bateson, who had once initiated a f ilm revolution in ethnography. 
On a legendary trip to Bali, Bateson and Mead attempted to displace the 
monopoly of the written word in ethnography with photography and f ilm 
as recording technologies in their own right: “We tried to use the still and 
moving-picture cameras to get a record of Balinese behavior.[…] We treated 
the cameras in the f ield as recording instruments, not as devices for il-
lustrating our theses.”7 Film illustration itself was meant to be a method of 
scientif ic knowledge, in order to get around the subordination of foreign 
societies to the conceptualizations of western paradigms. Registering on 
f ilm was meant to store “behavior” as physical action and reaction among 
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people, beyond all linguistic valuation, before the second step of analyz-
ing certain patterns and then discovering anthropological and cultural 
typologies in the images.
The f ilm material that Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead brought 
back from Indonesia at the beginning of the forties does in fact represent 
a milestone in the history of anthropology. Since the two anthropologists 
claimed to have discovered a model of non-aggressive social dynamics on 
Bali and – anachronistic to all geopolitical escalation – a model of non-
competitive social behavior, the trip could very much have been understood 
as a peace mission in dark times. The Balinese footage, however, caused 
such a stir above all because it represented the basis for a future dynamic 
anthropology. Already in the thirties, as part of their research in New 
Guinea, Bateson and Mead had observed behavioral patterns among young 
villagers on the Sepik river that they described as “schismogenetic”, meaning 
a process of progressive cultural differentiation that was increased and 
extended through symmetrical or complementary intersubjective feedback. 
Examples of this are male and female behavior in everyday life in the play 
between voyeurism and exhibitionism, in the back and forth of relationships 
and gazes. Cultural identity, the two anthropologists could demonstrate, 
could be understood as inter-relation, as interplay.
Since that time, anthropology no longer simply focuses on exploring an 
unfamiliar society, but on discovering what recursive processes are used to 
differentiate human behavior in a society into particular cultural or even 
moral types. The goal of anthropological examinations was not simply 
customs, rites, rituals, and relational forms, but the model that is visible 
behind all variable behavior: the rules of transformation. The charm in the 
heart of darkness.8
Due to his research in New Guinea, Bateson received a Guggenheim 
grant to explore a theory of social transformation. The wording is as fol-
lows: “A formulation of a nucleus of theory relating to concepts of culture, 
personality and character formation and the extension of this nucleus to 
cover the phenomenon of cultural change.”9 Due to their research, Mead and 
Bateson were invited, anthropologists among physicists, mathematicians, 
and neurologists, to the exclusive Macy conferences to investigate “feedback 
mechanisms and circular causal systems in biological and social systems”, 
which launched both the term and the epistemology of cybernetics. Ques-
tions of how social relationships and social transformation are modeled and 
regulated were at the core of this important American research program 
for a (post-)war world that had got out of hand, the predictability of which 
was supposed to be restored with the aid of electronic machines.
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The possibility of understanding and modeling cultural behavior in cy-
bernetic terms, that is, in loops made up of “feed-backs” or “feed-forwards”, 
was directly linked to the f irst Macy conferences and the effect that they 
had on contemporary epistemological reflections. It was only against the 
backdrop of the Macy conferences on cybernetics that Mead and Bateson 
could turn a cultural anthropology of characters and temperaments into an 
anthropology of socially differentiating behavior. Systematically surveying 
the foreign was turned into interpreting by means of systems theory. Mead, 
who examined mother-child relationships in particular in the light of this 
dynamic, recalls in a conversation:
There had been too much emphasis that there were temperamental differ-
ences among children, so that you responded differently to a hyperactive 
baby than you did to a quiet baby. But the extent to which there was a 
system in which the mother was dependent on what the child had learned 
as the stimulus for the next position wasn’t well articulated until we got 
the cybernetics-conferences going.10
Cybernetics was therefore – much like navigating the sea, this master 
pattern of cyberneticists and helmsmen – to be understood as a conse-
quence of situational assessments and the corresponding corrections for 
readjustment. Observing this behavior would then also have to be kept to 
a consecutiveness of actions in hierarchies of logical and temporal arrange-
ments that were only realized over the course of time.
Cinematography, with its temporal organization of events, thus initially 
promised to provide the ideal recording instrument for ethnologists. Never-
theless, Bateson and Mead’s efforts in Bali to use f ilm to raise the scientif ic 
methods of anthropology to new heights of data processing11 initially proved 
to be only an unexpected “quantum leap.”12 From their stay between 1936 
and 1939, Mead and Bateson brought back 25,000 photographs and roughly 
22,000 feet of 16mm film material, that is, more than 12 hours worth, which 
they wanted to evaluate as the basis for their studies of trances and dances in 
Balinese rituals. What was missing was the corresponding leap in methodol-
ogy. Only when viewing the material after their return to New York did it 
become clear to the two researchers that the footage was only the necessary 
preliminary work for a medial revolution in anthropological paradigms. 
Editing the f ilms, which required a structural organizational principle, 
emerged as an unresolved problem. What was lacking in the editing room 
was any convention that would have scanned the signif icant moments and 
events in the uniform calm of Balinese images, given visibility to relations 
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and behavior, and thus suggested some sort of editing principle. In the 
images of scenes from everyday life, rituals, and trance dances, which were 
recorded in all kinds of lighting, from various perspectives, and with dif-
ferent speeds, one cannot initially spot any coherent units or elements that 
might have organized the material. But this is precisely what would have 
been necessary for any scientif ic systematization in structural anthropol-
ogy. At the beginning of his universal ethnological examination apparatus, 
Claude Lévi-Strauss made the following remark: “In any f ield a system of 
signif icances can be constructed only on the basis of discrete quantities.”13
Bateson and Mead had selected an analog recording medium right at 
the point in time when the avant-garde of anthropologists were working on 
formalizing reality in the direction of a strict binary. Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
who was teaching at the New School for Social Research in Manhattan at 
the beginning of the forties, where Bateson was also lecturing, developed 
his methods of structural anthropology in analogy with linguistics, which, 
as Lévi-Strauss observed with “some, let us say, melancholy, and a great 
deal of envy”,14 precisely involved a technological collaboration with the 
engineers of that new science called cybernetics. Just as linguists differenti-
ated phenomena in language, Lévi-Straus discovered “distinct entities” 
and “pairs of oppositions” in ethnological analysis, for example of kinship 
relations, which could be ascribed to certain ways of behaving. So, just as 
Freud had called for deciphering the contents of dreams not according 
to their value as image, but according to relations of signif ication, Lévi-
Strauss noted that “the error of traditional sociology, like that of traditional 
linguistics, was to consider the terms, and not the relations between the 
terms.”15 Lévi-Strauss formalized these relations to make them available in 
an almost exemplary way for further extrapolation by the “great modern 
electronic machines.”16 The relations that Lévi-Strauss had discovered as 
cultural forms in societies could all be notated and systematized as “+” or 
“-” so that “each culture is a unique situation”,17 while remaining part of a 
general law. Following this system, one could write an algorithm for each 
culture, which would illustrate its patterns, processes, communications, 
and transformations – the dream of every computer administration.
Binary coding for Lévi-Strauss, as an anthropologically constant 
fundamental law – and this is the surprising turn in his argument – is a 
formalization due to the unconscious activity of the mind.
If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind 
consists in imposing forms upon content, and if these forms are funda-
mentally the same for all minds – ancient and modern, primitive and 
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civilized […] – it is necessary and suff icient to grasp the unconscious 
structure underlying each institution and each custom, in order to ob-
tain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other 
customs.18
The activities of the mind that humans beings are unaware of is not only ap-
propriate for Turing’s universal machine, it can also realize and integrate all 
cultures in world history with their institutions and customs as a Hegelian 
universal machine.
Unlike Lévi-Strauss, Gregory Bateson, who never tired of emphasizing 
the value of “loose thinking”19 in scientif ic processes, deliberately kept the 
relationship between linguistic and ethnological order casual and porous 
from the very beginning in order to avoid some as yet undiscovered uni-
versality of human forms of relationship turning out to be a self-fulf illing 
prophecy of a European, Cartesian mind. He systematically jeopardized his 
own intentionality when speaking and naming. In contrast to the elegant 
and elementary systematics of structuralism, he deployed Anglo-Saxon 
“trial and error”:
When I am faced with a vague concept and feel that the time is not 
yet ripe to bring that concept into strict expression, I coin some loose 
expression for referring to this concept and do not want to prejudge the 
issue by giving the concept too meaningful a term… I can go on using the 
vague concept in the valuable process of loose thinking – still continually 
reminded that my thoughts are loose.20
Bateson thus casts out his ever-ref ining net of signif iers, which is meant 
to catch unfamiliar wild thinking and acting, while he remains categori-
cally camouflaged like a hunter. Like the entrapped Narcissus, however, he 
himself becomes the f irst victim of this strategy.
Initially, however, Bateson wanted to transfer this method to f ilm in 
order to counter the French universalism of the mind with a psychosomatic 
ecology, which was to be viewed in Norbert Wiener’s sense as the circulation 
of the whole ecosystem, of the “organism-plus-environment.”21 Correspond-
ingly, the researcher couple got down to the task in a holistic way, albeit 
always maintaining a division of labor. Margaret Mead recorded the course 
of events in written form, while Gregory Bateson photographed and f ilmed 
at the same time – sometimes assisted by anthropologist Jane Belo. In 
one photo book, which the New York Academy for Science published in a 
special edition, almost 800 photos are combined into thematic tableaus 
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of f ive to ten pictures, each of which are extensively annotated en face, 
representing a fascinating typology of the image of the Balinese body in 
a hundred chapters. Bateson specif ically describes which cameras, which 
lenses, which f ilm, and even which development chemicals he used, and yet 
at no point does he announce which concepts of space and time – neither 
anthropological, f ilmic, nor cultural – he used to determine whether to 
use a telephoto or wide-angle lens, when and according to what model to 
take series, when portraits, and when wide shots. Since he started using 
a rapid-winder starting in 1937, the tableaus in the book look much like 
sequences of single frames in a f ilm, although they do not mark the courses 
of movement systematically, for instance regularly on a timeline. The images 
determine the aesthetic of the book to a great degree. They are not, as 
announced, introduced as a media revolution in the scientif ic gaze, for they 
function precisely not as photography and especially serial photography as 
a scientif ic method would have required. Chrono photographic processes 
were developed in the nineteenth century in order to f ix traces in which 
“behavior” is placed in a clear relation to temporal-spatial systems of coor-
dinates as a visible surface of psycho- physical interaction.
One distinction, at least, was made during the process of f ilming. Since 
there was very little f ilm material available, it was the “more active and 
interesting moments” that were shot, everything else being recorded with 
a still camera.22 At no point does Bateson indicate when he chose to expose 
the 16mm film at 16 frames per second, and when 24, nor in which situations 
he switched to slow motion. We read merely that “we were compelled to 
economize on motion-picture f ilm.”23
Contrary to all epistemological declarations of intent, what is lacking is 
any rule of transformation for the footage from Bali. The method behind 
Bateson’s f ilm anthropology can at best be described as an attempt to leave 
the principle of recording to chance as much as possible:
[…] it is so hard to predict behavior, that it was scarcely possible to select 
particular postures or gestures for photographic recording. In general, 
we found that any attempt to select for special details was fatal, and that 
the best results were obtained when the photography was most rapid 
and almost random.24
It is not diff icult to rediscover here the methods of epistemological hunting 
taken from written ethnography. With “random” photography, Bateson 
sought to deactivate the literary order of anthropology and, even more, 
the interest from his own anthropologist’s gaze. The Anglo-Saxon legacy, 
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which Bateson brought to the cybernetically constituted anthropological 
method was to refrain from all teleology. Later, he would explain this ex-
perimental phase of his research to a student: “One of the essentials […] for 
understanding it, was to have been brought up in the age when […] purpose 
was a total mystery.”25 Approximating chance as an illustrative principle 
completely suited the paradoxical intention of recording the Balinese in 
their own spaces and temporalities without intention or psychological 
or ethnological purpose. The anthropologist man-with-a-camera had his 
eyes on the complex, candid reality of human interaction: “[…] we tried to 
shoot what happened normally and spontaneously, rather than to decide 
on the norms and then get the Balinese to go through these behaviors in 
suitable lighting.”26
What they sought to register was what was not “predictable”, for which 
there was no term, everything that was not entangled in the nets of symbolic 
designations, because it fell through the cracks of the order of anthropolo-
gists who used writing. This was meant to expand and restructure the f ield 
of anthropology in terms of media. Using film, human behavior could finally 
be recorded beyond “postures and gestures”, in all physical reality and the 
uniqueness of random correspondences, in all its peculiar movements, 
speeds, and irregularities, in all the indescribable surfaces of the body 
and the unpredictable effects of exotic lighting conditions that once again 
transformed the dancers’ movements.
While Gregory Bateson devoted himself to the lack of intentionality 
of his recordings, he lost sight of the other side of the chance-coin: the 
inauguration of order presumed to exist in every coincidence, as a mo-
ment of conjuncture. Only where there are borders, margins, and paths 
can there also be crossings and intersections where accidents, chance, 
and incursions can occur. “What do we mean when we say that something 
happens by chance? We may mean one of two things, which may be very 
different – either that there is no intention, or that there is a law.”27 Bateson 
assumes that in doing away with intention he was also doing away with 
the law, and in his epistemological anarchy he sought to pit random against 
accident, hazard against chance, coincidence against probability. But not 
everything falls so easily into place with the cybernetic anthropologists. 
God may not play dice, but he did turn the dice’s structure into a kind of 
trophy. Bateson attempted to shed all awareness of what he was doing 
and to show that it was not only the photographed persons, but also the 
researcher who could forget what had happened: “The photographer himself 
ceased to be camera conscious.”28 All this making one forget and making 
oneself forget, however, did not change the fact that photography and f ilm 
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irrevocably brought symbolic conventions into the f ield of the Balinese and 
even Balinese culture. What Bateson had ignored was that photography 
and f ilm, with their mechanical equipment, optical devices, and chemical 
processes, were just as historically determined, and were just as foreign to 
the Balinese as the typewriter had been. Bateson had ignored that he, with 
Heiner Müller, was always already shooting from the hip.
The f ilm material initially remained unedited. Instead, Bateson began 
to organize all the open questions of social and cultural patterns in terms 
of system theory at the New School for Social Research. In this context he 
developed a graphic solution – halfway between writing and image – to the 
problem of anthropological illustration. Typical Balinese behavior, which 
consisted in systematically interrupting the “perhaps basically human 
tendency towards cumulative personal interaction”29 and in it as duration 
without escalation, becomes manifest, in its ordinate pattern of “cumula-
tive action” to the abscissa of time, in the form of a plateau. It is just this 
plateau that would later come to prominence in the history of philosophy 
with Deleuze and Guattari. Bateson was thus proposing one of the most 
important lines of f light out of the limitations of western thought:
“Some sort of continuing plateau of intensity is substituted for [sexual] 
climax”, war, or a culmination point. It is a regrettable characteristic 
of the Western mind to relate expressions and actions to exterior or 
transcendent ends, instead of evaluating them on a plane of consistency 
on the basis of their intrinsic value.30
Teleology, a total mystery. It is no coincidence that it was a f ilmmaker, Maya 
Deren, who pointed out to Bateson that the form and course of his plateau were 
solely due to the structure of his system of illustrating. In his schema, Balinese 
feelings only appear as a break in an increasing, cumulating line because he 
systematically does not mark a persistence in time as an increase in intensity. 
This could also be conceived differently. Deren pointed Bateson to an obvious 
counter example: “The duration in time […] applied to sexual activity even in 
occidental cultures is not considered a negation but, on the contrary, valued 
as a considerable achievement.”31 Duration itself could therefore be denoted 
as an analemma curve in the sky. In other words, Bateson’s graphic contains 
more information about Bateson than about Bali, as soon as the graphic is not 
read in its value as an image, but according to the relationships that it creates.
Deren’s discomfort with cultural theory was justif ied. What Bateson had 
sought as behavior in the f ilm images were not simply reactions in time, 
shapes in space, and forms of typical patterns of movement, but socially 
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pre-evaluated behavior such as dominance and submission. In a letter to 
Maya Deren from December 12, 1946, in which Bateson prophesied diff icul-
ties for her own film project, he explains to her the problems of his theory of 
binary and complementary elements, with which he constructed relations 
of social and familial relationships or national characters as a system of 
regulation or control, warning:
The trouble is that these paired adjectives are very inadequate descrip-
tions of human relationships, that in fact, to make a pair, the dominance 
and the submission have to be of such special sorts that the submission 
is the sort of submission which is appropriate to that particular sort 
of dominance… Dominance may be linked with spectatorship, and 
submission may be linked with exhibitionism, or the pair of polarities 
may be reversed – dominance being linked with exhibitionism etc. The 
important thing is that there shall be an ethological system of some 
sort underlying the relationship between the two contrasting elements. 
Beyond this is it probably necessary for the two elements to be talking 
about the same thing – e.g. sex, or drawing a hopscotch line, or whatever.32
Maya Deren distrusts any relationship categories constructed as binary, 
with which Bateson sought to make “behavior” calculable as information 
in social regulatory cycles. Her objection can be summarized as indicating 
precisely the error that Bateson takes for the most common one in the 
argumentation of systems theory: the confusion of “territorium and map.” 
Deren’s sharp camera-gaze maintains that Bateson is always dealing with 
illustrative functions in his material, whether these observations be written, 
photographed, or f ilmed. She f inds the constructions of his ethnological as-
signations to be “orders” in the double sense of arrangement and command, 
and she criticizes the blending of the levels of depiction. After a lecture by 
Bateson on February 22, 1947 she notes:
Last night the Bateson theory lecture and the mix up about Balinese 
‘startle.’33 I suspect it doesn’t sit in there right, because it is a ‘symptom’ of 
something which is an order, and it is not itself an order in the sense that 
the ‘other feedbacks’ are orders. Anyway, that dominance-submission 
business feels very wrong somehow but I don’t dare speak as strongly as 
I should like to because I’d have not the right thing to offer instead. At 
least if he would use arrows of dynamic movement (what the hell is the 
name of them?) rather than make those directional signposts! Time Time 
Time – not Space. Energy – not matter.34
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Deren’s critique of Bateson strikes at the core of all communications theory: 
the functional distinction (in representation) and operational equation 
(as circuit) of “order” as arrangement and command. Behavior should 
be understood much more as a symptom of a certain social order than 
as a classif icatory system in its own right. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition 
behavior is not only conduct, but also manners, and it is not for nothing 
that Bateson, much later, will invent the theory of the double bind precisely 
through the example of the parental imperative – “behave!”, while Bateson, 
in his depiction, pursues the signifying pair “dominance and submission”, 
which he himself introduced as a cornerstone of a “Balinese ethos”, Deren 
insists that one can observe a movement in in which “orders” develop as 
interaction and in which interferences, differentiations, and feedbacks are 
revealed to be variable. While Bateson – as was the implicit rule of digital 
research – introduced binaries into the social f ield in order to be able to 
recognize algorithms as patterns in anthropology, he ignored the fact that 
f ilm itself introduces an order. Movements are chopped up into discrete 
units and can be combined through this formalization into an illusion of 
movement and animated into illusionary movements. The cinematographic 
order scientif ically dictates that reactions and behavioral modes are only 
grasped over time, and they alter with time and temporality. In his f ilm 
depictions of the Balinese character, Bateson disregarded the time factor, 
thus documenting his indifference in relation to the technical process of the 
recording medium. His f ilms, however, were objects, not simply of “invol-
untary”35 even random manipulations of the timeline, but of manipulations 
justif ied purely by economic concerns, and thus provide a good example 
of the colonial gaze, which can notoriously remain innocent because it has 
implemented its operations and optical distortions, or more precisely: the 
optical instruments.
Relativizing time in a very practical sense is one of the elementary opera-
tions of all f ilm artists and researchers when they carry out experiments in 
experience on screen. The temporal structure is the moment of the f ilmic 
in every screening, which, by transforming discrete single frames into a 
perception of motion, creates an imaginary that cannot consciously bring its 
origins in its own technological realization into the present. Film perception 
is principally illusionary, and technological manipulations are not seen as 
such, but only in their aesthetic effects. Slow motion and time lapse take on 
particular emotional values as the expression of a context of motion, and 
are not simply their decelerated or accelerated variants. Rudolf Arnheim 
confirmed this in the terminology of the experimental psychologists when 
he was researching in the Frankfurt School of Gestalt: “The expressive 
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quality of any movement is dependent on its speed, and by changing the 
speed of natural movements f ilm can modify their character.”36 This is why 
we attribute the charm of the movements at 18 frames per second, which 
Chaplin also maintained in his sound f ilms, to the little man with the cane 
and the melons, and not to the f ilm apparatus that creates it. This is why 
Ninja and Wu Tang f ighters appear so externally concentrated when their 
on-screen movements just before the decisive stroke pass by in slow motion. 
Maya Deren also made a f ilm about the movements of shadowboxing in Wu 
Tang and Shao Lin: Meditation on Violence. The f ilm pits camera and body 
movements against one another and as is therefore a study of the cinema 
and the philosophy of Wu Tang at the same time, which is derived from 
the Book of Changes and which views life as permanent metamorphosis.
A f ilmmaker’s indiscretions do not point back to the f ilmmaker him or 
herself. Since f ilm perception is illusionary, we sense a time-lapse recording 
of Balinese dances as something nervous or hectic in the movement of the 
dancers, and not as the economical or even stingy decision of the camera-
man. Slow motion, which also exists in Bateson and Mead’s Balinese f ilms, 
is understood as expressing an intensity in the trance, a heightened physical 
control on the part of the dancers, and not as evidence of an increased 
analytical interest, which both led to these recordings and then edited them 
into the film without consideration for any ritual integrity. What is intended 
as neutral instrumental editing in the name of research develops, despite 
Mead’s off-screen commentary, into a willful emotional effect.
The duration of a jump, which is artif icially extended in the montage 
and can be combined from different sequences and perspectives, is exactly 
not meant to neutralize excitement and tension – if it’s edited well – but 
to increase it enormously. In this way, temporality in f ilm is transformed 
into intensity and f inally into emotion. Since Dziga Vertov’s stunning 
analysis and synthesis of movement in Man with a Movie Camera, and also 
in America at least since Panofsky drew attention to the fact that “these 
unique and specif ic possibilities [of f ilm] can be def ined as dynamization 
of space and, accordingly, spatialization of time”,37 it should have been clear 
that every relativization of temporal conventions in f ilm is a signif icant 
transformation of everything that an ethnologist can record as cultural 
information. It is the transformatory tool with which f ilmmakers can 
produce emotions in the space of the cinema, quite independently of the 
emotional states of their actors or their art of method-acting. But there is 
no other way for anthropologists in the f ield to shoot f ilm.
Margaret Mead, however, would adhere to this literal f ilmic illusion of 
pure visual anthropology her whole life. “If tape recorder, camera or video is 
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set up and left in the same place, large batches of material can be collected 
without the intervention of the f ilm-maker or ethnographer and without 
the continuous self-consciousness of those who are being observed.”38 In 
misrecognizing the degree to which the usage of cultural recording tech-
nologies is conditioned and marked by tradition, she summarily threatens 
those who put up resistance to their f ilming of her behavior with definitively 
losing their history:
[…] the isolated group or emerging new nation that forbids f ilmmaking 
for fear of disapproved emphases will lose far more than it gains.[…] they 
will rob of their rightful heritage their descendants, who […] may wish 
to claim once more the rhythms and handicrafts of their own people.39
Film archives or institutions in which the young and by now urbanized and 
electrif ied indigenous population might once again take possession of its 
legacy of ritual and handwork with the aid of anthropology have not pre-
vailed. In contrast, the subcultural use of electronic instruments in various 
musical styles like the blues of the Delta, certain jazz music, or Hendrix’s pop 
music might suggest an immediate and physical link to ritual techniques.40 
Margaret Mead’s well-meaning colonialism, which also ignored the role of 
technology, was avenged not by the descendants of the dead Indians, but, 
as her Brown students heard, by the projecting institution itself.
Parallel to the ongoing debate with Gregory Bateson, Maya Deren wrote 
an article about montage, Creative Cutting, in which she sees through the 
anthropologists’ game with f ilm technology: “It is the phenomenon of 
duration as tension which explains why slow motion – which may have 
in it very little activity – often makes for greater tension than normal or 
rapid motion for the tension consists in our desire to have our anticipation 
satisf ied.”41 It is this transformation of “duration” into “tension” that creates 
emotionality in f ilm. The intensity that appears in f ilm as certain editing 
sequences or in anthropological depictions of interactions that do not 
provoke a differentiation between groups as a continual, sustained curve, 
is created from elements that had previously been made discrete. If editing 
technique remains in common conventions, it remains unnoticed as a 
function of illustrative technology and thus unaware of the transformation. 
If it appears, as it did at the beginning of f ilm art, when there were barely 
any f ilm conventions, or later in the montage of cinéma verité, in Jean 
Rouch, or in Jean-Luc Godard’s “wrong”, visible cuts, it troubles the f ield of 
vision, thus instigating a disturbance to culture, its technologies of storing 
and recording, and thus the vey conditions of subjectivity.
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The relation to the apparatus is supposed to be forgotten twice: f irst when 
shooting in the f ield, and a second time in the cinema. If the technical feed-
back of f ilm movement disappears when a spectator looks at the electronic 
artif ice of the projection apparatus, the transformation does not return as 
an effect of the f ilming direction and intervention of an observer, but as 
an imaginary essence of what is depicted, thus provoking the spectator’s 
emotional reaction. When Bateson cannot manage to edit the images into 
any systematic scientif ic sense, what he experiences as the methodological 
failure of his ethno-cinematography returns as an emotional effect at a 
quite different spot. Maya Deren, to whom Mead and Bateson had initially 
loaned their Bali f ilm footage for her own f ilm project A Fugue of Cultures, 
had new and ecstatic experiences when watching the footage on her manual 
home viewer: “The minute I began to put the Balinese f ilm through the 
viewer, the fever began. It is a feeling one cannot remember from before, 
but can only have in an immediate sense.”42 Deren’s ecstasy on viewing the 
footage can also be described as transformation, in which a return of the 
cinematic unconscious in Walter Benjamin’s sense does not simply depict 
the “concept of culture, personality and character formation” that Bateson 
was looking for, but produces it in the f irst place. Emotional ramif ications 
develop in projecting the material that in the long run even form emotional 
relations. Nonetheless, Deren notes that it is precisely the manipulation of 
the f ilm speed that represents a reason for the artif icial ecstasy that has 
little to do with the Balinese trance technique, but is due above all to the 
feedbacking connection between the New York woman’s body with the 
New York f ilm apparatus.
The immediate physical contact with the f ilm, the nearness of the image, 
the automatic muscular control of its speed – the fact that as I wound – 
my impulses and reactions toward the f ilm translated themselves into 
muscular impulses and so to the f ilm directly with no machine – buttons, 
switches, etc. – between me and the f ilm[…]. Later of course, I shall use 
the projector to get proper speed, etc. But f irst this intimate copulation 
between me and the f ilm must take place… 43
While Bateson had just given up hope that f ilm might be a medium to 
depict circular-causal and feedback mechanisms in social systems, he had 
created all the necessary conditions to put such mechanisms in gear. The 
cinematic feedback that the anthropologists had presumably sought in 
the f ield occurred in the cinema. Only during projection could and must 
Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson be confronted with their cinematically 
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construed Balinese selves, and only then could they see the transformation 
of the stranger as their own. Heider’s students were plied and flattened by 
the same transformation, by an endless, and in McLuhan’s sense, medial 
extension, which is echoed by itself over and over again, and which can 
be described as a baker’s transformation, to use Deleuze’s terminology. At 
the same time this medial extension is further processed further into a 
multifarious “mille feuille”. It is the processing of one’s own sensibility, of 
one’s own trance, which would not be induced by Indonesian drums and 
dancers, but by the small Trojan horse of a 16mm projector in the lecture 
hall. Heider’s dauntless speed switching constantly kept this processing 
from becoming the usual procession of institutional anthropology.
In their model of the thousand-fold plateau, Deleuze and Guattari merged 
the double sense of the anthropology-order into a direction for philosophy 
to move. With regard to the subject, they turned out to be f ilm philosophers:
Starting from the forms one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, 
or the functions one fulf ills, becoming is to extract particles between 
which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness that are closest to what one is becoming, and through which one 
becomes. This is the sense in which becoming is the process of desire.44
Deleuze and Guattari selected duration from Bateson’s plateau – unlike 
Bateson himself – and therefore recognized the perception of intensities of 
relation. The history of evaluating the Balinese ethos shows that Bateson’s 
plateau is due to the experiments in f ilm depiction anyway, and in no way 
due to Balinese culture.
At the latest in 1951 Bateson will have integrated Deren’s objection, that 
he was transferring his own order into foreign systems and cultures through 
his system of notation, into his communications theory. This theory was 
published as a study of psychiatric reform. Along with a research group, 
Bateson had placed psychiatry in a completely new light by simultane-
ously examining physical illnesses under neurophysiological, linguist, and 
behavioral psychology aspects as abortive or ambivalent communication. 
Now his sights are set precisely on the illustrative system: the book about 
the new methodology bears the title Matrix. He had taken Deren’s critique of 
his transferal of western forms of subject formation to the rest of the world 
seriously. In the sixties, Bateson combined all his reflections on cybernetics 
and cinema with an emancipatory theory of subjectivity according to which 
personalities and characters can be formed, broken down, or even healed 
in the context of collective forms of relations with time and in duration. In 
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the foreword to a new edition 16 years later, he would add parenthetically: 
“At the time this book was written, it became abundantly clear that the age 
of the individual had passed.”45
At the beginning of these new research projects, Bateson placed Norbert 
Wiener’s thesis that the concepts of “information” and “negative entropy” are 
synonymous and develop simply and elegantly the connection between the 
knowledge (or non-knowledge) of an observer about the state of a system on 
the one hand, and the order or entropy that he or she can attach or attribute 
to this system. Every speaker is entangled in the continuous process of 
coding, evaluating, and transforming with his or her “information and 
evaluation system.” The premises of the book, in which Maya Deren is only 
faintly and fragmentarily perceptible, like an echo to Narcissus, are f irst of 
all that codif ication and evaluation are two sides of the same operation, as 
Deren had noted in relation to coordinate systems for the Balinese plateau, 
and second, that the simultaneous definition and evaluation that someone 
makes, from which their behavior can be inferred, presumes that the ob-
server progressively revises his or her assumptions, consequently learning 
from his or her mistakes. Bateson’s clear thesis on meta-communication 
can be read as a commentary on previous indiscretions. Bali, as it were, is 
a network of gazes, recorded in discrete image by the camera, projected in 
front of an audience, which relates to these images…
As a theorist and the great practitioner of a “learning to learn”, which 
can mean both “learning to deal with and expect a given kind of context for 
adaptive action” as well as “character change due to experience”,46 Gregory 
Bateson integrated the lesson of doubled film-time into his communications 
theory. Starting from psychiatric studies he took a social matrix above all 
as the basis of human behavior, relativized the observer’s standpoint, and 
recognized every codif ication, every mode of illustration as evaluation.47 
Bateson had experienced the cinema as a dynamic relational trap. His f ilm 
experiment had not simply displaced the sad typology of the anthropologist 
in the f ield, powerless in speech but powerful in writing, not simply made it 
possible to see the structure of social feedback mechanisms among stran-
gers, but shown that f ilms implied a fundamental relativizing of behavior. 
The ethnographer must thus know that he is at best a cybernetic catalyst 
in his work. Norbert Wiener formulated it to his Macy colleagues with a 
malicious undertone:
With all respect to the intelligence, skill and honesty of purpose of my 
anthropological friends, I cannot think that any community which they 
have investigated will ever be quite the same afterward.[…] There is 
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much in the social habits of a people which is dispersed and distorted 
by the mere act of making inquiries about it. In another sense from that 
in which it is usually stated, traduttore traditore.48 Bateson becomes 
“trasformatore.” Ultimately he will simply call for: art.
Years later – and much to Margaret Mead’s annoyance – Bateson, think-
ing back on the shifts of the time axis in the Balinese f ilm work, said: “I 
think the photographic record should be an art form.”49 Mead, on the other 
hand, who later edited the Bali material after all, remained true to the 
time of the anthropologist, subsuming the Balinese footage in all speeds, 
regardless of her off-screen commentary, to 24 pictures per second. She 
also did not refrain from showing the long thin f igure of Gregory Bateson 
himself with the camera at his eye at the end of the f ilm Trance and Dance 
in Bali, as if she wanted to present the erratic and flickering f ilm views as 
the mimesis into the obsessive and causal-circular exuberance. As late as 
1976, in a conversation with Stewart Brand, the two – who were both well 
over seventy – could still reactivate their old argument about “behavior” 
at a single mention. Mead immediately pointed out the weak blind spot of 
the cameraman, the persistence:
Mead: […] he’s a good f ilmmaker, and Balinese can pose nicely, but his 
effort was to hold the camera steady enough long enough to get a sequence 
of behavior.
Bateson: To f ind out what’s happening.
Mead: When you’re jumping around taking pictures …
Bateson: Nobody’s talking about that, Margaret, for God’s sake.
Mead: Well.
Bateson: I’m talking about having control of a camera. You’re talking 
about putting a dead camera on top of a bloody tripod. It sees nothing.50
Whether cameras can see, whether the control or steering of the gaze can 
be placed or even concealed in the detail of the apparatus, whether human 
being and machine develop symbiotic or parasitical relationships in the 
matrix of cybernetic artif iciality – in the 1940s these were not just questions 
for anthropologists with movie cameras. In the Second World War, camera 
and radar eyes on airplanes and machine guns could not only record and 
transmit visual material, they could also calculate trajectories and guide 
projectiles. But while the devices learned to behave more precisely, human 
behavior under the conditions of war had turned out to be highly unreliable 
and uncontrollable. People who were just supposed to shoot could suddenly 
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no longer trust their own senses and nerves, their muscles, and their self-
assurance, entrapped in irresolvable sensory-motor convolutions. They 
started to tremble, to stutter, to stagger, and, at best, simply to collapse. 
The mathematician Norbert Wiener, who was familiar with all these states, 
tried to f ind a remedy to these break-downs while working for the US Air 
Force. He discovered a new principle of integrated control: “This method 
of control appeared to us not unlike a method already known in electric 
circuits and now being applied in servomechanisms, or systems by which 
we switch in an outside source of power for control purposes.[…] We call 
this negative feedback.”51
It was this method of negative feedback that Bateson was looking for 
when he sought to achieve control over the camera, which would see in 
his place so that he could f inally get the goal of his gaze in the viewer 
– a constant feedback between technology and the gaze, which rather 
precisely describes the diff icult to achieve balance between self-control 
and absent-mindedness that is necessary for all artistic production. Bate-
son became increasingly interested in his own cultural transformation, 
which obviously included the world around him as an ecosystem. By this 
time, ethnologists had been able to further deconstruct the image of the 
stranger – if necessary, in a brutal and liberating way, such as Karl Heider 
had done when he showed his students that sometimes all that is needed 
to get the genie in the anthropological bottle to appear is a valiant grip 
into the apparatus.
In a letter from December 20, 1967 to the neurophysiologist Warren 
McCulloch, one of the pioneers of the mathematical calculation of neuronal 
network processes and one of the founders of the Macy conferences, Bates 
writes about the knowledge of the gods, which appears at the end of this 
lifelong research report that meanders through the sciences:
I suggest that one of the things that man has done through the ages to 
correct for his short-sighted purposiveness is to imagine personified enti-
ties with various sorts of supernatural powers, i.e., gods. These entities, 
being f ictitious persons, are more or less endowed with cybernetic and 
circuit characteristics.52
Gods regulate and rescue the world’s equilibrium by maintaining ho-
meostatic processes beyond all individual human interest. Maya Deren 
had also regretted that no human society had integrated this divine 
self-regulating dynamic into its social system: “But there is no society or 
organization designed to change itself and this is what the whole hitch is”,53 
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she noted on March 16, 1947. Shortly thereafter, however, she encountered 
the gods in Haiti, who appeared on the scene in such transformations, who 
seized bodies and intervened in human relationships. This case makes 
clear how such good gods form an alliance with the media of storage and 
transmission.
2. Depersonalizations
Maya Deren: Hollywood, Haiti
Magic cannot be explained. Magic can only
be practiced, as you all well know.
– Heinz von Foerster, 1990
Body Balance
While Gregory Bateson’s oblivious use of f ilm technology was making him 
the object of cinema-trance unwillingly, Maya Deren, a pioneer of American 
experimental f ilm, is going the opposite way: as a levelheaded machinist, 
she f irst appropriates the technological functions of f ilm, only to take 
her leave as often as possible in a kind of cinema-sleep. “[…]you may f ind 
me many evenings in the motion-picture theater, sharing with the other 
sleepers […] the selected dream without responsibilities.”1 While the British 
Bateson dragged visions of analytical symmetry to the USA modeled after 
his great role model William Blake, Deren smuggled an unusual legacy of 
Russian knowledge in among the American f ilmmakers. Her father had 
studied reflexology in St. Petersburg with Bekhterev, and had worked at 
his Psychoneurological Research Institute in the 1910s, a time when experi-
ments were being done on methods of group therapy, methods of collective 
suggestions and mutual psycho- physical equilibration, methods that were 
unknown in the USA. Only in the 1960s were similar forms of systematic 
therapy developed there for schizophrenia patients: by a research group 
surrounding Gregory Bateson.
Maya Deren will come close to circular-causal thinking, as she newly 
discovered it in Bateson’s lectures at the New School for Social Research 
in New York, when she begins systematically ref lecting on the cinema. 
Her most important text about cinema, Cinema as an Artform, in which 
she produces the relativity of spatio-temporal perception and historical 
technology, begins with the dedication: “To my father, who, when I was a 
child, once spoke to me of life as an unstable equilibrium.”2 Her theory of 
cinema examines just such an unstable equilibrium as a microstructure 
of a web of relations, not only between subjects, but especially between 
people and apparatuses.
Cinema, like dance, is about movements that produce an equilibrium of 
moments which are unstable in themselves. This is why Deren constantly 
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pursues the interferences of historical technologies and social relations in 
her texts on cinema. When technological developments encroach on the 
parameters of time and space, it relativizes everything, even the conditions 
of subjectivity. The indivisible ego no longer stands squarely on the ground 
of reality, but gets displaced into new parameters:
Today the airplane and the radio have created, in fact, a relativistic 
reality of time and space. They have introduced to our immediate real-
ity a dimension which functions not as an added spacial location but 
which, being both temporal and spacial, relates to all other dimensions 
with which we are familiar. There is not an object that does not require 
relocation in terms of this new frame of reference, and not least among 
these is the individual.3
For Deren, “relativistic” reality not only refers to the theory of a once 
new scientif ic way of thinking, but also to complexity and ambiguity, 
asynchronicity, blurriness, and imbalances in human perception, which 
have become scientif ically competent. With analogue media it was not 
reality, but movements and relationship between realities that became the 
object of research. For Deren, parameters like time and space are subject 
to historical and technological developments – as is shown by the fact that 
she insistently and repeatedly pointed out the simultaneous development 
of cinema, radio, and rocket technologies since 1945. But cinema itself has 
a part in this transformation of times and spaces. In the comprehensive 
sense that Deren gives to it, cinema, by drawing technology and perception, 
machines and human bodies, images and gazes together in its rhythm, 
can itself create reality: “Cinema – and by this is understood the entire 
body of techniques, including camera, lighting, acting, editing, etc. – is a 
time-space art with a unique capacity for creating new temporal-spatial 
relationships and projecting them with an incontrovertible impact of 
reality[…].”4
Against the magic of f ilm projection, the human head is powerless. Deren 
examines the two operations of f ilm production, technological storage and 
the technological assembling of stored data into a new reality, in its effect 
on subjectivity on both sides of the screen. “…filmmaking consists of two 
distinct but interrelated processes: photography – by which actuality is 
recorded and revealed […] in its own terms; and editing, by which those 
elements of actuality proper may be re-related on an imaginative level to 
create a new reality.”5 In photography every object portrays its own illustra-
tion onto light-sensitive surfaces or f ilmstrips, at any rate, as Deren repeats, 
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not before it has passed the analysis of recording technology: “the ref ined 
optics of the lens, the slow-motion analysis of the movement, etc.”6
Only after being treated technologically does reality become visible, open 
to experience and communicable, and thus reality is always a historical one. 
From the very beginning Deren examines the quality of an image not for its 
possible similarities with what is depicted, but for the effect of this image 
on thinking and the imagination, for the medial effect as a mental effect: 
“…the term ‘image’[…] presumes a mental activity.”7 The form of reality 
that is photography marks its place value in a series of transmissions that 
encounter and alter perception. This is why the photomechanical means of 
illustrating, which can be relayed as the impression of light itself, constitutes 
the form of reality that is every photograph:
The photograph not only testif ies to the existence of that reality […] but 
is, to all intents and purposes, its equivalent. This equivalence is not at 
all a matter of f idelity but is of a different order altogether. If realism is 
the term for a graphic image which precisely simulates some real object, 
then a photograph must be differentiated from it as a form of reality itself.8
While Rudolf Arnheim thought that photography had “raised our demands: 
we like reproductions not only to be faithful to the object but also to 
guarantee their faithfulness by being mechanical manifestations of the 
reproduced object itself”,9 for Deren photography is the tool that provides 
art with reality.
After 1945, however, it was precisely technological devices that threat-
ened to replace human senses and possibly also human thinking. Every con-
nection to machines played with the inevitable self-dissolution of human 
sensibility, and not only in art. The early researchers in cybernetics feared 
that the individual as an active agent in the world was being reduced to the 
minimum in the world of digital machines. In the opening speech of the 
Macy conferences it is stated: “Wiener in his introduction in ‘Cybernetics’ 
points out […] that the complexity of the computing machine type of mecha-
nism is so great and can be pushed so far now that it potentially threatens 
individual decision.”10 This is the disappointing way that the integration of 
the human into the digital human-machine was being presented.
At the same time, Maya Deren was experimenting on analogue f ilm with 
the effects of technological images on human seeing, seeking to establish a 
new reality assembled out of horizontal, reticulate, multiple functionalities 
and relationships for the purpose of rescuing human sensibility.11 She was 
simultaneously attempting to replace the idea of the individual with a 
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system of interfering human relations. This is the context in which she 
developed her concept of the ritual: “In its method – a conscious manipula-
tion designed to create effect, in contrast to the spontaneous compulsions 
of expression […] – the ritualistic form is much more the art equivalent of 
modern science than the naturalism which claims to be so based.”12 In one of 
her f ilm projects, she proposes progressively deconstructing the identifiable 
agents of action in her f ilms as “Rituals Involving Minimization of Personal 
Identity.” The smallest units of ritual activity – hand motions, eye motions, 
chalk marks on the ground, round or oblong forms – are meant to become 
recognizable as discrete elements, as “dis-associated”,13 and at the same 
time to be assembled into a joint in which a cultural system would f ind its 
expression. The interconnection between technological and social relations 
in the cinema is the prerequisite for its “incontrovertible impact of reality.”14
As a complement to this “incontrovertible impact of reality”, Deren devel-
ops the term “experience” in her texts on cinema. At f irst glance it not only 
bridges the epistemological gap between the production side of a cinema 
image and its reception. Still, this reception leaves traces and changes once 
and for all how space and time are perceived. Experience would be a f irst 
circular-causal mechanism in the cinema. Watching f ilms in the cinematic 
space alters perception, this sleepy dream-watching in the cinema. The 
new perception in turn determines new forms of watching f ilm, which in 
turn shifts perception, etc. It is precisely with the term experience that 
Deren distinguishes the work of experimental f ilmmakers who are seeking 
to realize genuine visual effects from the reality and effect of Hollywood 
cinema, which does not function at all as f ilm, but combines the literary 
metaphorically into a system of fatuous transcriptions. In Deren’s strict 
sense, Hollywood is not cinema at all, because it neither affects nor alters 
visual perception:
…the Hollywood f iction f ilm has created a kind of visual shorthand of 
clichés with which we have become so familiar that we are not even aware 
of the effort of transcription.[…] Actually, this has nothing in common 
with the directness with which we would experience a truly visual reality, 
such as falling […].15
Falling, tumbling, stumbling, these powerless movements of the body in 
space are a good example of the experiences that Deren wants to make 
f ilmic, because she assumes a strict composition in artif icial, constructed 
spaces and times, and because she takes and reflects the moment of the 
involuntary in cinematic perception. Even how one’s attention is drawn, 
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how one’s thinking it directed in the cinema, or the shock of a cut can be 
experienced as mental falling and tumbling. Incursions and consterna-
tion. In Deren’s f ilms, however, it is above all bodies themselves that are 
freed from the preconfigured gaze by which they are shackled and held 
fast in symbolic poses and gestures. She takes up the unpredictable and 
uncontrollable in movements, but not simply as letting-oneself-go or as 
relaxation, not as coincidence nor as an accidental shot, neither random 
nor chance. In order to create sequences of falling, spinning, jumping, or 
tumbling, Deren demands enormous discipline from the dancers that she 
works with, for what is supposed to emerge as feeling in the cinema must 
be assembled technologically from precisely calculated fragments into a 
new f ilm reality. “‘Film-Spontaneity’ is impossible”,16 she writes succinctly 
and in a snipe to the surrealists with the pig’s eye under the razor blade.
In order to have an experience in art or in the cinema, one has to grasp 
the essence of the production-device, not the essence of an object depicted 
by them: “…that experience would be created out of the nature of the art 
instrument by which it was, in fact, realized.”17 Deren’s note is much more 
signif icant for f ilm theory than for the visual arts. From the beginning, 
examinations of f ilm perception such as Arnheim’s or Panofsky’s have 
insisted that we can no longer speak of representation in the cinema, since 
in particular the perception of movement in cinema is a completely distinct 
and singular form of perception, “not the re-experience, but the experience 
of motion.”18 In her f ilms, Maya Deren will show that the same is true for 
perception of f ilm spaces and times.
In all of Deren’s f ilms, from Meshes of the Afternoon to the raw mate-
rial that she shot about voodoo rituals in the Caribbean, the shifting and 
interlocking of relations of time and space is not only a f ilm process, but 
also determines what could be designated as action or rather “incident.” 
The protagonists, dancers, lose themselves in spatio-temporal labyrinths 
and encounter themselves again, this time as others on their way through 
the foreign spaces. These odysseys are not to be seen as the progressive 
formational journeys of heroes, but as circular movements in spaces that 
displace any unambiguous gaze. Spaces reflect and refract gazes and raise 
questions about how the ego is optically involved in the relation to others.
Meshes, Tresses, Networks
The f ilm Meshes of the Afternoon, which was shot, according to Hammid, 
as a “home movie” at 1466 Kings Road in Los Angeles, a few blocks north of 
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Sunset Boulevard, combined everything that the Bolex – this Swiss preci-
sion clockwork among 16mm cameras – allowed for, including changing 
f ilm speeds, fades, and focal lengths, and equipped with its frame counter 
to precisely calculate multiple exposures. The f ilm became a labyrinth 
of perception, which in f ilm history has turned out to be a labyrinth of 
self-perception. The gaze in this f ilm is led into all the paradoxes provided 
by the functions of seeing. Meshes of the Afternoon realizes what Lacan 
designated as the prison-house of desire in an image: “In this matter of the 
visible, everything is a trap, and in a strange way […] entrelacs (interlacing, 
intertwining). There is not a single one of the divisions, a single one of the 
double sides that the function of vision presents that is not manifested to us 
as a labyrinth.”19 The interlacing of Meshes of the Afternoon is also about the 
seeing of seeing itself, and how the subject is displaced and shifted in the 
process. What does not stop shifting the subjects into meshworks of space-
time would then be the uncanniness of the home movie. The means are 
banal and yet fundamental, as Panofsky succinctly pointed out for cinema: 
“These unique and specif ic possibilities can be defined as dynamization of 
space and, accordingly, spatialization of time. This statement is self-evident 
to the point of triviality but it belongs to that kind of truth which, just 
because of its triviality, is easily forgotten or neglected.”20
Using simple tricks, the little house in Kings Road becomes a villa with 
endless staircases and interlocking rooms. While for example in one wide-
angle shot (Nr. 6) the protagonist climbs a couple of steps to the front door 
of the house, these very same steps will seem to have been transformed 
right afterwards into an infinitely long staircase by editing together several 
close-ups of the key falling down the many steps in slow motion (Nr. 9-12). 
The literary “…it would seem that…” becomes being in the f ilm by manipu-
lating time. Right at the beginning of the f ilm then, after the protagonist 
has approached the front door of her lover’s house with decisive steps, 
she loses control over herself along with the key – as is conveyed by the 
slow motion – and her perception of her surroundings. The slowed-down 
movements of the key appear to the identif ied and infected perception 
of the spectators as a paralysis of their own deciding power, their own 
ability to intervene. The suddenly transformed steps defy any perceptual 
intentions, or to put it the other way around, they no longer have control 
over the temporal spaces of the world. The problem of any interpretation of 
this f ilm remains that the intensity of a feeling produced by compressing 
time – of paralysis, of resistance, or of heaviness – always leaves open vari-
ous other justif ications at the same time, or, to use the terms of objective 
psychology, it links together different relations. With this f irst use of slow 
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motion, spectators are seized by the same disturbance of perception that 
the protagonist is experiencing.
The steps inside the home are slowed down using the same trick. Frustra-
tion, in the literal sense of deception, is conveyed to the spectator as a 
technological trick. Deren passes the instructions for producing this effect 
on to amateur f ilmmakers:
… to achieve on f ilm the sense of an endless frustrating flight of stairs, the 
great Hollywood studios would probably spend hundreds on the building 
of a set. You, however, can do it for just the price of the f ilm required to 
photograph any ordinary stairway three times – the f irst angle shows 
all but the top landing, the second angle shows the flight without any 
landings included, and the third angle shows the f light with the top 
landing. If the actor climbs the visible portion of the stairs three times at 
a consistent rhythm, you will succeed in having created a stairway three 
times as long as the real one.21
Film reality is not created from existing relations, but from optically 
constructed ones. Exertion, fear, and the feeling of futility that befall the 
protagonist are not mimicked, but simulated in f ilm perception.
A further trick to manipulate spatial feeling is to link spaces by linking 
two flash pans. A long and constantly accelerating pan (Nr. 16) through a 
room is edited during the blurriness of motion together with a pan that 
constantly decelerates and ends in a completely different room (Nr. 17). Later 
in the f ilm (Nr. 42) there is a pan away from these same rooms without a cut, 
and a staircase that was not there before becomes visible in the center. This 
gives rise to a new topological context of a space that seems to be familiar. 
An interlacing space that conceals its knots in the editing. The discomfort 
in this constellation appears not only as a serious doubt in the protagonist’s 
perceptive capacities, but also as a slight doubt in one’s own ability to re-
member. Such paradoxical spaces appear complex, but they are the result 
of simple editing tricks, which, due to their speed, fall below the threshold 
of conscious perception and intertwine feelings of time and space. Meshes, 
used as a technical term, not only means a network, but also feedback loops, 
that is, a term that meant more than handwork and handcraft in 1942. These 
feedbacks of perception, which are due to non-perceptible manipulations, 
the cinematic tricks of single frames, are what induces one into a cinematic 
trance. The discreet charm of the Maltese cross. Since he overlooked this 
systematic dismantling of duration in time done by recording technology, 
Gregory Bateson could not analyze trance – at least not in f ilm.
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Hammid and Deren also create illusionary continuity by using the flash 
pan to compress time. In a chase sequence between the protagonist and 
a f igure dressed in black, f lash pans link up not only different spaces, but 
also different recording speeds. The f igure in black walks up the street in 
slow motion, the camera follows her, then pans very quickly back. In the 
blurriness of the motion the next shot is edited in, which begins with a 
f lash pan that slows down, and then ends on the young woman who, in 
normal speed, takes up the chase (Nr. 32-38). Thus arises the paradoxical 
time structure that the person walking away moves extremely slowly while 
the chaser is walking very quickly and yet cannot catch up with the other. 
To conscious perception, however, they are in the same space and thus 
in the same time continuum. The paradox that the quick walker cannot 
catch up with the slower woman is resolved by the visual perceptual logic 
that knows nothing of technological tricks in that it draws compensatory 
“conclusions” that here could be called “unconscious conclusions”, to bor-
row a term from Helmholtz. Because the spaces cannot be differentiated 
optically, the different movement qualities of the two f igures get attributed 
to these f igures themselves as emotional qualities. The woman in black 
appears “uncanny” and “threatening” in her movements, the woman being 
chased “desperate” or “frustrated.”
The exact reversal of this construction, in which the change in time takes 
place over the course of the pan or as the scene goes on, is seen at the end 
of the f ilm Ritual in Transfigured Time, in which a woman, who is f leeing 
in normal time, cannot escape her pursuer, who chases her in slow motion. 
Here as well, the uncanniness of the spatio-temporal situation created by 
f ilm gets attributed to the man as an omnipotent f iend.
This transposition of the quality of a movement, which gets recorded 
technologically and thus produced and defined cinematically, to the charac-
ter of a person who moves is fundamental to watching cinema. It is a cultural 
means of perception, and it repeats the tactical history of the dispositif: the 
way from physiologically measuring a person to psychologically assessing 
him, which masks the operation of measuring. According to the cinema-
convention we spectators attribute cinematically produced variations of 
speed and movement to the actors’ bodies, not to the f ilm technologies 
that actually create them. But even if Deren initially only sees her tricks 
as the poetry of the medium, the paradoxical structures simultaneously 
expose the functions of the medium. The simplest manipulations of the time 
structure can make two different characters out of the same actress – in 
Meshes of the Afternoon it is always Maya Deren herself. Rudolf Arnheim 
described this logic in the sense of the experiments from Gestalt theory: 
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“The change of speed not only served to adapt visual movement to the 
range of human perception, but also changed the expressive qualities of 
an action.”22
Deren and Hammid have strategically reversed here what turns up 
again in the discussion with Bateson about recording and assessment in 
the documentary material from Bali. The parameters of illustration allow 
what is f ilmed to appear in a particular and preconfigured system that has 
already structured and shaped the innocent observation of the senses, be it 
those of the ethnologist of the spectator in the cinema. While it is also not 
possible to perceive at all except through such a matrix, the gaze should 
nonetheless – and this is the point of Meshes – be drawn to the meshes of 
the f ilm.
Another trick for interweaving chronology is the repetition of certain 
shots that are edited with different connections over the course of the f ilm, 
that is, into a different temporal context. Shot Nr. 21 for example shows a 
close-up of a pillow, then follows with a pan right to a record player where 
a record is spinning; the woman’s hand picks up the needle and pauses the 
record player. The shot fades out into blurriness after another pan to the 
left. Much later, shot Nr. 61 begins with a medium shot from below of the 
woman, looking down and holding out her hand. Shot Nr. 62 is a medium 
close-up of the record player, the woman’s hand comes into the picture 
as the camera zooms in on the record player. When the framing is almost 
identical with that of Nr. 21, she lifts the needle up again, once again paus-
ing the recording player… This repetition of the action appears in a new 
spatio-temporal context, thus disturbing the logic of the story. Once again 
the paradoxical structure actuates the circuits of logical attribution. Our 
perception in the cinema tends to adjust what it sees to the usual experi-
ences of time and space, thus falling into paradoxical loops of causality. If 
the same action is shown twice, then it will be a memory of the protagonist. 
If, however, as its introduction suggests, it is a second, identical action, 
then there must be something from outside that deceives the protagonist. 
What is specif ic to f ilm in this structure is that spaces and chronologies, 
but also identities and movements are f irst identif ied and organized in an 
automatism of reception, and are always only perceived as contradictory 
after the fact. Optical illusions in painting can be distinguished from those 
in f ilm in that the latter occur in linear time and cannot be verif ied over the 
course of projection. The constant belatedness with which consciousness 
recognizes the steps of perception as missteps thus becomes a disturbance 
of perception and of consciousness itself. All these dissociations, which 
are called “dreamlike” in interpretations, arise from simple technological 
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manipulations, which can be achieved with a Bolex or with simple edits 
made at the f ilm viewer. In Meshes of the Afternoon the dream of a romantic 
relationship becomes a somnambulistic pursuit and failure of two people to 
meet. They wander, deferred in time, through spaces and when they f inally 
meet, the young woman has already lost herself in her doppelgänger, her 
depictions on f ilm. If desire, running up and down stairs, is represented 
as a nightmare of desire structured by others and many other little things, 
this other is absolutely cinematic.
Through Meshes of the Afternoon Deren came to understand two things, 
as she wrote to the jury for a Guggenheim grant: “First, that a creative 
work of art implied the creation of an imaginative experience or reality 
rather than a reproduction of one already existent; and second, that that 
experience would be created out of the nature of the art instrument by 
which it was, in fact, realized.”23 Film is no longer about representation, but 
about constructing experiences that are even more real when they reveal 
historicity and relativity in the technologies of depiction themselves. In her 
second f ilm, At Land, which was shot in New York and on Long Island in 
1944, illusionary compressions of space and time become so much the object 
of the f ilm that Deren can summarize her long literary scenario in a single 
sentence, which for its part brings together perception, time, space and 
history: “At Land is concerned with 20th century-minded time and space.”24
This f ilm begins with a radical manipulation of time. Scenes are edited 
in backwards. At f irst we see the entire screen f illed with breaking waves. 
A woman’s body shows up lying in the spray and is bathed, white on black, 
by the water. When the shot comes closer to the woman, the f ilm material 
is edited in from front to back and in reverse – and thus, due to the technol-
ogy of projection, it is also turned on its head.25 The waves pull back from 
the woman to the sea in a strange and peculiar way, while the woman at 
f irst lies there unmoved. Her physical and sensual presence thus seems to 
follow a simple duration in progressive time, for there is no indication of 
any backward direction in her own physical chronology. This gives force to 
two temporal movements of the gaze. One part of the image seems to run 
backwards, an equally strong part of the image, or even stronger through the 
sensual presence of the beautiful protagonist, seems to run forwards in time. 
This gives rise to a dissociation in the perception of time, a schizoization 
of time. The drifting apart of two parallel sensations of time produces a 
circumstance in which a permanent psychic or perceptual-physiological 
compensation in the spectator attempts to adjust to the paradoxical 
processes and regresses on screen. Strictly speaking, this self-correcting 
self-ref lection of perception, regulated by external impulses, is already 
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trance. The time of perception and the perceived time periods displace one 
another without there being any absolute time of consciousness as a holding 
point. When a close-up of the woman’s eye movements follows the scene of 
the sea in the f ilm, which ultimately allows for no conclusions whatsoever 
to be drawn as to whether the material is running backwards or once again 
forwards, seeing has to be let go. Perception is squarely placed under the 
regime of f ilm movement. The following movements by the protagonist are 
then set apart from all reality of the beach with a hyperreality. Her move-
ments make her appear as a stranger in her surroundings. At the same time 
her sensual presence challenges the photographic realism of the sea waves.
Deren not only employs inversions of chronology, but also slow motion 
and time lapse in a way that disturbs the perception of speed and reflects 
on their determination from outside. When, for example, some of an actor’s 
movements are executed very quickly, but recorded in slow motion, the 
movement is seen in projection at a “normal” speed, albeit with qualities 
that only slow motion produces. The impression of emotional closeness that 
slow motion can produce is therefore also seen in normal time. In At Land 
there is an example of this in a scene in which the actor’s head movements 
seem to be a continuation of the previous scene in normal speed, but the 
delayed speed of her hair in the wind show this movement to be accelerated 
movement shot in slow motion. So this illusion makes it clear that any 
so-called normality of movement is no longer a matter of normal speed or of 
the normal course of movement, but a matter of a movement-combination 
achieved through a camera technique.
For Deren, as for the directors of the French Nouvelle Vague twenty years 
later, it is about mixing emotional affects against conventions, genres, and 
topoi. In this sequence as well, two different feelings of time are aroused 
in parallel, and a feedback loop of the senses produces a kind of visual 
echo in the brain. The different movements on screen place the spectator 
in particular but contradictory positions in relation to the image. We are 
temporarily displaced. By cutting things up into single frames, the physiol-
ogy of the actor’s movements can be reassembled in any number of ways. 
“(Slow motion) can create movements which are deceptively normal”, wrote 
Deren.26 In the natural and idyllic surroundings of the beach everything 
seems calm and unthreatening when suddenly there is the movement of 
the girl out of the water itself. But the sensual quality of her movements, 
the innocence of her appearance, and the fact that we are not immediately 
aware of the technical manipulation shift the uncanny quality back – in 
the spectator’s perception – to the carefree paradisiacal beach. Emotions 
in the cinema are thus constantly compressed and shifted further.
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When the woman from the sea f inally goes onto shore, there comes 
another spatial trick, which is an extension of the scene with the steps 
from Meshes of the Afternoon. The protagonist draws up from the beach 
and onto a tree stump. This is recorded from three different camera angles 
– from above against the backdrop of the sand, horizontally, and from 
below against the backdrop of the sky – so that the way to get there seems 
insurmountably long. The impression is made even stronger by the use of 
barely perceptible slow motion. Furthermore, her climbing is interwoven 
with another scene edited in parallel, in which the protagonist scales the 
table at a dinner party (Nr. 20-29). Maya Deren had hoped and claimed 
that the identif ication effect of photography – “the compulsive reality of 
photography” – that is, the identif ication of the woman on the beach with 
the woman at the dinner table, would link the scenes into a continuity. 
“There is a central personage who is identif iable in At Land: and whose 
identity serves as a continuity method.”27 In fact, however, the perceived 
continuity, which connects the obvious difference between the locations, 
is made even stronger as the protagonist’s movements are slowed down 
over the course of the edit and are executed more intensely as she feels her 
way. Physical movements, time, and space are connected in the f ilm in 
contrast to the various conventions that the protagonist is working against. 
What is fascinating in Deren’s spectacle is how easily she adapts, bodily 
and sensually, to the artif icial times and spaces. Like a cat she feels her way 
through the f ilm spaces, in springy, dancing movements, which in front 
of the camera must in part have been completely artif icial, slowed down, 
sped up, or fragmented. Complementary to this, the woman at the camera 
is also meant to adapt herself to the apparatus in order to make moving 
images: “[…] the body with its complex combinations of joints, swivels, 
etc., mounted on very adequate legs, can put, at the service of the camera, 
a variety and combination of movements which even the most elaborate 
tripod could not begin to offer.”28 The f ilm At Land has been described as a 
process of a woman growing up and becoming an artist,29 but this transition 
can be seen as more than becoming a camerawoman in a doubled sense. A 
connection emerges between body and apparatus, which appears as a new 
being in the movements on screen.
There is a preliminary form in Meshes of the Afternoon to the editing 
through continuous motion, which Deren herself would describe in retro-
spect as the prototype for all her successive works. At the end of this f ilm (Nr. 
131-136) one of the many Deren doppelgängers strides through the world with 
a knife in her hand in order to cut her own throat when she’s arrived at the 
other end. We see her feet in close-up as she walks in a continual path over 
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the beach, over grass, over a street, and f inally stepping up onto a staircase. 
“What I meant when I planned that four stride sequence was that you have 
to come a long way to kill yourself, like the f irst life emerging from primeval 
waters”, she wrote to James Card. “Those four strides, in my intention, span 
all time.[…] As I used to sit there and watch the f ilm when it was projected 
for friends in those early days, that one short sequence always rang a bell 
or buzzed a buzzer in my head. It was like a crack letting light of another 
world gleam through.”30 Indeed, the film does have a different, earlier ending 
in which the protagonist escapes the trap of self-perception, but the quasi 
last ending, which is a murder of the self among doppelgängers, contains 
yet another peculiar twist. Among the doubled women, the one who dies 
is the one who was always alone in the picture, who never let herself be 
copied or simulated, who could not move through the artif icial cinematic 
spaces and therefore could not merge with them. Those doppelgängers that 
gather around the table in their multiplicity, chat, and f inally pass a death 
sentence on the one – who is presented as the original – thus turn out to be 
resistant to romance love, to the deceptions of technical apparatuses and 
to the threats raised by the transforming mirror images. They stay cool, 
they are twentieth-century-minded or even cinematomorphic. Meshes of 
the Afternoon marks the beginning of the evolution of a cinema-being in 
Deren’s f ilms, a being for whom going through technical processes and 
images possibly means intensifying relations to the world. An intensifying 
that becomes perceptible to sleepers in the cinema as an emotionalization.
At Land does not yet signify the arrival into the new world that Deren had 
referred to in the letter to James Card, but is a search for forms of new, tech-
nologically manipulated relations to time and space. Stop trick sequences 
and illusionary connections between movements are deployed in ever new 
variations and combinations in order to push perception to the limits of its 
capacity to integrate. But wherever clear-cut self-consciousness, which is 
supposed to go along with clear-cut perception, has to be abandoned, the 
emotional side effects continue on unbroken. For Deren this test was a way 
of trying out the technical effectivity of f ilm methods: “This concern with 
time and space is not purely technical and one is not aware of the devices 
of the cinema because of the emotional ramif ications of this concern.”31
The odyssey through time frames in f ilm tests the relativizing of one’s 
own body in space and time through sensual impulses – and not only on the 
protagonist, but also on the spectator in the cinema. The diff iculty of build-
ing up a stable relationship to the fragmented and contradictory elements 
of new time-spaces is not only the topic of the f ilm, it is at the same time 
adapted and altered for viewing cinema. The adjustment of the individual 
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to cinematic circumstances takes place through a cybernetic link between 
perception and the cinematic apparatus. A gradual stabilization of subjects 
examined by historical technologies is possible due to the interventions 
and encroachments of cinema technology into the structures of perception. 
Cinema creates artistic continuity where physical relativity rules.
Deren’s f ilms enmesh gazes into images. Rudolf Arnheim’s remembrance 
of Deren’s f ilms shows that the transformation of technology into mental 
states has succeeded as seduction: “What we can assert is that the sequences 
of her images are logical. They are never arbitrary or absurd. They follow the 
letter of a law we never studied on paper; but guided by our eyes, our minds 
conform willingly.”32 The f ilm critic f inds himself and describes himself in 
complete trance. The dancer had enchanted him as a technician and as a 
scholar. The f ilm maintains the “incontrovertible impact of reality” that 
Deren claims for photographic images by immediately joining the specta-
tor’s perception and power of imagination with the artif icially construed 
worlds. Screen fuses with retina. Attention willingly subjects itself to optics 
and montage. Sujet supposé voir.
This is also the context in which Deren disrupts the understanding of 
identif ication from the theoretical calcif ication that it had been allowed to 
become, at the latest during the forties, a calcif ication made up of an act of 
idealization and subjugation to a higher principle, both in a psychological 
and a political sense. Identif ication, such as Deren needs for her cinema, is 
merely a process of transformation: “Identif ication – the idea of becoming 
something else – is a democratic, not a hierarchical concept.”33
In the short f ilm A Study in Choreography for the Camera, which Deren 
shot in 1945, this identif ication is relinquished entirely to the analysis and 
synthesis of movements. Here it is no longer the identity of the dancer, but 
the continuity of the dance that produces connections in the film.34 Film has 
altered the parameters of what is worthy of being recorded of people, and 
the short f ilm demonstrates the indistinguishability of dancer and dance 
on the f ield of the social, in which technical penetration places the subject.
In the barely two minutes that the f ilm lasts, seven optical time-space 
constructions create a dance in twenty shots that is due to the f ilm chore-
ography and that could not be achieved anywhere else but in the cinema. 
The dance that the camera choreographs is a symbiotic function of man and 
machine: “Moreover, (the dancer) shares with the camera, a collaborative 
responsibility for the movements themselves. This is, in other words, a dance 
which can exist only on f ilm.”35 But it is not only in the recording process, 
but also in the projection that this dance is a web that emerges when the 
spectator surrenders herself to the technological time frame in the cinema.
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The f irst camera construction in the f ilm is a very long pan in which 
the dancer Talley Beatty shows up at four spots between the trees of a 
wooded area. This pan is assembled from four shorter, very even pans, 
shot from a tripod. The second construction is a variation on movement 
continuity across spatial distances. The dancer stretches out in long circular 
movements, the f irst part of which is still in the wooded area, while the 
following parts take place in a variety of interior spaces, and the extension 
of the time of certain phases of movement is repeated and overlap. Over the 
course of this dance sequence the dancer – this would be the third purely 
optical choreography – ends up in front of a mirror, and the moving f igure is 
doubled in the image: a pas de deux through the mirror. The fourth and fifth 
tricks are accelerations of the movement by means of spatial or temporal 
contraction. In the shot in the Egyptian Court at the Metropolitan Museum 
a sequence of jumps on the diagonals toward the rear corner of the room, 
and then back to the camera, seems uncannily accelerated because the 
use of a wide angle lens compresses the spatial relations. The reduced focal 
length functions as a mental time lapse. The space gets a dynamism which 
then creates artif icial emotions. The same can be said of the treatment 
of time. When the dancer spins in front of a four-headed Buddha, Deren 
accelerates the pirouette by turning the f ilm speed down in the Bolex from 
its maximum 64 frames per second to 8 frames per second, thus achieving 
an extreme fast motion – while an assistant closes the aperture so that the 
lighting conditions remain stable. The manipulation of the camera appears 
as art and skill, as a quality of the dancer.
When Beatty eventually advances to one last great cinematically con-
structed leap, so that his head, torso, legs, and f inally even his heels f ly up 
and out of the image on the screen, the spectators are already deceived 
by this f irst phase of movement, since his jump is a landing cut in reverse 
into the f ilm, a fall edited in reverse. But since the jump continues, all that 
remains from the beginning is the impression of a particularly buoyant 
take off. In the end the various phases of movement of a jump that is shot 
in silhouette against the sky are edited together into almost 30 seconds of 
f loating in space before the dancer f inally lands. The camera constructs 
the reality of an artif icially cinematic dance.
Beatty’s jump, which, as one critic noted, was actually Deren’s jump,36 
displays the marionette f igures whose movements are the movements that 
we see on screen. Three of the dance tricks described here are not even due 
to the editing, but merely to the recording technique. This makes it clear 
that every movement on screen is the event of a technical construction done 
by those holding the camera. By selecting the lens, the framing, the speed, 
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and the spatial perspective, they create movements and times that only exist 
through the f ilm. “Certainly the camera is unique, among art instruments, 
in its ability to itself create time – not merely a sense of it – abut an actual 
period. It can create time which is accelerated, attenuated or arrested.”37 
It is such camera and cinematic constructions that Deren wanted to draw 
attention to, and that exceed ordinary entanglements of time in the cinema:
By a manipulation of time and space I do not mean such established 
f ilmic techniques as flash-backs, parallel actions, etc. Parallel actions for 
instance – as in a sequence that we see, alternatingly, the hero who rushes 
to the rescue and the heroine, whose situation becomes increasingly 
critical – is an omnipresence on the part of the camera as a witness of 
action, not as a creator of it.38
In her last f ilm The Very Eye of Night the dancers’ movements f inally be-
come composed of camera movements in such a way that the dancers are 
floatingly danced through the cinematic space in a quiet ballet. Body and 
movement meet each other in ever more abstract relations.
In her experiments with time and space, Deren was initially working with 
dance movements because they can be more easily edited, since they have 
their own rhythm. In the f ilm Ritual in Transfigured Time, however, she 
transforms ordinary movements into dance movements. Once again, this is 
due to the choreography of the camera: “…first I should state, for the benefit 
and ease of anyone overawed by the f ilm’s title, that the transf igurations 
of time are, on one level, just technical devices…” wrote the critic Ken 
Kelman.39 In the f ilm’s most famous choreographic moment, gestures of 
greeting were assembled from numerous encounters into a social ritual, 
although the course of movement during the repeated shootings was already 
so heavily ritualized that the movements recorded cannot be called either 
voluntary or involuntary. In a variety of sequences in which there are vari-
ous degrees of slow motion, Deren organized the rhythm of the movements 
with a metronome, the basic instrument of all psycho-laboratories.
In a further development of the examples from Meshes of the Afternoon, 
in the f ilm Ritual in Transfigured Time various recording speeds are also 
assembled into a space that had been established in the f ilm as continuous. 
The experiment is carried out in mathematical regularity. In one sequence 
at the beginning of the f ilm (Nr. 11-23) the two protagonists meet, played 
by Maya Deren and the dancer Rita Christiani. Maya Deren allows woolen 
yarn to unwind from her outstretched arms with great, even rocking move-
ments, and Rita Christiani then winds it into a ball either in countershot 
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or “over-shoulder.” While Rita Christiani is consistently shot in 24 frames 
per second, Deren slows down her own movements in the countercuts by 
increasing the slow motion from 48 to 64 and f inally to 128 frames per 
second, which means that even the possibilities of the Bolex here are much 
exceeded and Deren has to resort to copying and doubling single frames.40 
The person whose movements are slowed down is imbued with a psychologi-
cal unreality that can once again be described as dreamlike. In the context 
of this sequence, however, she appears as the f ilm echo to the movement 
of the other, who had entered the room with outstretched arms and eyes 
wide open, like the cliché of a sleepwalker. The cinematic entrancement is 
an extension of the symbolic-iconographic one.
In the ritual of greeting, the already ritualized movement sequences are 
eventually assembled from copies of the partial movements duplicated in 
the lab (Nr. 60-66), where the beginning and end of the sequence varies, 
bringing in a dancelike effect once again: the same old pattern in ever 
different performance. From this montage, which increasingly concentrates 
on detail, the dance and the dancers lose their center until the couple’s 
encounter develops from the dissolution of bodies.
The protagonists’ dance sequences in the park are also constructed 
by copying in doubled sequences (Nr. 71-73) and structured by different 
speeds of slow motion (Nr. 73 ff.). While the naturalistic parts of the dance, 
f ilmed without any particular manipulation, seem somewhat inappropri-
ately pathos-laden, all the dance sequences that were actually produced 
artif icially get all the attention and sympathy. Involuntarily we follow a 
jump in which a body successfully f ights against gravity, tensed up in all 
its physical detail until the very end.
Certain phases of movement in this sequence are held for seconds at a 
time in frozen images, and exuberance turns to horror when the dancers 
are solidif ied into a depiction of a demonic f igure somewhere between the 
god Pan and a Golem. Displaced from his solidif ication into slow-motion, he 
will be able to catch up with those who are hurriedly fleeing with his slow 
jumps. Tension, danger, and fear are not developed through mimicry in the 
scene, but through the gradual manipulation of time. In this scene Deren 
simulates and stimulates feelings and sensations in mathematical precision 
by means of gradations of the camera, and she controls the connections 
between nervous and mechanical impulses precisely not “by feeling”, but 
by producing feeling.
In the f ilm Ritual in Transfigured Time the transmission of the calculated 
feelings runs in different directions. “Ritual is about the nature and process 
of change”, explained Deren in a letter to James Card.41 The narrative of 
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Ritual in Transfigured Time can be described as the cinematic transfor-
mation of a widow into a bride. The inspiration for this f ilm was Marcel 
Duchamp’s “Le Passsage de la vierge à la mariée.” Like “La Mariée mise à 
nu par les célibataires”, “Le Roi et la reine entourés de nus rapides”, and 
f inally the famous “Nu descendant un escalier”, it is part of his series of 
stop-motion pictures that are all re-workings of the series by Étienne-Jules 
Marey.42 In “Le Passage de la vierge à la mariée”, the rest of a triptych is 
still recognizable, but unlike in the case of Holbein’s “The Ambassadors” 
the viewer does not need to move in order to see it. Instead, he or she is 
visually moved. Duchamp’s passage from virgin to bride is no longer meant 
to show a Marian mystery, but technological transformation. Like all his 
stop-motion pictures, this passage is also an image that thematizes and re-
stages the modification of the body by means of the illustrative techniques. 
He repeats the temporal segmentation that made what was illustrated in 
chronophotography into an object of study for physiologists, but also to 
supra-individuals that unfold out in their own traces: omnipresent and 
not contained in any body. On the other hand, Duchamp transposes the 
perception of visually stuttering movement from chronophotography into 
painting in such a way that the spectator literally becomes an involuntary 
voyeur of a wedding night, because and while all the trembling, f idgeting, 
slipping, and turning is conjured up before our eyes. Duchamp also found 
it amusing here to put the f ixed gaze of the voyeur itself into motion, and 
in doing so to make the viewer the subject and object of the transformative 
illustration.
The different slow motions that Deren deploys as a procedure of analyz-
ing and synthesizing reality are also always a reference to and a reverence 
for the f irst studies of motion in chronophotography. “Slow-motion is the 
microscope of time. One of the most lyric sequences I have ever seen was the 
slow-motion footage of the flight of birds photographed by an ornithologist 
interested in their varied aerodynamics.”43 Deren herself follows the analyses 
of psychologists and behavioral researchers who found the truth of basic 
emotional movements in dissecting visual and perceptible surfaces. Deren 
dissects the party scene in Ritual in Transfigured Time into emotional ele-
ments from which the dynamic and the impression of a society in society 
can be transformed into a ritual:
But apart from such scientif ic uses, slow-motion can be brought to the 
most casual activities to reveal in them a texture of emotional and 
psychological complexes. For example, the course of a conversation is 
normally characterized by indecisions, defiances, hesitation, distractions, 
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anxieties, and other emotional undertones. In reality these are so fugitive 
as to be invisible. But the explorations by slow-motion photography, the 
agony of its analysis, reveals, in such an ostensible casual situation, a 
profound human complex.44
Therefore, what is human in these movements is discovered through 
technical f ilm analysis. This discovery is then absolutely consequential, 
and is taken as a re-definition of what counts as human in the history of 
device-based psychology at the end of the nineteenth century.
The cinematic dissection of reality is therefore and at the same time an 
analysis of what is hidden behind the perceived temporal f low of everyday 
life, and on the other hand, the spectator’s own perception is plainly shown 
by synthesizing movements in the cinema, by repeating and arranging 
sequences. Perception of movement becomes the experience of cinema, 
movement becomes artwork, integrating the machine operator, the specta-
tor, and even the non-professional actor:
The reprinting of scenes of a casual situation involving several persons 
may be used either in a prophetic context, as a déjà-vu; or, again, precise 
reiteration, by intercutting reprints, if those spontaneous movements, 
expressions, and exchanges, can change the quality of the scene form one 
of informality to that of a stylization akin to dance; in so doing it confers 
dance upon non dancers, by shifting emphasis from the purpose of the 
movement to the movement itself.45
As Poincaré stated in 1895, the same year as the so-called invention of 
cinema, movement is necessary in order to get information about the 
psychical nature of stimuli from the information of neurons, all of which 
can only convey different degrees of stimulus, since it is from movement 
that an epistemology of learning through action emerges.46 Proprioception. 
Methods of the dancers. Forming a network of bodies. Cinema, although it 
only affects visual perception and in sound f ilm also acoustic perception, 
is a complementary epistemological structure. It itself induces motion 
perception and therefore conveys new spatiotemporal contexts as experi-
ence. Deren was always attempting to get at such an epistemology of the 
cinema by combining photographic realism and motion perception. Using 
the example of slow motion, she describes the manipulation of perception, 
of the “mind”, as an extension of experience: “Yes, slow-motion is not simply 
slowness of speed. It is, in fact, something which exists in our minds, not 
on the screen, and can be created only in conjunction with the identif iable 
96 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
reality of the photographic image.”47 Cinema appears as a technology of 
calling on, synthesizing, and forming certain psychic states.
Guilbaud pointed out, in his principles of cybernetics, that it is f irst and 
foremost the connection of time and space that forms meshes, nets, webs, 
networks, “réseaux” in the cybernetic sense.
Les thèmes, très variés de la cybernétique se laissent assez facilement 
grouper autour de deux thèmes majeurs: l’un est spatial et l’autre tem-
porel. Le premier, que nous avons suivi pour commencer, est celui d’une 
structure des relations, c’est le thème du réseau: asservissements circuits 
ou boucles de réaction (feedback).[…] Aux connexions spatiales, il faut 
donc joindre les connexions temporelles : le future dépend du passé. Or, 
les connexions spatiales et les connexions temporelles ne sont en fait, 
que deux points de vue sur une même réalité.48
Even if the mathematization of these networks, which Guilbaud has to 
require,49 are not conceivable at all levels for the cinema; the meshes of time 
and space that Maya Deren forms through discretions of elements, through 
their iteration and recombination can be completely understood as feedback 
in perceptual logic. As the meshes and matrices of watching movies, in 
which the individual must let herself be caught up and transformed at the 
very least.
Doubling, Identification, Becoming Other
Since Maya Deren did not wish to understand identif ication as establishing 
a consistent personality, but as a process of change (“Identif ication – the 
idea of becoming something else”50), the motif of the doppelgänger in her 
f ilms can be described as experiments using medial transformations. In 
Meshes of the Afternoon the depersonalizations and re-identif ications of 
the protagonist are staged as encounters, as collisions with reality as it 
is constructed in f ilm. The f irst tricks by means of which the protagonist 
is doubled are entanglements of time and space in the montage. A f irst 
doppelgänger appears after the woman has fallen asleep in the armchair 
(Nr. 9), then repeating her arrival at the entrance to the house. After the 
shot with the record player has been repeated (Nr. 21 and 62), there is a cut 
from the protagonist lifting up the needle to the same character sleeping 
in the armchair. The appearance of further doppelgängers, all following 
in the time-labyrinths that are invisibly entangled through the editing 
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technique, becomes even more ominous because they are appearances in 
temporal consecutiveness, self-pursuit, a self-“chase”, which consequently 
ends in a battle with the self and with killing the self. As in romantic stories 
of people selling eyes, shadows, and souls, the protagonist is killed by a self 
that foils her desire as a stranger. This other, however, as has turned out in 
the examination of artif icial time frames, is the f ilm experience itself in 
Meshes of the Afternoon.
In his essay on the uncanny, Freud pointed out the distinction “between 
the uncanny that we actually experience and the uncanny that we merely 
picture or read about”51 in order to show that illusion of identif ication is 
necessary for the feeling to overtake one. In the older neuro-psychological 
economy, Freud explains that “every affect belonging to an emotional im-
pulse, whatever its kind, is transformed, if it is repressed, into anxiety” and 
that there must therefore be a group of anxious states that can be explained 
as the return of the repressed. This also includes the uncanny as the “secretly 
familiar” that returns from repression.52 When a doppelgänger’s appearance 
becomes uncanny in the f ilm, this is because it proves that the copy leads 
a highly autonomous existence. In its various presentations it shows the 
prototype, the non-f ilmed original, that being captured in photography, 
for all its identif iability, can make an individual’s data off icial and public, 
its beauty and horror, old age or youth, tension or relaxation, qualities 
about which one can know nothing as corps propre, on in oneself. The 
doppelgänger demystif ies the technological divisibility of the individual. 
With the new media of the nineteenth century, identif ication and identity 
became a matter of technological recording, and eliminated all forms of 
self-assurance that was imagined in a space outside this frame of reference 
with the help of instantaneous photo-processing.
Moving about in the cinematic space in doubles and triples, the multiple 
doppelgängers in Meshes of the Afternoon compete with the romantic lone 
woman, modelled after literary predecessors, who is always trying to see 
herself through the windowpane and who, romantic all the while, must die 
from this. It is she who want to be the ego at all costs. And so she brings the 
uncanny into play. Deren’s later f ilms only contain cinematic doppelgäng-
ers, ready for serial production, no longer uncanny and ominous. Instead 
they are multiplications and facets of a person who does not want to let 
herself get defined by the gaze of a great Other, but who herself uses the pos-
sibilities of reproduction to become other, and who subverts, multiplies, and 
recombines all the attributions in the image. The fact that the image cannot 
be controlled by the ego in the f ield of the strange arrangements makes no 
difference to these roaming collectors and dancers, who constantly change 
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shape. All attributions are dissolved over time in the multiple reflections 
of the gazes. In the cinema, as Deren’s f ilms were able to show despite all 
apparatus theory, it is not the conf irmation of an original ego function 
that is repeated, such as takes place in the mirror stage. Rather, the whole 
allure of secondary narcissistic identif ications is placed into the work, in 
which everyone is constantly changing, or desperately wishes to change, 
into a different futurist ego.
To this end, Deren uses the photographic image on screen, edited into 
the f ilm, which is capable of deceiving the others, all the more so when it 
lets down its own self-perception, time and time again. As a good player 
Deren puts herself completely into the task, allowing herself to be optically 
fragmented, putting her own involuntary, unconscious movements of the 
camera’s illustration on display and merging them in such a way that the 
spectators see the Other of the others, the depersonalization in every f ilm 
shoot, causing them to be deceived about their own conscious self in the 
cinema as well. The doublings, depersonalizations, and extensions on screen 
are experiments with the self, in which perception and self-perception are 
constantly and mutually modif ied: proprioception in the technologies of 
perception. This auspicious fusion with the camera, however, only works if 
no identities, truths, or diagnoses are attached to it. Seeing in the cinema 
is the deceptive illusion under which a subject is constituted, and possible 
meshes and impossible rituals are transformed in these deceptions.
In the f ilm At Land there is an episode that at f irst seems to belong in 
the repertoire of slapstick. The protagonist, who had already gone through 
various stations of going on land as an experience of civilization, encounters 
a cinematically multiplied personality in the man. While walking along 
a country lane she is shown to be in dialogue with a man who is always 
a different one (Nr. 56-64). The counterpart to this changing identity is 
her own constitution, but not as identity, but as continuity, that is, as an 
artif icial duration of a sequence of time:
In one sequence of my f ilm, At Land, I wished to establish the continuity 
of a girl walking down the road, and at the same time her relationship to 
a person walking with her, to her right, while the identity of that person 
remained f luid and uncertain. It is really a ‘change of identity’ scene 
similar to the common dream in which one person’s identity changes to 
another’s before our eyes.53
This trick, that a new man jumps into the image behind the back of the 
camera as it pans back and forth with the dialogue, is so unspectacular 
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that the small adjustments in perception provoked by the scene are barely 
noticeable. It is not the similarity of the men that poses the question of iden-
tity. Rather, it is the establishment of a continual timeframe in the f ilm, in 
which the four men appear in the same spot, walking in the same direction 
and taking part in the same conversation, which seeks to force cinematic 
understanding to identify in the f irst place.54 By means of this trick, identity 
is presented without mediation as intersubjective, as interrelational and 
techo-social determination, in which the subjects, the man and woman in 
the f ilm, exactly like actors in the studio or on screen and the spectators in 
the cinema, are subjected to one another in their temporal-spatial relations. 
All desire that arises between them is shown to be the waste product of an 
optical construction. This waste product, however, is the actual pleasure 
in f ilms, as it is in every relationship.
Pasolini staged quite similar sequences in Mamma Roma. While Anna 
Magnani walks in long takes along the bleak whoring streets on the outskirts 
of the city, she is accompanied time and again by single men or groups of 
boys who engage in her monologue, answer her, calling in commentary 
and jokes. For all their differences, these men also possess a single timeless 
identity. Mamma Roma’s monologue could in turn be spoken in f irst person 
by two and a half thousand years of Roman history. What she has to say 
is def ined by her relation as a whore to the men and to friends, and by the 
dilapidated roads of the outskirts. The men, however, also appear on the 
world’s stage only because they are allowed to be in relation to Roma – and 
in the mirror reverse at the intersection, to amoR.
The sequence in Deren’s At Land unfolds its meanings only in the context 
of the entire f ilm, which is crisscrossed by a symbolic play by and with chess 
pieces. At the beginning, animated chess pieces move before a single chess 
player at the end of a dinner party. Over the course of this party the black 
queen captures a white pawn which is dragged from the f ield, falls over, 
tumbles off the board and – in a movement continued past the cut – tumbles 
outside through meadows and into the sea, where it begins an odyssey 
through natural landscapes. The chess game relativizes all other actions in 
the f ilm, albeit not through the strategic moves on the board, but through 
the relation of the characters to the rules of the game. Animated by the 
f ilm’s tricks, the chess pieces leave the space and the patterns of movement 
through which they are defined in their possible opposing power relations. 
Away from the board they can no longer meet according to the old rules of 
art, but are exposed to new laws of motion from bubbling brooks, breaking 
waves, or blowing winds. In the space of the chess board or of geometral 
optics, as Lacan calls it in a language game, we are “in space partes extra 
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partes, which always provides such an objection to the apprehension to the 
object”,55 because the relations are prescribed. Outside this space, as the 
parable of sea to sea shows in At Land, there will always be disturbances 
in a logic of gazes and movements that alter the possibilities for movement, 
unlike in a chess game, not only in their combinatorics, but in the very 
structure of their rules, or, to speak in human terms, in their identity. Which 
means: a queen only remains a queen while on the chess board.
The movements that the characters resort to in the water, waves, and 
wind cause a change of register achieved for the individual by entering into 
the cinematic space. In the cinema there are “moti inter motos”, which are 
recognized and misrecognized as they transform. But what appears to be 
the great freedom of the white queen is at the same time also her entrance 
into a new dispositif, new rules, new traps. Fixed identity, which quickly and 
early on was transferred to body movements in a symbolic order in f ilm 
history, is dependent on the parameters under which these movements are 
measured. They vary from medium to medium. In f ilm they are parameters 
of movement, and only by manipulating times and spaces can they in turn 
be liberated cinematically.
In At Land Deren develops constructions of identity that differ from liter-
ary procedures, and simultaneously liberates them through deconstructions 
such as the multiple man as a f ilm trick. This is the ruse of this anti-odyssey. 
And the end of At Land is also cunning. The protagonist liberates the white 
queen from her chess board and thus from the coordinates of her symboli-
cally established forms of movement. If the protagonist stole the queen from 
the board, she walks through the spaces of her odyssey backwards: reversed, 
to see herself seeing once again in all the stations. The f ilm ends with a 
thirty-second-long shot in which the protagonist walks along the beach, 
her beautiful naked feet in beautiful indescribable movements, holding the 
white queen up in her hand. She leaves traces that, like all tracks in the sand, 
look archaically old and archaeologically ephemeral, and that can hardly 
provide any information about the people who were walking there, but for 
all that much more about the sorry state of sand on the seashore as a way 
to preserve human faces and stories. This “back-to-nature” will, even if this 
trace disappears after thirty seconds in the darkness of the projection space, 
turn out to be a “back-to-the-temporal-spatial-nature” of the Paillard-Bolex 
from Sainte-Croix in landlocked Switzerland.
Another trick to create doppelgängers in f ilm is the use of doppelgänger 
maskings, which cover a part of the lens. The f ilm is precisely rewound and 
then exposed numerous times. The company Paillard-Bolex made them to 
order, but a cameraman like Alexander Hammid would make them himself 
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at any rate, if only to be able not only to double the single f igures, but to 
multiply them even more. In Meshes of the Afternoon three doppelgängers 
come together for a round table discussion about the fate of the f irst, three 
Maya Derens sit in judgment over themselves at the same time (Nr. 115), 
much like how a photo from 1917 shows f ive Marcel Duchamps pondering 
themselves.
Ever since Otto Rank declared the doppelgänger as an anthropological 
mental constant in 1914, the prototype for creating doppelgängers in f ilm 
has been The Student of Prague, as it was brought to screen by Stellan Rye’s 
cameraman Guido Seeber. Seeber, who was responsible for all the technical 
tricks at German Bioscop from 1908 to 1914 (and who later shot The Joyless 
Street and Secrets of a Soul for Pabst), used this trick of masking in his f ilm 
from 1913 in order to transfer the old fable of the selling one’s mirror image 
to f ilm. In his images, Rank f irst observed that representation in f ilm “in 
numerous ways reminds us of dream-work.”56 This was, as Friedrich Kittler 
showed,57 already a misrepresentation and supersession of the history of 
psychoanalytic knowledge, since it was not film that imitated the dream. On 
the contrary, f ilm, as Freud had previously seen it, as a chronophotographic 
dissection of bodies and a way to store symptoms at Salpêtrière, was the 
technical prerequisite for psychological and dream analysis. Before one 
could f ind symptoms in the body, before the ego could be confronted with 
a symptomatic Other, the body as body had to be able to be recorded and 
stored with all its marks and defects.
The doppelgänger in Deren’s f ilms are reworkings of human subjectivity 
in the age of the time machines, among which the camera, alongside the 
radio, the airplane, and concepts of relativity, is one of the most impor-
tant.58 Doppelgängers do not have a psychic or psychological origin, but 
come from the history of cinema itself, and take possession of realistic 
bodies. Since it became possible to indicate identity as the information of 
technological media by bertillonage, doppelgängers have been a problem of 
lighting. The relevant originary dispositif in f ilm history of all later double 
and triple exposures, long before the cameraman Guido Seeber’s tricks 
were constructed, was indeed Étienne-Jules Marey’s multiple exposures 
of a single photographic plate on which he recorded the course of motion. 
One and the same soldier jumped, fought, and ran in the depiction, vainly 
competing with himself, but since he was a being synthesized out of his 
own jumps in the stop-motion images, he could also float above all reality 
like the dancers in Deren’s f ilm.
Time and again, Deren’s delight in mobilizing doppelgängers generates the 
constellations in which the characters “see themselves seeing themselves” 
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through the countershot logic of gazes. In the repertoire of experimental 
f ilm this is a trick that is almost as old as doppelgänger masking, and Luis 
Buñuel deployed it extensively in Un Chien Andalou, that classic about the 
abysses and the traps of the gaze, in the sadomasochistic conversation of 
the protagonist with himself (partly using a stand-in, who was f ilmed from 
behind). In Meshes of the Afternoon the protagonist sees herself walking 
(65ff). And she sees her doppelgängers looking at themselves (121 ff.). In At 
Land the protagonist sees herself in the end with the looted or liberated 
white queen running through all seven of the previous stations (133 ff.): “The 
impression is that she is running backward through time, through all the 
action which she herself has carried out, and which she can see herself still 
carrying out, and that she, who is carrying them out, can also see the one who 
runs by.”59 Lacan called the illusion that the “ego” could see itself seeing itself 
“an avoidance of the function of the gaze” because no ego will get to see itself 
as what it had taken itself for. Due to the symbolic network of the rules of 
illustration or the symbolic orders, the ego will get to see what it did not want 
to see. Over the course of a f ilm, however, a new experience emerges when 
the movement of the symbolic and the dynamic of the imaginary, which 
always wish to be seen as others or another, are linked: “Those elements of 
actuality proper may be re-related on an imaginative level to create a new 
reality.”60 If, writing about Paul Valéry’s The Young Fate, Lacan characterizes 
structure as a feminine trick to undermine the symbolic order, in Deren’s 
f ilms it can be seen as a trick of feeding back the order by manipulating the 
time axes of the f ilm, as fates do, in loops, chains, and punctures in order 
to let deceptive moirés appear, under foreign Greek names, where there 
should be patterns. Incidentally, Valéry used a similar procedure with text 
in his poem. “It is not… necessary altogether to understand it as its exquisite 
musical monotonies induce a trance”, wrote one critic.61
Since gazes in the cinema, like reflexes and reflections of the ego, are 
not only cast as merely constructive and productive of relations, but also 
as malevolent, competitive, and destructive, one last duel of gazes is staged 
in a shot-countershot in Meshes of the Afternoon between the protagonist 
and her lover, played by Alexander Hammid. At the same time the motif of 
the mirror as illusionary form of identif ication gets fragmented here. One 
of the two endings of the f ilm f inishes with the – in the spectator’s view – 
long-awaited meeting of man and woman. In the last constellation we see 
a close-up of a woman lying on the bed. We can see her face on the pillow, 
next to which is lying the flower from the f ilm’s f irst shot. In countershot 
the man is sitting upright on the bed, looking at her, and when he leans 
over to her he is undecided as to whether it is to embrace her or to take 
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possession of the flower, which has turned into a knife at just this moment. 
The protagonists’ gazes – and with them the spectators’ gazes – shift in 
both directions between love and aggression and are also crisscrossed 
by side views of the reflective knife. Once again, spectators presume the 
mutual assumptions running between the protagonists’ gazes. Although 
the woman, quite in keeping with classical dramaturgy, lies submissively on 
the bed, and in one shot we see only her mouth, which opens slightly, while 
the man sits upright, coolly and anxiously looking down, this does not add 
up to any clear order of emotions. The spectators will attempt to recognize 
clear reactions in the protagonists’ facial expressions, but devotion, concern, 
lust, fear, betrayal, and revenge are interpretations that can be seen one after 
the other in the ever constant faces, or better, can be presumed. In the duel 
of gazes the woman suddenly grabs the knife and throws it in the direction 
of the man. This signif ies a change in the optical conditions as a whole. The 
sharp cut to the next shot shows that the image of the man must have been 
a mirror image, which has now been shattered. A large hole is now gaping 
where his eyes once were, providing a view to the sea.
Throwing the knife opens the gaze up to that optical space that surrounds 
the space of the duel and had obviously surrounded it the whole time. What 
is uncanny about this scene is that underneath, in the mirror’s blurriness, 
which supplants the space “opposite”, despite its shattered surface, the 
remaining partial portrait of the man, his face now without eyes and gaze, 
continues, speaking, to move. What is uncanny is that he is not simply 
dead, but has been displaced into a different, unknown, optically real 
but not logical space, in which he can no longer give any response to the 
woman’s inquisitive gaze, although he continues to have an influence on 
her reality. This image is once again reminiscent of the other images in 
the f ilm in which the medial voices from other spaces are silenced. The 
telephone receiver that is put back on the cradle over and over again, the 
record player that is stopped time and again. What is uncanny in Meshes of 
the Afternoon is that the connections to the absent and to the apparatuses, 
the talking and the reflection of others, which structures the ego’s desire, 
cannot be turned off. “It” keeps going. The second, less uncanny turn taken 
in Meshes of the Afternoon with this break in the optics is that the man’s gaze 
is cleared away as the sole answer to the woman’s desire, and not as killing 
the consciousness of the other, but as an optical switch. In the following 
shot we see the seashore with its beach and waves, blinking shards of mirror 
floating in the water reflecting patches of the sky. A re-relativized space 
has emerged by optically frustrating the structure of the gaze. Hard linear 
gazes turn into waves that play with and wash around the mirror images.
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This ending of Meshes of the Afternoon, in which the mirror flies to the 
beach as shards, is the first ending, the “happy ending” of the film. It replaces 
imaginary and eerie identif ication in the couple’s relationship with a mul-
tiplication of spaces. It is likely that this is the ending that Deren wanted, 
since is a female gaze that no longer wishes to be required to look someone 
else in the eyes in order to be recognized. And yet it does not heroically look 
away, but invents new optical illusions that serve as a strategic eye-catcher: 
becoming subject with one’s own devices. It is at any rate the f ilm ending 
that Deren chose as her own, for the f ilm At Land will start a couple of 
years later with almost the very same shot at the beach that Meshes of the 
Afternoon ends with, but instead of shards of mirror there are eyes, bodies, 
and the crests of waves in the image.
The mirrors that have played a central role in Meshes of the Afternoon as 
a cinematic function of optical reflection and as a functional metaphor of 
the gaze will no longer turn up in Deren’s later f ilms – except for the one 
mirror in Choreography for the Camera, in front of which the dancer briefly 
dances a pas de deux with his doppelgänger. The function of the gaze will be 
absorbed completely in the optical operations of the camera and the f ilm. 
Reflection becomes refraction. The tricks and techniques of the camera 
itself provoke the feedback of perception about the technical conditions 
that effect the reactions and emotions through projection.
The question of identity in the f ilm will increasingly get shifted from 
imagination to production. In At Land it was experiments with the gaze, 
as experiments with editing together times and spaces, through which the 
protagonist was meant to be put into a relation to a universe relative to 
herself: “The problem of that individual, as the sole continuous element, is to 
relate herself to a fluid, apparently incoherent, universe.”62 In Choreography 
for the Camera the film replaces the logic of a person with the logic of a move-
ment: “Here the identity which unites space and time is not the personalized 
identity of a given, individual character, for there is no effort to treat the 
dancer in these terms; rather, it is the identif iable nature of his movement 
which constitutes the compulsive continuity.”63 In Ritual in Transfigured 
Time these two forms of identif ication, which after all are necessary for 
“continuity” in the montage, are, as perception itself infers from a pattern 
of movement or a photographic shape, supplemented by a third mode:
There is a long sequence held together almost exclusively by the con-
sistent mode of movement common to a variety of individuals who are 
identif ied as singular and are used as interchangeable variables within 
a consistent pattern created by the f ilm instrument.64
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Ritual in Transfigured Time shows illusive movements that lead to il-
lusive identities. The artif icial movements of those acting and dancing, 
particularly in one sequence, in which the images are frozen and then 
re-awoken to artif icial life, are always presented as movements that were 
created by the camera in the f irst place. But the camera was only able 
to capture them because they had already been formalized in social or 
choreographed reality. The f ilm Ritual in Transfigured Time brings together 
f ilm and social technology to regulate real involuntary bodily movements. 
This regulation has its technological prehistory in serial photography and in 
neuro-physiological research into perception. In Deren’s f ilms the regula-
tions and the social codification of images are dismantled again, not in their 
presumed original elements, but in their variability on screen: allowing for 
dance through photography and editing and by deploying all the chemical 
and mechanical qualities of f ilm. In the end this is achieved by cutting in 
the image of the widow going into the water as a negative. This inversion 
of the material suddenly causes the bride to appear in white. Virgin, bride, 
widow. Signif ications are social technologies like every individual f ilm 
trick of the cinematic apparatus to change the woman any way one likes 
or desires. For Maya Deren this means ritualistically. This optimistic vision 
of being able to encounter oneself more precisely outside the body is also 
something that Deren shares with objective psychology.
Storing, Transferring, Transforming
In Cinema as an Art Form, Deren discusses Hollywood productions, distin-
guishing between horror f ilms, which position the origin of the uncanny in 
the external world, and psycho f ilms, which place it in the interiority of the 
protagonist. In her own f ilms the cinematic reality connects external and 
internal, objective and subjective, collective and individual movement in 
order to initiate perception itself as an interference between internal and 
external impulses. Even if Deren excludes the unconscious in the sense 
structuring individual wishes or drives as a productive power for art, the 
transformations that she describes for the cinema require at the very least 
assuming non-conscious processes. In Deren’s f ilm theory the difference 
between conscious and unconscious processes of perception is nullif ied 
in the theory of the ritual, which sees any transgression of the boundaries 
of the personality as technologically induced or technologically modif ied: 
“Above all, the ritualistic form treats the human being not as the source 
of the dramatic action, but as the somewhat depersonalized element in a 
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dramatic whole.”65 Watching movies is a transformative process that can be 
conceived of as circulating between depersonalization and identif ication. 
All manipulations of the perception of time, space, and movement are 
physically converted and psychologically something under the threshold 
of frequencies that are still consciously perceptible. Like in trance.
The theory of depersonalization has a long tradition in Deren’s works. 
At the beginning of the forties, when she was a 24-year-old journalist, 
Deren had written a paper about trance and dance, in which she made 
a comparison between archaic forms of possession and modern forms of 
hysteria, a work that made an impression on the great anthropologist and 
Haiti researcher Alfred Métraux:
When I did that paper on Haitian possession, I had no idea of making 
f ilms.[…] And then I went on to make f ilms and it lay all this while in 
my f iles – since 1942 – and was forgotten until now.[…] Now in 1947 I dig 
it out and Métraux says it is one of the best things he has ever read on 
possession.66
Deren describes both states, possession and hysteria, as social phenomena. 
This focus of this work, which originally appeared as an article in the 
journal “Educational Dancing”, is an intercultural comparison of extraor-
dinary states that are considered trances, absences, attacks, or possession, 
their social signif icance, and the technological means that induce these 
states: “If one compares hysteria with possession in terms of the individual, 
the similarities become so striking as to tempt one to combine the two 
phenomena into a single category.”67 What is decisive in the context of 
her f ilm theory is that the induction of states of hysteria or possession 
comes from outside as an artif icial agitation of the sense nerves. Rhythmic 
inductions are divine invocations: “…just as various mechanical devices 
such as crystals and light are employed in hypnotism, so, I believe, drum 
rhythms and are extremely important in inducing possession.”68 All states 
of possession are preceded by some artif icial agitation of the nervous 
system.
What characterizes the term hysteria in European medicine, according 
to Deren, is that the sick women are pathologized to the degree that their 
symptoms are seen as the symptoms of individual conflict, while possession 
in African or Caribbean society is recognized as the expression of critical, 
or better, crisis-laden collective processes, in which possible solutions 
can even become obvious and public. To view it in analytical terms, the 
states are viewed as a sickness, either of the imaginary – in Europe – or the 
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symbolic – in Africa and the Caribbean – and correspondingly it is always 
only the one or the other that gets treated.
In order to compare Caribbean knowledge of the gods with European 
descriptions of hysteria, Deren takes Eugen Bleuler’s no longer quite new 
but in fact groundbreaking Textbook of Psychiatry from 1916 as the basis 
for the state of the research in European medicine, which she cites in the 
American edition from 1924. The Swiss professor, director of Burghölzli, 
and teacher of C.G. Jung had published a standard work in which he, as a 
student of Charcot, both surveyed and critiqued the classical tradition of 
European medical knowledge on the field of possession and hysteria. Bleuler 
had revolutionized the discourse among professionals in psychiatry. He 
wrote one of the f irst and most systematic protocols for hypnosis from the 
point of view of the hypnotized person, thus judging hypnosis not only for 
its effectiveness in medical practice, but also for its effect on the patient’s 
psyche.69 Furthermore, Bleuler, who came from Zollikon, a town near 
Zürich, was able to understand patients when they spoke Swiss German 
or the malaproprisms of Swiss French, which was incomprehensible to the 
ears of German professors with positions at Zurich universities. Unheard 
messages became the object of science for the f irst time. Bleuler lived with 
patients day and night for 12 years at the psychiatric institution Rheinau 
in Zurich as a kind of socio-ethno-psychiatrist, “in great seclusion from 
the rest of the world.”70 He created an “affective rapport” with each patient, 
researching and gradually systematizing the rules of a disorientation that 
he called schizophrenia. Another reason that he wanted to replace the old 
term “Dementia praecox” was that “it can only describe the illness but not 
the afflicted person.”71 Bleuler thus took the f irst steps toward a systemic 
examination of schizophrenia, which would become so signif icant for 
critical psychiatry in the twentieth century. The persons aff licted with 
their multilayered speech, their inappropriate laughter, and their constant 
shifting between linguistic levels of meaning determine what schizophrenia 
is, according to Bleuler. Only after carefully listening to his patients did 
he published his famous study in 1911.72 Only when he had grasped all the 
“nonsense” was he able to develop a coherent picture of the illness from the 
incoherent ramblings. Furthermore, Bleuler illustrated his textbook with 
photographs, which means, he also drew on then new analogue recording 
technologies, which could document the unutterable disturbances and 
spasms, data for the novel amamnesis.
Bleuler’s systematics of psychotic processes turned sensations into 
primary psychic functions, and perceptions into groups of sensations that 
reanimate and link the physical traces of the memory of earlier sensations. 
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Associations, or, since it is the same thing for Bleuler, the thinking that 
follows these traces according to f ixed rules, “can best be understood by 
comparing it with the switches in an electrical plant. These switches may 
connect different machines with one another or let them run independently 
of each other; they can switch them on or off.”73 Bleuler’s theory of switching 
on and off in the nervous system is not only one of the clearest example of 
what, as Kittler noted, “every psychology or anthropology only subsequently 
spells out which functions of the general data processing are controlled 
by machines, that is, implemented in the real.”74 It justif ies a functional 
theory of the unconscious, which Bleuler only distinguished from the then 
competing system of reflexes because he was examining reactions that did 
not run by subcortical means, but by nerve tracts and cerebral cortices. 
Such unconscious processes can also help explain perceptions that do not 
arise from stimuli or sensations.
The comparison with electrical switches also makes it possible for us 
to understand a number of other phenomena, such as f light of ideas, 
schizophrenic disturbance of association, hypnotic phenomena, the exist-
ence of different personalities in the same psyche either simultaneously 
or side by side, the phenomena of the unconscious, and a number of 
pathological symptoms which are either denied or reluctantly admitted.75
Deren also assumes unconscious structures in Bleuler’s sense of generating 
“extra-sensory” perceptions when she examines phenomena of voodoo, 
although she immediately connects this unconscious with the cultural 
traditions that determine their structures.
The accepted explanation of such modes of thought is that past experi-
ences, which may not be consciously and individually recollected but 
which are permanently preserved in the sub-conscious, amalgamate 
under certain stimuli in terms of our mores and traditional value pat-
terns, and form ‘a conclusion’ as it were, independent of the exercise of 
conscious reason.76
The study of unconscious phenomena and hysterical symptomatology or 
ritual possession is therefore, in both Bleuler and Deren, always already 
cultural studies. Their archives are indeed not libraries, but also the bod-
ies themselves, in which involuntary forms of movement and patterns of 
behavior are stored, which are constantly reproduced unconsciously and 
in the case of western cultures are too rarely subjected to feedback and 
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modif ication. In this sense one can object, in contrast to Parin’s ethnopsy-
chiatry, that it is not that white people think too much, it’s that they dance 
too little.
At the end of the nineteenth century and as if in preparation for the 
events of the twentieth, there was an increase within psychology of examin-
ing trances, states of ecstasy, and mass suggestion. In the psychologists’ 
laboratories suggestibility was researched as a prerequisite for any attack, as 
a question of the transmission of unconscious psychic mechanisms. Bleuler 
had examined suggestibility as a special case of the formation of affectivity, 
that is, as a form of transmission that forms complexes of associations 
beyond language through “accompanying affective tones.” His psychological 
experiments are the exact reverse of the f ilm experiments being carried out 
at the same time. The Soviet director Kuleshov, for instance, was conducting 
his famous series tests at the time in order to show that f ilm functioned 
like a language because the meaning of images was altered by the syntactic 
permutation of shots: the Kuleshov effect. Bleuler was experimenting with 
the transmission of feelings that were supposed to be transmitted purely 
be affect.
This affective suggestibility is still fully present also in man, in spite of 
his language which has been more and more developed for intellectual 
needs.[…] Because of the close connection between the affect and the 
ideas to which it belongs and because of the influence of the affect upon 
logic, it is self-evident that the ideas are very easily suggested along with 
the affect…77
The unconscious affective transmission through links in the nervous system 
enters into competition with the conscious, intellectual transmission of 
language. The idea that the bearer or transmitter of a message is the affect, 
and not the meaning in a syntactic network, distinguishes Deren’s f ilm 
experiments in principle from those of the Russian avant-garde.
Maya Deren’s position, which was therefore also avant-garde in theory, 
consists in having examined the connections between cultural techniques 
and psychic processes from the very beginning. Already in the early paper 
on possession she concluded that it might be the emptiness between the 
drum beats or the images, the intervals, that hold the secret to all unknown 
or unconscious mental functions:
Drum rhythm consists in the regularity of the interval between sounds. 
Once this interval has been established, our sense-perceptions are geared 
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to an expectation of its reoccurrence. This means that expectant atten-
tion […] is being deliberately and directly brought into play.[…] Even more 
important, sustained rhythmic regularity and the fact that the source of 
it is outside the individual rather than within, means that consciousness 
in unnecessary, as it were, in the maintenance of this concentration.78
The attention turned on by repeating stimuli is also a quality of f ilm percep-
tion as trance technique. The study of archaic trances provides Deren with 
a way to see her own culture, alienated and cleared of all habit and custom. 
She seeks out the rhythms established by cultural techniques that form the 
bases of the rites and rituals of western culture and works with them. So 
when she analyzes a party scene using slow motion in Ritual in Transfigured 
Time, in which the guests always greet each other in the same poses and with 
the same gestures, she discovers a further layer of social interaction, invisible 
to the naked eye, internal to the conventions of movement: the hesitation, 
wavering, and trembling that goes along with all encounters: “…the course 
of a conversation is normally characterized by indecisions, defiances, hesita-
tions, distractions, anxieties, and other emotional undertones.”79 The gaze in 
and through the cinema is dissected as one that is at the mercy of technical 
manipulation and human relationality. Deren takes the emotional elements 
from which the dynamic of a society within society is transformed into a 
ritual and dissects them in a cinematic psychoanalysis of everyday life.
Poetically, the f ilm Ritual in Transfigured Time, since it compresses the 
moments analyzed into something new, is not simply satisf ied with analyz-
ing wavering, but constructs from this a joint of ritual actions. The emotional 
reality of the social event itself is placed into the work quite unrelated to 
the case of a single fearful individual. But just as the paradoxical structure 
of the gaze in her f ilms only unfolds in relation to the conventions of shot-
countershot, and just as the labyrinthine spatial and temporal constructions 
only function as a way of subverting habits of seeing in linear perspectives, 
so do the choreographies of Deren’s trance and dance f ilms only take their 
effect against the backdrop of standardized body movements, such as they 
were systematized at the end of the nineteenth century. Seen against the 
backdrop of the history of cinema, in which the body was increasingly 
standardized and shots were codif ied, the American experimental f ilms of 
the forties and f ifties, in which one could see bodies in erratic movements, 
unpredictable perspectives, and incredible transformations, represent a 
political provocation. In these f ilms, the movements of the actors became 
dances that turned the culturally grounded bodily order, along with its 
presumably objective order or the characteristics of race, class, and gender, 
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into a farce. It is only against the backdrop of normative movement of 
cinema that the many levels of Deren’s f ilms develop, all of which tend to be 
supported more by choreography than by narrative – choreographies that 
use the technical means of the cinematic apparatus to put social conven-
tions up for negotiation and in which normative reality becomes relative. 
The chronometry of the apparatus remains as a reference rhythm by which 
the deviations, the irregularities are chanted and syncopated, and new 
perceptual connections are made.
Learning by Feeling
It is not f ixed designs made up of optical machines and human bodies, but 
vectors of permanently shifting force fields that would be the right model for 
Deren’s f ilm theory. Her f ilms present feedback mechanisms and circular-
causal processes as they were being researched in the US during the forties 
by anthropologists, psychiatrists, computer specialists, and engineers. The 
cinema was to be conceived as an apparatus that linked individual percep-
tion and sensibility with times and spaces formed by technology. Techno-
logical images would form emotions that were nonetheless due to an exact 
experience of reality. What is always “recorded subjectively as emotion”, as 
Norbert Wiener conjectured, “may not merely be a useless epiphenomenon 
of nervous action, but may control some essential stage in learning, and in 
other similar processes.”80 Like affectivity for Bleuler. The nervous system 
stores our experiences and models the perception accordingly.
Gregory Bateson had underestimated the intrusions that f ilming released 
in the plateaus of Balinese culture, and its transformation by its connection 
with the apparatus was surprising to him. Deren as well will be surprised by 
an odd connection between human bodies and apparatuses in Haiti. But not 
like Bateson. In Haiti, Deren encountered the archaic techniques of voodoo 
rituals that she had previously studied and from which she had developed 
a radical critique of her own culture and its techniques. But while the term 
ritual had previously granted her a way to see the transcendences of western 
cultures as equally producing and projecting in its cultural technologies, a 
few years later she uses the eye of the cinema to look at the techniques with 
which the Haitian gods can artif icially be called into action. Like in the 
cinema, manipulations of time are introduced into the rituals as gateways 
to different perceptual levels, as “doors of perception”. “There are even ritual 
details in which inversion and reversal suggest a mirror held to to time.[…] It 
is like a motion-picture projected in reverse, a diver shooting back up out of 
112 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
the water on to the springboard.”81 Times, spaces, and movements are linked 
in certain cultures according to particular laws initiated, altered, and formed 
by the perception of those living in this culture. The integration of these forms 
can be understood in the service of gods or of media, the decisive factor is that 
this cultural aspect does not represent any law or f ixed schema, but a rule of 
transformation that has to be realized, embodied in constant performance.
When Maya Deren lands in Port-au-Prince in the autumn of 1947, she 
brings along two cameras, tripods, and material for 16mm f ilm footage, 
a 6 x 6 still camera and equipment to record sound on magnetic wire. In 
Haiti she records optical and acoustic signals separately, not at random, 
as Bateson had attempted on Bali, but following an integrity that she had 
recognized as the rule of transformation both of ritual and of the cinema 
as well. In rhythms and light effects, in temporal and spatial compressions, 
in fragmentations and compositions of collective body movements she 
assembles a reality of gods and devices. Afterwards she thinks she was able 
to differentiate manipulating and recording in ritual procedures:
I had begun as an artist, as one who would manipulate the elements of 
a reality into a work of art in the image of my creative integrity; I end by 
recording, as humbly and accurately as I can, the logics of a reality which 
had forced me to recognize its integrity…82
Deren experiences Haiti as a culture standing in transition between old and 
new gods, between old and new technical rituals. When she researches rituals 
and music, she herself becomes a “serviteuse”, the servant of the cult. Maya 
Deren lets herself be caught up in voodoo while recording the techniques 
of voodoo “humbly and accurately.” This is why she has become a model 
of anthropological cinematography in f ilm history.83 Even ethnographic 
f ilmmakers sometimes get confused about which god they serve. In her 
book about Haitian gods, Deren describes her own possession by the goddess 
Erzvlie, a complicated, scandalous, and ultimately one might say hysterical 
goddess who is the patron of dreams, love, and the muse of beauty.84 It is a 
story of relentless identif ication in the sense of “becoming something else”, 
in which the dreamlike imaginary love of the ego is abruptly interrupted by 
the arrival of a new order. Deren’s protocol describes dissociated perception 
in a cinematic space as a space of western mirror-ego identif ication. Trance 
and possession are described in the parameters or metaphors of the cinema; 
presumably unconsciously. This description is thus paradigmatic for ethno-
logical self-misrecognition in the foreigner. And for the universalization of 
the cinematic space through the avant-garde of ethnologists.
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To quote Deren’s protocol verbatim:
As sometimes in dreams, so here I can observe myself, can note with 
pleasure how the white skirt plays with the rhythms, can watch, as if 
in a mirror, how the smile begins with a softening of the lips, spreads 
imperceptibly into a radiance which, surely, is lovelier than any I have 
ever seen. It is when I turn, as if to a neighbor, to say ‘Look! See how lovely 
that is!’ and see that the others are removed to a distance, withdrawn to a 
circle which is already watching, that I realize, like a shaft of terror struck 
through me, that it is no longer myself whom I watch. Yet it is myself, for 
as that terror strikes, we two are made one again, joined by and upon the 
point of the left leg which is as if rooted to the earth.85
In ritual, the rhythm of the drumming reassembles the ego, which had fallen 
apart. The dance and the dance are indistinguishable, linked through the 
acoustic “order”, arrangement and command, that structures time. The next 
division takes places in the visual aspects of the mirror, which simultane-
ously constructs and divides the ego, demonstrating its interconnectedness 
with the doppelgänger. At this moment the gaze of the dance becomes the 
eye of cinema, which sees stroboscopically, shifting into slow motion, as if 
an imaginary projection speed were being reduced. A flicker starts, black 
holes emerge between the single frames, and the cinematographer loses 
herself not between the ego and the mirror image, but in the nothingness 
between image and image, which is never perceived in the cinema but 
nonetheless governs cinematic perception:
(I) pick up the dancing rhythm of the drums as something to grasp 
at, something to keep my feet from resting upon the dangerous earth. 
No sooner do I settle into the succor of this support than my sense of 
self doubles again, as in a mirror, separates to both sides of an invisible 
threshold, except that now the vision of the one who watches flickers, the 
lids f lutter, the gaps between moments of sight growing greater, wider. 
I see the dancing one here, and yet in a different place, facing another 
direction, and whatever lay between these moments is lost, utterly lost. I 
feel the gaps will spread and widen and that I will, myself, be altogether 
lost in that dead space and that dead time.86
The film breaks in the projection room. What lies between image and image 
as trance remains unconscious. It nonetheless turns up in the protocol 
precisely as the technology of cinema. The fact that Deren no longer wants to 
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edit her own material after this coinciding of f ilm image and identif ication 
is everything but the rejection of the medium of f ilm. It is much more about 
promoting it into the pantheon of recording technologies that have formed 
souls, spirits, and memories. The great alliance of cinema and anthropology 
has brought the gods down from heaven in order once again to connect 
them to the bodies of human beings. They are meant to change the world. 
But the stories that they tell the anthropologists are stories of media that 
have been changing people, their societies, and their histories from time 
immemorial. Sometimes we forget that, sometimes we are reminded, for 
instance by Godard when in Le Mépris he shows that Fritz Lang knew it.
Bateson had observed that people in occidental cultures still speak and act 
as if dissecting and codifying reality on the one hand and subjectively evalu-
ating this reality on the other were processes that were mutually separable, 
while in fact every visual perception of another person and every physical 
reaction can only register the combined process of codifying and evaluating, 
that is, behavior.87 This indicates the emergence of a new concept of the 
human being, which has its preconditions in the cinematic recording of 
human characteristics. But only in the f ifties of the twentieth century did 
“l’homme imaginaire”, whose behavior always had to be accompanied by a 
double, get established in everyday life as well. Edgar Morin examined the 
imaginary man in an ethnological study of his own society in its dependence 
on the technology of cinema: “J’ai fait en même temps de l’anthropologie du 
cinema et de la cinématographologie de l’anthropos, selon le movement en 
boucle: l’esprit humain – éclaire le cinema – qui éclaire – l’esprit humain 
etc.”88 Working with Jean Rouch in the summer of 1960, Morin also turned 
his diagram of the f low between the functions of anthropology and the 
function of the cinema, which projects all behavior onto the surfaces of the 
body, into movements and voices beyond the symbolic, into a f ilm experi-
ment. The reactions by various inhabitants of Paris to the questions “Are you 
happy?” was combined into a kaleidoscope of French society: Chronique 
d’un Été, a f ilm commissioned by the Musée de l’Homme. A f ilm about 
f ilm and anthropology, in which Batesonian binaries such as man/woman, 
dominance/submission, strange/familiar are relativized into a historical 
image of post-war society, where taboos suddenly push their way back into 
the light and onto the big screen.
Bateson himself abandons cinematography and takes up circular-causal 
processes in neurology and psychiatry. This is exactly the reason he remains 
an anthropologist. His studies on homeostatic processes in schizophrenia 
research examine group processes in which they attempt to understand 
“the use of relations”, as Lacan says, the usage of relationships between all 
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the members of a group, from outside, from the behavior and strategies 
of talking. Bateson’s research has aff iliations with Vladimir Bekhterev’s 
studies, which he had carried out in St. Petersburg a half century earlier. 
These two strands of the history of psychiatry, which are separated from 
one another by all the systematic, ideological, and institutional borders in 
the world, can – and not by chance – be linked by the name Maya Deren.89 
Par hasard the history of sciences as novel.

3. Deviations
Jean Rouch: Accra, Paris
The heart of the Corybantes has transformed today into the heart of a f ilmmaker 
with and camera and a Nagra.
– Jean Rouch, 1977
In a modern industrial society, the artists consistute, in fact,
an “ethnic group”, subject to the full “native” treatment.
– Maya Deren, 1953
Following the end of the war, poets, painters, and ethnologists were traveling 
out of the ruins of Europe and into Africa, the South Seas, or the Caribbean 
to research occultism, mysticism, ritual practices and possession, and, as 
Michel Leiris wrote, “to forget their mediocre little ‘white man’s manias’ (as 
certain blacks say), and also to lose what they conceived of as their identity 
as intellectuals.”1 They dragged along their own cultural technologies with 
them, subjecting the objects of their research to the very same literary, 
iconological, or medial orders that they were hoping to escape, a fact that 
they remained oblivious to, and at any rate did not make their readers 
aware of – with very few exceptions, who tended to be engineers rather 
than humanities scholars. Jean Rouch, for example, “Ingénieur des Ponts 
et Chausées”, had already signed up to go to Africa at the beginning of the 
Second World War, since the only thing left for him to do in France was to 
blow up bridges before the enemy could get to them. He wanted to use his 
knowledge constructively in Africa and what interested him as an engineer 
were how things worked, or how they had to be built so that they worked. 
Coming from a family of Parisian artists and adventurers, having observed 
the surrealist scene in Paris in his youth, and having been a regular visitor 
at Café Flore, he was also interested in how things become dysfunctional, 
how they produce erratic effects, and how they took place on the bridges 
of unforeseen encounters between cultures. Rouch was a cartographer of 
dépaysement.
In 1941 Rouch was deployed to the area around Niamey in Niger. His 
predecessor gave him some advice: “Just don’t go native! Keep away from 
those niggers! After all, you’re representing French culture!” Many years 
later, in a conversation with Hanns Zischler, he would add: “I did not take 
his advice.”2 Rouch represents his life as a clear case of “going native”, which, 
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in the colonial history of the nineteenth century, could only be imagined 
as a vision of horror. With Rouch, however, it was a fortunate and also 
always absurdly comical transition into the heart of darkness. At second 
glance, it may be more exact to see Rouch’s “going native” as the “going 
cinematographic” of the people in Niger.
As a thirty-year-old in 1947, Jean Rouch went back to places where he 
had overseen the building of streets and bridges during the war, and where 
he, with the mediation of his friend Damouré Zika, had learned about the 
rituals of possession of the Songhay. He had already shot some footage in 
Niger at the time, but it was all destroyed by heat and sand during transport. 
Unlike Leiris, however, Rouch did not fancy himself as being able to leave 
behind his own culture on his way through Africa. On the contrary: In 
Africa this culture confronted him once again with the indestructability 
of all the doppelgängers that are all the more durable in being safely stored 
phantom versions of the originals: “Vichy survives in the colonies”, he as-
serted.3 At the margins there was not only resistance to the authority in 
the center, but also the curious suspension of centralized power and its 
instruments in the form of conscious and unconscious memories, which 
were at any rate very physiological. The bearers of these memories, how 
they worked, and the odd collectivity that they could claim, however, would 
f irst have to be determined.
In his history of cinema, Gilles Deleuze writes that the directors of 
cinéma verité, and particularly Jean Rouch, had followed in the footsteps 
of Rimbaud by becoming black. This would not mean becoming part of the 
native people, but of allowing the missing people to appear again against 
the nations in the f irst place.4 Deleuze uses the term people (the German 
equivalent Volk can no longer be used in a simple, functional way) to 
designate the deterritorializing and reterritorializing relation of people to 
the land on which and with which they organize themselves. He therefore 
describes a colonial post-war development at the end of the f ifties that 
leads to a multiplicity of liberation armies and fronts called “populaire” or 
“the people’s”, and in which new approaches to the land were organized. 
The colonial frontiers ran straight as an arrow, and had imposed adminis-
trative violence across all the mountains, rivers, and climatic zones. The 
reappropriation of the land by the people could therefore always proceed 
against colonial authority and with a sensual appropriation of the landscape 
at the same time. The people’s traff ic routes, therefore, were always taken 
imbued with the senses, in Africa as in Cuba and Latin America: bridges, 
streets, cameras, radio stations; what revolutionary f ilm would not have 
made them the focus.5
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Rouch’s f ilms are ref lections of various imaginary histories, driven 
by a search for post-colonial identities, which we encounter as much in 
Leiris’s poetry as we do in Fanon’s manifestos or in the f ilms by the crazed 
camera teams in the Sierra Maestra. The opposition between “US” and 
“THEM” def ined the battle of the people’s revolutionaries: No pasaran. 
Rouch’s f ilms, however, put the imaginary and complicit relation between 
“I” and “me” into the image as the prerequisite of all questions of power. This 
not only goes for the f ilm Moi, un Noir from 1957, which Rouch shot with 
young migrants who had emigrated from the northern provinces in Niger 
to Abidjan in order, as we hear in the commentary, to enter the modern 
world. Rouch presents the street kids, “les voyous d’Abidjan”, as Sapho would 
later commemorate them in her songs, as people who f ind themselves in 
transit, between two worlds, “caught between tradition and the machine 
world, between Islam and alcohol”, young people who “have not renounce 
their old beliefs but who are devoted to the modern idols of boxing and the 
movies.”6 Correspondingly, “I” in the film means Eddie Constantine, Edward 
G. Robinson, Tarzan, or Dorothy Lamour. What appears as a curiosity to 
the spectators is of ethnological consequence for Rouch. Under Muslim 
rule, which had become f irmly established in Niger during the seventeenth 
century, every Songhay child, in addition to their “ma kayna”, the smaller 
name takes from Songhay tradition, received a bigger name, “maberi”, which 
the marabout selected from the Quran at the child’s birth.7 The identity of 
the Songhay was a combination of the two names in which the imaginary 
imperium of Hollywood was specif ically inscribed in the case of the young 
migrant workers.
It is these identities in transition, the states between “I” and “me”, exist-
ences between culture, that interest Rouch. As such he is not tempted to 
present his protagonists as being on the hunt for authentic moments. He 
uses the means of f ilm to help them get to a space in which they can become 
“themselves”, ritually and cinematically. And in which they can represent 
themselves: Eddi Constantine, fabric brokers at the market in Treichville/
Abidjan, everyone gets the close-up that he needs to get his female custom-
ers to look him in the eyes according to the rules of Hollywood. Tarzan 
gets the microphone when he provides the voice for an American singer on 
the radio. All the protagonists delivered their monologues and dialogues 
as interventions, as art, and lion-maned presentations in the studio, or 
cut in later along with atmospheric sounds. Rouch’s commentary is not 
privileged among these voices. He also subjected himself to the cinema 
and its rules when he stayed on the young people’s trail all through Abidjan 
for six months, running across the traces and rituals of his own culture all 
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the while. When he f ilms them all traveling to the beach together, Rouch 
comments on his view, the images, and glamorous Abidajni stars at the 
same time: “Voici enfin l’Afrique en vacances.” Moi, un Noir examines what 
images an “I” would produce if it had the cinema.
“For Rouch, it is a matter of getting out of his dominant civilization and 
reaching the premises of another identity.”8 Rouch’s strategy was every bit 
as careful as Deleuze presents it to be. Because he was aware that he was 
not only the symbolic representative of French culture, as it was called 
during the war, but that he was also the engineer that had seen to creating 
the conditions for traff ic and mobility in Niger, he also wanted only to 
use f ilm technology to set up constructions on which identities could be 
positioned, according to their usage, with or against cultural conventions. 
Rouch examined how people learned to move, identify, and differentiate 
on the bridges and streets and on other symbolic orders that the colonial 
masters had saddled the country with. This is why he does not merely f ilm 
indigenous dances and music, but wild speech, the art of fabulating, which 
explodes the masters’ discourse through speech acts that have gone mad. 
“‘I is another’ is the formation of a story which simulates, of a simulation of 
a story or a story of simulation which deposes the form of truthful story.”9 
Cinéma vérité is a truth of the cinema that differs from other truths due to 
its technological processes of production, but that no longer needs to claim 
to be absolute. Films are a productive force that builds new bridges and con-
nections, on which syncretized forms of transitioning beyond established 
forms of consciousness can be cultivated:
The trance, the putting into trances, are a transition, a passage, or a 
becoming; it is the trance which makes the speech-act possible, through 
the ideology of the colonizer, the myths of the colonized and the discourse 
of the intellectual.10
While Deleuze emphasizes the imaginary and ideological requirements of 
trance, Rouch f irst and foremost had its technical aspects in view, which 
could steer or divert the paths of the imaginary. One of the most well-known 
scenes from his f ilms is the shot in Cocorico, Monsieur Poulet, in which a 
Deux Chevaux makes it way along the Niger not far from a long bridge, given 
additional paddling and pulling by the chauffeurs. The 2 CV can swim, the 
people on the Niger knew this, as did the entity that signed off as director 
with “DaLaRou”: a combination of Damouré ZIka, Lam Ibrahim Dia, and 
Jean Rouch, the longstanding shooting unit made up of old wartime friends 
and colleagues. An entity that has completely “gone native”, embodied, 
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wired, and fraternized by means of f ilm technology, and which appropriates 
the cinema, despite all of Metz’s misgivings, as “corps propre”: “Voici enfin 
l’Afrique en cinema!”
The 2 CV shot has nothing to do with the randomness that Bateson 
aspired to, but everything to do with “errandum”: the prefabricated must 
absolutely be abandoned. In order to do so, it is not so important to know 
oneself than to allow for technical possibilities, for movements and mobili-
ties. The little f loating 2 CV with its increasingly naked chassis is a nice 
African answer to the occidental call for disclosure. In the river, hidden 
paths are technologically uncovered. And in the cinema.
At any rate, for Rouch the cinema is by no means a technological cure-all 
for constructing or reconstructing cultural constellations. In his ethnologi-
cal studies of the f ifties, with which he was one of the f irst, after Griaule, 
Leroi-Gourhan, Lévi-Strauss, and Germaine Dieterlen, to get a doctoral 
degree in anthropology, he proves to be a careful and almost fastidious 
philologist of Songhay culture. In his Contribution à l’histoire des Songhay, 
which was published in 1954, he reconstructs their history by comparing 
the off icial chronicles, in particular the texts of Mahmoud Kati (Tarikh 
al Fattach) and Abdoulrahamane es-Saadi (Tarikh es-Soudan), as they 
had been preserved since the seventeenth century in Timbuktu, with the 
oral traditions in epics and songs that had been passed down. In a critical 
analysis of the Muslim historiography, which had been considered the 
off icially legitimate history of the Songhay to that point, he reconstructs 
another history, in which written and oral records correct one another. By 
doing so he develops, for instance, the thesis that the “actual” Songhay were 
no longer to be found in Timbuktu or Gao after the seventeenth century, 
but in the south and near Anzuru, on the islands between the rapids of 
Niger, where in fact the centers of Songhay magic and ritual still lie today.11 
The new historiography thus already produces new categories for African 
origins or identities without judging the political value of particularization. 
It is a simple matter of discovering stories of cultural interferences, even in 
the historical tradition. Such a reconstruction of history, however, assumes 
that ethnography, as Rouch practiced it in his f ield research, can advance to 
become verif iable historiography. Historically, this step is due to the record-
ing technologies of audiotape and cinematography, which turn songs and 
dances, voices and gestures into data in the f irst place. How these new data 
should be treated methodologically was still open to debate in the f ifties.
Rouch’s other major ethnographic studies, Migrations au Ghana, which 
appeared in 1956, and La religion et la magie Songhay, which was published 
in 1960 as Rouch’s “doctorat d’état”,12 served as both the foundational 
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research and starting point for his f ilms. His data and depictions, all of 
which – except for those that stem from chronicles in the name of and in 
the archives of the Muslim rulers – were the result of empirical investiga-
tions in the f ield, could be supplemented by the African spectators in the 
projections on the village square. His justif ication for him viewing writing 
as inadequate for his purposes of transitory and reciprocal anthropology 
was that the Songhay had torn only the photos out of the dissertation that 
he had written about them and hung them up in their huts because they 
could not read. Because the interventions of the African spectators in the 
f ilm work had proven to be a helpful corrective, however, Rouch began to 
propose ethnology methodologically as a self-correcting scientif ic system. 
Here as well, he made a detour around the institutional ways. Only after 
the fact does pragmatism turn out to have been an epistemological leap:
I was convinced that using the means of f ilm one could contribute 
substantially more to the research of foreign cultures than a scientif ic 
discourse can, however thorough it might be. When, for example, one 
witnesses and records an initiation, one is struck with how the individuals 
being initiated react (this is most obvious with circumcision): classical 
anthropology doesn’t even take note of this at f irst, it reduces the suf-
fering or jovial person to a fresco, an overall tableau. It takes itself out of 
the reality that it itself has seen like a mask.13
As an engineer, Rouch can position a simple “more”, even if, as shown by 
Bateson’s experience, recording with a different medium than presumably 
Eurocentric writing is no less alienating and distorting. There are certainly 
more and other data that differentiate behavior as the faculty and interac-
tion of bodies. In principle, however, cinematography is nothing other than a 
new form of registering bodies, which could be applied, exactly like writing, 
in the sense of colonial administration. In fact, the f irst anthropological 
f ilms were perhaps Félix Regnault’s simple surveys of the gaits of the various 
“races.” Rouch was also aware of this, but in contrast to Bateson he nonethe-
less did not believe that the master discourse of ethnology could be toppled 
by a simple change in media. For Rouch, f ilm was a direct advance in ethnol-
ogy as the exchange between two cultures, in as much as those f ilmed could 
understand the f ilm images, albeit not in the same way as the European 
researchers. The people in Rouch’s f ilm speak about these differences. 
This was the differentiating feedback that he was seeking. Africans should 
comment on his f ilms so that he, Rouch, could react again, recording the 
commentary and putting it on the soundtrack… or correct the soundtrack 
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like in the f ilm Bataille sur le grand fleuve, a f ilm about the hippopotamus 
hunt, which spectators in Niamey criticized after it was completed because 
Rouch put hunting melodies – played on authentic string instruments! – on 
the soundtrack. Moi, Rouch, later admits what he was trying to do: “I wanted 
to ‘make movies.’”14 Moi, un cinéaste! The Africans, however, let him know 
that hippopotamus hunting required silence, a different nervous tension 
than that provoked by the music in the prepared dance ceremonies. They 
made their arguments ritually, cinematographically, and as hunters all at 
once. Voici l’Afrique.
Damouré Zika, who had seen himself on screen for the f irst time in 
Bataille sur le grand fleuve, then wanted to appear as an actor in future 
f ilms: “on va jouer!” And so it was in many other f ilms, and the so-called 
ethno-f iction f ilm was invented. In turn, other spectators of Bataille sur le 
grand fleuve suggested that Rouch make a f ilm about their lion hunt. This 
led to the f ilm La Chasse au lion à l’arc. The new cinema that Rouch initiated 
in Africa developed at the level of these expressed wishes.
Rouch’s specif ic methods also consisted in using cinematography not 
only as a recording process, but as a potential and transcultural feedback 
procedure.
This extraordinary technique of ‘feedback’ (which I would translate as 
‘audiovisual reciprocity’) has certainly not yet revealed all of its possibili-
ties. But already, thanks to it, the anthropologist has ceased to be a sort 
of entomologist observing others as if they were insects (thus putting 
them down) and has become a stimulator of mutual awareness (hence 
dignity).15
And a mutual transformer. After his dissertation, which he viewed as 
a “visa for the irrational”,16 Rouch did not write much more. Instead he 
almost exclusively only gave interviews in front of television cameras or 
tape recorders, which were then edited, treated, broadcast, and printed in 
transcript: Jean Rouch tells… Jean Rouch reports… Jean Rouch continues…
For audiovisual technology to work the contacts that were made have to 
be right. Communication is then a question of correct wiring. Any inten-
tions that one had in mind become worthless in the f ield if the contacts 
are loose. What Rouch intends with his procedure is more than simple 
dialoguing between cultures. Connections are to be set up as flow functions 
that use technical mechanisms to dismantle hierarchy. Petit à petit. The 
feedback in Rouch’s f ilm speech is meant to strengthen the disintegration 
of retracted conventions, albeit not as a way of avoiding a clash of cultures, 
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but in order to make it loud and clearly audible. In the porcelain shop of the 
f ine information society you have to shatter the old connections, “casser 
les vitres” in a double sense:
Le monde est en train d’évoluer justement par suite de ces moyens 
d’information.[…] Si j’ai un rôle à jouer dedans, c’est de casser des vitres. 
Quand les vitres sont cassées, on est forcé de les remplacées. Même si on 
les casse pour des mauvais motifs, il faut mieux le faire.17
Rouch sees his f ilms as mediating between strangers, but neither as 
diplomacy nor as interpretation. In the network system made up of hu-
man beings and the camera, the gazes of third parties, others, and other 
authorities are switched on, and they jostle, disturb, or increase what gets 
transferred. Rouch tinkers with the technology until new imaginary spaces 
start to emerge, in which mental states are realized that are non-integrated, 
nor can they be integrated into respectable civil society. While western 
psychoanalysis reconstructs how the subject has to be positioned in the 
symbolic realm of language in order to integrate longing and desires con-
sciously into a personality, Rouch attempts to open up a space in which 
the non-integrated parts of the personality can be seen in the f irst place: 
as in trance, as in possession. In this cinematically constructed topology 
of the savage, all sorts of intersubjective, transsubjective, and social com-
munication becomes visible, but not “white” or “black” neuroses. This is why 
Rouch’s technical “depersonalization” in Africa is the opposite of Parin’s and 
Morgenthaler’s ethno-psychoanalysis. Only in 1969, in Petit à petit, does the 
drama of the ethnologist become an intercultural comedy. Damouré Zika 
and Lam Ibrahim Dia trail through Paris in order to survey the passersby 
as ethnologists, noting down their ancestry, cranial circumference, and 
dental structure and examining the costumes of men and woman. Taxi 
drivers, police off icers, and businesspeople become informants. “Parisians 
are ugly, too thin or too fat, very ugly. They are also very sad. Without a doubt 
they suffer from a terminal illness, and they know it”, notes Damouré Zika. 
When the sad passersby express their surprise and no do open their mouths, 
no wanting to show their teeth, the ethnologist merely explains that the 
f ilm is for television, and the Paris natives immediately show what they’ve 
got. Even in Paris, an artif icial, technically constructed, and imaginarily 
structured space of higher authority can be exposed.
In 1960, in preparation for the f ilm Chronique d’un été, Rouch and Ed-
gar Morin had begun working with the cameraman Michel Brault and 
the manufacturer Coutand to design a new, more mobile camera outf it. 
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“Coutand was prepared to develop the super light Éclair, which he had 
built for satellites, for civilian use as well.”18 He tested the new technology 
on colleagues in Paris:
The participating camera of Nanook has become a moving camera, a 
contact-camera. The mobility and this closeness triggers, I believe, a 
new form of dialogue, for the questioned/observed person no longer has 
to distinguish between ‘me’ and ‘camera,’ he addresses a system that is 
self-contained and interconnected.19
An Éclair-centaur, a camera-man.
The improved optical network system shifts and displaces the iden-
tity positions of its participants to the point that they do not recognize 
themselves.
Just like the f irst people I attempted to interview, I was highly surprised 
by the provocative strength caused by this contact. It was a conversa-
tion with Paul Lévi, a student of Marcel Mauss, with whom I carried 
out a highly intense conversation, the camera always at my eye. I posed 
questions and got responses that I (and as he himself told me afterwards, 
also he) had never experected.[…] I call this state “ciné-trance.” This 
expression plays with the Vertov’s coining of the term “kino pravda” 
(“cinéma vérité”).20
Ciné-trance did not emerge in Africa. It is a technological invention from 
Paris, with feedback from speech and other reactions. It provided access to 
hidden, repressed, denied layers of history. In Chronique d’un été this occurs 
quite simply through the fact that a young woman with a microphone asks 
people if they are happy. Not much later she dissects the Great Nation in its 
bleak historical sections, which its subjects, colonial or European, cannot 
elude. If Rouch’s f ilms are about the cybernetic linkage between gazes and 
reactions, then technology is just as important as the discourses behind the 
speech act distinguished by Deleuze.
Using a 16mm Bell & Howell from the flea market, Rouch began, shortly 
after the war, to shoot f ilms about rituals and possession. He was “in charge 
of research for the Musée de l’homme”, which, as Godard noted, was the 
best def inition of f ilmmaker. He described the permanent feedback of the 
f ilm experience as a series of transformations behind, in front of, and by 
means of the camera. Some elements of this series are enumerated in the 
title of one of his f irst texts: “On the Vicissitudes of the Self: The Possessed 
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Dancer, the Magician, the Sorcerer, the Filmmaker, and the Ethnographer.”21 
Spectators in the cinema can add themselves to this list. From the begin-
ning, possession has been a state that occurs not only in the ritual space of 
the ceremony, but in the cinematic space that reaches far beyond the optical 
f ield of the camera (or the projection space of the cinema).
In his description of possession, Rouch relativizes the distinction be-
tween dance acts and speech acts emphasized by Deleuze. In the time travel 
that is one of the elements of dances of possession, language and movement 
both become messages sent from the beyond. In possession (as in all ritual 
processes) both the dance act and the speech act get their rhythm from the 
outside. This is familiar to Europeans in dancing, but uncanny in speaking. 
“The gods speak through the dancer, his body, and his mouth. When people 
dance, they dance their history; history appears as they know it from the 
continual narrative.”22
The messages are brought from the beyond with the aid of the camera, 
which at the time was not even a satellite camera. Just as Deren surmised in 
her examination of phenomena of possession, the power of the imaginary 
established in rituals is dependent on the use of the symbolic and is thus 
provoked and intensif ied by recording technology. The truth that emerges 
is due on the hand quite simply to the cinematic restructuring of a space. 
Because behavior itself, that is, the transforming interaction between 
subjects, is made visible, cinéma vérité can register the precise truth of 
lies. Rouch explains this with an example of a particular encounter, over the 
course of which notions of center and periphery, of power and submission, 
got inverted and twisted in a dual back-and-forth of presumptions. In the 
Comédie Française Rouch saw De Gaulle talking with the Moroccan ambas-
sador during the intermission of a performance of Racine’s Andromaque. 
Rouch recounts:
I got within a few centimeters of de Gaulle and he, when he realized the 
camera was rolling, turned to to the ambassador and asked: ‘Excellence, 
who do you prefer, Andromaque or Hermione?’ ‘Hermione, mon Général!’ 
‘How right you are!’ And I am quite certain that this dialogue would never 
have existed in this form without the camera.23
If Rouch’s claim can be taken as more than speculation, it is because he had 
the experience of imaginary and reciprocal presumption being immediately 
crystallized in the space of the cinema according to the rules of the symbolic 
and its representations: supra-individual and precise. The general poses 
the question of the stance vis-à-vis the tyrants, and the man from Morocco 
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takes sides with the one who renounces her own origins. Of course, since 
the camera’s rolling, this could all be a matter of displacements, deferrals, 
false statements, which is what produces cinéma vérité in this feedback. 
Trojan horses for General de Gaulle. The camera instigates a show in which 
everything is off-center – even if the center and the power located there 
have not yet been abolished. Rouch studied this in turn with his footage 
of possession rituals: “It’s a short step to f iction, for what occurs in these 
dances is in principle nothing other than the birth of tragedy. Dionysus is 
always passing by. The heart of the Corybantes is transformed into the hears 
of a f ilmmaker with a camera and a Nagra.”24 It is not a matter of authentic 
culture, but rather of people and gods in cultural transit.
Before the classics can appear in f ilm with symbolic shifts, however, 
and even before the imaginary can extend its wings in the cinema, Rouch 
describes the simplest alliance of f ilm with possession, one located at the 
most elementary level of the camera’s technology. The process of rhythmi-
cally chopping up, with which the camera dissects the imaginary identity of 
bodies into individual frames, can be connected in its rhythmic regularity 
to the technique of inducing trance. Like drum rhythms, the intermit-
tent scansions of the camera throw consciousness out of sync with the 
self-referential consciousness. The noise of the camera indicates that it 
allows an Other from outside to take the place of the ego. Maya Deren 
explained this process in terms of the physical properties of the nervous 
system: “Sustained rhythmic regularity and the fact that the source of it 
is outside the individual rather than within, means that consciousness is 
unnecessary, as it were, in the maintenance of this concentration.”25 Rouch 
provides a technical description based on footage shot for a f ilm from 1971 
about two particular drummers, Tourou et Bitti, and about the music and 
the states of possession that they create. When he comes to the village with 
the soundman Moussa Hamidou, the musicians are already playing, but 
nothing has yet happened among the dancers:
I wanted to come into the village with the camera rolling. The problem 
for Moussa, who was coming with me, was to choose the best of the 
various sounds, the best of many things said, which of course did not 
always happen identically with the image. We reached the dance square, 
where an old dancer, old Albeydou, Sambou Albeydou, was just then 
approaching the orchestra. I also went to the orchestra and then – sud-
denly – the orchestra paused. Normally I would have had to stop, but I 
left the camera running, I squinted over at Moussa, he nodded to me, we 
kept shooting, and the people around us sensed or knew that the camera 
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was still running and at that moment possession took over.[…] The priests 
and the dancers went along, they knew that their dance and their music 
were now being recorded, which stimulated them greatly.26
Here the camera replaces the function that has to precede all trance and 
suggestion, as Deren had described for the leveling of the stimulus frequency 
in acoustically inducing trance. An expectant attitude has to be introduced, 
in which sense data are processed differently:
As we know, rhythm consists in the regularity of the interval between 
sounds. Once this interval has been established, our sense-perceptions 
are geared to an expectation of its reoccurrence. This means that expect-
ant attention, which I have previously spoken of as an important element 
in suggestibility and concentration is being deliberately and directly 
brought into play.27
Only when the confusing, noisy, and cacophonous flow of data has been 
artif icially chopped apart and systematized and a certain artistic space has 
been established – in the acoustics of the archaic drum rhythms or in the 
visual aspects of the cinematically rhythmatized space – can the imaginary 
and symbolic relations be connected to it. This is the physiological pre-
requisite of possession. Rouch, however, does not so much stress the process 
of rhythmically dissecting the movement, but the reverse of the process, the 
continuity of the uniformly formalized elements, such as the 24 frames per 
second in the projector, the cinema-trance, which continues even when a 
black frame appears on the screen. Both sides of this process, the dissection 
and the imaginary synthesis, form the social technique that combines the 
peculiarities of the gods into the body images of the dancers. In order to 
preserve the integrity of the ritual, intervening subjective decisions have 
to be reduced. This is why Rouch insists on long takes, on shooting with the 
camera without interruption as long as there is material.
To emphasize it once again, what was signif icant was the long take, the 
continuity of f ilming during the ritual. My efforts went to shooting even 
longer, substantially longer takes – an exclusively technical problem, 
which, as I hoped, could be solved by Jean-Pierre Beauviala, the camera 
engineer and inventor from Grenoble.28
Engineers regulate the appearance of the gods technologically and amongst 
themselves. Bridges and streets, “Ponts et Chaussées”, are applied in the 
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realness of the cinematic space that unlock the dark continent of the psyche 
in possession, creating new insights and new overviews and allowing for 
journeys into the heart of darkness. Psychic space is differentiated by the 
technology of the camera. A new topology emerges, which stands completely 
within the logic of European, western technology, but which also provides 
an image of how a Deux Chevaux makes its way down the river along the 
bridge African-style. As long as the engineers manipulate the technology, 
they def initely maintain an awareness of the fact that the paths that they 
are plotting are also those that they have have to “get over.” They can and 
must also know that they themselves are transformed by this technology:
Vertov said that the eye of the camera is a mechanical eye, the micro-
phone is a mechanical ear or sense of hearing (so-called radio hearing), 
this mechanical anatomy is characterized by a certain variability in the 
optical (lenses, apertures, focusses) and in the acoustic (axial registration 
with directional microphones). If I, equipped with these instruments, 
make a f ilm, I myself am a ciné-observateur and f ind myself in a state 
of ciné-trance. In other words: I, Rouch, get up, move, and do something 
that I otherwise would never do.29
In one of Rouch’s f ilms the historically altered cultural technologies are 
combined with the camera technologies into a spectacular cinema-ritual, 
which turned into a scandal. The f ilm Les Maîtres fous, which he shot in 
1954, was considered horrible, malicious, and racist by both French an-
thropologists and cinéastes and African spectators.30 The f ilm interweaves 
cinematic and ritual space. It does this in a surgically precise and absolutely 
ruthless way and is an example of Rouch’s technical and unflinching art of 
“becoming black.” The complexity of the staging begins with Rouch inviting 
the priests of the Haouka cult themselves to shoot a f ilm about their rituals. 
They are the rituals of the Songhay cult practiced by the “Gold Coastiers”, 
the migrant workers from Niger in Ghana, in which the representatives of 
the French and British colonial authority have replaced the spirits of the 
bush, of the water, or of the air. In the f ilm commentary these are referred 
to as “les dieux de la ville, les dieux de la technique, les dieux de la force.” 
It was thus a conscious step by the priests to extend the service to include 
cinematography, which represents a kind of African mnemosyne in the pan-
theon of the Haouka – or, as Rouch applies it – as troops of Corybantes who 
can totally destabilize memory as the central power. Because the priests 
themselves appeared as the commissioners of the f ilming, that it, of the 
technical surveying of the gods, they already subjected the anthropologists 
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to their cult, and precisely not as persons of authority from the colonial 
powers, but as servants: “à la bonne.” In addition, a camera, which is called 
Bell & Howell, must have appeared to these Haouka priests as a convenient 
omen for the change of “his master’s voice.”
The title already announces yet another application of the f ilm. On the 
one hand the “maîtres fous” are traditionally “the masters of the wind that 
brings madness in its wake”, that is, the priests who have overcome mad-
ness. At the same time, “maîtres fous” is the name of the mad masters, the 
colonialists with their cultural and symbolic orders, their science, their 
traffic systems, and their military parades. The syncretic sect of the Haouka, 
beginning with the order that they gave to start shooting, provided the 
occasion for a f ilm of reciprocal anthropology. Les Maîtres fous is, according 
to Rouch, “in the f irst place a f ilm about us, the whites, about the image 
that Africans make of us.”31
Rouch’s camera had to be rewound after 45 seconds. The “mise-en-scène”, 
the dramaturgy, arose during shooting, in the seconds necessary to rewind 
the spring mechanism again. Since Rouch was shooting in long takes, as 
always – that is, making no interruptions and no cuts as long as the cam-
era ran in the space of the ritual activities, but only movements – he had 
placed himself under the periodic standards of the camera and thus in a 
ritual space. What caught his attention as he was rewinding the camera 
determined the next take. This was, according to Rouch, the thinking in 
the f ilm, that had got lost with the incorporation of motors into cameras. 
The gods of technology rule the parameters of cinema-thinking.
The sound, on the other hand, could be recorded continuously for 30 
minutes. In order to apply it later, the editor listened to the whirring of 
the camera, which was heard scene for scene in the original sound of the 
ritual in the Ghanaian bush. Editing the f ilm followed the chronology of 
its recording.32 The shots, their beginnings and ends, are so haphazard and 
noticeable due to the camera’s limitations that there’s no way to claim any 
overview, any overall perspective. In the dramaturgy on the ritual stage, 
which is extremely diff icult to comprehend, the cameraman is optically 
and f irmly integrated in the events, in one role among many, subject to the 
direction of the gods.
The techniques used to induce trance in the ritual are not separately 
described in the film. What can be recognized is that rhythms are created by 
pounding wooden guns and that large amounts of gin have been poured out 
on the central sites of the scene. The f irst signs of possession are shot from 
various camera angles, almost textbook cases from a catalog of convulsions: 
f irst in the left foot, then in the right, in the leg, through the back, to the 
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shoulders, to the head. Rouch captures the eyes askew, the contorted joints. 
The degree to which the camera, the appointed cameraman, and the shoot 
are stimulating the Haouka cannot be determined. The f irst possessed 
person to get up, “Kaporal Gardi”, the corporal of the guard, does so in fact 
directly in front of and looking at the camera. Over the course of the ritual 
various other gods appear without being f ilmed from the beginning. The 
trance as ciné-trance is evidently only one among many in this ritual. At 
any rate, everything, let’s not forget, that we see of possession is cinema.
Among the gods that appear after the corporal of the guard, there are 
the locomotive driver, Captain Malta of the Red Sea, the General Secretary 
Gomno, the Major Commandant Mugu, Samkaki the truck driver, and 
Chemoko, the son of the corporal. They are recognizable through their 
movements, but additionally for the spectator by the fact that a running 
commentary paraphrases what is said by the other participants, sometimes 
also already gods, sometimes still human beings, as they greet the new 
gods, test them, and adorn them with the appropriate accessories. The 
perversions of colonial history are presented in many small details. Even 
more than the ridiculed medals, helmets, suits, and flowery phrases, small 
shifts in the relations show that the gods know what is driving them on. For 
instance, in Les Maîtres fous it is the wife of the doctor, “Madame Lokotoro”, 
who appears, not the doctor himself, whose f igure also appears in Foucault 
as the “master of madness”, the one “who makes it appear in its truth and 
[…] dominates it, pacif ies it, and gradually makes it disappear after having 
artfully unleashed it.”33 In the ritual, the doctor’s Other appears, what moves 
and controls him: Madame.
Much more than any symbolic staging, however, it is in the embodiment 
of movements that the Haouka gods make themselves known. The corporal, 
the captain, the locomotive driver are distinguishable through their gaits, 
in which man and corresponding machine are partially fused, whistling 
and f izzling, into a single way of moving. The gods therefore also appear 
as a farce in the off icial history of anthropological f ilm, which constantly 
disavows its ergonomic beginnings and its initial regulation of bodies. 
Cinematography is supposed to differentiate racially. Here, however, all 
the movements of the maîtres fous appear as awkward, synchronized, stiff 
convulsions set to a militarily strict pre-established rhythm: “In all the other 
f ilms that I shot on dances of possession the gestures of the dancers are 
rounded out, soft, themselves dissolved in the greatest turmoil, while in Les 
Maîtres fous they are angular, coarse, and ludicrous.”34 But they are precise 
in a double sense. In the middle of the footage of the possessed, Rouch 
inserts an old f ilm document of a British military parade in order to be able 
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to show how the cult dancers simulate or distort these odd movements and 
accessories. Through this material, however, it becomes clear that our gaze 
among les maîtres fous has already begun to differentiate, and we become 
attentive to differences between the gestures and movements of the British 
and French occupiers. Under the gaze of the Africans, the Blacks, as they 
could proudly be called in the négritude of the f ifties, it becomes visible how 
colonization had also subjected European bodies to a manifest violence. 
The ritual in the f ilm becomes a lesson in reciprocal anthropology. In this 
regard the possession dances of the maîtres fous are unequivocal. They 
show how domination does not remain on an administrative level, but 
how it, unconscious and supra-personal, takes power through bodies. This 
magic was f irst applied in Europe during the nineteenth century under 
no less brutal rituals and then, through physical drill and psycho- physical 
identification, transferred to the bodies of the colonized. The divine appear-
ances of the Haouka reproduce and disf igure the technologies precisely to 
the degree that power has made itself subjects through drill and stereotypes 
in Africa. The transfer in the film works so well because chronophotography 
had been the most important tool in establishing new bodily regimes in the 
nineteenth century. This is repeated here in reverse. In the commentary 
we hear a comparison between ritual and real colonial administration: “Ici, 
l’ordre est different, ici et là, le protocole est bien le même.” The order that 
the ritual dictates is the order (and the command) of the Haouka gods. The 
protocol that governs how subjects (like the British subjects in the f ilm) 
should behave has the same prehistory. It is due to the dispositif by which 
movements can be stored, controlled, and reproduced in the f irst place: the 
protocol of cinematography.
Because Rouch subjected himself to the recording rhythm of the camera 
– the micro-rhythm of 24 frames per second (here, unlike Bateson, he was 
accurate) and the macro-rhythm of the 45-second takes – and because he 
allowed the persons to depersonalize strictly according to the rules of the 
Haouka in his montage, which maintained the continuity of the movements, 
of the torches, of the colors, and of the relationships, he accomplished his 
task. The terror that seized the audience at the screening of Les Maîtres fous 
at the Musée de l’homme and that made the film unforgettable repeated and 
distorted one of the strategies of possession itself: that of tying memory un-
consciously to the body by means of affects. “For it is the defeated who know 
best which of the opposing tactics were irresistible”, wrote Maya Deren. In 
Rouch’s f ilm as well, the subordinated can indicate the tactics with which 
they were codif ied to become part of a powerful empire, in order then, as 
dispossessed, to flail on the f ishhooks of power. The possessed persons f irst 
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of all incorporate the “corporal”, the one who holds the corporeal body, then 
the officers, the administration, the traffic system, and the “forbidden” other 
sex, namely the wives of two dignitaries. Freedom, equality, civic fraternity, 
identity, and happiness are all promised by power, capturing their subjects 
with tricks that, if all goes well, leave behind weapons, quick jobs, old cars, 
and sex. The Haouka ritual and the f ilm give it a name: violence.
What shocked spectators when the f ilm was shown for the f irst time 
in 1955 at the Musée de l’homme was the violence with which possession 
usurped the participants’ bodies: the screams, the cramps, the shaking, the 
wide-open, rolling eyes, the foaming mouths, and the staggering, buckling 
extremities. In the f ilm, as Rouch shot it, the real of the bodies is made 
painfully present in the imaginary of the appearance of the Haouka gods. 
The gods “de la ville, de la technique, de la force” demonstrate how they 
physically displace the whole person, leaving nothing left of the old remains 
of the soul, which might still indicate a consciousness that accompanies 
these transformations. No “je-sais-mais-quand-même”, as Leiris has seen 
or only hoped for in Haiti, suggests that the possession might be simulation 
or theater. The camera shows an absolute power takeover of civilization in 
the interior of the nervous control function, and shows itself to be part of 
the technology of civilization. The spectators were appalled, the majority 
left the room in protest, but obviously not many of them were ready to 
realize what was being presented: the mercilessness and horror with which 
cultural technologies penetrate the body. Perhaps this is also exactly why 
they fled. To a much smaller degree, but perhaps even more uncannily, this 
process is repeated in the cinema. Rouch was reviled by Europeans and by 
Africans, by whites and blacks, accused of having gone too far. Obviously, 
however, none of the critics heard any message in this presentation of the 
ritual that might have conveyed the takeover by power as a takeover of 
bodies. Not consciously at least, for the message is crystal clear: “to whom 
it may concern.”
What had been particularly shocking to the spectators was the depic-
tion of a dog sacrif ice. In order to show that they are Haouka and thus not 
subject to the order of human beings, the possessed persons eat of the dog, 
which had previously been killed by the priest. Rouch did not shy away 
from showing how the animal was torn apart and dog’s blood dripped 
out of foaming mouths. The gods made fun of any attempt to rationalize 
the horror. In one scene of anticipatory anthropology “the captain” has a 
conference convened in order to pose the decisive question of whether 
the dog should be eaten “raw or cooked”. In the meantime the dog is lacer-
ated further by the gods and swallowed up in large pieces. Rouch makes 
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no attempt to rationalize. The little dog in the f ilm cannot even stand in 
metaphorically for the allegiance with which it obeys the master’s voice, 
archaically and technically. Bell and Howell. The master eats it up. When 
the technology provides the rhythm, there is no more faithful allegiance, 
but only involuntary loyalty. The violence is the intrusion of the real, not as 
the making visible of the apparatus on the screen, as Baudry had imagined, 
but as the twitching of the bodies, the real of which sweeps up once again 
against colonial codif ication in the technically controlled space. Rouch 
cinematically doubles the space of symbolic violence, thus bringing it into 
the screening room. That was unbearable. It is said that Lacan left the room 
without a word along with all the others.
The demented paths of the gods provided the f ilm’s appeal to psycholo-
gists, anthropologists, and cinéastes. It was well received in these circles, 
where the last trance left to central Europeans was being organized in 
the f ifties: the mass mobilization on the streets and the air with the goal 
of forgetting oneself for a couple of days. “Ici, l’ordre est different, ici et 
là, le protocole est bien le même.” The f ilm, which the gods of the cities, 
of technology, and of violence had commissioned and in which the gods 
bloodthirstily show that they recognize no taboos, received the f irst prize in 
Venice in 1957 in the popular category of ethnography, geography, tourism, 
and folklore. “Voici enfin l’Afrique en vacances.”
An almost uninterrupted commentary runs on the soundtrack through the 
entire f ilm, which is normally an effective method of establishing distance 
between the images and a secure order outside the f ilm. For instance, we 
have confidently watched lambs die in dozens of f ilms about Jesus. Rouch’s 
commentary, however, is unsettling even at the level of language. It emerges, 
like the images, in the mutual displacement of the participants and repeats 
the African fabulation. Rouch reports that the speech of the possessed was 
a speaking in tongues: “Une langue, qu’on peut interpréter mais qu’on ne 
peut pas traduire mot à mot.”35 At f irst he has the speeches translated into 
into an African language and then conveyed in French afterwards. The 
commentary that is added in the f inal version was spoken by Rouch in a 
crazed state that he himself calls glossolalia, and that ordered him in the 
darkness of the projection to the microphone in the recording studio. In the 
studio Rouch repeats what befalls the good workers at Accra when they are 
seized in the ritual of the gods. In the space of the recording studio, in which 
the projected images set the rhythm of the speech, in which the foreign 
speech of the gods is taped as the movements of one’s own tongue, in which 
one’s own voice returns distorted and alienated as the carrier of technically 
processed, foreign speech, consciousness takes leave, a consciousness that 
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might have been able to imagine where the ego might be. The physical is 
left to the laws of technology. It carries the mental functions in place of a 
feedbacking consciousness. The glossolalia that Rouch reports seems only 
to have an anecdotal character. Technically it corresponds exactly to the 
experiences of our present culture: Gods only come into the studio.36
The god that we are presumably waiting for in the f ilm is the incarnation 
of the camera-man: the f igure that inevitably belongs to the personnel of a 
colonial troupe. This even seems to be signalized when above the “general 
secretary, at the termite hill-royal palace” an old cinema program is f ilmed, 
Le Signe du Zorro, the f ilm about the revenge of the disinherited. Only when 
the locomotive driver blows through the image, and the governor berates 
those present in French, when Captain Malia from the Red Sea stumbles 
through the scene like Groucho Marx in the British “slow march”, Madame 
Lokotoro inaugurates and desecrates statues while wearing an elegant sum-
mer dress, and the priest Mountyeba chats at the alter like a radio reporter, 
do we notice that the camera-man is also on the scene and is shooting as 
the kino-eye. We as spectators suddenly notice that we do not comprehend 
the gaze that rips us out of our anchoring by seeing; only afterwards can 
be reconstruct it. The camera is our consciousness on the scene. By techni-
cally implementing the gaze on oneself, Rouch repairs to the level and the 
program of the gods. He transforms himself by f ilming. What our gaze 
identif ies on the scene is a technically equipped white man, and thus, like 
all the other gods present, a Black, a Negro, a Noir, who understands his 
ego as other through the many interconnections and relations. What we 
ourselves see are the pictures of a cameraman who has linked himself and 
the camera to a cinematic occupation of the world. A maître fou. In Vertov’s 
tradition Rouch has linked himself to the maîtres fous. In Vertov’s tradition 
he has become a black: “In many of my f ilms I freed the camera from its 
prescribed usage, “converted” it. In today’s capitalist-industrial-socialist 
world there is no other way to make f ilms – you have to use the camera in 
ways that were not intended or prescribed.”37
At the end of the f ilm Rouch’s commentary speaks of the fact that pos-
session might be a cure for some people, with which the Africans might be 
able to integrate into the system of normality. At the end, this sentence is 
introduced somewhat rhetorically: Has the camera not already shown how 
its remedy works? Isn’t the f ilm about how to use media in a way that they 
become remedies? The gods of the city, of technology, and of violence have 
shown us this unambiguously.
Much like Deren in her comparison with hysteria, Rouch also designates 
possession as a way of dealing with states that are merely considered 
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symptoms of abnormality in our society and are not perceived as social 
processes, which show how dropping out, whether desired or undesired, 
can be integrated by the norm. “For me this f ilm is of utmost signif icance 
because it represents something like a key, and this key can help us to 
recognize the social character of mental illnesses and the social, the public 
form of alleviation and cure.”38 In western medicine, by contrast, it is not 
hysteria itself, but only its expulsion, that amounts to a cure. Historically 
media in western societies initially serve to justify mental illnesses, because 
what escapes the text based medicinal discourse can only be physiologi-
cally grasped and systematized by using the images of technology. Another 
brilliant camera builder, Albert Londe, had turned hysteria into a fact by 
working with the consciousness of male and female patients. The former 
chemist was thus promoted to being a god in white. He could not cure 
anything, all he could do is provide rules for justifying selection, hospitaliza-
tion, isolation. A half century later Jean Rouch will describe how the “griots” 
in Africa work when they are able simultaneously to protect tradition and 
to cure. A griot, for instance, is responsible for providing encouragement 
in the case of catastrophes and overpowering enemies:
En recourant à la musique, aux phrases rythmées des devises, en rappe-
lant les haut fait des ancêtres, il parvient à créer une seconde personnalité 
à ‘lever le cœur’ du guerrier au combat, du chasseur de lion, du pêcheur 
d’hippopotame, du ‘Gold Coastier’ défaillant et souffrant du mal du 
pays. Ce courage sera évidemment éphémère mais il suff it en général à 
triompher de l’épreuve.39
Consciously or not, among these examples Rouch always names examples 
from his own f ilm work: La chasse au lion, Battaile sur le grand fleuve, Le 
Maîtres fous, and he also names his own process, using rhythmic phrases 
like in his commentary produced in the studio, of subjecting himself to ritual 
rules in order to remember the past and the ancestors, thus producing a dop-
pelgänger that can behave appropriately in light of the threat. A fleeting but 
absolutely useful doppelgänger that can be projected in the cinematic f ield.
Rouch became a griot. As a master of the black magic of images he 
con tinues to work on developing medial deviations, making visible the 
processes of transformation and of intercultural mirror inversions, and 
analyzing the imaginary security of our white personalities. “Maîtres 
fous is, the voice of Dionysus speaks out of Maîtres fous, the voice of the 
imaginary in our society. And in the future I will continue in this direction 
with cameras that have yet to be built.”40
4. Compressions
Albert Londe: Paris, Paris
Quand le corps en mouvement est inaccessible comme un astre
dont on veut suivre le déplacement […] la photographie supplée
aux procédés mécaniques avec une très grande facilité.
– Étienne-Jules Marey, 1885
One of the genres in anti-monarchist group pictures in Dutch painting, 
in which early bourgeois male societies claimed their own hierarchical 
order, is that of the anatomy lesson. The surgeon, who occupied the great-
est knowledge and the power in the guild, was made the focus by using 
structures of light and gaze, the other doctors were placed in the hierarchy 
correspondingly: in the foreground, middle, or background, in portrait or 
full-length, closer or further away from the corpse, with or without surgical 
tools.1 One picture in this tradition of anatomy lessons is a canvas by the 
painter André Brouillet, which was exhibited in the the Paris Salon of 1887. 
It depicts a lecture by the neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot as a medical 
attraction of the time: “Une leçon clinique à la Salpêtrière.” This painting 
has been presented as emblematic by both male and female historians of 
hysteria because an engraving based on Brouillet’s model hung in the iconic 
corner of psychology itself, in Freud’s study at Berggasse 19 in Vienna.
Instead of looking at a corpse, as is the case with historical anatomy 
pictures, here the doctors and assistants are looking at a woman who has 
fainted and collapsed into the arms of a young man, while an older and a 
younger nurse stand in attendance, following the process like chamber-
maids in a Trauerspiel. An older gentleman is standing next to them. He 
is addressing the audience, but in his iconography he belongs on the stage 
of the dramatic events. Charcot, the “Napoleon of Neuroses”,2 is, like his 
military model, both the worst enemy of the old regime and its heir. His 
lectures, where clinical cases were presented every Tuesday, were scientif ic 
revolutions and social rituals at the same time. Charcot is considered the 
inventor of the systematic clinical pattern of hysteria, which he had pro-
posed in the 1870s by schematizing hundreds of photographs of his patients 
at Salpêtrière. Only through this schematicization, which had been clearly 
laid out for other doctors in a synopsis drawn by Paul Richer, the head of 
the laboratory for pathological anatomy, could the ranting and raving of the 
patients be organized into a complex of symptoms. What had previously 
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been distorted in all medical or theological orders as mad femininity was 
researched, systematized, regulated, and controlled at Salpêtrière.
The experiments with hysterics already represented a second career 
for the neurologist Charcot. In the wake of the war in 1870-71, which had 
brought many dead persons with bullets in the head into the clinic and onto 
the dissecting table, he had already excelled with a completely new medical 
cartography of the human body. Due to his research in nerve physiology, 
he was able to redefine connections between symptom and cause. In his 
studies on tropical disturbances he shows, through the example of a Ger-
man soldier, that injuries to the brain can lead to rashes on the buttocks, a 
bold thesis, unheard of even among privates.3 Disturbances to the nervous 
system and especially the cerebrospinal axis, as Charcot demonstrated 
in the cases if shootings, allowed for a completely new view of how the 
inner physiology of human beings is connected by the nerve tracts. The 
“Napoleon” of neurologists could also be considered the “Columbus” of 
illnesses to the spinal system, precisely because he had no orientation over 
the systemic state of the new land he had discovered.
In 1887, however, when Brouillet’s picture was exhibited at the Salon, 
Charcot’s scientif ic reputation in Paris had become obscured. Research 
and publications by the medical school of Nancy were casting doubt on the 
general validity of his iconographic understanding of the course of hysteri-
cal states, insinuating that they were effects of the examination methods at 
Salpêtrière itself. The demonstration was raised to the level of diagnosis, it 
was claimed, and Michel Foucault will claim that this is exactly what was 
really new about the lessons in Salpêtrière, illustrating Charcot’s art of crisis 
control with an example of an unpublished handwritten document from 
the archive: “The subject exhibits hysterical spasms; Charcot suspends an 
attack by placing f irst his hand, then the end of a baton, on the woman’s 
ovaries. He withdraws the baton, and there is a fresh attack, which he 
accelerates by administering inhalations of amyl nitrate.”4 Sigmund Freud 
attended Charcot’s lectures when he was staying in Paris from October 
13, 1885, to February 28, 1886. In his obituary for Charcot in the “Wiener 
Medizinscher Wochenschrift” he also emphasizes reproducibility as the 
high point of the methodology:
While he was engaged in the study of hysterical paralyses arising after 
traumas, he had the idea of artif icially reproducing those paralyses, 
which he had earlier differentiated with care from organic ones. For this 
purpose he made use of hysterical patients whom he put into a state of 
somnambulism by hypnotizing them.5
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Diagnosis had slid into functionality; whoever could set it in motion had 
explained it.
Raising reproduction to the level of explanation initially meant that 
the goal of treatment was no longer therapy, but controlling the illness. 
Freud will not follow his teacher in this. Charcot’s oracle, that no theory 
would prohibit what happened in the clinic from existing – “ça n’empêche 
pas d’exister” – is something that Freud only pointed out in response to 
the search for an “it” in the hysterics’ spells, an untouched “ça” that had a 
mysterious, disturbing, and modifying influence on consciousness, which 
Freud wished to examine. Freud praise of his teacher, however, was a 
paraphrase of Charcot’s sentence:
We can artif icially produce it under certain circumstances; this is the 
sublimity of a genre and, in fact, the ideal of pathological physiology. 
The ability to reproduce a pathological state partakes of perfection, 
for it seems that one possesses the theory when one has the means of 
reproducing the morbid phenomena at one’s f ingertips.6
For Charcot, theory was f irst and foremost the “known like” of clinical 
practice, which made hysterics publicly mad time and again, and especially 
Tuesday for Tuesday. The transfer of the symptomatic order to the bodies 
of the patients was the ideal of the diagnostics, although what was missing 
in Charcot’s methodology was exactly any description of the “means of 
reproduction” that he claimed to have at hand.
How the transfer of signs to the bodies takes place, how the oddly 
reciprocal interferences of desire were performed as regular mechanics 
or dramaturgies between body and soul, was something that Charcot did 
not want to know anything more about – in contrast to Freud, who will 
later get his f irst indications toward a theory of the unconscious from this 
relationship. Charcot only submitted evidence that “it” did not let itself be 
disturbed.
According to Foucault, the technological and discursive apparatus that the 
various scientif ic and related services at Salpêtrière made available belongs 
to a third epoch of truth production, which became established at the end 
of the eighteenth century. Truth is generated in the experiment, and thus 
must be repeatable. In the laboratory that was Salpêtrière, the techniques 
of hypnosis and suggestion were ref ined to the point that the ill persons 
obviously did what they assumed to be the demands of the doctors without 
resistance. The hysteric, according to Foucault, “herself retranscribed the 
effects of medical power in forms that the doctor could describe in terms 
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of a scientif ically acceptable discourse.”7 For Foucault sexuality was the bait 
in the net of discourse in which the fugitive souls of the nineteenth century 
were caught. “They constructed around and apropos of sex an immense 
apparatus for producing truth, even if this truth was to be masked at the 
last moment.[…] sex was constituted as a problem of truth.”8 It is a problem 
that is at the same time a ruthless power play, and Foucault’s designation of 
the doctors is the exact opposite of the designation with which the Haouka 
priests simulated the sick power of the white colonialists. “All the techniques 
and procedures put to work in the nineteenth century asylum – …the func-
tion of all of this was to make the medical f igure the ‘master of madness.’”9
As variable as the interpretations of the “Leçons clinique à la Salpêtrière” 
were, their methods were persistently viewed as the invention and im-
plementation of a semiological order of the female body. Involuntarily in 
accordance with Charcot’s demands, hysteria was read as an iconography 
and a staged event.
Charcot’s own dramaturgy was as aesthetic as it was useful, for instance 
when, in order to illustrate a lecture on various forms of tremors, he had 
women brought in wearing hats with long feathers so that the specif ic 
characteristics of each tremor in their trembling could be distinguished 
down to the last row of the lecture hall.10 This was clinical practice with 
style and strategy, and the dilettantish cynicism of this kind of staging 
had a long tradition at Salpêtrière. Charcot’s predecessor, Duchenne de 
Boulogne, had researched the Mécanismes de la physiognomie humaine, 
as his publication from 1862 is called, by electrically stimulating the face 
muscles of both male and female patients. In doing so he went so far as 
to ascribe to their bodies roles from classical dramas: certain probes and 
certain muscles caused Lady Macbeth to appear in a fury of rage. Charcot’s 
colleague Paul Richer, in turn, more vulgar in every respect, saw dogs, 
cats, and ordinary people represented.11 The pleasure of the doctors was 
visible, masked as the patients’ wishes, incarnated on the stage of the 
medical theater. Both male and female patients, as mad as they may have 
previously been, surrendered themselves to the intellectual madness of the 
masters. One of the psychoanalytic primal scenes at Salpêtrière was also 
the presentation of the obscene to open view. It documents the banality 
of early psycho-physiological power fantasies, but also the eff iciency of a 
relay that continuously shackles all research to the system of meaning. At 
the same time, the direction, regulation, and supervision of the researching 
gaze is hidden away in the order and structure of the archive itself. This is 
also not new for hysteria. Already in the seventeenth century hysteria had 
been designated as an epistemological sickness of physicians themselves. 
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Any one who has studied hysteria as an epistemological effect since then has 
had to be prepared for feedback mechanisms with one’s own scientific work.
During the 1980s, when the f irst effects of new electronic developments 
were breaking into ordinary life, coinciding with a crisis in theoretical 
feminism and instigating a discussion about femininity and representation, 
a renaissance in the historiography of hysteria began in which the visual 
presentation of hysterics, as Brouillet’s picture shows, was examined as a 
staging of gender difference. Hysteria was declared the hospitalization of 
a desire that, following the dictates of the individual hysteria researcher’s 
discipline, could be analyzed as relations of media, power, and gender.
Once Charcot’s reorganization of the body had been established, it was 
seen that his experiments had not only been affairs between doctors and 
patients, but manifestations of a new science of the body. This presumed 
the development of new optical devices that got their f inishing touches in 
the laboratories of physiologists and replaced a geometric optics with a psy-
chological one. The technical developments appeared to the tableau painter 
André Brouillet as a crisis of his own profession at the sector of imaging, and 
he had treated them in his picture of Charcot’s lesson. Alongside the f irst 
staging to shows the construction of typical femininity in the male space 
of medicine, a second staging lies hidden in the image, one about seeing 
and being seen, about becoming-visible and remaining-hidden: about the 
chemical-physical machinery behind the stage that allows for the staging 
and makes the truth from Salpêtrière available to science.
Charcot, the director on the small stage of hysteria, is himself only a bit 
player in a much more broadly encompassing reform of the medicinal gaze. 
Brouillet’s picture shows that Charcot is also only another person to look at 
in this play, exactly like the helpless patient and the heroically composed 
assistant. Behind the doctors’ heads, that is, at a site that the three women 
in the picture could see if they had not lowered their heads or had not shut 
their eyes in helplessness, hangs a picture, painted after a photo from the 
photography archive at Salpêtrière: it is the picture of a woman whose body 
forms an arc stretched out backwards from her head to the tips of her toes. 
In the synopsis of the hysterical poses that Richer had prepared as drawings 
based on the photographic models of the doctor Paul Regnard, this is the 
“arc de cercle”, the “great hysterical arc” or “das Gewölbe” [“the arch”], as 
Sigmund Freud translated more beautifully because more Kleistian. This 
arc represents the highpoint in the course of the hysterical attack in the 
order of Salpêtrière. Better yet, it presents it. In the hall of the clinical 
presentations the “great hysterical arc” counters that all the patients are only 
doppelgängers of the recorded originals, in which poses and bodies coincide, 
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of which there are registries, photographs, and medical knowledge, and 
which can thus be brought into play by power, truth, or gender differences. 
The development at Salpêtrière during the 1880s consisted in allowing the 
illustrational apparatus to disappear from the consciousness of the male 
and female patients and in presenting the technological images of the body 
to them as their own.
As a professional, Brouillet shows in his picture how he is part of the 
cover-up of the technological intervention. He worked out the “arc” in 
all the lighting effects of the drapery under aesthetic aspects, not under 
systematic or medicinal ones. From the picture-in-a-picture it is not possible 
to tell whether his model was a photograph or a drawing, even if the motif 
can be identif ied as one from Régnard’s collection. Because it deliberately 
blurs the traces of its origin, Brouillet’s picture remains a variation on the 
fundamental question of Salpêtrière: “Is hysteria original or copy?”12 But 
while this question refers in the research to the appearances of patients, 
their poses and gestures, Brouillet integrated it into his picture as a question 
of media: as a question of the procedure of illustration.
Brouillet goes even further in his composition. On the right side of the 
picture the assistant Joseph Babinski – who would later become a famous 
specialist in hypnosis – catches the patient Blanche Wittman – one of 
the star hysterics of Salpêtrière and also of the history of hysteria – in 
her fall, while on the left Charcot’s colleagues Paul Richer, Charles Féré, 
Alfred Binet, and Gilles de la Tourette sit at a table observing the master. 
Charcot, who had described himself as an artist and director of hysteria, 
was shifted from the center of the picture to the right side by Brouillet, and 
so a table is visible at this spot with measuring instruments and devices 
for electronically stimulating the patients. The chair in the geometrical 
middle of the picture, a splendid leather armchair in comparison to the bare 
wooden chairs in the auditorium, the scholar’s seat, la chaire, the chair in 
the academic sense, remains empty. This could be an homage to Charcot as a 
clinician. Brouillet, however, has placed a figure in the image that relativizes 
the arrangement of those present. On the left margin in the foreground, at 
the position where the commissioner is often found observing, checking, 
and confirming events in classical painting, sits the photographer Albert 
Londe. In 1884, the year of a cholera outbreak, Londe was named director 
of photographic services as Salpêtrière. It was Londe who had provided 
Brouillet with photographic prints of the doctors and assistants, which he 
then used as his models. Londe himself, on the other hand, was not painted 
according to any photographic model, but had personally sat for the painter 
in his studio. Londe is one of the few people in the picture to be seen in 
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full, in a white apron tied at the waist and a black silk cap: the traditional 
garb of an assistant doctor. This was simply presumptuous, since Londe 
was not a physician, he was a trained chemist and amateur photographer 
and earned, at the time the picture was painted, 1200 francs a year, roughly 
the equivalent of an off ice boy’s salary.13 Thus while the facial expression 
of most of the audience and even of Charcot were due to an instantaneous 
photograph taken with a quick camera, which Londe had developed, Londe’s 
portrait is the result of hours of sitting in the studio: a character study in 
the manner of the old painters. This difference is as diff icult to make out 
in Brouillet’s illustration as is the reproduction of the “arc de cercle” on the 
wall as being the result of photographic recording technology. Nonetheless, 
Brouillet placed the destitute Londe in the position of the benefactor, for 
the painter knew better than anyone that without Londe’s photographic 
constructions, not only would this picture not have been possible, but 
there also could not have been any “Leçon clinique à la Salpêtrière” in the 
1880s. Londe’s techniques had completely restructured the medicinal gaze. 
Brouillet’s picture is secretly an homage to the new era of recording and 
depiction, which had become established at Salpêtrière since 1884.
Brouillet and Londe knew from their own experience that the disparate 
eras of recording that were hidden in the picture were the key to mastering 
madness. The mastery of the neurologists was due to the technologies and 
procedures of depicting an illness, which showed no visible physical lesions, 
it was “sine material.” Charcot had prided himself in being able to direct a 
gaze that visually def ined the forms of nervousness. His methodological 
problem consisted in being able to document this gaze. Charcot’s clinical 
practice can be distinguished from the experimental medicine of Claude 
Bernard’s school, the famous vivisector, in that the patients were monitored 
and observed, their symptoms catalogued and systematized in order for 
the data recorded to be compared posthumously in the autopsy with the 
nervous-physiological f indings in vivo. According to Charcot, the clinical 
rooms at Salpêtrière were not laboratories, but a
sort of living pathological museum whose resources are almost inex-
haustible. It is true that we sometimes miss the beginnings of disease; 
but, on the other hand, we gain by being enabled to investigate after 
death the lesions which correspond to the symptoms studied minutely, 
and over a long period of time, during life.14
Usually, however, to no avail: the whole thing, as a museum disguised as 
a charitable enterprise – Freud called it an “the institution for the care of 
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women”15 for poor people were treated free of charge at Salpêtrière provided 
they committed every part of themselves, including their nervous systems, 
to the institution – functioned as a hysteria exhibition only so long as 
the exhibited objects were still alive. In the pathology in which Freud 
had worked, neither lesions nor forms of trembling could be discerned. 
Although Charcot had stylized himself as a seeing, as “visuel”, he could not 
provide any proof for his unerring diagnostic gaze to the patients. This is 
why the throne of science remains empty in Brouillet’s painting. In place of 
a scientist there is the technology that makes the new knowledge possible 
in the f irst place.
In 1882, when the parliament approved the budget for a new professorship 
in neurology under Gambetta, the chemist Albert Londe was originally 
hired as préparateur for the museum. When he started he found a photo 
lab there, which he called “prehistoric”,16 and promptly set about renovating 
it and equipping it with new machinery. Stages and mounting devices for 
lighting patients were brought to his light-workshop, and the darkroom was 
brought up to the latest standards. Londe developed a half dozen camera 
prototypes, and in 1893, when Charcot was already dead, the (in)famous 
“Piste de la Salpêtrière” was installed outside, on which the patients had to 
complete long courses of movement in front of a serial photographer and 
even later in front of a f ilm camera.
With this “photographic service”, as his division was off icially called, 
Londe had greater visions than simply the task of depicting patients. Ulti-
mately it was not Londe that had introduced photography to Salpêtrière. 
Long before he started his photographic service the famous volumes of 
photographs made by his predecessors, the Iconographie photographique 
de la Salpêtrière, were already in the laboratory. The three volumes had 
been brought out between 1876-1879 by the neurologists Bourneville and 
Régnard. But these photographs were, as Bourneville wrote in the foreword 
to the f irst volume, merely illustrations of the medical gaze, and had only 
been printed because “our excellent master Monsieur Charcot” encouraged 
doctors “to publish the observations gathered by us in his halls, illustrating 
them with photographs taken by Monsieur Régnard.”17
Londe, on the other hand, did not wish to illustrate the medical gaze, but 
to thoroughly modify it. In “prehistoric” research, photography itself played 
no scientif ic role. Londe, however, envisioned an epistemological function 
for the new technology. The photograph itself was supposed to be the test 
case, the proof, in the sense of evidence and of the artistic copy, “épreuve”, 
of the illness hysteria, because it discovered things that the naked eye could 
not discern. Just as the photographer Londe is asserted to be a physician in 
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Brouillet’s painting, the value of the photo lab is also meant to be raised to 
being a scientif ic laboratory.
The moment of Londe’s attempt at a power grab was opportune. In the 
1870s Jean-Martin Charcot had worked on localizing various nervous ill-
nesses in the brain. Since 1878 he had examined and systematized hypnotic 
states, eventually presenting his research at the Académie des sciences in 
1882, thus achieving scientif ic recognition for hypnosis. In his opening 
lecture of a series in the winter of 1885, at which Sigmund Freud most likely 
also participated, Charcot confronted his listeners with a new, unresolved 
medical problem:
But you are aware, gentlemen, that there still exists at the present time 
a great number of morbid states, evidently having their seat in the nerv-
ous system, which leave in the dead body no material trace that can be 
discovered. Epilepsy, hysteria, even the most inveterate cases, chorea, 
and many other morbid states which it would take us too long to enumer-
ate, come to us like so many sphinx, which deny the most penetrating 
anatomical investigations. These symptomatic combinations deprived 
of anatomical substratum, do not present themselves to the mind of the 
physician with that appearance of solidity, of objectivity, which belong 
to affections connected with an appreciable organic lesion.18
Only Londe was able to provide the “material trace that can be discovered” of 
hysterical illnesses, as the material trace on a photographic plate, thus advanc-
ing both hysteria to an illness with verifiable and reproducible symptoms, 
and photography to a scientific method at the same time. Londe’s technical 
invention made the epistemological revolution possible. The material trace 
that he sought was not to be found under the surface of the body, but in the 
folds of the temporal extension of its process. Time had to be manipulated, 
enlarged, taken under the magnifying glass, in order to get to the bottom of 
hysteria. The decisive shift in Londe’s methodology, as opposed to the old shots 
by Régnard, was the drastic shortening of exposure times. In the 1870s, that 
is, at the time when the first Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière 
had been photographed, the usual exposure time in interior spaces lasted 
between 15 and 30 minutes. In 1880 Londe’s exposure of an external shot with 
45 seconds got a great deal of recognition, around 1884 “temps de pose”, as 
they were called in French from the perspective of those photographed, under 
one second were still quite rare.19 Only in 1886 did Londe define the snapshot 
as a photograph that was exposed for less than ¼ of a second. Most of his 
spectacular inventions and improvements in photographic technology – a 
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new coating for the plates, new circular shutter techniques, the chronophoto 
apparatus, and ever the improvement of his lenses – served to reduce the 
exposure time for the purpose of instantaneous photography.
Londe’s technical inventions were the requirement to open up a new field 
of research at Salpêtrière with the objectivity of scientific methods: the logic 
of the involuntary and the unconscious in human movements. The short 
exposure times and intervals with which Londe’s camera depicted moments of 
movement could no longer be consciously perceived. This altered the diagnos-
tics of hysteria absolutely. The “system of relations” [“réseau”]20 between the 
various discursive, institutional, or iconographic elements, which could only 
be created thanks to instantaneous photography, captures the unconscious 
as a “mental trace that can be discovered” by scientists for the f irst time. 
This was something that Régnard’s “prehistoric” photographs with their long 
exposure times could neither hope for, nor could they technically achieve it.
In a certain respect, what happened in Londe’s studio was nothing more 
than in the “composite portraitures” of Francis Galton or of bertillonage, the 
facial photography developed by the director of the photographic service of 
the prefecture of Paris, Alphonse Bertillon, which quickly became mandatory 
for European police departments.21 A person was photographically reduced 
to a portrait view and a brief moment of posing in the simplest time-space 
coordinates. Such shots were made in series with multiple exposures of 
individuals, and then assembled by the eugenicist Galton as familial groups 
or by Bertillon as criminal groups, so that types began to emerge with char-
acteristic deviances, visible at f irst glance. These could then be determined, 
numbered, and transmitted by telegraph to aid in manhunts.22 Londe showed 
how something similar could also be made visible in neurology, something 
that only existed in the series of photographs: the facies, typical expressions 
of an illness that could not otherwise be materially detected.
Dans un autre ordre d’idées, le chirugien, le médecin constatent au 
moyen de la photographie l’étendue des lésions, leur aspect; ils en notent 
les modif ications et complètent ainsi de la manière la plus claire leurs 
observations. Il est même certaines affections qui donnent au malade une 
phsyionomie toute spéciale, qui ne frappe pas l’observateur dans un cas 
isolé, mais qui devient typique si on la retrouve chez d’autres personnes 
atteintes de la même maladie.23
The trick images are engraved into the physician’s memory, the picture of 
the illness emerges in the photo lab: “C’est ainsi, en particulier, que dans 
les maladies du système nerveux, on a pu établir des types rigoureusement 
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définis qui correspondent à des affections détérminées. Ces types restent 
gravés dans la mémoire du médecin…”24 Londe wrests power from the 
engineers. His process of fragmenting the old pictures of bodies into the 
realm of the millisecond and of reassembling them into new types is the 
prerequisite for any and all psychology of the unconscious. It would be 
wrong to describe Londe’s work as bureaucratic identif ication photography. 
For him it was more about mobility during the shots, about the shots of 
movement, about the variability of the illustrative system of photography.25 
Londe was considered to be an excellent photographer, both inside and 
outside of Salpêtrière, because he did not adhere to reproducing particularly 
prominent characteristics, but depicted bodies, just as he did landscapes or 
his many shots of the sea, as light, surface, and movement. Instantaneous 
photographs were meant to f ix the unfamiliar and unpredictable.
Even his f irst amateur experiments to improve the layers of the photo-
graphic plates with a dry emulsion, silver bromide gelatin, signif icantly 
extended the horizon of movement in photography. Using the new plates 
(which incidentally laid the foundation for the f inancial empire of the 
Lumières), preparing, shooting, and developing a photograph could occur 
far apart in time. For the f irst time the photographer could leave his studio 
with the plates under his arm and take pictures when and where he liked, 
then develop, enlarge, or process them later in the darkroom.
Following the same intention, of extending photography’s mobility, 
Londe took a decisive stand against the mechanical hangings that were 
used in Salpêtrière to sedate the patients in the frame of the picture. For 
certain shots Londe did admit the use of apparatuses like “head rests”, but 
he wanted to assemble and illustrate what was characteristic, not to set up 
a typical scenario by force:
Il faut s’en servir lorsque le malade ne peut garder i’immobilité et que 
le manque de lumière ne permet pas de faire une épreuve instantanée. 
Il en sera de même lorsque l’on opérera de très près et que l’on voudra 
faire à grande échelle la tête ou quelques parties de celle-ci… les yeux, la 
bouche, le nez ou les oreilles. La grande dimension de l’image dans ces cas 
particuliers nécessite des pose plus longues que d’habitude et d’autre part 
l’immobilité complète du sujet est encore plus indispensable: cependant 
toutes les fois que la position, l’attitude du malade seront caractéristiques, 
il faudra proscrire d’une manière absolue l’emploi de l’appui-tête.26
The only way out of this practice based on devices, which Londe called 
“mauvais à priori”,27 was to develop mechanisms and equipment that 
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allowed for ever shorter exposure times in instantaneous photography. 
Londe replaced the “guillotine” shutter of the old cameras, in which a piece 
of cardboard whizzed down from a wooden bar, with circular shutters. In 
1881 he constructed the prototype of a camera with variable sector apertures 
made of copper, f ixed to steel plates. The apertures were controlled by a 
gear mechanism, and the time of the aperture was regulated by a spring 
mechanism. Using a dial on the outside of the camera one could set different 
exposure times. With these apertures Londe could expose for 1/10 or 1/15 
of a second if he used additional lighting. This prototype was built by the 
watchmaker Dessoudeix, with whom Londe would collaborate again and 
again: a small heart valve of darkness.
Londe had his apparatuses built as small as possible, light, but also 
robust, to the point that he could recommend the use of the hand camera 
in 1893 in order to follow the patient and to capture a tremor or an attack 
at just the right moment: “Il ne saurait être question de vouloir amener la 
malade dans cet état devant l’objectif, il faut que ce soit l’opérateur qui la 
suive avec un appareil à main, pour la saisir au moment favorable.”28 All of 
Londe’s developments attempt to render the rigid structures of the studio 
superfluous. He sought out a method of depicting the moving, living bodies 
of the hysterics, and he wanted to give these movements of involuntariness 
free reign.
At this point it is clear why it is so perspicuous to use Foucault’s term 
dispositif in relation to Salpêtrière. If at f irst is was the mechanical and 
architectural devices of the photo studio, in the concrete and simplest 
sense of the French “dispositif ”, in which patients in the 1870s were sat, 
arranged, turned, and f ixed, with Londe’s inventions these adjustments 
become functions of the recording apparatus, which allow for a medical 
view of the body outside the studio. The new freedom of movement that 
was granted to the patients’ bodies in the 1880s corresponded precisely to 
the forms of time and space Londe’s new cameras were able to penentrate.
Neurology needed to analyze the ever faster movements, the trembling, 
twitches, and ticks that had perhaps already been somehow perceived by 
the physician’s gaze, but had never been seen or observed. Photography, as 
Londe constantly stressed, discovers what remains hidden to the eye: “Il est 
absolument certain que l’objectif photographique peut révéler des choses 
que l’œil le plus exercé ne savait pas percevoir.”29 In this context Londe 
borrows a formulation from the famous astronomer Jules Janssen, who had 
described the photographic plate as “rétine du savant”, as the scientist’s 
retina,30 after he had recorded Venus passing before the sun, only analyzing 
it afterwards. Photography allowed one to temporally isolate the depiction 
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from the object being observed, and to value depiction over observation. To 
photograph meant to store and process an event for science.
Hysteria is therefore rightly called a sickness of representation.31 Physi-
cians at Salpêtrière had turned the iconography of hysteria into an object 
without reflecting on the separation of their object of examination from 
the patients. As long as they might stare at them, they could only learn as 
much about them as an astronomer who stares into the sun and only sees 
the flickering of his own eyes. The work of the photographer consisted in 
inventing techniques that necessarily resolved the transferal of the moving 
body to the image so true to nature and so scientif ically that, on the one 
hand, clear information could be gained from raving and trembling bodies, 
and on the other hand, nothing of the bodies was missing in the images. The 
technical service is the condition for the discursive order that Charcot was 
able to set up in “all the wilderness of paralyses, spasms and convulsions.”32 
Even in Salpêtrière, the Masters of Madness could only appear and keep the 
protocol because the Master of Technology gave the “ordre” of the course.
By means of the instantaneous photograph, the meshes of the networks, 
the physical and the sensual can be captured as signs and organized, decid-
edly f iner. No longer just poses and gestures, but also involuntary move-
ments and also a frothing and vibrating can thus be f ixed and systematized 
in order to render a diagnostic judgment about the unconscious. A realm 
of raving and mad movements beyond scientif ic ascertainability, in which 
both male and female hysterics could send rebellious messages and cries for 
help to all concerned through their attacks and behavior. While exposure 
times of ½ hour or even ½ minute can still be described as an authentic 
personal statement, self-showing, self-expressing, quick photography in 
milliseconds seizes evidence from movements in moments that are so brief 
that the patients do not notice, much less have the chance to react. Since 
Londe the drama of hysteria is that utterly everything has been requisitioned 
for the processing of signs with the new medical camera gaze. Even the 
mad productivity of the hysterics’ parodies, acting, and performances, like 
Charcot’s stage work, has to let itself be synchronized and processed by the 
new cameras. What we see, read, and know about hysteria emerges in photo-
graphic networks. What can be captured as the message of male and female 
hysterics had previously passed through the processes of technical storage, 
as they can graph and corresponding dramatize physical expressions in the 
realm of the millisecond in the case of instantaneous photography.
In his 1976 study, psychoanalyst Lucien Israel examined hysterical 
symptoms “dans la ‘pathologie’ relationnelle de l’hystérie”,33 stressing the 
diff iculty of separating message and medium in hysteria:
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The symptom is the entirety of hysteria, bearer of a message, of a some-
times awkward, often disturbing message, but one that always takes its 
toll on the bearer. This automatic message, coming from the unconscious, 
only becomes meaningful when deciphered. The diff iculty in deciphering 
it comes from the fact that the addressee is caught in the same net and by 
the same system of attitudes, customs, and thoughts as those who have 
compelled the hysteric to take to this encrypted message of symptoms.34
The hysterical message can only be deciphered by someone who allows 
him or herself to be touched by it, who is “concerned”, and who restores 
to it the language with which it can procure being right and healed in the 
social. Israel as well understood hysterical messages as being directed “at 
everyone”,35 as messages that have to be conveyed. This is why this decoding 
also and fundamentally includes the examination of technical patterns 
and registers to which the male and female hysterics react or, when it is 
simply too fast for human perception, to which hysteria itself responds with 
twitching, speaking in tongues, or even with “sécrétions abondantes.”36
The power of the doctors existed, not because of or despite the rebellious 
desire of the patients, but because there were technologies available to them 
“to produce illness in its truth”,37 that is, to translate desire into medical 
discourse and to exclude everything else through technical evidence. Every 
psychological logic presumes a technological logic. Any critique that would 
liberate female and also male patients from the discourse of the Masters 
of Madness must apply itself to the arbitrariness of these technologies 
and the symbolic orders inaugurated by them. Only then do the messages 
break down in their translation, and it could be shown that not only hyster-
ics, but all of us are simulators when faced with the technical medium of 
photography. And that a snapshot will always prove each of us to have been 
dissimulating.
In December of 1882 Londe presented his stereoscopic camera for relief 
photography to the Société française de photographie, which was meant to 
be used to document experiments on faradic stimulation of face muscles. 
The principle behind this camera consisted in f ixing two lenses on a plate 
behind which a complex clockwork could be used to move an aluminum 
panel, rather than a simple gear mechanism. The exposure times could vary 
between 1/33 and 1/200 of a second with this camera. The star model for 
one of the f irst series of images that Londe took with this construction was 
Blanche Wittman, who will faint before all the doctors’ eyes in Brouillet’s 
tableau. 16 round photos glued next to one another showed how, in a state 
of hypnotic catalepsy, a certain cramped attitude could be transferred from 
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the right to the left arm by using a magnet: “Mlle Wittman, transfer d’une 
attitude au moyen de l’aimant.”
What was already presented as a chronophotographic series, as a con-
tinual depiction of a course of movement, however, in reality still belongs 
to the era of the pose. Londe later admitted that the individual exposure 
time amounted to a second in each case, that the suspension of movements 
therefore lay with Mlle Wittman, and was not any chopping up of f luid 
motion by the camera. But on whichever side of the lend the intermittent 
twitches were made: the photographic preparation of reality by means of 
photography is entropic, no event can be reconstructed from the photo-
graphic manipulations. This is something that photographers know as well 
as painters do, when they offer themselves as chroniclers.
It was only the next camera that Londe built that f inally allowed for 
technical chronophotography strictly speaking, that is, serial shots in which 
the individual photo is taken independently of particular and regular time 
intervals. Instead of two lenses, nine lenses were arranged in a circle on a 
plate, “qui nous permet de faire neuf épreuves successives à des intervalles 
de temps rapprochés.”38 Nine times, one after the other, the photographic 
plate captured a snapshot of the patient as she turned in new steps behind 
the lens: the real Revolution Nr. 9 of the history of the sciences. These new 
recordings of hysterical attacks took place in fractions of seconds, in periods 
of time in which patients could no longer simulate because the short inter-
vals allowed for no conscious reactions, in the realm of the technological 
unconscious. That means that male and female hysterics, even if they were 
familiar with photographic services, could not turn the attack of illustrative 
technology to their self-image. The random shots caught something real, 
which could not merge itself with any imaginary image. The doctors of the 
Salpêtrière could organize what became visible on the photos as they saw fit.
In the nine-lens camera a battery provided an electrical impulse to the 
mechanism that controlled the shutters, while the impulse in turn was kept 
in rhythm by a metronome. Thus, the moments of movement that were 
photographed were initially determined by a unif ied division of time. This 
meant that a technology was implemented in the “appareil photo-électrique” 
that had otherwise been the domain of the doctor during inducing hypnotic 
or hysterical attacks: the induction of trance by a rhythmic pattern. In this 
case, it belonged to the mechanism of the apparatus itself. The tick-tock of 
the metronome set the rhythm that set the pace for the patients’ nervous 
crises while at the same time setting the rhythm by which the crisis would 
be recorded. Subjective and objective in the recording shifted positions 
with every stroke.
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The time in which Londe was taking his f irst series with this “appareil 
photo-électrique à neuf objectifs” corresponded exactly with the shift in 
Charcot’s research from localizing nervous source of the disease in the brain 
to the study of illness as “sine materia.” In the foreword to his translation of 
Charcot’s lectures, Freud, observing that Charcot had left the research into 
the organic studies of neural diseases, wrote: “At about the same time at 
which Breuer was carrying on the ‘talking cure’ with his patient, the great 
Charcot in Paris had begun the researches into hysterical patients at the 
Salpêtrière which were to lead to a new understanding of the disease.”39 It 
was this camera that made is possible to store the neuroses – at any rate 
it also made it irrelevant to have the cooperation of the male and female 
hysterics, and had made an allegory of the rapport between doctor and 
patient. As such it was examined further in the iconographic research into 
hysteria. The engineer in doctor’s clothing, who ref ined the power over 
madness, remained unobserved as an assistant.
Because the single frames of the camera with nine lenses on the 13 x 18 cm 
photographic plate were tiny, Londe was developing a prototype for another 
camera at the beginning of the 1880s. Its twelve lenses would be overlapped 
so that the square images would almost entirely f ill up the wide format of 
the photographic plate. With this prototype Londe delivered his medical 
masterpiece in 1884: He photographed the patient Rosa Guillot, whose 
unusually fast attacks, lasting for only seconds, could not be identif ied by 
any of the resident doctors at Salpêtrière. With his chronophotographic 
series Londe showed that the crises could indeed be classif ied as epileptoid 
hysterical in the synoptic pattern of Salpêtrière. When, a few weeks later, 
the crises slowed down and Rosa Guillot’s neurosis could be identif ied 
by the naked eyes of the doctors, Londe was shown to be correct with his 
photographic slow-motion diagnosis, and he was credited with the f irst 
application of photography that was not merely for depiction, but could aid 
in diagnosis.40 Did he feel vindicated after this triumph for appearing in 
the garb of the assistant doctor when he sat for the painting in the artist’s 
studio?
The serial camera with twelve lenses also chopped up the image of the 
body, which might still have been a draft of the hysterics’ “ego”, into a clinical 
picture that consists of sections of twitching that cannot be consciously 
controlled, and that had appeared indistinguishable to the naked eye of 
the doctors and students. In the 1870s, when “walking through our halls” 
with his students and assistants, Charcot, the physician, had incited this 
in order to sharpen the medical gaze in the muddle of the body:
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At f irst glance one might well think that a monotonous spectacle of its 
gazes was present. In fact, if one is satisf ied with a superf icial look, the 
symptom of trembling seems to be identical or nearly the same in all the 
women. Only one factor is remarkable, namely the changing intensity and 
distribution that the rhythmic vibrations presenting by their members.41
After processing with the photographs, after 1885, Charcot was able, ac-
cording to Freud’s own memories of the “rounds with his senior in one 
of the departments of the Salpêtrière”, to bring some order to “all the 
wilderness of paralyses, spasms and convulsions for which forty years 
ago there was neither name nor understanding”,42 or simply no recording 
technology.
A short time later, Londe’s works was also publicly recognized: At the 
beginning of 1885 Charcot illustrated his depiction of the case of Guinin, a 
male hysteric, with a 12-part chronophotogrpahic series of Londe’s. Charcot 
presents himself here as quite as aesthete of hysteria and he underscores its 
beauty precisely through the illustrated example of a male body:
Toute cette partie de l’attaque est, chez G(uinin), parfaitement belle, si je 
puis m’exprimer ainsi, et chacun de ces détails méritait d’être f ixé par les 
procédés de la photographie instantanée. Je fais passer sous vos yeux les 
f igures qui ont été ainsi obtenues par M. Londe. Vous voyez qu’au point 
de vue de l’art, elles ne laissent rien à désirer; mais de plus elles sont pour 
nous très instructives.43
Charcot is methodologically dependent on photography, but he does not 
wish to understand or name it itself as a medical implement, and even 
in his books he shows hardly any prints of photographs, which were sup-
posed to have become so famous for the lessons at Salpêtrière. Londe is only 
mentioned three times in his entire Œuvres Complètes. Charcot denies 
the signif icance of the technicians and their instruments for research and 
quickly incarnates even the technical service. “But to tell the truth, in this 
I am nothing more than a photographer; I inscribe what I see.”44 It was the 
photographer Londe’s intention, however, to give visibility to what a naked 
eye and even also the naked eye of a physician could not see.
Charcot’s obeisance to Londe’s work at this rare spot in his writings does 
not only have aesthetic reasons. In 1884 Hippolyte Bernheim published the 
f irst of his works about suggestibility in hypnotic and waking states, from 
which his vehement attacks of Charcot’s representation of the typical forms 
of hysterical f its is meant to have come.45
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Against these attacks on his scientif ic standards, Charcot publicly 
engages photography to emphasize the objectivity of his research. But he 
is wary of acknowledging the mechanist as clinician. At the same time he 
co-writes the book Les démoniaques dans l’art with Paul Richer.46 Charcot’s 
evocation of the documents of painting in this volume is a manifestation 
not only of his claim of the timeless truth of his its iconography, but it is at 
the same time a concealment of the technology that his analysis cannot 
do without. At the same time Richer, Gilles de la Tourette, and Londe were 
planning the publication of a Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière on 
the basis of instantaneous photography. When this appeared in 1888, the 
foreword contains the following text:
Avec l’aide de la photographie instantanée, on arrive à f ixer, à décomposer 
sur le papier sensible des mouvements anormaux.[…] qu’il eût été impos-
sible d’analyser avec toute précision souhaitée à l’aide du simple examen 
clinique.[…] La photographie d’un paralysé agitant ou d’une hystérique 
en attaques n’en dit-elle pas plus long à l’esprit qu’une description, si 
analytique qu’elle soit?47
This elevation of photographic methods over clinical ones must have been 
irksome to Charcot, and he took his revenge by relegating photography to 
the second tier of aesthetics in relation to clinical work. In a counter move, 
Londe had representatively enhanced his own value through painting and 
might have been relieved that his methods did not have to withstand any 
serious scientif ic controls, for he had readily delivered illustrations that did 
not serve the cause of science, but the power plays of the physicians. The 
photo series of Guinin’s attack in twelve images, arranged as if they were 
taken from a single plate, was just as manipulated in time as the series of 
Blanche Wittman had been. Londe had compiled it in the photo lab from 
two different series of twelve in order better to simulate the aesthetics of 
the attack. Charcot’s verdict, that hysterics “simulate without any particular 
intention.[…] and cultivate the art for their own sake”,48 goes for both the 
medial staff as well as the photographic personnel. Simulation is the method 
per se at Salpêtrière. And Londe’s time compression, achieved through the 
technology of photography, successfully replaced all the physiotherapeutic 
compressions, braces, and brackets with which the hysterics’ bodies had 
previously been f ixed in the clinic.
Unperturbed by all of this, Londe pursued his wish to perfect the photog-
raphy of the involuntary and the unconscious as a scientific method vis-à-vis 
medical practice. For example, he exposed some patients for so long that 
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their trembling members disappeared in blurriness, while the rest of the 
body, which was still, remained quite sharp. In this way “hysterical” body 
parts could be photographically isolated. This shows that chronophotogra-
phy and thus also the pre-f ilmic chopping up of the patients at Salpêtrière 
was only one of many different illustrative procedures with which Londe 
experimented. The series of instantaneous photographs, however, proved to 
be the most effective. For Londe, scientific photography becomes equivalent 
to chronophotography as def ined by Étienne-Jules Marey in 1882 as serial 
shots of moving objects in relation to def ined temporal intervals. Londe 
developed certain tricks to undermine this mathematical scientif ic basis 
of the method. In 1893 he presented his camera with twelve lenses to the 
Société française de photographie. And once again it turned out that Londe’s 
variant, unlike the competing procedures, had liberated the dispositif of the 
limits of time and space. While Eadweard Muybridge’s serial photography 
was installed permanently at the racing track at Palo Alto, and Marey’s 
camera was a permanent f ixture in the Parc des Princes in the Bois du 
Boulogne, Londe built a mobile and variable camera unit. He exposed the 
plates with five variable shutter times. The mechanism of the twelve-picture 
camera was completely unlike the nine-picture camera, for the photo plate 
no longer turned along with it. This meant that the entire apparatus was 
more stabile and allowed for signif icantly shorter exposure times. Each of 
the twelve lenses in the camera had its own shutter, which was triggered 
by a remote electric allocator. This theoretically allowed Londe – and this 
was also an option that he wanted to keep open for scientif ic recording – to 
overlap the end of one shot with the beginning of the next by using longer 
exposure times. One incidence could, if necessary, be recorded without any 
temporal interruption. Marey’s gun, by contrast, could take take twelve 
pictures a second at 1/700 of a second, meaning that more than 98 percent 
of what happened before the camera in this second was not captured.
There was yet another change with respect to camera with nine pictures, 
controlled by a metronome, one that would also necessitate a change in 
how the new pictures of hysteria were decoded. On the camera with twelve 
lenses, each individual lens could be set to f ive different exposure times 
and various intervals: long and short exposures, long and short intervals, 
according to the theme that was to be recorded. Furthermore, the lenses 
could be triggered to go off in any order. The camera therefore allowed 
for any combination of times and intervals, and even for the coupling and 
reciprocal time lag of two different lenses. In his book Photographie médi-
cale: Application aux sciences médicales et physiologiques, Londe provides 
technical instructions for setting up the camera for every phase of the 
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so-called “great, complete, and regular hysterical attack.”49 The twelve-
picture camera could capture particular phases in a certain way by using 
a variety of time settings and of “editing together” an “ideal” of the process 
already in the camera, to use f ilm terminology. Time is edited, movements 
are scanned, no matter how strong and long the hysteria rants and raves. 
To this degree, Londe’s chronophotography is not just cinematography, 
but already animation avant la lettre. Londe specif ies how to regulate the 
camera-dispositif for photographing in the clinic with the goal of systemati-
cally producing clinic pictures:
Premier cas: Temps de pose courts, intervalles rapprochés. – On opérera 
ainsi pour les études ayant trait à la locomotion animale, aux attaques 
d’hystérie et d’épilepsie, aux tremblements, à la chorée, etc.
Deuxième cas: Temps de pose courts, intervalles plus prolongés. – Marches 
pathologiques qui durent plus longtemps que la marche normale, mais 
où, dans certaines périodes, on trouve des mouvements très rapides.
Troisième cas: Petites vitesses, intervalles courts. – Reproduction de 
certains tics à courte distance: les mouvements du sujet peuvent n’être 
pas très rapides, mais être effectués dans un temps relativement court. 
Bâillement hystérique, torticolis spasmodiques, etc.
Quatrième cas: Petites vitesses, intervalles plus ou moins prolongés. – En-
registrement des transferts de contractures ou d’attitudes passionnelles, 
des modif ications d’attitudes obtenues pendant l’état cataleptique sous 
l’influence de l’augmentation progressive du courant faradique.50
The technical instructions regulate the classical course of the attacks, which 
can be seen in the photo series; they are the result of a particular dramaturgy 
of time. The seemingly regular and continuous course of movement that 
can be seen in the pictures is already carried over into compressed and 
expanded time periods. The schematic attacks of the series, which mark the 
medical gaze, are compiled from chronophotographic slow-motion and time 
lapse. Unlike the series by Marey and Muybridge, Londe’s series allow for no 
inferences about the temporal course of the patients’ movements, because 
each shutter can be set differently. On the other hand, the attack of Guinin, 
simulated in the photographic sense, is the best example of this. Of the twelve 
photos on the print, those with the quickest course of movement (pictures 
3, 5, 12) are shot with the shortest exposure and the shorted intervals, while 
the pictures of the “arc de cercle” (pictures 6, 7) are taken in extremely large 
intervals, for the poses lasted from f ive to ten minutes. These temporal 
distinctions can no longer be extracted from the sequences of images.
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The options of the twelve-pictures camera bring Londe’s photography into 
a new phase. He disassembled attacks into their instantaneous moments 
of unconsciousness and synthesized them in a hysterical dramaturgy into 
ideal arcs. The complicated and fascinating movements of the patients are 
technologically dressed up. Their oppositional scanning and rhythmization 
gets lost in the new artistic era of instantaneous storage and archiving. 
Around this time the great and regular attacks start disappearing from 
Salpêtrière. The old stars among the hysterics of Regnardian iconography 
lost their imaginary pleasure in the photographic service, which had 
betrayed them. They disappeared. And where to?
The patient Blanche Wittman, who lay in Babinski’s arms, the focus of all 
the medical gazes, had already been the model of numerous photographs 
in the collection Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière, which had 
appeared in the 1870s. She was called “la reine des hystériques”, a star model 
that was supposed to be “authoritarian, capricious, and unpleasant toward 
the other patients as well as the personnel.”51 After being treated by Jules 
Janet at the Hôtel-Dieu she developed a new, balanced personality, “Blanche 
II”, who conveyed that she had always been present as well at Salpêtrière, 
when “Blanche I” was apparently unconsciously acting out the three stages 
of hypnosis. Brouillet had recorded this double personality when he put 
Blanche into the picture twice: once in the “hysterical arc” of the painting 
at the wall, the model for which is taken from the old photograph, and once 
in the hysterical crisis in Babinski’s arms, a crisis that had already played 
out under the auspices of the Londe era, in which the change in personality, 
that play with the imaginary, the tricks of the hysterics, no longer counted. 
With Londe the tricks of instantaneous photography formed the arsenal of 
power and the matrix of aesthetics, and women’s bodies had to compete 
with the rolling waves before La Rochelle. By 1887, when Brouillet’s picture 
was exhibited at the Paris Salon, Blanche Wittman had already returned 
to Salpêtrière. She wanted to take part in those experiments where the self 
could become other. She became an assistant in Londe’s photo lab and later 
in the x-ray department. Blanche Wittman died, just like Walter Cannon, as 
a result of high exposure to radiation in the laboratory while seeking for the 
truth of communication of social bodies.52 “Quand le corps en mouvement 
est inaccessible comme un astre dont on veut suivre le déplacement.[…] 
la photographie supplée aux procédés mécaniques avec une très grande 
facilité”,53 writes Étienne-Jules Marey, Londe’s good friend, who knew the 
beautiful “Blanche” only from photos.
max ernst, “The unconscious of the landscape becomes complete”, in: m.e., La femme 100 têtes. 
berlin. no year, no pagination.
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Least interesting of these shivers are the ones with a perfectly steady frequency, 
no variation to them at all. The next-to-least interesting are the frequency-
modulated kind, now faster now slower depending on information put in at the 
other end, wherever that might be. Then you have the irregular waveforms that 
change both in frequency and in amplitude. They have to be Fourier-analyzed 
into their harmonics, which is a little tougher. There is often coding involved, 
certain subfrequencies, certain power-levels-you have to be pretty good to get 
the hang of these.
– Thomas Pynchon, 1973
Experimenting
The Benzedrine-guzzling Pfc. Eddie Pensiero in Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow 
can “read” various forms of shivering at f irst glance, that is, he can analyze, 
differentiate, and allocate them to the mental states of his fellow human be-
ings. What the normal human eye cannot perceive at all gets mixed together 
in his amphetamine quickened mind, dissected into slow-motion and still 
frames of involuntary movements, or dissolved into sinusoidal waves. The 
series of shivers enumerated by Pensiero corresponds to a tour de force 
through the history of the psychophysiological sciences of the nineteenth 
century. It is the history of researching and charting human physiology 
in the neurological sciences, which not only signif ies a ref inement in the 
technologies of measuring physiological functions, but at the same time 
constructs new bodies by developing new apparatuses for testing.
When the nervous functions were discovered and exposed, the old 
body with its soul gave way, leaving the f ield free for new concepts of the 
human. Over the course of the nineteenth century these became the basis 
for transforming medical, moral, and political discourses. Those wishing to 
have power and rule over others no longer had to manage people’s minds, 
but to control their nervous functions. In the physiology of the nineteenth 
century there arose a coherence to the body with its nerves, still in effect to 
this day, which could be altered by medicine and pharmacology and could 
be broadcast by technical media. In the illustrative technologies founded 
by the new knowledge, however, it becomes clear that the “new” human 
being is is formed by very few paradigms, while other faculties of feeling, 
wanting, and thinking fall by the wayside. The lack of these others, of the 
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rejects of research, remains unnoticed unless it comes stubbornly back in 
odd, abnormal states.
In order to explain how perception works, whether it is an activity 
of the immaterial mind or of the chemical-physical body, devices were 
developed over the course of the nineteenth century and laboratories were 
set up that were meant to amplify, record, and analyze the involuntary 
and invisible movements of people. The experiments began with simple 
recordings of a living body wired with the device, later individual nerves 
were connected measuring devices, and f inally complex trembling states 
could be artif icially, or to be more precise, electronically induced, which 
in turn were technically retained, measured, and “read.” The complexity 
of scientif ically ascertainable human feelings did not, however, as was the 
case for Pensiero, depend on the intuition of a brain under the influence of 
drugs, but on the improvement of the test devices.
The shivers named by Pensiero can be counted among the most important 
inventions of experimental physiology and psychology. They correspond 
to the classics among laboratory instruments that def ine the logic of the 
body in the nineteenth century. The physiologist Carl Ludwig constructed 
the kymograph, with which simple frequencies of nerve impulses could 
be measured. Wilhelm Wundt built his complication-clock, on which an 
oscillation amplitude could be set, which f irst shifted the test person’s 
perception into rhythmic oscillations in order then to examine their reac-
tion in relation to this f irst oscillation. The advantage of this device was that 
the oscillations could be set by non-professionals or even the test person 
him or herself. “Information put in.[…] wherever that might be”, as Pensiero 
thinks. Hermann von Helmholtz tried to analyze the physiology of percep-
tion in its smallest physical functions, for instance with his resonators, 
which represent a kind of Fourier analysis. Differently sized glass spheres 
or metal probes began to tremble when they met their own frequency in a 
complex acoustic signal. Helmholtz explained how the device worked by 
“breaking it down” in its “fundamental harmonic vibrations.” Later there 
would be experiments with influencing the nervous functions through 
chemical changes of the carrier substance. An area that was examined 
by behaviorists and reflexologists, but also by biologists (for example the 
adrenaline researcher Walter Bradford Cannon). This was the extent to 
which nerves could be analyzed in the nineteenth century. The similarity of 
amphetamine to the hormone adrenaline was recognized in 1910, and in 1930 
Benzedrine was developed and introduced in the Second World War.1 The 
analysis of the kinds of shivering involved with coding and subfrequencies, 
mentioned by Pensiero, like Benzedrine and the computer, which could 
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analyze this shivering with no problem, belong to the 1940s. This is when 
reflexology, chemistry, and electronics formed the unholy alliance to which 
Pynchon dedicates his novel.
During the forties experimental artists in the USA – including Sydney 
Peterson and James Broughton, Marie Menken and Willard Maas, Kenneth 
Anger and Norman MacLaren – began making f ilms about the sensations 
and feelings that occur when human bodies are confronted with non-human 
technologies. In the forties Maya Deren wrote articles about f ilm art for a 
living, working day and night with the help of Benzedrine proscribe by Max 
“Dr. Feelgood” Jacobson, the side effects of which would eventually kill her. 
Norbert Wiener, also on Benzedrine, calculated how airplane trajectories 
could be predictable for human brains, commissioned by the Army.
Technologically recording and systematizing “feelings and emotions” 
and then inducing them again in the nervous system in order to control 
and manipulate them: this was a focal point of the research on human 
beings as it was being carried out by the military-medical complex of the 
nineteenth century in preparation for the twentieth. The idea of a freely 
mobile spirit on the one hand and the simple reach of the technically or 
chemically manipulated nervous system on the other are ultimately only 
still linked by historical-critical paranoia, by a thought: pensiero. Eddie 
Pensiero, whose Benzedrine perception is therefore brought up to speed by 
all available means, reports the history of his own nervous condition with 
the novel’s catalog of shivers, shortly before his visual center becomes so 
quick that it can decode the stroboscopic messages of Byron the Bulb: … you 
pretty much have to be on speed to get the hand of these. The bulb in turn 
can only express itself because it is has entered into a nervous-electrical-
circuit feedback with a human being who engages its electrical generator. Its 
f lickering therefore not only simulates the heart of all cinema projections, 
in which devices and nerves also have to be interconnected in intermittent 
movements so that f ilm stories can be told. Its flickering also tells the newer 
story of the human body, which has become wired with medical test devices 
and is in a feedback loop to the prurient bundle of nerves when it is either 
analyzed or – in the experiment – depersonalized.
At the end of the nineteenth century the cinema as an entertainment 
apparatus declined in physiological research. At the beginning of the history 
of cinema, not only are there the optical devices that had been improved in 
the nineteenth century, which could be manufactured in mass with more 
precise lenses.2 At the beginning of the history of cinema there are also 
devices that had been developed in the f ields of physiology and psychology 
in order to examine perception itself as a way of treating impulses in the 
164 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
nerves. The goal of all the inventions of the technicians in the laboratory 
was to record bodily functions through observation as much as possible 
without blurriness and to store the data for later objective analysis. Over 
the course of the medical attempts to investigate the functions of the mind 
and perception, bodies were newly organized according to the f indings of 
nerve physiology, charted, interpreted, and in the process they changed 
perception itself. Recording devices were at one and the same time also 
machines for staging. This side of experimental physiology and psychology 
is also part of the history of cinema.
The technical prehistory of cinema, the history of cinematic perception, 
and f inally the change to the body itself through the recording systems 
are three different aspects of the same process: apparatuses, nerves, and 
their physiological interfaces are linked into media. The individual has 
to enter into relations of perception that can be no longer be consciously 
controlled. In the 1940s experimental f ilms from the USA are putting just 
these three components of media communication – technology, perception, 
and corporality – up for negotiation. They experiment with the feedback 
between bodies and devices, with the limits of the body that are meant 
to separate internal from external and that had become permeable in the 
impulse-reaction circulation of the nerves. Experimental f ilms thus always 
introduce fragments of a psycho-physiological or psycho-technological his-
tory of cinematography. This is why the simple history of cinema by military 
devices, as Virilio wrote, should be compared with, or better yet, included 
in a medical one.3 It will be able to show that the term experimental in the 
genre def inition of many f ilms can be correctly related to the methods of 
physiology and psychology in the nineteenth century.
Shocking
In his essay about Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin describes the “shock” of the 
photographic process as a technical realization of the power of destruction, 
which it would be remembering under the conditions of modernity, because 
there would no longer be any experience to be had in it. The human being 
is aligned to the machine and, as Benjamin writes with horrible precision 
in 1939, it is “part of society’s preparation for total war that training is shift-
ing from techniques of production to techniques of destruction.”4 These 
preparations for war had already been in progress for a long time. In the 
nineteenth century “technology.[…] subjected the human sensorium to a 
complex kind of training. There came a day when a new and urgent need 
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for stimuli was met by f ilm. In a f ilm, perception conditioned by shock 
[chockförmige Wahrnehmung] was established as a formal principle. What 
determines the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt is the same thing 
that underlies the rhythm of reception in the f ilm.”5
Before any contents lies what the f ilm viewer is not allowed to see: the 
rhythm of the intermittent images that stimulate the brain to react, to have 
to go along, to “see” continuous movement. Karl Marx had designated the 
reduction of the industrial worker’s experience to a very few movements as 
mere training [Dressur]. What was also being trained were the perceptual 
capacities and the instructions to the animal and human test subjects in 
the laboratory. Calling the scientif ic coordination of perception “training” 
sounds euphemistic to our contemporary ears, but the term indeed has its 
origins in training horses for racing – and thus even has a connection to 
the f irst chronophotographic tests in Palo Alto. Training is also there at 
the beginnings of illustrative technology, which later, with Frank Gilbreth, 
would serve the ergonomic perfection of human working motions.
Benjamin went to great efforts to show that the term experience, which 
for him designates unconscious forms of remembering a self-conscious 
society both independently and separately in reciprocal and collective 
forms of production, has been historically surpassed. But the term, just at 
the moment that it should have been dismissed from art criticism, turns 
out to be highly applicable or at least adaptable for a critique of industrial 
forms of producing art and art reception. It undergoes a renaissance by 
means of physiology and psychology, while elevate experience to a matter 
of the nerves.
As a physiological method the new experience comes from France. 
“L’expérience n’est au fond qu’une observation provoquée”,6 writes Claude 
Bernard in his introduction to experimental medicine, adding “provoquée 
dans le but de faire une idée.”7 The equivalency of experience and “expéri-
ence” is permissible because the unconscious quality of the knowledge 
that Benjamin had laid such value on has also been maintained in medi-
cal usage. The physician has experiences in the experiment, controls the 
external, from which his “internal” thought process is defined, thus linking 
his own perception with the experimental set-up. He becomes part of the 
experiment.
The scientists of the nineteenth century researched nerves physiologically 
and psychologically in Bernard’s sense, synchronizing them with technical 
devices, and trained test subjects in stimulus and reaction experiments to 
make their mental and psychic activities retrievable. Even Pavlov, in 1899, 
formulated his methodological reflections like an invocation of Bernard’s: 
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“The more complicated a phenomenon is (and what is more complicated 
than life?) the greater is the need of experiment.[…] The experiment, how-
ever, takes the phenomenon to hand in a sense, setting sometimes the one 
and sometimes the other in motion, thus determining the real context of 
the phenomenon among artif icial, simplif ied conditions. In other words: 
Observation collects that which nature has to offer, whereas experiment 
takes from her that which it desires.”8
While it was François Magendie who had founded the f irst laboratory for 
experimental physiology, Bernard was the f irst to put the various bodily 
functions into mutual relation and to verify the interconnections with 
experiments. He was also the f irst to methodologically justify the experi-
mental intervention in the interior of the body with apparatuses, medical 
invasion. “L’homme ne peut observer les phénomènes qui l’entourent que 
dans des limites très restreintes; le plus grand nombre échappe naturelle-
ment à ses sens, et l’observation simple ne lui suff it pas. Pour étendre ses 
connaissances, il a dû amplif ier, à l’aide d’appareils spéciaux, la puissance 
de ces organes, en même temps qu’il s’est armé d’instruments divers qui 
lui ont servi à pénétrer dans l’intérieur des corps pour les décomposer et 
en étudier les parties cachées.”9 The founder of experimental methods 
in medicine defended vivisection,10 although his most famous theorem 
is that of the stabilizing the “milieu intérieur”, which keeps all relations 
within the body in harmonic exchange and balance, a balance that is more 
unstable the higher the creatures are organized.11 “D’un autre côté, tous 
les phénomènes d’un corps vivant sont dans une harmonie réciproque 
telle, qu’il paraît impossible de séparer une partie de l’organisme, sans 
amener immédiatement un trouble dans tout l’ensemble. Chez les animaux 
supérieurs en particulier, la sensibilité plus exquise amène des réactions et 
des perturbations encore plus considérables.”12 Consequentially, his experi-
ments could only demonstrate disturbances in the living body, although 
Bernard sees the key to knowledge precisely in disturbance as destruction: 
“pour apprendre comment l’homme et les animaux vivent, il est indis-
pensable d’en voir mourir un grand nombre, parce que les mécanismes 
de la vie ne peuvent se dévoiler et se prouver que par la connaissance des 
mécanismes de la mort.”13 Bernard conducted his most famous experi-
ments with secretionary functions of the body and with various vasomotor 
mechanisms with Curare, the arrow poison of South American Indians, 
which Alexander von Humboldt had been the f irst to describe for western 
medicine, a strong mix of alkaloids and menispermaceae, which relaxes 
all the muscles.[…] and brings all trembling to the zero point.
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Over the course of the century the methods of getting experience went 
under the skin and perforated the body. The f irst f ilm experiments that 
physiologists created at the end of the nineteenth century are simple con-
tinuations of those experiments with cut-up body parts in the laboratories, 
and they served the same purpose: to reanimate what had previously been 
destroyed for the sake of the experiment. This includes 35mm films that 
Ludwig Braun made in Vienna, f irst on artif icially animated dog’s hearts 
and then, in 1898, on “live, exposed human hearts”,14 just like Charles 
François-Franck’s f ilms about artif icially induced reflexes on the leg of an 
anaesthetized dog.15
In the clinical practice of the eighteenth century, as Michel Foucault 
has demonstrated, the “f irst scientif ic discourse concerning the individual 
had to pass through the stage of death.”16 The triumph of physiology in the 
nineteenth century can thus be described as a renewed interconnection 
of dead or dissected body parts and as the successful reanimation of a 
harmonic and balanced body. But the bodies, according to the experimental 
experience in the laboratory, are not the same ones as before. The experi-
mental set-ups left behind traces, which became part of the body that they 
were examining. Without the media that extended these apparatuses into 
our bodies and – as Marshall McLuhan more positively observed – that 
extended our bodies into the apparatuses, no experience would have been 
possible in the twentieth century. Pynchon lets Pensiero think that only a 
brain on speed can create the connections between laboratory experience 
and shivering. There is, however, a bit of data on this paranoia in the history 
of science that might also illuminate brains that run somewhat slower.
Registering
Although Claude Bernard’s methods determined research all over Europe, 
because almost all influential physiologists had worked in his laboratory at 
one time or another, the direction of the experiments in Germany initially 
differed signif icantly from the French. The search for the physiological 
functions of thinking, wanting, and feeling there became a battle over 
the mind or a mental organ, and an argument about national and ethical 
values. In Germany the question of devices became the crucial question.17
It was not until the 1860s that the scientif ic disciplines responsible for 
the mind started to differentiate, as did the laboratories and experiments, 
and thus the complexity of mental functions. In the 1870s psychology was 
separated from physiology and finally established as a distinct discipline by 
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Wilhelm Wundt in 1879 in Leipzig. The question of the mind was no longer 
a big issue, but it also no longer had much to do with what physiologists 
had previously picked apart in the experiment. In 1874 Wundt explained 
that, under the term mind, psychology had made “the whole realm of inner 
experience” their object. This inner experience, however, as Claude Bernard 
had claimed, had been “provoked” by “external” experiments. Wundt had 
to and could demonstrate his elaboration of the life of the mind with 400 
pages of fundamental physiological research.18 Henceforth the mind was 
seen as a complex of individual psychic functions, which were disclosed to 
each apparatus used to test them in the laboratory.
The analysis of the mind continued as nerve studies. Even philosophical 
institutes used technical devices to speculate. Johann Friedrich Herbart, 
Kant’s successor in Königsberg in the professorship that Hugo Münsterberg 
is supposed to have turned down later in favor of Harvard, proposed an order 
of concepts and connections between concepts already in 1824 according 
to the laws of statics and mechanics. Around 1830 microscope technologies 
were signif icantly improved and found a process of cutting nerve tissues 
from the brain in thin slices and chemically hardening them. Augustus 
Volney Waller, who in 1851 had demonstrated that every nerve f iber is linked 
to a nerve cell, invented a method of damaging nerves in such a way that 
their channels could be traced through the brain and spinal cord due to 
secondary degeneration. The functions of the mind and its paths were 
suddenly revealed to be nerves.19 When Fritsch and Hitzig announced the 
localization of motor functions in the cerebrums of dogs, they also noticed 
that the methods produced the following result: The smaller the damage 
to the brain, the more differentiated the mental functions appeared. The 
thought that the “mind is a kind of overall function”, they scoffed, can only 
still be accepted due to all too “colossal mutilations of the brain” in the 
experiments.20 Total damage equals total mind.
Technologies and devices decide the question of the mind, and so it is 
no wonder that the expert that was called from Zürich to Göttingen for 
arbitration was precisely an inventor of physiological devices for research-
ing mental activity: Carl Ludwig, founder of “quantifying experimental 
physiology.”21 The list of students that studied with him in Zürich, Vienna, 
and Leipzig shows what influence his work had on the development of 
experimental psychology in the second half of the nineteenth century: 
Granville Stanley Hall, who later founded the f irst laboratory for psychol-
ogy at Johns-Hopkins University in the US, Ivan Mikhaylovich Sechenov, 
founder of Russian reflexology, Ilya Fadeyevich Tsion, or Élie de Dyon, as he 
was called in Paris, and Ivan Petrovich Pavlov as well as Ernst Mach and Paul 
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Emil Flechsig, who dedicated his famous inaugural speech as rector to Carl 
Ludwig.22 In psychological laboratories the world over experiments were be-
ing carried out with devices built by Ludwig. American psycho-technology 
and Russian psychoreflexology are indebted to Ludwig for their methods of 
interconnecting nerves and apparatuses to apply isolated stimuli in order 
to read and systematize result by means of the apparatuses.
Ludwig’s most important invention was the kymograph in 1846, a reg-
istration device that “set the course of all further physiological research 
more than any previous observations of physiological f indings.”23 As was 
common at the time for physiologists, Ludwig assembled the device, which 
recorded the pressure fluctuation in the central arteries and simultaneously 
in the rib cage and thoracic cavity himself according to the needs of the 
experiment. In the place of an observing physician, the body attached to the 
apparatus could record its functions and its circumstances itself. The body 
no longer had to be destroyed and killed in order to get the measurements, 
but it still was injured, drilled into for the interconnection. Only then did 
the immediate representation of the body appear as a graphic curve, as 
can be seen beating even faster today on electrocardiographs: the rationale 
for a method that “means something similar for biological research as the 
alphabet for human culture.”24 If history “runs parallel with the development 
of its methods of registration”25 is as true for physiology and it is for modern 
biology, this is the founding act.
Defining, separating, and recording the functions were considered the 
basic operations of the physiological method. With scrawlings similar to 
the attempts of a f irst-grader to write, the bodily functions reported with 
black “rubber-based ink” on a white piece of vellum paper. Samples of this 
are still stored today at the Physiological Institute at the University of Turin. 
Ludwig would later inscribe the back of this to his student and biographer 
Angelo Mosso, who noted that the paper “designated the origins of the 
graphic method in the history of science”, writing: “These f irst stammerings 
of the heart and breast are donated to the collection of my friend Mosso. C. 
Ludwig, Leipzig, August 15, 1874.” In turn, it was Mosso who designed the 
ergograph in Ludwig’s tradition, with which work and exhaustion could be 
measured.26 Ludwig’s change in methodology was in fact revolutionary. If 
the mind could no longer speak, the body could now write. Initially it was 
not possible to get anything from its scribblings without having to drill 
into it. The segmentation of the functions and the organs is suspended in 
the fluid script of the heart.
Étienne-Jules Marey, who had introduced graphic methods into physi-
ology in France, would dissect his studies of movement into individual 
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images with a photographic gun, which he also built himself. Just as script 
can be cut out of discrete heartbeats, continuous movement can also be 
fragmented, and with other apparatuses the horses and soldiers concerned 
can learn to run again as images. Indeed, Marey is considered one of the 
inventors of cinematic projection, but for him it was much more a matter of 
measuring bodily movements, and he did not take the illusion of movement 
on screen for the reality of the gait. Marey paid his respects to Ludwig’s 
inventions in 1895, the year of the so-called birth of the cinema, when 
he had to announce his death as president of the Parisian Académie des 
sciences: “On lui doit l’introduction en physiologie de méthodes précises et 
fécondes en progrès. Ludwig créa le premier des instruments enregistrateurs 
aujourd’hui si nombreux dans les laboratoires de physiologie.”27 Marey’s own 
invention from 1860, the spygmograph, with which he had the rhythm of 
the human pulse recorded on a sooty cylinder, was a further development 
of the kymograph, this simple device that nonetheless set up a prototypical 
register for mental functions and thus established the parameters for all 
future programs of measurement and training.
Going Wild
While mental activities were being tested for their chemical and physi-
cal foundations in the laboratories, states of exception of the sense and 
perception organs cropped as night views of this research at the same 
time: trances and raptures, erratic attacks, f its and ticks, which should 
precisely have been excluded by research. It seemed as if the concentrated 
investigation of a certain mental accomplishment set other nerve connec-
tions in motion as well, letting the body become confusingly muddled. 
New apparatuses were constructed to determine the laws of these states 
of confusion, in turn calling up other odd effects. So, right around 1848, in 
the years of the great expulsion of spirits, ever new unknown phenomena 
were turning up.
The appearance of feedback effects in the laboratories, when observing 
nerves and observing perception were interconnected, was f irst seen in 
the middle of the century in a famous case. In 1840, after experimenting on 
himself with disturbances in seeing color and afterimage effects, Gustav 
Theodor Fechner lapsed into a three-year-long trance, from he he only 
awoke through a kind of self-healing that he described as rebirth, such as 
it known in shamanism. A metamorphosis took place that marks every 
shamanistic journey. During his illness, the physician transformed into the 
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natural philosopher Fechner. He wrote an illness or travel report about his 
self-perception using the metaphoric language of the shamans, in which 
rider and ridden, movement and moved could no longer be separated:
One main symptom of my mental feebleness consisted namely in the fact 
that the course of my thoughts eluded my own will. It split my insides 
equally into two parts, into my ego and into thought. The two battled 
each other; the thoughts attempted to overwhelm my ego and and to 
take a self-empowered course, destroying its freedom and health, while 
my ego in turn strained all the power of its will to become master of my 
thoughts, and, when a thought sought to take hold and continue, to dispel 
it and to pull in another one from further away. My mental pursuits thus 
consisted, rather than in thinking, in a constant warding off and reining 
in of thoughts. I sometimes seemed like a rider attempting the subdue a 
steed that had gone wild and bolted with him[…]28
The artif icial, experimental separation between thoughts and conscious-
ness, which according to Kant must be able to accompany any ideas, had 
become an experience for Fechner and was close to destroying his ego. 
No term for such a disorder could be expected from the humanities. A 
philosopher like Hegel had subjected phenomena like those that confused 
Fechner to the adventurous process of the spirit itself, which had sublated 
the natural sciences in itself: “This dialectic process which consciousness 
executes on itself – on its knowledge as well as on its object – in the sense 
that out of it the new and true object arises, is precisely, what is termed 
Experience.”29 The self-consciousness that befell such an odyssey of the 
movements of thinking he called “unhappy”. Fechner, however, as a good 
natural scientist, made his anarchic experiences the basis of his new 
research. The loss of consciousness also incited him to examine what was 
not conscious in perception. After his illness he researched the physical 
laws of psychic activity as a relationship between the strength of the 
impulse and the strength of the sensation by differentiating sensations 
in their physiological threshold values. Sensations and feelings had to be 
made calculable, every thing else was the madness of wild steeds. In 1860 
Fechner published the “The Measurement of Sensation” in his Elements of 
Psychophysics, as a conveyance and (negative) enhancement formula of 
physics in the psyche: γ = k log β/b: “The magnitude of the sensation (γ) is 
not proportional to the absolute value of the stimulus (β), but rather to the 
logarithm of the magnitude of the stimulus, when this last is expressed in 
terms of its threshold value (β), i.e. that magnitude considered as unit at 
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which the sensation begins and disappears. In short, it is proportional to 
the logarithm of the fundamental stimulus value.”30
Like the relationship between machinists and dancing puppets in the 
marionette theater, namely as a relationship of numbers to their logarithm, 
the psycho-physicist calculates stimulus and sensation in relation to one 
another, in short: S = k log R, the “Weber-Fechner Law.” Walter B. Cannon 
declared the law, which was drawn up unaware of all the ways the nerve 
connections react chemo-physically, to be responsible for the most and 
the greatest detours and derailments in psycho-physiology.31 Fechner’s 
research, however, is also responsible for the royal roads to knowledge 
in psycho-physiology. Precisely the fact that he relied on the experience 
of his derangement helped him to develop the basis for a psychic model 
that split mental life into daytime work and nighttime work, which could, 
however, exist together. He thus created the foundation for the largest 
competitive project on the universal spirit. In The Interpretation of Dreams, 
Sigmund Freud thus called him the “great Fechner”, and precisely because 
he developed the model of an optical apparatus for the psyche:
As the starting-point for our enquiry, I should like to pick out one from 
among many remarks made upon the theory of dreaming by those who 
have written on the subject. In the course of a short discussion on the 
topic of dreams, the great Fechner puts forward the idea that the scene 
of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life. This is 
the only hypothesis that makes the special peculiarities of dream-life 
intelligible. What is presented to us in these words is the idea of psychical 
locality. I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus 
with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an 
anatomical preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to 
determine psychical locality in any anatomical fashion. I shall remain 
upon psychological ground, and I propose simply to follow the suggestion 
that we should picture the instrument which carries out our mental func-
tions as resembling a compound microscope or a photographic apparatus, 
or something of the kind. On that basis, psychical locality will correspond 
to a point inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages 
of an image comes into being. In the microscope and telescope, as we 
know, these occur in part at ideal points, regions in which no tangible 
component of the apparatus is situated.32
Freud, unlike the biologist Cannon, had not checked Fechner’s calculations 
and detected mistakes his formulas, but, after previously having thought up 
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a complex neuron apparatus for psychologists in his sketches on Wilhelm 
Fliess, he f inally constructed an imaginary apparatus in The Interpretation 
of Dreams that split up Fechner’s measured experiences into functional 
systems: an “the mental apparatus as a compound instrument.”33 This ap-
paratus is meant to demonstrate how internal and external impulses are 
received as sensations, transformed as agitations to the nerve impulse, and 
can be stored in different layers – or as Freud formulated using media tech-
nical terms, “permanent records”34 – before they trigger a motor reaction. 
This system φ is Freud’s model of the psychic apparatus, which has to work 
like a “reflex apparatus”, albeit one that treats, connects, or constrains the 
stimulus impulse, before it is diverted at the motor end, according to certain 
criteria – including the strength of the impulse. Freud’s examples are meant 
to make it possible to see how the mental functions are cut up. In an optics 
of the photo apparatus, the impulses are turned into impressions, virtually 
depicted and possibly even stored on another level. With this model Freud 
can also show that traces of memory can also be regressively activated 
and can simulate uncensored sense perceptions that nonetheless remain 
innocuous for all their shamelessness, because they can never bolt through 
to the motor end of the reflex apparatus. It is this model of regression that is 
called up in various theories of cinema, including for instance Godard’s, in 
order to show how memory and association can become sense perception 
in quiet cinema perception.
Freud constructed the apparatus, which had actually been induced by 
Fechner’s traces, exactly into the “idea” that Fechner provided for him – with 
the difference that Fechner’s color optics, with which he had looked at the 
sun, did not store impressions like a camera, instead concentrating the 
light rays directly on his eyes, his visual center. Using experimental optical 
apparatuses, Fechner varied the effect of external impulses on his percep-
tion – and experienced how the agitation caused sustained disturbances in 
his interior, leaving behind traces on which his thoughts went off on their 
own wild rides. Freud, much later, will conceive of an internal counterpart 
to Fechner’s test device, an imaginary camera that f irst f ixes the agitations 
in order then to work through them in layers, without exposing itself to the 
agitations. The experimental installations from the laboratory gradually 
become internalized.
By analyzing his own experiences, Fechner opened up the area of the 
involuntary, of the unconscious, and of trances to science in the long term. 
Freud’s apparatus provided a psychotherapy for psychophysicists. Trances, 
this feedback of the trembling nerves, can only be controlled if they are 
f irst recorded and then analyzed. His predecessor on the path had been 
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the French astronomer Pierre-César Jules Janssen from the observatory 
in Meudon, who had captured the passage of Venus in front of the sun on 
December 9, 1874 with his photographic gun. He could then calmly observe 
the seventeen phases later on a photographic plate – which he therefore 
called the “retina of the scientist”35 – without having to turn his gaze toward 
the sun. Scientif ic objectivity was thus taken out of the flickering realm of 
the observing scientist, vulnerable to trance, and became a simple matter 
of recording. Janssen’s camera was the predecessor of Marey’s photographic 
gun. In the history of a technology of cinema, experiments in technology 
and in perception physiology converge. Imaginary psychic apparatuses were 
proposed as a complement to real physical ones, in order to systematize 
disorders and to balance out stimulus energies, which had previsions kept 
a professor constrained to a bed for years. The psyche was qualif ied and 
quantif ied as what a pscyho-physician can regulate.
Ultimately, also in the optical apparatus of the cinema, the “scene of ac-
tion of dreams” is artif icially interconnected with that of “waking ideational 
life”, without the trances that it induces becoming physical impositions 
or mental disorder. The use of apparatuses and technical equipment to 
induce mental and nervous reactions in psychological laboratories was the 
prerequisite of cinema-viewing.
Resonating
In addition, it was also necessary to understand the physiology of the nerves 
to which the apparatuses were specif ically meant to be joined. In 1847, 
when Carl Ludwig was graphing out the sputtering of the heart, Helmholtz 
published his thesis about conserving energy and undertook the f irst meas-
urements in the speed of motor nerves in frogs using the Galvanometer. 
In 1850 he established the exact rate of speed in nerve conduction. Once 
again, the discovery was preceded by the development of an apparatus: the 
carriage inductor, constructed by Du Bois-Reymond, with which modifiable 
streams of induction could be applied to different spots of the nerve. Two 
muscle spasms that were produced with it served as marks to measure 
time.36 Helmholtz found devices for highly exact time measurement with the 
military, where Siemens was improving conventional methods of recording 
by “the fortunate idea of eliminating all mechanical mediators and letting 
the electricity itself make the mark.”37 The rotating cylinders from Siemens, 
which he took as the basis for his myograph, could be run at a speed of 60 
rotations per second and allowed for measuring time down to the 40,000th 
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of a second. Compared to the measurements of light velocity made with 
Foucault’s pendulum, which is exact to the 77 millionth of a second, this 
is not much, but Helmholtz nonetheless gave his listeners something to 
think about: “You see that the microscopy of time has far outflanked that 
of space.”38 Helmholtz was able to give the propagation velocity for impulses 
in frog nerves at 27.25 meters per second. The microscopic analysis of nerve 
movements in time and space showed that a movement goes through the 
body that the body knows nothing about and that it itself did not sense.
With his new construction, Helmholtz had raised Ludwig’s kymograph to 
the highest possible mechanical velocity through a significantly higher rota-
tion speed and through a more uniform course of the barrel. This was the 
prerequisite for being able to make assertions about human self-awareness 
and its perceptional times.
Fortunately the distances that our sense perception has to go through 
before they get to the brain are short, otherwise we would be far behind 
the present with our self-awareness and would even lag behind the 
perceptions of sound waves; that is, fortunately they are so short that 
we do not notice it, and we are not touched in our practical interest. For 
an ordinary whale it is perhaps worse; for in all probability he perhaps 
experiences an injury to his tail only after a second, and needs another 
second to command his tail to defend itself.39
But even for an ordinary professor, it can become bad, as Fechner noted, 
when the connections in the brain are so multifaceted that perception 
impulses are impeded, displaced, duplicated, and a series of asynchronous 
thoughts ends up in a mad dash. Helmholtz was able to show how self-
awareness functions under normal circumstances, and he also provided 
possible physiological explanations for confusions and trances. “My most 
signif icant result was that the sensations of the senses are only signs to 
configure the outside world, and the interpretations of them can only be 
learned through experience.”40 His explanations of the physiology of percep-
tion and the achievements of the brain come ever closer, thanks to Werner 
von Siemens, to communications technology. In the physiology of nerves 
it had been assumed that a specif ic sense energy and a correspondingly 
specif ic nerve energy determined the various perceptions of the senses. 
In his On the Sensations of Tone Helmholtz showed that there were indeed 
various sense organs and nerve conducts, for example, for optical or acoustic 
signals, but that each individual nerve f iber can only establish different 
impulse strengths. He illustrated his model with the comparison, which 
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became well known in cybernetics, between nerve systems and telegraph 
systems: “Nerves have been often and not unsuitably compared to telegraph 
wires. Such a wire conducts one kind of electric current and no other ; it may 
be stronger, it may be weaker, it may move in either direction; it has no other 
qualitative differences. Nevertheless, according to the different kinds of 
apparatus with which we provide its terminations, we can send telegraphic 
despatches, ring bells, explode mines, decompose water, move magnets, 
magnetise iron, develop light, and so on. So with the nerves. The condition 
of excitement which can be produced in them, and is conducted by them, 
is, so far as it can be recognised in isolated f ibres of a nerve, everywhere 
the same, but when it is brought to various parts of the brain, or the body, it 
produces motion, secretions of glands, increase and decrease of the quantity 
of blood, of redness and of warmth of individual organs, and also sensations 
of light, of hearing, and so forth.”41
Perception is also similar to the telegraph system in that it need not know 
the functions in order to transmit signals; that it need know nothing of its 
functions in order to transmit them promptly. Consciousness can become 
a dangerous millstone on the neck of life. He f irst developed his theory of 
“unconscious inferences” in a lecture entitled On Human Vision, which 
Helmholtz held in Königsberg in memory of Kant on February 27, 1855. Using 
the phenomena of apparent color and apparent motion he explains how “a 
change in the practice of interpretation in sense perceptions can occur”, 
which goes unnoticed by consciousness. Explaining this phenomenon, 
according to Helmholtz, would be the task of psychology, which at the 
time was incapable of complying because the unconscious in the sense of 
psychic circuits that do not function consciously was not its object, but only 
introspection. For help in explaining apparent phenomena “we f ind no help 
among the psychologists, because for psychology self-observation has so 
far been the only way to cognition, but here we have a mental activity that 
our self-observation can give no account of; we can only infer its existence 
from physiologically examining the tools of the senses.”42
His research led him to the objective science of unconscious nerve ac-
tivities in the old mental functions of thinking, feeling, and wanting. The 
results also raised a question that for philosophy could only be explained 
by consciousness: namely, how to ensure that perception accords with the 
world. Helmholtz solves this by internally relativizing the sense organs, 
which signal all the changes between consciousness and the outside world. 
For vision, he explained: “The agreement between facial perception and 
the outside world also completely or at least mainly has the same basis as 
all our knowledge of the real world, namely the experience and continual 
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verif ication of its correctness by means of the experiments that we conduct 
with every movement of our bodies.”43
The methods of dancers. Years before Poincaré showed that all sense 
perception is only possible through correlations of sense perceptions 
and bodily movement, in order to make sense data out of the data of the 
sense organs, Helmholtz had already described this experience for vision. 
This dance-like experimental physiology consistently leads to declaring 
all of life to be a permanent experiment. Experience is provoked, had, 
and modif ied with every movement. The individual bodily processes are 
held together in constant dependence and thus in balance. Under the 
conditions of communications technologies, however, Claude Bernard’s 
theory of “milieu intérieur” had been transformed into milieu altogether, 
to “milieu général”, which must also be able to balance inside and outside 
through signals. The idea that follows from Helmholtz’s f ine description 
of methodology is his groundwork for a theory of media. Technology, 
perception, and corporality are connected in a physical and homeostatic 
way: pre-cybernetic.
In order to show how hearing works, Helmholtz had resonators con-
structed, “hollow spheres of glass or metal, or tubes”,44 which, when put on 
the ears, f ilter out all of the sounds from the outside world that correspond 
to the oscillations of the resonator: a practical, sensual Fourier analysis. 
Tones, overtones, and undertones could thus be differentiated when they 
occurred in “the soughing, howling, and whistling of the wind, the splashing 
of water, the rolling and rumbling of carriages.” The resonators were simply 
models for how the ear works, which can analyze “the sound of a string into 
precisely the same constituents as are found by sympathetic resonance.”45 
Helmholtz amplif ied his resonators electromagnetically. Analysis and 
induction function as the same interconnection between sense organ and 
apparatus. Inside and outside the same Fourier analyzer. In his research 
on the physiology of the senses, Helmholtz presents the internal func-
tions as the counterparts of the devices with which he had conducted the 
experiments, or modified the devices according to his f indings about nerve 
functions.
Helmholtz became an avant-gardist of all experimental art, not only as 
a teacher at Berlin’s Art Academy in the winter semester of 1848/49, but 
through his later research on acoustics and optics. He analyzed sensations 
and built devices that synthesize them again. But it was not artists that he 
wanted to teach about the microscopic mechanics of sensations and feel-
ings, who already knew anyway, consciously or unconsciously, but critics. 
“In my somewhat unusual attempt to pass from natural philosophy into 
178 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
the theory of the arts, I hope that I have kept the regions of physiology 
and esthetics suff iciently distinct. But I can scarcely disguise from myself, 
that although my researches are confined to the lowest grade of musical 
grammar, they may probably appear too mechanical and unworthy of the 
dignity of art, to those theoreticians who are accustomed to summon the 
enthusiastic feelings called forth by the highest works of art to the scientif ic 
investigation of its basis.”46
Helmholtz lets the art theorists know that enthusiastic feelings are 
only effects and are not themselves open to scientif ic inquiry, and that the 
physical “and that this analysis of the sensations would suff ice to furnish 
all the results required for musical theory.”47 No special mental activity is 
needed in order to appreciate art. Helmholtz, who was passionate about all 
the arts all his life had no need for any extra illusions: all that resonates in 
perception are the oscillations of the world, which is something that any 
dancer can verify.
Rhythmizing
The history of cinematography as media history, that is, as the interweaving 
of technology, perception, and corporality, can be more easily reconstructed 
from the laboratories of the physiologists than from the experiments of the 
psychologists. In psychology the devices that were used as aids to examine 
perception were dismissed, and thus the technological part that turns the 
study of the mind into media research in the f irst place was shut out. For 
instance by Helmholtz’s former Heidelberg assistant Wilhelm Wundt, with 
whom he competed for having invented the term “unconscious inferences” 
and for how they work.48 In 1902 Wundt wrote that “as long as one applies 
the physical aids merely to the purposes of examining psychic appear-
ances and their contexts, the actual character of of these also remains 
psychological, just as the electric, thermal, and other physical effects that 
one makes use of for chemical examinations doesn’t turn them into physical 
phenomena.”49 There he recaptured the science of perception once again 
for the humanities. It is thanks to Wundt’s biography that psychological 
laboratories in Germany and the US were not joined to medical professor-
ships, but to philosophical ones, for the physiologist Wundt was appointed 
Professor of Philosophy in Leipzig in 1875 and founded the f irst institute for 
experimental psychology there in 1879, which became a model of institution 
building in the whole world through the activities of his students. His career 
is also due to the construction of a device.
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Wundt’s appointment in Leipzig was promoted by the astronomer Zöll-
ner, not quite without self-interest, for the astronomers had a perception 
problem, which they hoped to solve with Wundt’s aid. In astronomy certain 
deviations in the measurement of time, which had been undertaken by a 
variety of scientists, had become apparent. In order to read time – for in-
stance at the Royal Observatory in Greenwich, where it was authoritatively 
determined for the entire empire to a tenth of a second – astronomers had 
to coordinate two rhythmic series in perception: one acoustic and the other 
optical. Through a telescope with a built-in wire grid, they observed the 
passage of a star through the f ield of vision. When the star appeared in the 
wire coordinate f ield of the telescope, the astronomer looked at the clock, 
noted down the time exactly to the second, then counted the second with 
the ticks of the clock, which he could hear, at the same time observing the 
path of the star through the grid. He noted the position of the star with the 
beating of the seconds “in his mind’s eye” before the star crossed the decisive 
mark, and also the position at the stroke after it had crossed the mark. Then 
he estimated the placement of the mark between the two star positions that 
he had noted “in his mind’s eye” in tenths of the whole distance and added 
these tenths of a second to the number of seconds that he had counted until 
the stroke before the passage of the star through the grid.50 And just like 
Pensiero, “you had to be pretty good to get the hang of it.”
The astronomers work proved to be a permanent set-up for psychological 
experimentation. It turned out that their results varied. After Helmholtz 
had proven that one could in fact measure the time of conveying mes-
sages in the nerves, and Christian Wolf had presented his studies about 
absolute personal equations in perception, the differing reaction times of 
astronomers’ observations were determined. But it was only Johannes Hart-
mann’s experiments that showed that expectation would be a signif icant 
determinant in the personal, specif ic time lags in perception.
Hartmann’s experiments were carried out with apparatuses that be-
long in turn to the technical forerunners of the cinema: the stroboscopic 
cylinders of the Vitascope. Simulating the passage of stars he had points 
of light appear in equal intervals by means of a rotating disk. At the same 
time he had a clock ticking and marking the rhythm of the test subject’s 
perception. This person was supposed to give a sign when the optical and 
acoustic signals were perceived to be simultaneous. He thus discovered 
that there were deviations in observation from person to person, but with 
each individual person they were fairly stable. Some test persons noted 
the coincidence of acoustic and optical signals before the actual moment 
of concurrence, others afterwards. Hartmann concluded from this that the 
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reaction of the observer in this experiment was determined by his or her 
own expectations as induced by the rhythmic return of the impulse, not 
by the occurrence itself. He was able to show that the occurrence was even 
perceived by some observers when it had not happened at all, when the 
series of impulses was interrupted shortly before the decisive moment. The 
observer was therefore reacting to his or her own subjective disposition as 
it was induced by the intermittent stimulation in the experimental set-up.
This information turned a question of astronomy into one of psycho-
physics. The experiments no longer had to examine only the transfer time 
of the impulses, but the reaction times, which was obviously contingent on 
complex processes in the nervous system and brain. In order to measure the 
times that played a role in reactions and associations, Wundt constructed 
an apparatus in 1863 that simplif ied the observatory situation, that is, the 
intermingling of regular acoustic and optical impulses, and made it possible 
to simulate it in a variety of ways: “Wundt’s Complication Clock.” With the 
stipulation that one should proceed in self-experiments “as inattentively as 
possible”, Wundt stipulated that in using the complication clock, psychologi-
cal practice should isolate intellectual faculties as much as possible from one 
another. The unconscious of this psychology lies in the practical dissociation 
of mental functions.
This clock qualif ied Wundt for his post in Leipzig. Only a few years after 
Helmholtz had proven, against all assumptions, that the impulse in the 
nerve needs time to proceed, psychologists were now agreed that the time 
needed to process stimuli was extremely variable. An impulse could work 
its way around in the brain without triggering a reaction until a suitable 
attention predisposition made it receptive for an association, thus provoking 
an idea and its reaction. Wundt tested the physiological agitation of various 
sense organs and traced shifts in the reaction times back to combinations 
and complications of conceptual links. He examined perception and ap-
perception, attentiveness, involuntary memory, association, in short, all 
the processes that were considered mental activities, therefore opening up 
the research f ield of “mental chronometry.” Only Pensiero’s paranoia will 
show that the chronometric apparatuses that could def ine the duration, 
frequency, and amplitude of trembling, or shivers in his case, measure their 
own paradigms. The psyche is tested “subject to information[…] that is fed 
in at the other end.” What is important for f ilm perception as a stroboscopic 
stimulus of the optical nerves is above all the experiments carried out on 
“attitudes of expectation.” The rhythmizing of the stimulus impulse, which 
had already driven the astronomers mad, becomes the norm in the labora-
tory through chronometry. It is the prerequisite for all forms of ciné-trance.
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Now it can be seen that even Wundt, over the course of his publications, 
constructed the model of a psychic apparatus according to the prototype 
of his experimental set-up. The devices from the laboratory were tacitly 
projected into the interior of people. In the f ifth edition of his Physiological 
Psychology from 1902, in which Wundt summarized his research in Leipzig, 
the technical requirements of psychological measuring, the chronoscope 
and the complication clock, were relegated to the third volume. The experi-
ences were supposed to no longer know anything about their prerequisites 
in the set-up of the experiments. The body, moved in regular rhythms, as it 
had been synchronized by the clockwork over the course of research, seems 
to Wundt to represent in part the nature of the body and of consciousness. 
In one of his f inal works, the Introduction to Psychology, which was consist-
ently reprinted up to 1922, rhythm seems to be a quality of the organism, 
and thus a quality of perception itself: “Our consciousness is rhythmically 
disposed. The reason of this scarcely lies in a specif ic quality, peculiar to 
consciousness along, but it clearly stands in the closest relationship to 
our whole psycho-physical organization. Consciousness is rhythmically 
disposed, because the whole organism is rhythmically disposed.”51
This idea would be nice and easy if it weren’t for the fact that the rhythm 
that is meant to dominate here is always based on the regular ticking of 
a clock as the norm. When Wundt wrote the Introduction to Psychology 
as a book of popular science, he replaced the complication clock with a 
simple device that was available in every modest home with a piano: the 
metronome. Using this device, anyone could conduct psychological tests in 
self-experiments. Experiments with one’s own perception as “the entrance 
of some content into consciousness – an entrance that can be in fact proved” 
and with one’s own apperception as “the grasping of this by the attention”52 
thus became a kind of parlor game. When the self-experimenter gets going, 
that is, comes into “attitudes of expectation”, he or she has the experience 
of a psychic (personal) achievement, which appears involuntarily. Simple, 
uniform ticks become a series of strokes in which various emphases can 
be perceived. From the pure ticking, a “content” suddenly enters “into 
consciousness” through perception. The perception itself undergoes a 
marvelous metamorphosis and transforms the world according to the 
rhythm of the organs.
Now our means of locomotion are in a certain sense natural pendulums, 
the movements of which generally follow with a certain regularity, as 
with the pendulum of the metronome. Therefore whenever we receive 
impressions in consciousness at similar stated intervals, we arrange them 
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in a rhythmical form similar to that of our own outward movements. The 
special form of rhythm, ascending or descending, is within certain limits 
left to our own free choice, just as with the movements of locomotion, 
which may take the form of walking, of running, of jumping, and lastly 
of all different kinds of dances.53
What arrives in consciousness is always already physical for Wundt, and 
thus unconsciously processed into intervals and aligned to the rhythm of 
the body. The physiologist with the clock has become a philosopher. The 
attitude of expectation that has been observed in earlier experiments with 
rhythm as the consequence of the ticking of the clockwork now appears 
as a subjective achievement that brings the uniform signals of the world 
into a certain order. Wundt had forgotten that it was not “we” who aligned 
the intervals of external impressions to our internals ones, but that at the 
beginning – and this had been the reason for his appointment at Leipzig 
after all – the problem consists in the fact that unconscious achievements 
of perception have been manipulated by external influences.
Psychologists have attempted ever since to alter body rhythm by means 
of devices, to reduce or to lengthen intervals of its pulse in order to see how 
perception reacts. Nerves are connected in order to measure their specif ic 
contributions, forgetting that the nerves can only give the rhythm of their 
impulse when they have already been connected, that is, when the ticking of 
the clock has already put its own movements into an attitude of expectation 
fairly artif icially. But there is no great shamanistic Fechner of chronometry, 
who would have told of the efforts to restrain the trembling of the nerves 
in in the manifold forms of dance. Perhaps it could have been Nietzsche, 
or Senate President Schreber, who wrote down a shamanistic tale for brain 
physiology. But the idea that rhythm might be stuck “inside” the body itself 
was the absurd core of occidental madness for both of them, a core that 
precisely cannot recognize that every rhythm always takes possession 
from “outside” the body: from history, from sounds, or from rays of light.
Wundt’s tests recall all kinds of achievements by literate individuals, 
and appear on the surface of unconscious psychic achievements to gratify 
the contents of bourgeois inner life. In tests to determine the threshold 
of perception, Wundt used a tachistoscope, a quick viewer that was able 
precisely to determine between 0.05 and 0.20 seconds in presentation 
times.54 Experiments with unconnected elements (letters) and connected 
elements (strokes) were supposed to show how consciousness was capable 
or arranging its contents in phrases and rhythms. If six different elements 
can normally be perceived at one glance, the consciousness can grasp signs 
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in the order of language even faster, that is, it can read. Within a familiar 
word in a familiar language, consciousness can grasp as many as 20 elements 
at a time. Wundt’s example of this is “Wahlverwandtschaften” [“elective 
aff inities”], which can keep together even if it is not spelled correctly.
For acoustic stimuli as well, the maximum number of events that can 
be grasped is six. But integrated into a regular rhythm with three different 
beats, six units of combinations can also be noted. Classical spelling literacy 
and two-beat variations of a metronome ticker are appropriate to the nature 
of the psyche, polyrhythms such as those in jazz or in the complicated 
rhythms of voodoo rituals55 cannot be grasped by it. Central Europeans 
no longer notice anything when Africans or Haitians know that the gods 
are among them.
If, according to Wundt, “our means of locomotion are in a certain sense 
natural pendulums”, as regular as those of the metronome, all that is lacking 
is the methodology of the Kleistian puppeteers to make the connection 
and provide the beat to appear as the inspiration for the gracefulness of 
dance. “The limbs, which were no more than pendula, following along 
mechanically, without any extra help, of their own accord”, as is described 
in the marionette theater. Because the puppeteer and his mechanics cannot 
be seen, what appears is the artistic and mysterious “path of the dancer’s 
soul.” Wundt also staged the grace of rhythmic perception as path of the 
soul simply by forgetting that the art of the movement of the soul is a trick 
that allows the machinery to disappear into the wings. This as well is an 
important preliminary step to staging perception in the cinema.
Wundt is also responsible for the insight that in cinema all meaning is 
preceded by a physiological rhythmic structure that regulates what provides 
that meaning:
In ordinary life we generally speak of the phenomena, that are observed 
in such cases, as a change from “expectation” to “realisation.” If we fol-
low these phenomena a little more closely, we notice that in our case 
the process of expectation is a continuous and regularly varying one. 
At the moment immediately following one beat, expectation strains 
itself to catch the next one, and this straining increases until this beat 
really occurs. At the same moment the strain is suddenly relieved by the 
realisation of the expected, when the new beat comes. Then the same 
process is repeated during the next interval.56
If this beat takes place in intervals of up to 0.05 seconds, the sequence of 
tension and release moved around the threshold of conscious perception. 
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Wundt positions it beneath this; for him expectant nervous twitching is 
an emotional state:
It is at once obvious that these states, which we shall call for shortness 
the contrasts of strain and relaxation, have the very same right to be 
called feelings. For feelings, wherever they arise, accompany, as subjective 
reactions of consciousness, sensations and ideas, but are never identical 
with them.57
Ideas, following Wundt’s def inition, are the contents of consciousness, 
which are related to the objects of the outside world, and sensations are 
the corresponding psychic experiences from which they are composed. 
Feelings, by contrast, are elements of subjective “emotions”, of internal 
impulses and moods that are independent of objective objects. Warm, 
cold, red, white, and, like in Kieślowski, blue, are sensations, while there 
is a feeling for space and time. While physiological experiments treated 
feeling and sensations as essentially the same thing, psychology differenti-
ates precisely here.58 Wundt put feelings to test into the laboratory as 
subjective states: the rhythmic sequence of the stimuli were altered. An 
increase in tension was indeed observed with an increase in intervals, 
but the perception of release also became clearer, and the pleasurable 
sensation that was introduced in expectation of this release f lipped over 
into a unpleasurable sensation. If the intervals were decreased, thus rais-
ing the frequency of the stimuli, singular feelings of tension and release 
disappeared in favor of a general excitement, a state of trembling, which 
was also unpleasant. Set back to a moderate speed the rhythm had a 
calming effect.
The analysis of feelings in the experiment thus became an induction 
of synthetic feelings. The experiments with metronomes allowed Wundt 
to produce complex and even conflicting atmospheres, without these be-
ing linked to any particular idea. Since in Wundt’s theory all feelings: joy, 
pleasure, cheerfulness, anger, worry, fear, etc. are dissected into the three 
basic emotional pairs: delight and aversion, tension and release, excitement 
and pacif ication, they can be artif icially produced in the dramaturgy of 
intervals. They are accompanied by the corresponding somatic changes, for 
instance the expanding and contracting of the blood vessels, of glandular 
functions. Many experimental f ilmmakers will continue working on exactly 
these efforts from experimental psychology. They will examine perception 
in the cinema by creating feelings cinematically, with or without the as-
sociated idea.
menTal aPParaTuses 185
In the laboratory, Wundt collected evidence that there is indeed a subjec-
tive steering function for all sensations and ideas, a mind, but a multiple one: 
“It is not as simple being but as the evolved product of countless elements 
that the human mind is what Leibniz called it, a mirror of the universe.”59 
Other psychologists preferred to think of the mind not as a mirror of the 
universe, but to treat it as a mirror of the laboratory. Eugen Bleuler carried 
out a connection between the laboratory apparatuses and psychic reactions 
when he proposed his therapy with “Gelegenheitsapparaten” [“opportune 
apparatuses”] in 1922. What Wundt had dissected into single elements 
and subroutines in the laboratory is later combined again, for instance by 
Bleuler, as a physiological function, the conscious and unconscious, the 
light and the dark sides of the human mind function next to one another 
as little apparatuses without disturbance.
The cinema as as apparatus linking technology, perception, and 
corporality lies in the continuity of psycho-physical apparatuses. Film 
dramaturgy consciously introduces the unconscious effects of a circuit. 
A systematic insecurity of self-consciousness and a deception of percep-
tion is recognized, analyzed, and consciously built into the devices as 
expectation in order to shift and displace consciousness and to induce 
trance. Cine-trance. But very few have understood as well as Maya Deren, 
who had read Bleuler, that these psychological effects were always about 
historical technologies. She can write about voodoo rhythms and at the 
same time say the following about cinematic psycho-technology: “Once 
this interval has been established, our sense-perceptions are geared to an 
expectation of its reoccurrence.”60 From the archaic trance techniques to 
the new media is theoretically just one small step, but it took almost 50 
years to implement it in practice and in perception psychology. The new 
medial trances can be joined up specif ically with particular rhythms at 
particular receptors. This altered corporality itself in communication. New 
bodies were formed, old body parts and body images dissipated. Whatever 
a body could still be and become: We, as those sensing and feeling, like 
Eddie Pensiero, are at the disposal of the media as bundles of nerves and 
nail biters, the technologists and lab workers have seen to that. However 
we turn and shift in the dance of the correlation functions of our senses 
and our brains: Before all subversion, refractoriness, and anarchy, before all 
the intoxication of the senses, the interconnection of nerves lies beneath 
conscious perception as a social technology.
The sources of affections that lie outside also belong to the history of the 
cinema as a registration of physical corporality. It is the French history of 
the measurements made in the nineteenth century.

2. Psycho-Motor Activity
 La femme sans tête
Highway sign on the A31 to Beaune
While the Germans came to the cinema attempting to optimize the mind’s 
functions, the French invented it to take care of their bodies, and it is 
believed that one can still recognize this difference in national f ilm produc-
tions to this day. In 1872, after France had lost the war against Prussia and 
the good citizens were shocked by the vitality, energy, and mobility of the 
communards on the barricades in Paris, a patriotic movement was formed in 
France that traced the catastrophic outcome of the war back to “decadence”, 
to the soldiers’ instability and their weak wills. A gymnastics movement was 
instigated to restore elegance and more stamina to the French. One of its 
leaders was Georges Demeny, who had founded a “cercle de gymanstique” in 
Paris to develop and train new bodies, which were not meant to be drilled in 
any authoritarian Prussian sense, but trained in an economic French style 
to optimize energy use, avoid fatigue, and learn sequences of movement in 
which the organism functioned without resistance, in short, to introduce 
grace in the Kleistian sense as an artif icial paradise. Demeny made great 
efforts to ground the new forms of movement in science and registered as 
an assistant to the physiologist Étienne-Jules Marey.
After his medical practice had failed, Marey studied the physiology of 
movement as an independent researcher in his own laboratory and de-
veloped his own methods to read these movements from the living body. 
He wanted to liberate physiology from the anatomy that it had always 
been subordinated to. While still as assistant doctor in 1859, Marey had 
developed the sphygmograph, a machine to read the pulse, which became 
so popular in medical practices that Marey could live off the royalties 
from the patent.1 The sphygmogrpah differed from Ludwig’s Kymograph 
in that it was applied on the outside, on the skin, and did not have to be 
inserted under the skin. It was made of aluminum and wood, which made 
it very light, and instead of working with weights, it worked with a spring 
that pressed the apparatus onto the artery. Instead of using a steel pin, 
Marey’s sphygmograph used a spring to write down what the change in 
the receptacle dictated. But although Marey’s technologies sought to record 
inconspicuous movements like the beat of a butterf ly’s wings, his most 
spectacular and bloodiest experiment in these years was a cardiograph 
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of the heart of a living horse, which he carried out together with Auguste 
Chauveau, the laboratory director of the veterinary clinic in Lyon. A rubber 
plunger was inserted into the cardiac chamber of a horse and transmitted its 
contractions as neat three-track notations. Blood pressure in both cardiac 
chambers and the beats of the heart were recorded in an “indirect” method. 
The graphic notations only translated: “Nos courbes n’exprimaient donc 
pas les mouvements du cœur à proprement parler; mais elles permettaient 
cependant de déduire des changements de pression qu’elles traduisaient…”2
If Carl Ludwig is considered the inventor of the recording system where 
bodily states leave their traces on soot or papered cylinders without the aid 
of a physician, Marey was the theorist of the graphic methods of notating 
body movement. Perceiving and representing motor phenomena coincided 
in the body’s self-transmission mounted in the inscription machines. Marey 
proposed devices and built models that allowed all possible movements 
to be brought into the one-dimensionality of a single line. In the 1860s he 
examined human and animal motor activity and made notations according 
to intensity, duration, and form. In addition he constructed the thermograph, 
the cardiograph, the pneumograph, and the myograph, which he also built in 
a lighter version than Helmholtz’s prototype so as to be able to record the fine 
movements of muscular tremors. Marey’s apparatuses, however, did have the 
disadvantage that they limited freedom of movement when they were used, 
that is, they altered the movements that they were meant to measure. Only in 
1878, when he saw Muybridge’s photo series in the journal La Nature, did Marey 
invent mechanisms to record living creatures in presumably free movement.
Following Jules Janssen’s model he constructed a photographic revolver, 
which he tested in the summer of 1882 with his assistant Otto Lund in the 
radiant light of Naples. 12 pictures could be taken on a rotating photographic 
plate at 1/720 of a second, and Marey brought another 25 photographic plates 
in a dark bag so he could reload his photographic gun at the beach.3 The 
images made on the plates, however, were as small as postage stamps, and a 
series of 12 pictures was too few to be able to determine the exact trajectory 
of the bird they had photographed in its speed and direction. So Marey 
altered the parameters. He built a camera with a f ixed photographic plate. 
Several phases of a movement were exposed over one another on the same 
plate by rotating slots at 1/1000 of a second in intervals of 1/10 of a second. 
In contrast to Galton, who standardized the traces of many bodies in the 
contracted space of double exposure, he envisioned analyzing a body’s 
course of motion in its graphic-spatial expansion.4
Marey used these multiple exposures to create his pictures in phases, 
which went against all western conventions of representation and which 
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immediately unleashed a wave of experiments in the visual arts. Since the 
Renaissance the picture frame had established a clear unity of space and 
time. Marey’s pictures, which showed a course of time, could not be read 
in this sense. They thus inspired avant-garde artists to depict the course 
of movement on the tableau. Impressionists such as Edgar Degas in his 
friezes of dancers, František Kupka or Jacques Villon, futurists like Giacomo 
Balla or Luigi Russolo, even later Suprematists like Kazimir Malevich and 
Natalia Goncharova and, super-pradigmatically, Marcel Duchamp’s Nude 
Descending a Staircase introduced images of phases to the canvas, a new 
feeling of the body transformed in time as a counter to identifying central 
perspective.
Marey, however, was not interested in the aesthetic value of the depic-
tions, but in their documentary value, and this was flawed. If the person 
being depicted moved too slowly, the phases of movement got entangled, 
and the photo print showed a muddle of limbs. Marey solved this problem 
by fragmenting and reducing the persons with lighting techniques. While 
at f irst he had recorded f igures dressed entirely in white against a black 
background, he then had his models dressed in white only on one side, or 
only with one white leg, and then f inally in black leotards marked at the 
joints with shiny buttons connected with metal bands. Time and space were 
economized in the depiction: “Dans l’épure que l’on obtient ainsi, le nombre 
des images peut être considérable et la notion de temps très complète, tandis 
que celle d’espace a été volontairement restreinte au strict nécessaire.”5 The 
photographs that he got from this approximated graphic illustrations. The 
image of pure movement in compressed time had be liberated from the 
body. In a very few attempts Marey had tested more or less all of the options 
for illustrating bodies according to different criteria, creating a repertoire 
that not only offered the necessary foundations for physiologists, but also for 
all future f ilm directors. With light and costumes he made it easy to control 
the relationship between movement and the body, making it possible to 
separate movement optically from even larger bodies.
Using this method, which emptied the body of all f lesh and blood, the 
f irst calculations of physiological pivot points were carried out by lever 
principles and swing axles. After Demeny and Marey had provided the f irst 
measurements, the city of Paris made the Parc des Princes in the Bois de 
Boulogne available as a station for physiological experiments, initially pat-
terning their equipment after Muybridge’s model in California. Marey und 
Demeny worked in a hangar equipped with black felt, and starting in 1883 
they used a camera with the new shutter technology that was mounted on 
tracks according to the model of Edison’s “Black Maria” as a large darkroom. 
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Later a pole was installed from which views could be recorded from a bird’s 
eye perspective. In comparison to the equipment that two German physiolo-
gists put on a “test individual” in order to measure the “gait of the human 
being”, Marey’s installation was very free. Wilhelm Braune and Otto Fischer 
attached small discharges – although not until 1891 – and later Geissler 
tubes to the test subjects, which were charged by a Rühmkorff inductor 
coil. With this equipment the measurements documented nothing but the 
gait that the subject could take under such cumbersome circumstances and 
the diff iculties of the experimental conditions. In contrast the conditions 
of the light French runners could be seen as natural, although they also 
restricted the illustrative apparatus of body movements from a distance.
In contrast to the moving camera work, which Londe, for instance, 
was developing at the same time, every stretch in the Parc de Princes was 
supplied with scales, measuring rods, and chronometric gauges so that 
temporal and spatial parameters could be meticulously documented on 
the photographs, that is, in fraction of seconds. The objects on the runway 
were no longer bird and insects, as had been the case with Marey, but hu-
man beings, who followed a course once it was set up and could carry out 
particular movements. Together with Demeny, Marey tested gymnastics 
students and soldiers from the military school at Joinville. Walking, run-
ning, jumping, fencing, riding, waving flags, carrying backpacks.[…] The 
military disciplines were examined, with the support of the ministry of war, 
for their trajectories, their energy consumption, and training programs.
It immediately became clear in the Parc des Princes that mechanical 
discipline was required for all the measurement. In cinematic tests, for 
instance, a runner on the level circuit of exactly 500 meters had to interrupt 
the contacts of a telegraph circuit, which were installed along the track 
every 50 meters, as he passed them. Inside the laboratory an odograph 
wrote down these interruptions, and thus the speed of the runner, in 
corresponding zigzagging lines. The speed could only be related to the 
steps of the runner because he was synchronized by a bell in the middle of 
the race track. Rhythmatized from a distance, the runner ran his rounds. 
“Cette sonnerie peut prendre toutes les fréquences possibles depuis 40 
jusqu’à 120 coups à la minute.”6 Truffaut’s f irst f ilm, about the dark side of 
post-war education, was called Les Quatre Cent Coups. In the f ilm, rhythms 
and strokes characterize the authorities that structure the individual’s life 
from outside. The history of discipline and the history of cinema and the 
history of French society. In France, the idea that the cinema realizes its 
culturalization beneath conscious perception and catches up with it again 
at the level of the narrative, is always present.
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In dynamic tests the soldiers in the Parc des Princes were laden down 
with different weights in order to calculate the relations of weight and speed, 
pressure and mobility, exertion and achievement in phases of movement. 
What had previously been treated as a question of character – stamina, 
resolution, deportment – was, in the new French body politics, divided “dans 
la marche ou dans la course” into individual physical sizes, transferred into 
graphic grids, and made calculable. This in fact allowed for the creation of 
guidelines for gymnastics lessons, which would be whipping people into 
shape throughout the twentieth century all over Europe: “Il y a donc, pour 
chaque allure, une cadence optimum: celle où la vitesse croît plus vite que 
la dépense du travail.”7 There is an optimal rhythm at which achievement 
increases faster than effort is made. What immediately appeared to the 
Germans, following Wundt, as a natural component of their organism, 
was f irst worked out as a scientif ic special form by the French, who also 
let themselves go, but then was trained into the body with tambourines 
and bells. A certain rhythm that makes patriots mobile: “Les premiers 
résultats que nous avons obtenus one fait l’objet d’un rapport au Ministre 
de la Guerre.”8
On October 15, 1888 Marey presented the f irst long f ilmstrips that he had 
shot with Demeny to the Académie des sciences. They were approximately 
50 centimeters long and – in order to comply with copyright – were made 
of paper. What could be seen was the flight of a pigeon: Land in sight! And 
a hand opening and closing. The f ilms had to be run through the camera 
between two sockets on the shutter, and held still in each case in order to ex-
pose 20 images per second with 1/500 of a second. In 1889 in Paris one could 
get f ilms coated with a gelatin-collodion layer from the Lumière company, 
while the photographer Nadar bought nitrogen f ilms from the American 
competitor Eastman. But neither the f ilmstrips nor the machinery worked 
quite right. The strips became charged with static, were too short and the 
coatings were too irregular, the strips did not run evenly. The pioneers of 
cinematography, Marey, Reynaud, and Edison did indeed exchange notes 
at the World’s Fair in 1889, but Marey had little interest in perfecting the 
illusion of motion, for the apparatuses that he manufactured were meant 
to serve the purpose of analysis. Nonetheless, although he was merely a 
technical agent in the history of cinema, he had made the decisive step 
toward f ilming human beings: namely, qualities that had previously been 
considered mental were physiologically analyzed and then recombined. 
Inner values were measured as external. The movement of the soul from the 
outside, as is common in archaic and shamanistic trance techniques, could 
now also be realized in the heart of Europe through cinematography. While 
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neurophysiologists had established that the nervous system could use body 
movement to transform data from the surroundings into information, while 
physiologists measured movement in anatomy in order to gain information 
from it about the body and character, while soldiers ran their exhausting 
laps for the text on the drum of the sphygmographs, what appears at the 
interface of these undirected, but every f iner data nets is the cinema, which 
can turn movements and the transmission of stimuli into psychological 
stories. What becomes clear on Marey’s testing grounds is that, since 1871, 
the “armament of the souls” is a complex that combines apparatuses, bodies, 
nature, and technology into a new aggregate. This is why Marey is the model 
for all media theory that sees running such machines as the process that 
makes it impossible to distinguish our physical and psychic breathlessness.
Even Max Ernst, who assembled the Parc des Princes into a landscape of 
souls in his cycle “La Femme 100 têtes”, discovered the way that the psyche 
could go crazy around 1900 in the apparatuses with which it was measured. 
He showed that lost souls could be found again outside in nature, which, 
itself integrated into the culture machine as a technical auxiliary construc-
tion, regulated movements and forms of human bodies. He gave the subtitle 
“die landschaft wird im höchsten grade unbewußt” [“the unconsciousness 
of the landscape becomes complete”] to one of his pictures from 1929, in 
which Marey’s track is supplemented by trap-like devices and by the verti-
cally split and displaced body of a woman. Female bodies, the woman, as 
Bresson then f inds, were completely missing in the measuring being done 
at the historical Bois de Boulogne. Ernst imported them from other research 
stations and among other parameters and, foreign and anachronistic, placed 
them in the paths of the male soldiers in order to transform desire into pure 
escalation of energy… while the gait at 40 and 120 beats per minute remained 
constant. “Cette sonnerie…” Heralded gender difference. Hammered gender 
difference. The secrets of the new souls lie outside the body, where the 
naked eye sees nothing, just as on the highway to Beaune, on the way into 
the Musée Marey, there is suddenly a sign with three waves signaling that 
in the invisible landscape beyond the street there should be a river, called 
“La femme sans tête.” A hundred years later, what Marey had recorded 
conforms to every serial human being as an image of the soul, even more, it 
is enough for an optical bundling of desire, as Max Ernst prophesied in his 
pictures. Documents of biometry become sentimental views. The curators 
of the Musée Marey in Beaune ensure that the soul has changed under the 
measurement into beautiful, cryptic affectivity, unconsciously of course: 
“L’homme de Marey est repéré, mésuré, millimétré, cadré […] au risque 
de perdre son âme: Il préf igure les images du corps numérisées, obtenues 
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depuis quelques années grâce aux ordinateurs. Il reste cependant chargé de 
mystère et d’émotion.”9 If the mystery designates the transformation of the 
image of the body around 1900, after the psychic qualities become visible 
on millimeter paper, then emotions are simply the physiological reactions 
that the soldiers register on themselves: expanded blood vessels, heightened 
glandular activity, increased heartbeat. Even patriotic sweating. The fact 
that these reactions can be introduced even more strategically, in more 
variety, with more entertainment, more narrative, and more commercially 
will then be shown by the cinema.
Marey did not lose his soul to the new medium, but his assistant. After 
Demeny had been commissioned to produce f ilm footage for deaf children 
in 1891, he patented a phenakistoscope for reproducing these series of im-
ages under his own name as a “phonoscope.” Under duress, in the light of 
a giant concave mirror, which focused the sun directly on his somewhat 
pinched face, Demeny said to the camera what lay heavy on his heart: “Je 
vous aime” and “Vive la France.” He glued 24 single images onto a metal 
plate, which was illuminated from inside, while a shutter restrained the 
light while transporting the images. At the international photo exhibition 
in 1892 in Paris Demeny thus became the f irst f ilm star. Love in the age 
of technological reproducibility: “Je vous aime” unflinchingly ran its laps, 
addressing both amateur and professionals personally.
Marey replaced Demeny’s assistance with that of Albert Londe. This 
collaboration not only fuses the latest visual technology and the most tested 
methods of illustration, but also the most advance tricks for capturing the 
nervous functions by chronophotography with the most modern equipment 
for illustrating body movements. Parallel controls and communication of 
physique and psyche. With Londe and Marey the faculties of knowledge 
come together, which f inally provide the conditions for cinema.
In the experimental station at the Parc des Princes and in Marey’s “Villa 
Maria” near Naples with its permanently installed underwater camera, 
a group of capable young physiologists, biologists, and neurologists were 
trained as f ilm artists. For the former Charcot employee Paul Richer and 
the young Lucien Bull, the Olympic Games of 1900 in Paris became a 
f ilm academy where they recorded the athletes, along with Marey, f irst 
to measure them and then for pleasure. Lucien Bull, who would later 
be the director of the Marey Institute in Beaune, developed radio cin-
ematography, with which he shot footage stereoscopically at more than 
2000 frames per second of the f light of insects and ballistic footage – his 
most famous f ilm being that of a bullet going through a soap bubble, in 
which one can see that the surface of the bubble closes up again after 
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the entry of the bullet before exploding completely as the bullet exits 
the other side. Another well-known f ilmmaker was the medical student 
Jean Comandon, whose f ilms were purchased as educational f ilms by 
the UFA. In 1909 he shot a f ilm about microbes in mouse intestines with 
dark f ield illumination and in the same year a f ilm about the syphilis 
virus, f ilms show cells dancing with great tenderness. The most famous 
of Marey’s successors, however, must be Charles Emile François-Franck, 
Marey’s assistant at the pathological physiology department at the Collège 
de France. Under Charcot at Salpêtrière in the 1880s François-Franck had 
investigated circulation and localization in the brain, and had published 
a book about the motor brain functions, for which Charcot wrote the 
foreword. This work included f ilm footage that, unlike with Londe, was no 
longer meant to show the external movements or symptomatic expressions 
of emotional stimulations, but the inner paths of transmitting stimuli. 
François-Franck’s experiments are complementary to Londe’s illusionary 
and imaginary images, which abstracted fragments from the living ap-
pearance of the body. François-Franck electrically anesthetized, dissected, 
and reanimated animal bodies for cinematic recordings. His f ilms are the 
missing link between the experiments of Duchenne de Boulogne and the 
f irst close-ups by D.W. Griff ith and the sine qua non of all Frankenstein 
movies.
Although Meliès and the Lumière Brothers are considered the actual 
pioneers of f ilm, the natural scientists, the unknown avant-gardists of f ilm 
history, developed a wealth of styles and techniques that slowly paved the 
way for f ilm into art. These include slow motion and time lapse, which make 
it possible to see the movements of plants, animals, and cells, underwater 
photography and the microscope, the x-ray and radio cinematography. It is 
in biology films that the first artificial worlds emerge that only exist through 
the fusion of camera and human perception. Among natural scientists f ilm 
was used in a f ilmic sense from the very beginning, and not as a replacement 
for vaudeville, theater, or literature. Feelings that arise while watching the 
staging of microbes in mouse intestines are undoubtedly artif icial and 
undoubtedly genuine.
The f irst artists’ f ilms in came into being among the cinéastes in the 
laboratories in France. Jean Rouch recalls how his uncle, a professor 
at the medical university, regretted that in 1920 he had to fail his most 
talented student in physics, chemistry, and biology. This was Jean Pain-
levé, the son of the mathematician, two-time Minister of Defense, and 
Minister President Paul Painlevé. Since 1924 Jean had been publishing 
Neo-Zoologisms in the journal “Surréalism”, which he had founded as a 
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counter to Bresson’s projects with Ivan Goll, Appolinaire, and Delaunay. 
In 1925 he passed the exams at the Académie des sciences after all with a 
f ilm about stickleback eggs, one of the f irst f ilms to question structural 
gender difference, in which he edited in a sequence in reverse at the 
onset: the heart of a stickleback embryo repels a red blood cell! When 
the commission wanted to check the f ilm again the next day, Painlevé 
had re-edited the f ilmstrips and has since been considered a master 
f ilmmaker of biological works, with cameras that he himself built with 
the participation of the cameraman André Raymond. All of his f ilms 
calculate the doubled reality of the trick shot, both strictly satisfying the 
criteria of scientif ic observation and at the same time being the result 
of highly complicated manipulation. “La science est une f iction”, wrote 
Painlevé as well.10 His f ilms show everything exactly as it is and at the 
same time let us see that everything visible here can in no way be seen 
in any reality outside the cinema. They are therefore surrealist on the 
technical level and, through their montage, which makes use of similari-
ties, mimicries, and deceptions of movement identif ication, they are also 
political manifestos. The f ilm Le Vampire from 1939, about a type of bat 
that carries diseases and that has its front paw quivering upward at an 
angle, features music by Duke Ellington and a commentary by Painlevé. 
It ran in Copenhagen for two years during German occupation at the 
train station cinema.11
In 1924 in the Paris avant-garde cinema “Vieux Colombier” there was 
a screening of medical and natural science f ilms by Lucien Bull and Jean 
Comandon, which was attended by the group of artists and f ilmmakers sur-
rounding the Surrealists.12 Traces of all these manipulations of time, bodies, 
and movements are obvious in f ilms like Germain Dulac’s La coquille et le 
clergyman (1926), Buñuel’s Chien Andalou (1928), or Man Ray’s Étoile de mer 
(1928). It is less useful to trace the surrealist tradition of cinema at the level 
of the motif than at the level of the systematic inversion of times, spaces, 
and movements, through which a “total transmutation” was effectuated 
at the editing table – “the fortuitous encounter upon a non-suitable plane 
of two mutually distant realities.”13 To illustrate this aesthetic, Max Ernst 
introduced Lautréamont’s example of an encounter between a sewing 
machine and an umbrella on a dissecting table. At this point in time the 
perception apparatus itself is among the things that can be met on the 
editing or the dissecting table, and its sensors and cycles are already fed 
back with its mechanisms.
The surrealists, however, did not obtain just the formal manipulations 
of the f ilm recording and transmission technologies from the medical 
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tradition, but also the structure of shooting and the gaze, which turns 
floating seahorses, disoriented dogs, and sick girls into stars.
In his brilliant outline of f ilm history, Dalí wrote:
Following the dull years during which the technique is improved the 
cinema […] suddenly reaches its true golden age in the achievement of 
the f irst materialist f ilms of the Italian school (prewar and the beginning 
of the war). I am referring here to the grandiose period of hysterical 
cinema…14
3. Psycho-Drama
The films of Painlevé, Buñuel, or Dalí make it easy to forget the murderous 
legacy of Marey’s inventions. Following the model of Londe, who had provided 
an iconography for unconscious poses and developed dispositifs of the female 
or male unconscious, f ilm became the model and then also the substitute 
for conventional medial diagnoses. “Film reproduces” was plainly stated in 
the protocols, and one enthusiastic researcher among the clinicians, Emil 
Kraepelin, who had completed his education with Wundt, would turn to the 
cinema in relief in his Munich psychiatric practice. The cinematogram archive 
would spare him the confusion and madness of the patients at his station:1
In order to demonstrate the meaning of the cinematograms that Weiler 
has been taking for years at the psychiatric clinic in Munich for clinical 
teaching purposes, selected pictures were presented. Since the main 
advantage of cinematography for teaching is that it visually reproduces 
the attacks, it was initially paralytic, epileptic, and hysterical attacks 
that were presented.2
The physicians, especially the neurologists, were strangely easygoing in how 
they dealt with the new medium, and the technological conditions of the 
medical assessments they made using it often remained concealed in the 
darkness of the laboratory. What they all saw projected before their eyes was 
seen as a valid case and attack, as complete and self-suff icient reality, not 
as a recorded trace, which, as is common with other optical examination 
devices such as the microscope of the x-ray, can only become scientif ic data 
by f irst specifying the adjustment coordinates, exposure times, or focal 
lengths. Mere cinematography becomes f iction f ilm – as science.
Already in 1898 the Romanian neurologist Georges Marinescu, another 
one of Marey’s students, carried out the f irst systematic f ilm recordings of 
paralytics. His f ilms turned cinematography into a neurological measuring 
instrument meant to distinguish “normal” and “abnormal” movements. 
Cinematography was the diagnostic basis for differentiating health and 
illness by means of analyzing movement. Anyone who limped, staggered, 
stammered, or doddered was registered in the image as “pathological”: the 
drama of being presented, which does not stop in the cinematic mythology 
of Frankenstein’s monster.
In Marinescu’s footage patients of a hospital in Bucharest are presented 
sequentially by the nurses. From left to right, from right to left, toward the 
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camera and away from it, clothed at f irst, then with bare legs, presumably 
better to see the play of the muscles, and then f inally nude. After a group 
of adults, children are presented as well. They hobble, buckle, have trouble 
moving forwards and getting through the area captured by the frame. Their 
movements look even more awkward due to the mise-en-scène of their 
skinny little bodies in the completely empty space of the picture.3
Marinescu’s camera stands f ixed to one spot. Only the reactions of a few 
patients who laugh or wave when they go to the camera draws attention to 
the fact that there is someone behind the controlling gaze that the spectator 
is positioned in, someone who is directing this. With the children, who 
obviously attempt to evade the direction not to make eye contact with 
the camera-eye, the sequence in which they walk towards the camera is 
edited down to a few seconds. By using looks and gestures to point out what 
surrounds the area where they are being judged, the children break through 
the formal objectivity of the visual structure, and exactly this moment is 
edited out in the name of science. Shortly before the cut, however, we see 
them laugh briefly, presumably because they recognized someone behind 
the camera. Only the cuts point to a different space, to the off-screen space 
of the shot, and thus to the fragile masks of scientif icity. If we watch the 
images without the commentary that was added later on, the cinematic 
strategy of eradicating those recorded becomes even clearer. We see name-
less, stumbling bodies shot from the side in wide-shots, largely without 
faces. The young men have shaven heads. All personal characteristics that 
could be manifest in clothing have been taken away from the children, with 
the exception of a couple or social, or rather asocial, markings: the girls 
have disheveled braids, are unkempt, their stocking hanging down. Nudity, 
which is meant to reinforce the impression of physical health in Marey’s 
hopping soldiers, and which by now looks a little ridiculous, reinforces the 
impression of helplessness in the small patients in Bucharest, robbing them 
of any human characteristic. Around 1900 medical exams were already 
being used to slate children for treatment like the one that would lead 
millions of so-called abnormal or pathological persons to their deaths over 
the course of the century by more or less totalitarian regimes.
The iconography of annihilation in these f irst f ilms by Marinescu can 
be seen in all further f ilms about ataxia or catatonia. It is correct that the 
titles of f ilms were only the names of the illness involved, for what is being 
portrayed is the image of the illness with all its specif ic symptoms and 
particularities, an image that was meant to train less experienced neurolo-
gists in diagnosis. In line with to the fact that it was not the person in need 
of help, who was suffering under seizures or manifestations of paralysis, 
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and whose appearance might cause fear or pity, that was represented, but 
only a body befallen with symptoms, the extermination of just this body 
appears as a coup de libération, which would no longer take any account 
of anything human behind it or in it – a logic that is repeated in horror 
f ilms as valiant impalement and, incidentally, often as burning by body 
snatchers and the living dead. Unlike in German fairy tales, it seems that 
no good and enchanted soul will be able to work its way out of these f ilm 
bodies possessed by evil.
In the same year that Marinescu was shooting his f irst psychiatry 
f ilms, Albert Londe was carrying out a series of experiments with chrono-
apparatuses. Some of the ones that survived show male and female patients 
on the “Piste de la Salpêtrière”, series recorded with the camera with twelve 
lenses. At the end of the twentieth century, f ilm scholars edited these im-
ages into short 35mm films to show early examples of movement analysis. To 
give their f ilm students the most authentic illusion possible of the medical 
position on the “Piste de la Salpêtrière”, they even compensated for the 
parallel shifts that had come about through the distances between the 
twelves lenses. Didactically and artif icially they attempted to created a 
central perspective of unif ied space after the fact, which would allow for 
only a single and continuous ideal gaze, whereas previously a series of 
views and vantage points had only allowed for interpolating the patients’ 
movements. But despite the best efforts of the f ilm scholars to create an 
absolute and – as it was implemented in the history of perspective from 
the beginning – self-denying gaze in a homogenous optical space, the clips 
jerk and jump a little, just enough to make every student aware that these 
images and these historical medical views are a carefully arranged optical 
construction, exactly like every cinematic space. But it is precisely the dif-
ference between these awkwardly reconstructed not-yet-f ilms by Londe on 
the one hand and the films by Marinescu, staged in the coherent space of the 
f ilm camera, on the other, that makes it possible to trace the new sovereign 
power of the camera’s gaze as visual diagnostics in medicine. The dysfunc-
tional aspects of watching movies also provide some elucidation here. If the 
f ilm historians had wanted to analyze the power, the source of which had 
been concealed in the construction of the apparatuses, they would have 
been better served if they had exposed the technical parameters of working 
on f ilm rather than continuing to conceal it with further manipulations. 
When Londe himself later shot some footage with a f ilm camera, he seems 
to have implicitly taken the role of cinematography into account. In 1999 
three of Londe’s f ilms were restored by the Archives des f ilms of the CNC 
for an exhibition in Paris. The f irst showed a Cheval entraînant un moulin, 
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the second the Abbatage d’un bœuf, and f inally the third was a cinematic 
Démarche pathologique de la Salpêtrière. Training, fragmenting, staging: 
there could be no more precise summary of the cinematic body politics 
that reworked Marey’s measurements into dramas.
One example that shows that cinematic recordings around 1900 was 
already no longer serving to analyze movement, but had become quixotic 
evidence for medical diagnoses, is the f ilm Neuropatologia by Camillo 
Negri from 1908, and it can be taken as representative for the cinema that 
Salvador Dalí had in mind when he rhapsodized about the “grandiose period 
of hysterical cinema.”
In his clinic in Turin, Negri had himself and his assistant f ilmed as they 
treated a woman having a nervous attack. The woman was wearing a mask, 
presumably to protect her identity. Already because of this, the sequence has 
an undertone of a Sadistic boudoir play, and is reminiscent of the stagings 
done at Salpêtrière in which hysterics had to incarnate classic theatrical 
roles or zoological forms. After the woman has been brought into the picture 
she gives a brief explanation, which is of course kept from the spectator, and 
its wording clearly belongs to the medical protocol. Immediately following 
this she falls into a state of twitching. Negri, who is bent over her busily and 
business-like, communicates during the whole shoot with the cameraman 
or the technical personnel behind the camera, obviously to check whether 
everything happening can be seen in the image, and what instructions to 
give to get the spectacle to run its course. Toward the end of the f ilm, when 
the patient is already giving the impression of being completely exhausted, 
Negri once again gives a sign to shoot and then begins to press the woman’s 
abdomen against the mattress. A new attack begins. From the point of view 
of the f ilm, there is no way to tell if the woman moved on her own accord 
or whether the professor’s strong push and the feathers of the bed started 
up the whole movement. One might say that hysteria itself thus appears in 
front of the running camera. The subject and object of the hysterical move-
ment are indistinguishable. Just as the title says, neuropathology appears 
in the image as a malaise of representation, as a trick of the neurologists, 
as a mise-en-scène of the cameraman, as a reaction of a female body to 
diverse psychic and physical factors. Because the identity of the woman 
on the screen behind the masks of the “great universal matrix”, the “Caput 
mortuum” of the female, as Michel Leiris called the practice in the case of 
his research in Africa, has disappeared, it is no longer her twitching and 
trembling that appears on the screen, but an attack, under the guidance 
of the professor. What the f ilm shows cannot give any information about 
the physiological course of the attack. Recording it on f ilm is no longer 
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measuring it for the camera, but staging it for the camera. The complicitous 
looks that Negri gives over and over again to the camera confirm how sure he 
can be of getting the applause of his colleagues. The scientific demonstration 
merges with its interpretation by the operating specialist. At the end of the 
f ilm the two men in the laboratory are presented like actors at the f inal 
curtain, holding up a woman between them: the weak sex, patient, diva, 
object of scientif ic ambition, whether she shares this now or not.4 Staging 
and diagnosis run in parallel and are demonstrated with shots that are not 
relativized by any accountability beyond the technical aspects of f ilming the 
experiment. Hysteria once again appears as the overwhelming corporality 
of a symbolic order. Structures that supply meaning get into the image by 
means of technical workmanship. Only when the attention is shifted to 
cuts, dissolves, zooms, and pans does it become clear how film and medical 
orders are dramatized into social contents. L’âge d’or du cinéma hystérique.
How to distract attention away from technical workmanship was 
taught by a German assistant doctor, Hans Hennes. Like Charcot, what 
he cherished about cinematography was that it could reliably store and 
differentiate where human objects of view behaved erratically. “Once the 
footage is shot, the picture is available for reproduction at any time, the f ilm 
is always ‘in the mood,’ there are no misf ires.”5 Only with time will it turn 
out that “reproduction” is a euphemism for dressing. The degree to which 
cinematography in Germany found its way into medical diagnostics is 
documented in the thorough overview published by the medical officer and 
radiologist Dr. Martin Weiser, a student of Ewald Hering’s, just after the war 
in 1919. His book Medizinische Kinematographie is both a film handbook and 
a scientif ic report, revealing a number of inventions, techniques, and tricks 
that were being used by physicians with the camera. Already in 1911 one Dr. 
Summer had emphasized “the value of cinematography for the differential 
diagnosis of epileptic seizures against hysteria and organic diseases of the 
brain.”6 The great model of all neurologist-f ilmmakers, however, was the 
Italian brain physiologist and cinema pioneer Osvaldo Polimanti, who 
had taken it on to supplement his written protocols about neurological 
deficits after extirpations of certain brain areas with “successful cinematic 
records.”7 Weiser emphasized – and almost in the same words that Londe 
had used to formulate his visions – that doctors should make use of the 
cinematic impression of the medical gaze as a “natural” perceptual method, 
in distinction from writing:
From early childhood on we are used to grasping processes of motion not 
through description, but through direct perception, and we understand 
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them in nature and in cinematic representation much quicker and more 
thoroughly than when reading a description, no matter how exhaustive 
it is, during which we must reconstruct the process of motion in our 
imaginations.8
As long as the connection between medical diagnostics, technology, and 
body politics remained concealed under the assumption of the naturalness 
of cinematic perception, the imaginary and hallucinatory practice contin-
ued in neurology, throughout all political and ideological periods. It was 
always the Golden Age for neuropathology. For a 16-minute f ilm series that 
presented ‘catatonia’ in seven cases, German f ilmmakers compiled silent 
f ilm footage from 1925-1943. Intertitles direct the spectator’s attention. In 
this f ilm there is no recognizable continuity or logic of the shots that might 
make it possible to have a scientif ic comparison or a systematization of the 
material. The persons in the image are shown in wide shots, sometimes in 
medium shots or close-ups, without any comprehensible criteria for the 
decision. They stand there in their underwear, draped in black camisoles, 
or shot in everyday clothing. Following inaudible commands they carry out 
certain movements. In contrast to the expressionless people in Marinescu’s 
f ilms, now “types” are developed, pathological roles that the sick persons are 
supposed to merge into. This becomes most clear through the example of a 
“catatonia picture”, that simply indicates “affected clothing and posturing” 
as a symptom and shows a man in a cape with a hat and scarf looking off 
into the distance. A picture of illness that would have done for any actor’s 
head shot; the records department of psychology would f inally get its carte 
blanche as coming to itself.
Finally, the medical f ilm work of Dr. Johannes K.J. Kirchhof should 
be mentioned. In 1940 and 1941 he shot the f ilm Ataktische Störungen bei 
einem Geschwisterpaar [Atactic Disturbances in Siblings]. The siblings, a 
man and a woman, both around f ifty years old, are required, one by one, 
to walk around naked in a room f itted with grey cloth and to demonstrate 
a particular twitching in their movements. The camera sometimes gets 
quite close to the bodies, mercilessly panning from top to bottom over and 
over again. Shots of the patients looking into the camera are edited in. The 
doctor (presumably Kirchhof himself) enters the picture in a white lab 
coat with a tie and collar to demonstrate an announced kinetic tremor, 
namely the increasing trembling of the man when he attempts to grasp the 
doctors hand. In response to the joy that the naked man shows in seeing 
the doctor again, whom he clearly knows well, the doctor responds with a 
faint, embarrassed smile, which points the gaze not back at the patient, but 
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to the camera. The staging reduces the madness of the patient to his illusion 
in thinking that he is a human being just like the doctor and he could enter 
into eye-contact with him at will. But the naked man does not have his 
gaze in the space of the camera and is thus no longer the subject. Beyond 
the implied diagnostic level – the analysis of nervous twitching – there is 
a second level of the feud of gazes, which only one of them, technologically 
equipped, knows about and survives: the medical gaze that is reinforced 
by the camera. If we think that a certain horror has got a name and a face 
in Dr. Kirchof’s appearance, it soon becomes clear that the technology of 
f ilming also seeks to subordinate the gaze of the spectator to this logic 
of annihilation. The staging consequently ends in a sequence that shows 
the patient writing his name. We see the trembling hand, then the patient 
holds up the paper and his name, now visible in full on the piece of paper, 
is illegible. Even on the symbolic level, the identity of the patient is thus 
def initively negated. Even more: the f ilm suggests that the patient has 
forfeited his humanity himself through his uncontrollable movements. The 
f ilm always only seems to show what is, but shots, gaze manipulation, and 
montage constantly generate meaning. Given the euthanasia campaigns 
during the Third Reich, the sequence, in which the man’s trembling results 
in his failure to write his name, means that there is no identity here anyway. 
In this discrete f ilm sense, annihilation would only be the completion of a 
process that, as the f ilm seeks to establish in all objectivity, has long been 
the patient’s destiny.9
In view of such obvious efforts at staging in medical f ilms, it is astounding 
that the scientif ic claim of “medical cinematography” (Weiser), that is, the 
legitimacy of recording and registering bodily functions by simply storing 
them on f ilm, could hold for so long. Certainly the fact that cinematography 
lies in the direct tradition of inventing methods to record physiological 
movement meant that systematizing movement, and thus also formalizing 
and pathologizing it, seemed to be guaranteed by film. But even if cinematic 
methods of measuring by analyzing single images and sequences can be-
come an artif icial synthesis of movements, various levels of staging come 
forth in projection, on the screen, and the f indings turn out to be imaginary 
anyway. Interventions by a cinematically examining doctor can only be 
reconstructed in the case of the basic stroboscopic illusion of movement if 
slow motion and time lapse can be sensed or even noticed as “signif icant.” 
All variations beneath this perceptible threshold, be they due to conscious 
manipulation or to the contingent dysfunction of the apparatuses, remain 
unnoticed. In contrast to the failed comparison of parallel axes mentioned 
above, which made the reformation of chronophotographic analysis visible 
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as the projected illusion of movement, the space constructed by the camera 
will also simulate homogeneity and wholeness, even in moving shots, due to 
the angle of the shot and to editing, which will cause the perception of the 
body and the gazes to appear as natural. In all cinematic “neuropatologia” 
illusionary perception perceives the staged illusion of movement. Film 
and neurology appear as historically connected, seeking to bring the truth 
of neurological diseases to light as feedback of data that is always only 
neurological. It is a system that can be manipulated without challenge 
as long as both sides of the attack are f iled away. For instance, Polimanti 
conscientiously f iled f ilm footage of a disoriented dog running in circles 
in the surgical protocol of extirpation.
4. Psycho-Technology
If the neo-impressionist is convinced, for instance, that the pleasurable 
impression of a landscape that his picture is meant to induce only comes about 
if a certain f lickering emanates from the entire image, he then stands like a 
psycho-technologist before the totally ratichal and not at all aesthetic question 
of how the psychological effect of the f lickering impression can be achieved.
– Hugo Münsterberg, 1914
It was not fables, forms, or colors that were raised to the quality of artworks 
at the end of the last century, but excitation frequencies. Inasmuch as per-
ception had been dissected in the laboratory and examined for its individual 
functions, art was no longer examined as an aesthetic phenomenon, but 
also for the way it affected the nerves. Physiologists had previously analyzed 
body movements and then, from outside, neurologically identif ied the 
qualities of character. Psychologists had established the effect of images 
and rhythms on the psyche. In psycho-physiological analysis art once again 
became physical: a mental reaction to nerve stimuli.
One of Wundt’s students, Paul Linke, continued his experiments as 
studies in cinema perception. In March 1916 he reported in Dresden on 
his attempts to induce seeing motion artif icially. “Dr. Paul Linke/Jena […] 
breaks with the old, purely physiological views, which sought to explain the 
problem of movement merely through the phenomenon of the afterimage 
and amalgamation. According to Paul Linke, seeing motion in cinematog-
raphy is an illusion of identif ication”, was written in 1917 in Photographische 
Korrespondenz.1 Linke provided the technological basis for a psychological 
explanation of Wertheimer and Köhler’s experiments. Working in Wundts’s 
laboratory, he had tested how many images in a series were necessary to 
create the illusion of a course of movement. “What emerges from his work 
is that our psyche possesses a quite astounding and previously unknown 
capacity to reproduce a course of movement out of two different single 
images.”2
As proof Linke had built “the tautoscope for the psychological cin-
ematographs” which put two different images from a series on screen, 
“two perceptions of a face […] that have so little spatial difference from 
each other that they can be identif ied, that is, can be referred to one and 
the same object.” The two elements had to be perceived separately, but “be 
simultaneously present in the consciousness, indeed, simultaneous, for 
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instance, like the sound of a spoken word or the rhythmic beat of the notes 
of a melody.”3 Linke shows his audience that two visual impression can be 
separated from one another by dark phases for so long that an afterimage 
effect could no longer be considered a connector between the two images. 
Stroboscopy, he demonstrated, calls on a capacity of the brain itself, so that, 
as one spectator reported, “a clear impression of motion (emerges) in that 
the psyche automatically supplements the phases in between.”4
Martin Weiser, who had written the first handbook for filmmaking physi-
cians, initially considered Linke’s studies to be psychological suprematism: 
it only worked for points, lines, circles in black-and-white. But Linke was also 
able to delude him with transformation effects: apples into pears. Weiser 
remarked that Linke’s trick of affecting the brain was a typical trick form 
Wundt’s laboratory: “In Linke’s experiments we must still bear in mind 
that a quite specif ic rhythm is maintained, to which the psyche adapts.”5 
Rhythm is the missing link between f ilm and medical diagnosis, between 
Ewald Hering’s panmnemism as a “surrogate science of the soul”,6 Bleuler’s 
mental apparatuses, which could replace broken nerve functions, and the 
stroboscopic affection of the psyche. Rhythm creates the tension in which 
we are prepared to let signals in the nerves become data: expectation in 
Wundt’s complex sense. Or in the sense of a certain drum rhythm, which 
calls to action a certain dance in the limbs and a certain god.
Also in 1916, when the German Friends of Photography and Film were 
rubbing their eyes after Linke’s screenings, in the USA the f irst psycho-
technical f ilm theory was being written, The Photoplay: A Psychological 
Study, and by one of Wundt’s students, Hugo Münsterberg. Historical and 
practically, Münsterberg described the compatibility between psyche and 
cinematic apparatus. In his f ilm theory, which was one of the f irst f ilm 
theories at all, he reversed the relationship between subject and object, 
familiar from art reception, when it came to watching movies. “In the 
photoplay our imagination is projected on the screen”,7 wrote Münsterberg, 
and by “imagination” he did not mean fantasy, but the imaginative power of 
the mind. “The mental function involved is that of expectation or, when the 
expectation is controlled by our feelings, we may class it under the mental 
function of imagination.”8 Results and terminology from years of research 
in the laboratory in Leipzig, starting with the f irst complicated expecta-
tions of astronomers up to systematic differentiations and interferences of 
feelings and sensations, turn out to be perfectly suited to the experience 
of the cinema. Perception studied by nerve physiologists as transferring 
and processing impulses, can easily be extended into the apparatus of the 
cinema. Münsterberg could easily demonstrate that, “for the first time in the 
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history of art, feature f ilms are capable of implementing the neurological 
f low of data itself”, as Friedrich Kittler summarized the bold new theory.9
Münsterberg, was a philosophy professor in Freiburg, where, with the 
help of his technician, Herr Elb, he had amassed an extensive collection of 
devices for experimental psychology, including a complication clock. From 
there he went twice to Harvard: the f irst time from 1892 to 1895, to work on 
his book Die Grundzüge der Psychotechnik, the second time in 1897, when he 
was appointed as the youngest chairman of the Philosophical Department. 
What the American psychologists – especially William James, his colleague 
and boss, who was one of the few “great” psychologists of the nineteenth 
century who had not studied with Wundt – found highly convincing in the 
work of the 34-year-old German was how he answered classic philosophi-
cal questions with answers tested by concrete experimental psychology: 
“Consciousness of the self does not exist at all; if the ego, the only function of 
which is consciousness, is to be directly known, it is then condemned to be 
in the role of the Baron Münchhausen, who had pulled himself up by his own 
hair”, wrote Münsterberg in his Beiträge zur epxerimentellen Psychologie 
in Freiburg.10 He researched logic, ethics, and aesthetics with the help of 
Elb’s laboratory technology: “Philosophy never has to do with the problems 
of special experiences, but always has to ask how and in what sense such 
experience is possible.”11 He transformed Wilhelm Wundt’s systematics 
of feelings – pleasure and displeasure, tension and release, agitation and 
pacif ication – into an economy of experiences that, in their dynamics, as 
Helmholtz and Poincaré had claimed for the physiology of perception, can 
produce identity and non-identity from the dynamic processing of stimuli 
and reactions. This subjectivity from Leipzig-Heidelberg-Freiburg, with 
its neo-Kantian turn, asserts itself as a practical self-actualization in the 
New World:
We say our will is fulf illed when the idea we try to maintain becomes 
realized. What does realization mean? […] It means the identity of content 
between the preceding and the resulting experience.12
Already in his Eternal Values, which f irst appeared in English in Boston, 
Hugo Münsterberg had integrated the economy of nervous energy and the 
perception of the world into a neuro-philosophy. Based on his studies of 
mental experiences Münsterberg developed a complex system of “eternal 
values”, which provide access to the world in four categories, as logical, 
aesthetic, ethical, and metaphysical. Or, to put it the other way around, 
they provided the world access to the mental processes, for values form the 
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relations that form human beings: “The world of values is the only true world, 
and for every one who wants to have a world at all, all the relations which 
result from the self-assertion of the experiences must be acknowledged as 
absolutely valid for the true world.”13
Since they psycho-physically dissolve into single mental functions, values 
are the contemporary replacement for old categories. They are the tools with 
which the internal, external, and social worlds are linked by neurological 
interconnections and flows of data. With these “eternal values” Münsterberg 
can remain both moral philosopher and technician of brain functions at the 
same time. In 1914 he published the f irst version of his popular scientif ic 
work Die Grundzüge der Psychotechnik, a discipline that he had founded, 
and which was meant “to be an application of psychology in the service of 
cultural tasks”,14 a science that relates to psychology like “the engineering 
sciences do to physics or the agricultural sciences do to botany.”15 In a more 
eff icient American sense, culture simply meant ergonomics, optimizing 
performance, social hygiene. Here Münsterberg once again goes after 
psychological methods and an overly hasty invocation of consciousness:
Physiological psychology links the sensation of consciousness by means 
of processes in the brain, while anti-physiological psychology joins the 
very same conscious processes through a psychic entity. This may be 
called the unconscious or the subconscious or the soul, but in any case 
it remains an unknown, which cannot be found in any experience.16
Incidentally, Münsterberg excludes Freud’s psychoanalytical concept 
of the unconscious from his verdict on the unconscious since it is also 
based on neurological impulses that “were repressed and, after they had 
long vanished from consciousness, remained in effect indirectly in the 
unconscious.”17 As long as the phenomena observed by Freud can even be 
verif ied “galvanometrically” they belonged exactly to Münsterberg’s area 
of research. In his psychological laboratories reflex-like reactions and their 
non-conscious effectivity and duration were tested as mental automatism.
One experiment at the Harvard Psychological Laboratories that has since 
become one of the most famous occurred during the period of Münsterberg’s 
f irst tenure. Leon M. Solomons, together with his assistant, test person, 
and colleague Gertrude Stein, attempted to track down the mechanism 
that conjured up the appearance of a second personality during hysterical 
trances. To achieve this, they ran tests on motor performances that could 
be carried out without any conscious aid: automatic writing combined 
with automatic dictation. In order to simulate this state, which, according 
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to Solomons, became pathological in hysterics, he trained Gertrude Stein 
to systematically distract her attention and to sever sensory-motor con-
nections in the brain. “Real automatism”, wrote Solomons in his report, 
“that is, dropping out of consciousness […] comes only at intervals and for 
short periods at a time. But it comes whenever the attention is sufficiently 
distracted.”18
The trance that Gertrude Stein had to exercise in order to simulate the 
motor reactions of hysterics, unconscious in the automatic sense, is thus 
negative attentiveness training. Neurologically channeled habits were to 
be interrupted, de-conventionalized. The tests did not work when the at-
tention could not be distracted by self-observation, for instance by reading 
a novel. “Our trouble never came from a failure of recognition, but from a 
functioning of attention.”19 Over the course of the test and training units, 
Gertrude Stein developed a sure trick to separate motor and sensory skills, 
as well as aural and linguistic ones, and to cause them to disintegrate into an 
artif icial trance of intellectual dissociation. “Miss Stein found it suff icient 
distraction often to simply read what her arm wrote, but following three 
or four words behind her pencil.”20 In so doing, she had also shown that 
the classical training methods of the eighteenth century, in which the 
synchronization of writing, reading, and comprehending was exercised 
in schools, is what creates the context for a soul in the f irst place. Stein 
deconstruct this through intrapsychic time manipulation as inducing 
trance and personality doubling.
Later Gertrude Stein claimed that these dissociation exercises were 
merely memory training in the laboratory, and ultimately not so different 
from the other memory training, the intellectual training associated with 
schooling to which all students are subjected. Already in 1935, while on a 
lecture trip through the USA, she had explained to students, practically 
inside the “laboratory”, that the experiments on automatic writing in the 
Harvard laboratories had not formed the methods of her own literary 
production, or should we read: had not formed it. Educational formation, 
she writes, is always imitation, and therefore anyone can know what he is 
doing within the university:
I did not think that we either of us had been doing automatic writing, we 
always knew what we were doing how could we not when every minute 
in the laboratory we were doing what we were watching ourselves do-
ing, that was our training, but as he wrote the article after all I was an 
undergraduate and not a professional and I am always very docile, and 
all the ideas had been his all that had been mine were the def initions 
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of the characters of the men and women I had seen naturally it was as 
if I had written that I did that automatic writing. I did not think it was 
automatic I do not think so now, I do not think any university student is 
likely certainly not under observation is likely to be able to do genuinely 
automatic writing.21
Automatic writing would have assumed a machine-like circuitry at the basis 
of human nerve physiology, and if Gertrude Stein had any ambition, it was 
that of wiring up her own brain, cabling herself, even if she had to descend to 
the bottom of the Atlantic to do so. For Stein, it was not a matter of automatic 
writing on an anthropological search for the rules of authentic human logics 
of letters of signif iers at the basis of consciousness, nor was it about simply 
becoming a typewriter. She experimented with the quick interferences 
between the inscription machines of physical perception, between literal 
and corporal conventions as issues of the nerves. Naming generations of 
small white poodles “Basket” and then notating the feeling for a dog named 
Basket… or writing oneself as a character in the autobiography of a loved 
one, these were the media circuits in which Stein produced herself and 
sought to recast the tracks of reaction from the outside. In her literary texts 
Gertrude Stein constantly translated back and forth between the flow of 
nerve data and media and between the flow of media data and nerves. What 
is understood as human in various cultures and institutions is constituted 
historically from these connections. From certain circuitries, for instance, 
Americans are made, with “minds” that are radically different than the old 
European souls. Whoever newly associates inside and outside, as Gertrude 
Stein does in her texts, creates, as Münsterberg showed neurophysiologi-
cally, logical, aesthetic, ethical, and metaphysical surpluses: The making 
of… Americans. “No, writing should be very exact and one must realize 
what there is inside in one and then in some way it comes into words and 
the more exactly the words f it the emotion the more beautiful the words.”22
Solomons’s experiments might have been the preliminary studies to 
establish new circumstances and new images of the human by studying and 
establishing new sensory-motor reflex arcs. Sensual-nervous reflex tracks. 
If it had gone according to Stein, it presumably would have been like the 
ones developed while driving. Shift, accelerate, shift. Solomons’s and Stein’s 
experiments might also have been the beginning for an artif icial regulation 
of social life from the psychological laboratory, as the Russian reflexologists 
later planned, but they did not get so far at Harvard. The connections be-
tween nerves and apparatuses, which had become established everywhere 
in normal life, worked so eff iciently and produced such incomprehensible 
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states that even Solomons and Stein rested on the relay that gave the states 
a convention. At the end of their research they stated that hysteria is “a 
disease of the attention”,23 although they might have understood attention 
to mean the neurological, sensory-motor interconnection and feedback 
of intellectual subroutines, which could be experimentally altered. It is 
notable throughout that over the course of training, the subroutines of 
“minds” could be more reliably switched on and off with books, images, 
or apparatuses than with “one’s own” central consciousness. Münsterberg 
had arrived at Harvard.
Just as he had had the connections between dissociated mental functions 
and apparatuses tested in the Psychological Laboratories, Hugo Münster-
berg examined the psycho-physiology of cinematic perception in 1916. His 
theory of cinema is, like the Eternal Values, divided into “outer” and “inner” 
“Development of the Moving Picture”, that is, into routines of technological 
devices and those of the mind. As such, the Cinematic Apparatus is being 
designated, already in 1916, as something that goes straight through all 
the old corporal boundaries, part apparatus and part perception. “Our 
imagination is projected on the screen!”
As a f irst indication of the fact that watching movies is a special 
internal labor of the brain, Münsterberg also presents seeing motion as 
a phi phenomenon, using examples from the museum of stroboscopic 
apparatuses, and in doing so offers a list of all Wundt’s fellow students and 
colleagues, who had discovered the cinema through their psychological 
experiments: Stricker, Exner, James, Fischer, Marbe, Wertheimer, Korte, 
and Linke. They had all done away with the illusion of the afterimage 
effect as the basis for seeing motion: “The apparent movement is in no way 
the mere result of an afterimage […]. The movement is in these cases not 
really seen from without, but is superadded, by the action of the mind, to 
motionless pictures.”24
Just as seeing motion is a mental act that is initiated by the apparatuses, 
seeing depth in the cinema is a function of the brain induced from outside. 
The experienced psyche combines perspectival relations, shadowing, and 
various level of movement into plasticity where there is only a flat screen. In 
the studios of the “Vitagraph Company”, which were f irst set up on Nassau 
Street in New York, high above on the roof of the Morse Building, and later 
were moved to Brooklyn, Münsterberg adopted, alongside directors and 
actors, directorial tricks as one of the physiological justif ications: “For in-
stance, by a well-known optical illusion the feeling of depth is strengthened 
if the foreground is at rest and the background is moving.”25 This is the 
neuronal depth and melancholy of road movies.
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The impression of depth and seeing motion are only two of the per-
ception forms that can automatically be instigated in the cinema by 
technical tricks as an artif icial analysis and synthesis of elementary 
brain functions. All cinema dramaturgy is fundamentally based on this 
mixture and consolidation of such routines, and Rudolf Arnheim, in his 
f ilm theory grounded in Gestalt psychology 16 years later, at any rate 
without previously having taken note of Münsterberg, will then extend 
his fundamentals of perception elements in the cinema. Münsterberg, 
however, emphasized what Arnheim would notice only much later, in 
relation to the f ilms of Maya Deren, namely the psychological trance in the 
cinema, which emerges from the complexity and complication of neuronal 
entanglements: “It brings our minds into a peculiar complex state; and we 
shall see that this plays a not unimportant part in the mental make-up of 
the whole photoplay.”26
Attention, and its possible dissociation from the familiar conventional-
ized sensory-motor context that Solomons and Stein had trained, represents 
the pivot point in Münsterberg’s theory of the cinema. With his psycho-
technical analyses of both theater and cinema reception as a dynamic of 
attention, Münsterberg disappointed all the ideals of the educated class. 
It was not only true for the cinema, ostracized by the pedagogues anyway, 
but also for the stage, that the attention is involuntarily drawn toward what 
is loud, shiny, and unusual, or what blinks and flickers. While the staging 
in the theatre has to make efforts to direct the attention consciously, the 
cinema is nothing other than the guiding and misguiding of involuntary 
attention itself, by means of the various techniques of the camera and of 
montage: “…there is surely no lack of means by which our mind can be 
influenced and directed in the rapid play of the pictures.”27
Münsterberg enumerates these means better than any handbook of 
directing f ilm, indeed, as a cineaste-purist, not even dealing with text or 
music as aids to distracting attention. Camera angles and focal lengths, sets 
and framing enhance the movements and relations that distract attention. 
If it wants to be more than filmed theater, cinema must assert itself as direct 
and unconscious distraction and affection of the nerves.
And Münsterberg was American enough not to view the reality of the 
cinema, which corresponds to real mental experience, as secondary, but as 
reality with its own rules, which can also stand up to the scientif ic scrutiny. 
The fact that in 1916 there were still numerous technical shortcomings 
that distorted these mental mechanisms does not alter the fundamental 
autonomy of experience: “It is a unique inner experience, which is charac-
teristic of the perception of the photoplays.”28
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The experiments in the psychological laboratories had shown that all 
impressions and impulses could be linked, processed, and made present in 
the brain by associations with past and remembered events. The work in the 
studios corresponds to this exactly. Cinema, unlike theater, can also make 
a web of temporal and spatial associations directly present to perception. 
“In our minds past and future becomes intertwined with the present. The 
photoplay obeys the laws of the mind rather than those of the outer world.”29 
When Münsterberg establishes that in the cinema, in contrast to the theater, 
where the spectator remains left to her own thought process, the power of 
the imagination is projected on the screen, this not only means that it is 
manipulated from the outside, but also that the unconscious actions of the 
brain are made visible in how they work in the optical elongation outward, 
and are made objective, as in the laboratory. In this way, Münsterberg is one 
of the theorists of the artistic idea that, while it cannot yet be called artistic 
intelligence, certainly can be called artistic power of the imagination. The 
cinema initiates physiological automatisms, and the feelings and reactions 
produced by them cannot be distinguished from those that appear outside 
the cinema.
Münsterberg certainly distinguishes this artistic induction of inner states 
from suggestion, which is always only a coercion to think and feel what 
comes from the outside. How unstable this distinction is can be read in 
Münsterberg in the formulation that the suggested idea “is not felt as our 
creation.” In the cinema, however, the suggestion must appear as one’s 
own imagination, “our imagination projected on the screen”, and may not 
be sensed as coercion. The suggestive power of the cinema must therefore 
consist in putting our imagination into a state in which the processes on the 
screen are still sensed as our own creation and as real feelings or associa-
tions, but at the same time the transmission has to work with all the tricks 
of trance so that thoughts are subordinated to the associations from the 
screen. “The whole technique of the rapid changes of scenes which we have 
recognized as so characteristic of the photoplay involves at every end point 
elements of suggestion which to a certain degree link the separate scenes.”30
Münsterberg also gives an example of suggestion in the cinema that is 
meant to show that the technique must not become conscious. In an adapta-
tion of Carmen with the anagrammatic vamp Theda Bara (“Arab Death”), 
Münsterberg counts 170 cuts in ten minutes, “an average of a little more 
than three seconds for each scene.”31 All that emerges from this montage is a 
feeling of “nervousness”,32 which means that f ilm technology is detectable as 
feedback on the nerves. This interconnection of technology and perception, 
a certain vibration, these flickering images must directly strike emotions, if 
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cinema is to be art and not simply a psycho-physiological experiment. “To 
picture emotions must be the central aim of the photoplay.”33
While at the theater it is essentially the duty of the actor to evoke feelings 
and emotions, in the cinema is the technology, which the performers must 
and may yield to. Unlike on stage, their reactions must be able to be trained 
involuntary ones. The diff icult task of the f ilm actor consists in introduc-
ing automatic or reflex movements: the movement of glands, vessels, and 
involuntary muscles; the have to weep, sweat, let their pupils dilate… Unlike 
in the theater, however, f ilm directors can compensate for the naturalism 
of physiological reactions with bodily street credibility. Since f ilm direction 
can dissect any body into fragments, even non-professionals without any 
trained feeling for the whole body can be cast for the production of feelings 
and emotions: “If he needs the fat bartender with his smug smile, or the 
humble Jewish peddler, or the Italian organ grinder, he does not rely on 
wigs and paint; he f inds them all ready-made on the East Side.”34 The fact 
that “method acting”, an acting style that activated emotional eruptions 
through biographical memory, would become established later in the USA, 
does not contradict this. Even in method acting, it is a matter of activating 
involuntary affects, which can then be introduced ad libitum for the widest 
variety of historical dramas. In this regard, the memory only clears the way 
to the emotional storage repository.
Since f ilm technology is not dependent on the “whole” body or images 
of the body, the body politics of f ilm can start beneath consciousness: 
with automatisms. These can be physically conveyed in such a way that 
even induce involuntary physical reactions from the spectators, much like 
Gertrude Stein in the laboratory: “we always knew what we were doing how 
could we not when every minute in the laboratory we were doing what we 
were watching ourselves doing, that was our training.”
Feelings and sensations in the cinema run on a Mobius strip between 
inside and outside, body and technology, which only need remain wired 
through the nervous systems of the actors, spectators, and technicians in 
order to induce trembling, gasping, or blushing in the most unbelievable of 
scenes. What is transmitted is f irst the motor and then the sensory reflexes, 
which then become sensed emotions.
The horror which we see makes us really shrink, the happiness which we 
witness makes us relax, the pain which we observe brings contractions 
in our muscles; and all the resulting sensations from muscles, joints and 
tendons, from skin and viscera, from blood circulation and breathing, give 
the color of living experience to the emotional reflection in our mind.35
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In Wundt’s terminology, what we f ind in these examples from Münsterberg 
is a beautiful transformation of sensations into feelings.
Real f ilm art, however, consists in emotionalizing the world so that the 
spectator’s feelings emerge independently and also in contrast to the emo-
tions being played out. So just as perception psycho-physically distorts and 
modif ies what it sees, f ilm must also introduce the nervous functions to 
the spectator’s power of imagination: “The whole keyboard of the imagina-
tion may be used to serve this emotionalizing of nature.”36 The keyboard 
of the imagination is a technological one. From this simply realization, 
Münsterberg comes up with examples that belong to the refined technology 
of f ilmmaking. In chapter 6, “Emotions”, he proposes producing a certain 
trembling, which is not specif ied as an emotional value, but initially only 
describes a heightened state of tension, like “a certain vibration”, which 
creates the images of a neo-impressionist:
Take the case that we want to produce an effect of trembling. We might 
use the pictures as the camera has taken them, sixteen in a second. But 
in reproducing them on the screen we change their order. After giving 
the f irst four pictures, we go back to picture 3, then give 4,5,6, and return 
to 5, then 6,7,8 and go back to 7, and so on. Any other rhythm of course is 
equally possible. The effect is one which never occurs in nature and which 
could not be produced on stage. The events for a moment go backward. A 
certain vibration goes through the world like the tremolo of the orchestra.37
Even at this early stage, Münsterberg was coming up with recipes for 
experimental f ilms. At any rate his suggestions were not appreciated. On 
the contrary, f ilm criticism, including Kracauer’s “psychological history 
of f ilm”, represented such tricks and uses of the material as superf icial. 
Kracauer, for instance, considered “one-turn-one-pictures”, with which 
Fritz Arno Wagner created the jerky movements of the vampire’s coach 
in Murnau’s Nosferatu, a frivolous effect: “It is noteworthy that such an 
amount of picture sense and technical ingenuity served the sole purpose 
of rendering horrors.”38 For Münsterberg, in the specif ic case of f ilm it was 
not about mirroring emotions, but of transmitting them.
In experimental f ilms, manipulating material is the prerequisite for 
experimenting with transmitting states or feelings. The question of the 
conditions of human seeing always arises, but so does the question of the 
possibilities of extending or destroying human emotionality through new 
experiences of seeing. In the fiction film these technological tricks are indeed 
more or less subsumed under the course of a narratable story and a surface 
216 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
iconography, but they nonetheless always have a decisive effect on the style 
and effect of a film in the cinema. It would seem that the most reliable people 
to be able to analyze f ilms as f ilms would be trance specialists and test 
subjects from the psycho-technological laboratories. Like Münsterberg, Maya 
Deren, in her examinations of suggestibility and possession, also studied 
the basics of f ilm technology, which lie outside sociology, in the textbooks 
of psychiatrists, formulating her f ilm theses as a psycho-physicist: “Ideas 
without an accompanying affect do not act suggestively; or, one might put 
it this way – the greater the emotional value of an idea, the more contagious 
or suggestive it is…”39 …and the better the transmission.
Deren’s most important reference, Eugen Bleuler, also described, in 
his natural history of the soul, how important affect is as a medium for 
transmitting an idea.
The adult cannot remain cheerful among mourners, not because of the 
ideas underlying mourning, but because of the perceived expressions of 
affect. The fact that related ideas might also be suggested along with the 
affect is self-evident in the close connection between the two and in the 
influence on logic by affect, quite unrelated to the fact that it may well 
be the goal of the mechanism to transmit ideas as well.40
The alliance between the technology of experimental psychology and that 
of emotionalizing f ilm, which is described in both historical and practical 
terms in Münsterberg’s book, is part of a larger context of a revolution in 
perception, which began with the investigation of the nervous functions. 
Cinema is only one kind of relativized experience in this context, one for 
the poor, or for everyone. Münsterberg reverts back to the terminology of 
the neo-Kantian in order for the extension of the world in the cinema not 
to appear as a confusion of consciousness:
But the richest source of the unique satisfaction in the photoplay is 
probably that esthetic feeling which is signif icant for the new art and 
which we have understood from its psychological conditions. The massive 
outer world has lost its weight, it has been freed from space, time, and 
causality, and it has been clothed in the forms of our own consciousness. 
The mind has triumphed over matter and the pictures roll on with the 
ease of musical tones.41
While Münsterberg found himself under political f ire in real life, because he 
opposed the American entry into war and intervened for a “Nordic alliance”, 
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he remained a scientif ic servant of the state in his media analysis. Instead 
of giving reasons to consider the susceptibility of the masses to suggestion 
in the darkness of projection and agreeing with the chorus of critics of 
the new medium, he felt competent enough as a lab director, in the joy of 
discovering that the soul is as cinematomorphic as its depiction, to tackle 
the question of how to channel national feelings.
The fact that millions are daily under the spell of the performances on 
the screen is established. The high degree of their suggestibility during 
those hours in the dark may be taken for granted. Hence any wholesome 
influence emanating from the photoplay must have an incomparable 
power for the remolding and upbuilding of the national soul. […] The 
people still has to learn the great difference between true enjoyment 
and fleeting pleasure, between real beauty and the mere tickling of the 
senses.42
Certainly Münsterberg himself f irmly believed that national feelings would 
some day be a matter of media and the psycho-technicians. The Americans 
did not appreciate him for having described for them the knowledge and 
the fundamental techniques of forming a national soul that he, as a proper 
American, carefully distinguished from the spirit of a people and the mass 
tickling of the sense organs. The course of national cinema in America 
in fact ran quite differently than Münsterberg had envisioned it, and the 
necessary nationalism was prescribed more by the Production Code of 
1930 than by aesthetic training in Münsterberg’s sense. All over the world, 
however, psychologists, physiologists, and soon even chemists at all the 
most important conferences would take up the technological reproduc-
ibility of sensations and feelings as the order of business. For Münsterberg 
this all came too late. He did not survive the attacks on his person, his 
research, and his lab work, and he died in December 1916, at least without 
having to witness the US entry into the war personally.

5. Psycho-Reflexology
We sometimes cry when we catch sight of an object, not because this object 
generates a sad feeling in and of itself, but because it reminds us of a dead friend 
through an association.
– Vladimir Bekhterev, 1913
Feelings and Emotions
In October 1927 at Wittenberg College in Springfield, Ohio a symposium was 
held under the title “Feelings and Emotions.” The occasion was the inaugura-
tion of a new psychological laboratory, which, as a brand new institution, 
was being housed together in one building with the chemists. The lists of 
those lecturing was impressive. In the volume that was published shortly 
thereafter of the lectures, all the great men – and Margaret Washburn as 
the only woman – of experimental psychology were represented, including 
Pierre Janet from Paris, Alfred Adler from Vienna, Edouard Claparède from 
Geneva, the Hamburg institutional director William Stern, the physiologist 
Walter Bradford Cannon from the Harvard University Medical School, and 
from Leningrad the old reflexologist Vladimir Makhailovich Bekhterev.1 On 
the program were 34 lectures by scientists who belonged to the avant-garde 
of psychology and who represented the second generation of the classic 
school: Karl Bühler as a student of Ebbinghaus, David Katz as a student 
of Georg Elias Müller, Adler as the fallen student of Freud. The whole was 
under the auspices of James McKeen Cattell, Wilhelm Wundt’s very f irst 
assistant in Leipzig.2
Barely 50 years after setting up Wundt’s f irst psychological laboratory, 
a time when psychology schools and methods differentiated themselves, 
specialized, and fought with and against Wundt, the enemy factions recon-
ciled in late autumn in Ohio. But what seems to be ripe for f ilming in this 
scenery, the strolls through the autumn foliage, an international exchange 
between scientists, the reconciliation of the different schools, is science 
f iction. First of all there are contradictory reports of who exactly was in 
Ohio. William Stern merely sent an article from Hamburg, and all that is 
known about Pierre Janet is that he had spoken in Princeton, Philadelphia, 
and at Columbia University a year earlier as he was on his way back from a 
series of guest lectures in Mexico about the “Psicología de los sentimientos.” 
Bekhterev, whose visit Ellenberger seeks to authenticate,3 was in the process 
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of being politically sidelined at the time, and in 1927 in the Soviet Union 
this meant much more than a travel ban.
What is certain is that the Wittenberg Symposium in 1927 was one of the 
last great international psychological congresses before the Second World 
War. It is also clear that the topic “Feelings and Emotions” was so explosive 
that the National Research Council in Washington supported the sympo-
sium. The invitations and the interest of the speakers show that the problem 
of feelings and sensations was the focus of neurological and psychological 
research all over the world. What we can see from the contributions is that 
the theories of how to explain, measure, control, and regulate emotions 
were still quite diffuse. It is clear that there were certain convergences in 
the discussions in Ohio. It is also clear that one person was def initively not 
invited: the inconvenient Sigmund Freud. “Feelings and emotions” were no 
longer available to simple therapeutic or cultural critical work. At the time, 
Freud was writing Civilization and its Discontents, expressing doubt that 
a strictly physiological description could do justice to the historical and 
cultural networks in which emotions are differentiated. For this reason he 
advises starting from associations, images, and representations in order to 
infer from this the hidden, underground world of feelings.
It is not easy to deal scientif ically with feelings. One can attempt to 
describe their physiological signs. Where this is not possible – and I am 
afraid that the oceanic feeling too will defy this kind of characteriza-
tion – nothing remains but to fall back on the ideational content which 
is most readily associated with the feeling.4
In Ohio it was exactly the ideational content that was suppressed. Shortly 
before the lights had gone out in Europe – to borrow a documentary f ilm 
title from Alexander Hammid – before the various fascist systems could 
practically demonstrate that they could stabilize their power in a targeted 
manner through mass mobilization of certain feelings, the scientists were 
attempting to f ind their way in the darkness of “feelings and emotions.” 
They wanted to get from describing and systematizing feelings and sen-
sations in the laboratory to inducing and regulating these feelings. The 
symposium at Wittenberg College represented an international brainstorm, 
in which psychology gathered together its practical clout in order to be 
able to promise that they could direct emotionalized bodies in the future, 
physiologically, pedagogically, and even aesthetically. The alliance with 
chemistry expressed in the new architecture of Wittenberg College would 
in fact determine the immediate future of psychology and psychiatry. 
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In 1927, however, there were still quite different concepts of artif icial 
emotionalization.
It is possible that Bekhterev was not in Ohio in October, 1927, but his 
lecture was definitely given. In it he presented a proposal for a linked system 
in which nerves and apparatuses, metabolism and chemistry would be 
amalgamated beyond the individual body. Feelings are the measurable signs 
of this interconnection. Bekhterev’s proposal, which he had worked out in 
parallel to the f irst effective mass use of the press in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the signif icant use of the press and f ilm in the First 
World War, marked the aesthetic concepts of many avant-garde artists in 
Russia, then in the Soviet Union, during the tens and twenties. Meyerhold’s 
theater of biomechanics, in which bodily expression simulated and induced 
mental activities as the primacy of the “external”, Eisenstein’s montage of 
attractions, Kuleshov’s coordinate system of feelings for f ilm, or Vertov’s 
kinoki concept are directly or indirectly based on Bekhterev’s research and 
are inconceivable without his medial turn in reflexology. With his lecture 
in Ohio Bekhterev was attempting to establish transatlantic contact. He 
directed his message at those to whom it would concern, due to their own 
research: the physicians surrounding Walter B. Cannon from Harvard, this 
“shadow community” who had also begun to examine not only individual 
organs, but connections and relations between physiological circumstances 
and homeostasis within complex physiological systems.5 Emotions, which 
had always been considered an infraction into the controlled experiment in 
laboratory medicine, were now to be seen as signs and signals of an affective 
interaction, as information about the states of the body! Bekhterev wanted 
to place his biomedial vision in the context of this research. It came, like 
Münsterberg’s proposal ten years earlier, too early for science and too late 
for the author.
The Ends of Paranoia
Whoever experiments must also take into consideration that his hypothesis 
might get conf irmed. Vladimir Mikhailovich’s death becomes a legend, 
like in a Kleistian biography, at the moment that his life comes to its heroic 
highpoint, and at the same time it falls into the grotesque. In December 
1927, when the great old man of Russian hypnosis and reflexology, who was 
now over seventy, was being celebrated in Moscow at the First All-Union 
Congress of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists, he unexpectedly got a 
summons from Stalin to pay him a medical visit. Bekhterev diagnosed him: 
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paranoia. Following this Stalin had him poisoned on the very same night 
with two specially prepared ice cream desserts.6 Daniil Kharms made the 
story famous in Soviet literature:
So the professor’s wife was sitting drinking coffee. Suddenly a ring. What’s 
that? – A parcel for you.
The professor’s wife was really pleased; smiling all over her face, she 
thrust a tip into the postman’s hand and was soon unwrapping the parcel.
She looked in the parcel and saw an urn of ashes, with a message: ‘Here-
with all that remains of you spouse.’7
Bekhterev, who added a “von” to his last name in German, was a celebrity 
in international psychiatry8 until he was murdered, and the memory of 
his name for the western world became reduced to a disease of the bone 
marrow, which results in a stiffening of the spine. In the east his name 
remained current because one of the most experimental clinics for nerv-
ous diseases is named after him, which is familiarly referred to as “the 
Bekhterev” to this day.9 Alongside Ivan Mikhailovich Sechenov, his teacher, 
and Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, his lifelong rival, Bekhterev is considered the 
founder of Russian ref lexology. The comparison with Pavlov’s working 
method, strictly concentrated on the physiology of the nerves, does not quite 
do justice to the grandiose vision of a unity of all sciences of the human 
being and its multiple relationships that Bekhterev wanted to realize in 
his Psychoneurological Institute. Because Bekhterev’s experiments and 
proposals are almost completely unknown, at least in West Germany, but 
nonetheless represent the missing link in a neurological media history, 
because they so decidedly influenced the arts and artists in the Soviet Union 
and then also in the western world, and because they unexpectedly link the 
experiments of the tens and twenties to the later cybernetic experiments of 
the sixties, I will present them here, at least to the degree that they affect 
an archaeology of the cinema.
Bekhterev had studied neurophysiology in Paris with Charcot, experi-
mental psychology with Wundt in Leipzig, brain anatomy with Paul Emil 
Flechsig, and, like Sechenov and Pavlov, had worked in the psychological 
laboratory of Carl Ludwig before becoming professor of psychiatry in 
Kazan in 1885.10 The condition that he took on for his appointment at Kazan 
was to set up a psycho-physiological laboratory in the classical Leipzig 
style: with a pneumograph, a reflexograph, a reflexometer, an apparatus 
for measuring brain volume, and a Hipp’s chronograph for measuring 
psychic processes. This equipment was standard in the laboratories that 
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were founded all over the world by Wundt students toward the end of the 
nineteenth century.11
In 1884, when Bekhterev was Flechsig’s associate at the University Nerve 
Clinic, the lawyer Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber had just been admitted, whose 
Memoirs of My Nervous Illness appeared in German in 1906, which formed 
the basis for Freud’s Psychoanalytic Comments on an Autobiographical Ac-
count of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia paranoids).12 Schreber’s memoirs as 
“Iatrogenic (i.e., professional) psychosis”13 made it possible to see the mirror 
inversion, the feedback between the systematic delusions of psychiatrists 
and patients, and Bekhterev’s later misjudgment of this is thought to have 
laid the groundwork for his abrupt end. Schreber’s memoirs, as a view to 
the dark side, or better yet, the inner side of brain anatomy, would serve to 
set the protocol for what was researched in Leipzig under Flechsig.
God to start with is only nerve, not body, and akin therefore to the hu-
man soul. But unlike the human body, where nerves are present only in 
limited numbers, the nerves of God […] have in particular the faculty 
of transforming themselves into all things of the created world; in this 
capacity they are called rays.14
Bekhterev’s system of neuroscience forms an odd counterpart to Schreber’s 
madness, it is also based on assuming a ubiquity conveyed by nerves, in the 
space and intoxication of which trans-personal forms of communication 
and transmission occur.
Schreber’s and Bekhterev’s constructions are both the flip side of the 
new psychological and neurological sciences, which had taken it upon 
themselves in the second half of the nineteenth century to experimen-
tally fragment the human body. Anyone combining what they analyzed 
in interdisciplinary paranoia could recognize the vision of a technically 
guided, emotionalized, and rhythmically moved human-machine corpus. 
Among the scientif ic parallel worlds that dissected these bodies in a 
sensory and motor sense and – as can be seen then in 1895 – made them 
cinematomorphic, is the brain research that Bekhterev did with Flechsig 
in Leipzig in 1884 as well as Wundt’s experimental examination of the 
processes of attention and memory and of “sensations, (of the question of 
‘psychophysics’ strictly speaking)”, which was the majority of his work in 
the laboratory.15 At the same time, Londe was ref ining chronophotography 
in Paris in order to systematize neurology according to the traces found on 
the body’s surface, and in the Bois de Boulogne Demeny was putting on a 
suit with metal strips on the side in order to record movement as ergonomic 
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data. The transformation of the body in the signal system was in full gear 
everywhere, which would lend itself well to broadcast news technology.
Ever since there have been methods of brain anatomy “to take apart the 
organ with its billions of ganglion cells and nerve conductors, mechanical 
observations of mental appearances have been recognized by science.”16 
They are supposed to serve to direct the tributaries in their ever more 
mobile existence and also to guide them morally. Brain specialists hoped “to 
provide a physiological foundation for ethics […] in order to be able to base 
law on this whenever possible”, as Flechsig suggested in his rector’s speech 
in 1894.17 At the end of the nineteenth century neurology was asserting itself 
directly as a science of power.
Bekhterev, who had studied at all of the centers of this European 
neuropower, began to link hysteria, hypnosis, and suggestibility research 
on the one hand with nerve-physiology and brain-anatomy on the other. 
He examined unconscious mental activity with laboratory apparatuses, 
with which he undertook to check and regulate crazy thoughts. And like 
Bleuler, Bateson, Deren, or Rouch, he examined hypnosis and suggestibility 
as historical and social phenomena.
One of the Bekhterev’s f irst great cases was that of the sect founder 
Kondrat Malyovany, whom he had described in the study Suggestion and 
its Role in Social Life. In this encyclopedic examination of historical mass 
illusions, mass hallucinations, and mass possessions, in which Bekhterev 
investigated the psychopathological background of religious and political 
group dynamics, Malyovanism stands in a long series of psychopathologies 
between medieval demon possession and modern mass panic. Bekhterev 
did not settle for any psychiatric judgment “of primary madness or of para-
noia”,18 but reconstructions, in “numerous examinations” with Malyovany, 
the system of mad perception, although he was less interested in a clear 
diagnosis than in the way to stimulate and convey Malyovany’s thoughts, 
with which he wanted to account for the relations between consciousness, 
nerves, and their collective interconnection.
Not only in his perception, but also in Malyovany’s movements, in his “de-
cisive gestures”, his “restless speech”, the “trembling” of his hands, Bekhterev 
discovered affective feedback that extended beyond the person of the sect 
leader. His attacks “of trembling or shaking” while preaching led to “some 
of those present, namely the women, also coming down with convulsions 
or cramps.”19 Bekhterev judged the different expressions of Malyovanian 
possession according to Charcot’s system of hysteria.20 Unlike at Salpêtrière, 
however, and similar to how Deren will describe Haitian possession in 
contrast to clinical hysteria, Bekhterev diagnoses the states not as a sign 
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of individual psychopathology, but describes them as symptoms of social 
states and social networks.
Like Bleuler, Bateson, Deren, or Rouch, Bekhterev was also a commuter 
between two worlds: the world of the European natural sciences and the East 
Eureopean world with its multi-spiritualist cultures and states of conscious-
ness, which he was also familiar with from his medical practice. Although he 
had studied trance techniques, hypnosis, and the lessons of systematizing 
them at Salpêtrière, in Russia Bekhterev drew a theoretical cordon sanitaire 
around his research on hypnosis by precisely demarcating it against the 
traditional shamanistic cures that are so similar to hypnosis. As an inorodčy, 
a non-Russian in the intelligentsia, he had good reason not to dare to go near 
the fringes of science. Possession and shamanism, which were epidemic in 
the Russian past and present as Bekhterev described them in 1905, were 
supposed to be cured by the systematic medical form of suggestion.21 Only 
by institutionally differentiating suggestion from clinically induced hypnosis 
and the practices of shamanism could there be a clean division between 
spirits and spirit, between madness and science, between what was examined 
as “mental over-inoculation” in archaic mass hysteria and the technological 
news systems, which would soon be called media and mass media.
Hypnosis as a therapeutic technique belongs to the clinical focal points 
of Bekhterev’s work. His therapy program for alcoholics, whom he treated 
with hypnosis, were internationally recognized innovations.22 Since 1893 
he had been teaching hypnotic procedures at the Psychoneurological 
Institute. Like Charcot’s lessons, Bekhterev’s hypnosis lectures were not 
only attended by students and doctors, but also by the local public in St. 
Petersburg. At this time Bekhterev developed the foundations of a new and 
universal theory of the human mind. At least by 1902, due to the results of 
his research on “conductors in the brain and the marrow”, Bekhterev was 
opposing the various psycho-physiological theories with his new concept 
of a “biopsychology”, which outlines the most important strategy of his 
research and therapies.
The error of all […] teachers consists in the attempt to fathom the es-
sence of things speculatively, while the task of true science does not lie in 
investigating the essence of things itself, but is geared toward pursuing 
the mutual relationships between appearances.23
Making relations, rather than essence, the object of science was the episte-
mological turn from which Bekhterev formed the basis of an avant-garde 
science of the human being.
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Everything visionary, however, f irst had to hold up to psychological 
experimentation. Bekhterev solved the problem of mental relations in 
the light of cellular physiology and impulse transmission by assuming a 
universal energy that represents a medium of general inf luence in and 
between all things and living beings:
… that the world surrounding us therefore presents itself to a certain 
degree as active medium f illed with energy, that furthermore the me-
dium, in whatever form we might want to conceive of it, can be modif ied 
under the influence of the active principles of energy, and that in this way 
the entire visible exterior world owes its emergence to the effectivity of 
energy within a medium, which is as unfamiliar to us in its essence as 
energy is itself.24
Bekhterev could infer this energy based on experiments in artif icial growth, 
in which dissimilar substances entered into mutual effect. Furthermore, he 
had discovered “action streams” in the peripheral and central nerves, which 
also pointed to a general energy. Incidentally, due to the same experiments 
Bekhterev held the view that evolution was not driven by selection, but by 
the polymorphous creative powers in organisms to form something new 
and to learn.25 Only eighty years later will neurobiologists again introduce 
an epistemological turn with similar theses.26
Bekhterev examined the circumstances and functions of transmission 
of this world energy, the carrier and director of which would be the central 
nervous system in higher organisms. In contrast, for example, to Dubois-
Reymond, who attempted to prove that the f low of nerves was “animal 
electricity”, Bekhterev describes energy as a principle, which equally encom-
passes material, electro-chemical changes and the “subjective states that 
are commonly designated as mental appearances or inner appearances.”27
Here, however, it must be emphasized that in our use of the term ‘energy’ 
we are in no way associating this with the common usage of ‘physical 
energy,’ as is currently assumed. In our view, the energy or force for the be-
ing is nothing other than an active principle disseminated in the nature of 
the universe. We know nothing more of the essence of this active principle, 
which appears as the milieu of the global aether, but we see the expressions 
themselves in the constant conversion of substance all around us.28
This theory of a universal transformability of the world was Bekhterev’s 
answer to Herbert Spencer as well, whose theses were being fiercely debated 
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in Russia around the turn of the century.29 Bekhterev extended Spencer’s 
neo-Darwinian thesis, that the activity of the nervous system was an ad-
justment of internal circumstances to external ones, by inverting it. “This 
def inition, which has nearly become accepted, forgets that there is also a 
modif ication of external conditions, that is, an accompanying adjustment 
of external circumstances to internal circumstances.”30 This thesis of the 
reciprocal effect of nerve impulses set a precedent for the orientation of 
Petersburg artists toward reception physiology. The concept of “extensions 
of man”, as McLuhan designated the electronic media as an extension of the 
nervous system into the surroundings, has one of its most radical origins 
in Russian psycho-reflexology.
In his book about suggestion, Bekhterev distinguishes between an ac-
cessible consciousness and an inaccessible one, which he assumed to be 
collective. Although the technical terminology of contemporary psychology 
suggested it differently, Bekhterev did not allow himself to designate this 
inaccessible thing as the “unconscious”, since it remained unconscious only 
for the subject itself, but not for objective psychology with its apparatuses, 
measuring devices, and observations. Objective psychology can show that 
an object of perception does not land in the “personal” consciousness in the 
state of suggestion, “but in other areas of our psyche […], which can be called 
the collective consciousness.”31 The concept “collective consciousness” is the 
basis for a psychological model that assumes a connection among subjects in 
which, alongside pure language and conscious communication – as is evident 
in the model of the telephone – all sorts of roaring is transmitted that no one 
understands. These transmissions connect every individual personally and 
directly with the “collective consciousness.” The individual is distracted and 
scattered by it, but also socialized and cultivated or subjected to suggestions:
In such cases the external impression passes by our personal conscious-
ness, thus managing to reach the sphere of the psyche without our ‘ego.’ 
In this case it is not through the main entrance, but through the backdoor, 
so to speak, that it lands directly in the inner chambers of the mind. […] 
Suggestion is thus the direct over-inoculation of certain mental states 
from person to person.32
If Bekhterev’s examination of the paranoia of Malyonvanism ends with the 
conclusion that mass suggestion has its origin in masses of suggestions, this 
is only seemingly a tautology. In fact he founded the f irst mass psychology 
that attempts to show that the reason for mass hysteria is not a single mad 
leader, but physiological and cultural structures that provide the means for 
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psychic mechanisms to run according to laws that can be studied objectively, 
structures that make the “over-inoculation” of ideas possible. In 1905 this did 
not result in discounting madness or possession as religious deviances, but 
in studying them as a social phenomenon. At the time Bekhterev’s diagnosis 
was enacted as an anti-tsarist demand to enlighten the Russian people, who 
were drowning in misery and alcohol. In 1927, when Stalin showed that 
he thought he had conquered the political-bureaucratic apparatus of the 
Soviet Union as a single leader, the diagnosis of the intrepid psychiatrist was: 
Even Stalin is just part of the apparatus, despite all despotism he is just its 
secretary. The diagnosis of paranoia was thus not at all meant personally, but 
was a subjective slight for Stalin, even if in the name of objective psychology.
In the 1970s a manuscript turned up in Leningrad, long believed to have 
been lost, of Bekhterev’s report that he had presented as a lecture to the 
All-Union Congress “32 Hours before His Death.” In it Bekhterev presents 
his “psychotherapeutic triad”: “explanatory lectures in the groups, group 
hypnosis, and treatment by auto-suggestion.”33 Fifty years after his death, 
Bekhterev was rediscovered in the socialist countries as the one who had 
invented group therapy, before any American or French researcher. The 
jubilation was mixed with slightly revanchist undertones in the Cold War 
competition between psychiatric technicians, and it was aff irmed, against 
all the anarchy of group formation, that Bekhterev had laid the founda-
tions “for our psychotherapy, which respects the social determinacy of 
human beings”, and therefore he was on the side of order.34 But it was not 
quite so simple. Bekhterev viewed a person’s health as a question of the 
functioning exchange between people and their surroundings. Reflexology 
is fundamentally an ecology of relations.35
The honor given to Bekhterev in the German east could be traced back 
above all to his attempts to provide therapy to alcoholics. His system-
atic proposals and his neurologically based vision of collective processes, 
however, remain without comment. The mixture of nerve physiology and 
research on possession, which was only socially acceptable under the term 
“psychic infection”,36 the numerous transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
experiments, and also the medical self-reflection of reflexology seem to 
have made Bekhterev suspect for all time and under all regimes.
Personality Changes
By the turn of the century, in order to create a secure basis for his research 
and his researchers, Bekhterev had already planned for a private institute 
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“with a whole series of scientif ic disciplines for general research on the 
personality, the training and hygiene of the mental sphere, and also to 
set up courses to study the prophylaxis and cure of nervous and mental 
diseases.”37 The institute had to attend to a serious lack in tsarist society. 
“Due to the enormous number of attendees, it was necessary after a few 
years to transform the courses of the Psychoneurological Institute into a 
large private university (the f irst in Russia at the time), already accredited, 
which comprised up to 8,000 students and was not inferior in either the 
quantity nor the quality of the teaching staff to any Russian state university. 
Here many people received their education who would not be accepted 
into a state university under the current circumstances, which naturally 
provoked the reluctance of the state professors and the government.”38
Those excluded from universities in the current circumstances in 
St. Petersburg were, for example, women, who were already working in 
Bekhterev’s laboratories as researchers and experiment leaders before the 
turn of the century. Also excluded or subjected to strict quotas were Jews, 
for instance one Solomon Derenkovsky, Maya Deren’s father, or one Denis 
Kaufmann, who later became the f ilm director Dziga Vertov. Bekhterev’s 
private initiative was necessary to constitute critical research and academic 
public life in St. Petersburg: a legal space for minorities, which was also open 
to artists, writers, and musicians. Under the tsar the Psychoneurological 
Institute became a center of political critique and student unrest. Bekhterev 
had defended civil liberties from the position of a nerve physiologist and 
in 1906 (in contrast to Pavlov) advocated for academic autonomy without 
compromise against the threat that the minister of defense would appoint 
positions in the medical academy. In 1905 he wrote a general assessment of 
living conditions in Russia from a psychiatric point of view as a manifesto 
against suppression in schools, in the family and military, against prohibition 
through legal practices, against the political police and the death penalty. 
What he made available was the Personality and the Social Conditions of its 
Development and Health, but no longer in the sense of a bourgeois individual, 
but as part of a larger context of stimulus and reaction.
The term personality thus contains, in addition to inner unity and 
coordination, a certain activity in relation to the outer world, which is 
grounded in the individual processing of external stimuli. […] Mental 
life is not only the sum of subjective experiences, but always also gives 
expression to a certain group of objective appearances. It is these objec-
tive appearances around which the personality enriches its external 
social surroundings.39
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Bekhterev read the whole manifesto at the congress of psychiatrists and 
neurologists, which had only been permitted by the Minister for Interior 
Affairs on the condition that no topics outside the f ield be addressed. 
Political movements, however, were not outside the professional concerns 
of Bekhterev. The intentions of Vladimir Mikhailovich, who also wrote 
plays, were exalted beyond any doubt: “…in Russia, in a country that is 
backward and uncultivated in many respects, a man of science cannot get 
around […] having to provide answers to various questions of the sick social 
entity.”40 160 million people lived in Imperial Russia, for whom there were 
350 psychiatrists and neurologists. Bekhterev demanded what was not self-
evident: health care for the mentally ill. In 1905, when “enormous violence 
rolled over the whole empire as a reaction to the existing order of things, 
the unsustainability of which […] was imposing itself on the population”,41 
reflexology showed itself as a mass psychology of the Napoleonic spirit:
Why do the masses move inexorably at a mere wave of the leader […], 
why does everything strive toward the same goal as if on command? 
[…] However one might think about this, and whether or not one wishes 
to accept special ‘psychic waves’ that simultaneously extend over great 
masses of people and are even supposed to be capable of a moving 
backwards under certain circumstances, what cannot be doubted as 
the bases of the whole appearance are the powerful effects of reciprocal 
suggestion in masses of people. […] Such mutual suggestion leads to a 
kind of ‘electrical charge’ of singular individuals, whose sensations now 
increase into extraordinary tension.42
In the “psychic waves” and “electrical charges” are the electrif ied media nets 
without which the leaders of the uprisings of 1905 and 1917 could not have 
brought their commands to the masses, presented as an ideal revolutionary 
model from the control room of brain physiology. Bekhterev’s scientif ically 
def ined agitation lends the artistic and dramaturgical metaphors of the 
revolution a neurological foundation. The “shock theater”43 of Meyerhold 
and Eisenstein invoked this research and and the concept of a personality 
that enters into contact and exchange with its social surroundings when 
something is communicated. This concept could only be conveyed with 
great effort or incompletely without the corresponding reflex “social theory.” 
Some German revolutionary theater artists were indignant. Piscator wrote:
In an article published in the German press by Potemkin director S.M. 
Eisenstein, he explained that he saw the task of the ‘Potemkin’ f ilm as 
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electrifying, jolting the spectator. If that really were the task of revolution-
ary drama, the effect could be just as easily achieved by putting on a 
boxing match.44
Brecht in fact adopted boxing as a dramaturgical model, and Vertov will 
show how a boxing match would have to be presented in a cinematically 
revolutionary way so that it took apart bourgeois consciousness in the 
process of reception. Piscator was simply lacking psycho-physical insights. 
In the Soviet Union, however, they varied as well. Eisenstein’s idea of a reflex 
structure differs from that of Vertov’s as a central nerve system does from 
one that is mapped in a net-like way.
The methodology of the general, which Bekhterev really was, might even 
have helped the tsar prolong his rule, quite in the sense of “sympathy for 
the devil.” For Bekhterev added to his analysis of power in the age of mass 
movements an instruction manual of collective unconscious electrif ication. 
Far from idealistically dreaming up the liberation of the people as enlight-
enment and maturity, Bekhterev published power-bestowing knowledge 
beyond good and evil, to whom it may concern:
Anyone who spends a lot of time with the people and has his own experi-
ences knows what the value of logical persuasion is. In the best case it 
only has a very slow effect, while suggestion through encouragement or 
command almost always leads quickly and surely to the goal.45
The tsar did not wish to hear anything about experimentally tested propa-
ganda. In 1917 the Psychoneurological Institute was once again the center 
of the uprisings. First the new rulers appreciated the research: under the 
Bolsheviks the institute was indeed dependent on state subsidies, but was 
developed further. On 32½ dessiatines of land within the city of Leningrad, 
ten more buildings were constructed. Bekhterev published journals and 
organized congresses on special psycho-neurological topics such as develop-
ing personality, criminology, the psycho-physiology and ref lexology of 
work, which are very similar to Münsterberg’s psycho-technology. For the 
third edition of his General Principles of Human Reflexology in 1925, the 
“second after the Revolution”, Bekhterev’s work is off icially recognized in 
the foreword as the consummation of the history of psychology. Bekhterev’s 
teaching on associative reflexes “paves the way to constructing an objective 
teaching of the human personality.”46 The Bolsheviks, inspired by thoughts 
of a mass empire that could be uniformly governed by general electrif ica-
tion, welcomed the attempt to research the nervous system as the state basis 
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in regulatable personality. In the model of the neurologists who conceived 
the nervous circuitry according to the idea of the telegraph system, they 
saw their own strategies in good hands.
Ways of Behaving
The signif icance of Bekhterev’s collective reflexology for an early history of 
f ilm, however, is not only based on the idea of a general medium of transmis-
sion that affectively links the body beyond its boundaries.47 What is more 
important in terms of methodology is the reflexological principle that the 
entire human being in its social multiplicity only gets access to observations 
from outside. Processes “that we have always called ‘mental’”48 are only 
recognized correctly through objective scientif ic observations “with their 
strict methods, with their exact apparatuses and measurements.”49
In critical comparing the psychological schools and laboratories, 
Bekhterev regrets that “self-observation is the reigning, if not the only 
method of research”,50 and that even Münsterberg and Ebbinghaus ulti-
mately had prescribed introspection. If he differentiates precisely in this 
respect between memory and remembrance, Bekhterev f inds himself 
surprisingly closer to psychoanalytic methods than to psychological 
ones: “Experience shows […] that self-observation is not even suff icient 
to recognize one’s own psychic life.”51 It was appropriate, then, to draw 
conclusions from experimental observations regardless of how test subjects 
found or sensed their states. “Free from efforts and attempts to intrude into 
the subjective world of dreams and fantasy, psycho-reflexology gives us 
prose in place of poetry, for it observes the neuro-physiological functions 
exclusively from the outside.”52 For ethical and presumably political reasons, 
Bekhterev also criticizes conclusions by analogy in subjective psychology, 
with which conclusions are drawn in the introspection of a subject about 
another and thus about general experiences. This methodology precisely 
takes for granted a general human consciousness, which does not exist all 
according to the f indings of objective psychologists: “We deny the right 
of subjectivist psychologists indiscriminately to extend, by using analogy 
with themselves, the conclusion of their self-observation to the subjective 
world of others and particularly to the subjective world of children, of 
psychopaths, and of animals.”53
In protest, therefore, against a psychological truth that had already been 
elevated to a dogma of a general human psyche before all research and 
experimentation, and that already acclaimed to know how a subject had 
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to be attuned, Bekhterev had founded reflexology – the science that, due 
to its history in the twentieth century, became a synonym for fantasies 
of programming and consolidation: in behaviorism as a science of social 
techniques of adjustment and in the adaptation of Pavlov’s theories of condi-
tions reflexes for a totalitarian reason of state. Psycho-reflexology in the 
sense of its initial founder, however, would have been concerned with the 
differences of individual experience, with measurable personality rather 
than the measure of the human being, because it examined not the essence, 
but the conditions of its emergence, unfolding, and development on the basis 
of a general principle of transmission. And a principle of transmission is 
general if it is binding not only beyond philosophical frameworks, but also 
beyond anthropomorphic ones, for human and animal, sane and insane, 
protists, starfish, and voiceless infants. Psycho-reflexology is thus capable of 
scientif ically demonstrating, in the middle of Communism, the inequality 
and incomparability of human being and pig.
The subject can only recognize its conditionality or damage when it is 
observed by an outside, an other, or by apparatuses that depict the states of 
the self as estranged and reflected. The reflexological method analyzes emo-
tions as paths in the nervous circuit and in the general transfer of impulses, 
discovering intersubjective relationships there. In contrast to traditional 
psychology, in which “the goal of examining objective appearances was 
to recognize the human soul”, reflexology explains “the raw relationships 
to external influences or stimuli.”54 After the Revolution Bekhterev even 
subsumed Marxism into reflexological knowledge: “Existence which deter-
mines consciousness” is the activity of associative reflexes that can become 
visible as “(in reflexological terminology) human behavior.”55
Behavior is thus to be understood as the complex reactions of psycho-
physiological bodies to one another; reactions that the trembling, blushing, 
or gasping individuals do not perceive in themselves, nor do they want to 
perceive them from themselves. Reproduced technologically, however, they 
can behave in relation to themselves.
Nerve Priming
In contrast to Freud, who, in order to found psychoanalysis, stopped 
looking at hysterics and began listening to them, Bekhterev learned to 
draw conclusions from observing patients in terms of the state of their 
nerve conduction at the Salpêtrière. Even while still in Paris he began 
to develop the foundations for a theory of personality as ref lex science 
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from the correlations between disturbances of the nervous system and 
the motor expressions observed. “The f irst attempts to approach the study 
of personality objectively were made by me as early as 1885, when I was 
studying traumatic psychoneuroses and hysteria.”56 In his assessment of 
hysteria as the constriction of the f ield of consciousness, Bekhterev was 
following Pierre Janet and f inding himself not so far from Leon Solomons’s 
and Gertrude Stein’s conclusion that hysteria is “a disease of attention.” 
If in doing so Bekhterev was invoking Radin’s theory of hysteria as the 
disintegration of personality, then this was not in the sense of a pathologi-
cal exceptional case, but as an appearance of collective, social lack. The 
objective examination of hysterical symptoms only led to few, disturbed, 
or wrongly connected nerve conductors.57
The study of nerve conduction was Bekhterev’s main focus during his time 
in Leipzig. His handbook Conductors in the Brain and Marrow, published 
in 1896, became a classic in the f ield, used as the basis for neurophysiology 
even beyond the borders of German clinics. Bekhterev had written the f irst 
edition in German, but already in 1899 the “second, completely revised, and 
signif icantly expanded version”58 appeared, translated back into German 
from the Russian and enhanced by the experiences had at the new labora-
tory in Kazan, but still paying its respects to Paul Emil Flechsig as teacher 
and advisor for the work.
Wilhelm Wundt had also examined localizations of mental activity in 
the cortex and described functional neuro-anatomical connections. His 
theory that brain functions are different reactions to stimuli could also 
have been considered the inspiration and initiation of Bekhterev’s concept 
of association reflexes if Wundt had not made the jump from physiological 
laws into mental ones in synthesizing the basic elements of neurology. 
Wundt insisted that the individual components that could be examined 
physiologically combined into complexes that represented more than the 
sum of individual reactions, and out of which were formed the psychic 
complexes, “consciousness” and “ego.” It was precisely this conclusion, 
however, that Bekhterev would consider hasty, dismantling it on the editing 
table of neuroanatomy.
Flechsig, who was only ten years older than Bekhterev, was the more 
important teacher59 for him in Leipzig, and during his short stay there 
the two of them carried out a formidable and certainly merciless series 
of experiments together, especially on the brains of human embryos and 
newborns, which they got from God knows where. By means of successive 
myelinogenesis of the nerve cords they represented the development stages 
of the brain – Flechsig’s “myelinogenetic methods” – and localized the 
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“associative areas” in the nerves, which grow up in the end to be the organs 
of mental activity.60 To this day, the representation of corporal sensation is 
localized in the areas designated by Flechsig.61 Flechsig had outlined certain 
areas in the brain as “spheres of bodily feeling”, in which the shape of the 
body was illustrated. As an inner mirror relationship, this constituted the 
“consciousness” in physiological reflexivity, in which the system of inner 
perception is the f irst area that develops and with the the self-feeling of 
every small child is more developed than motor self-control.62 Bekhterev 
adopts this concept and its topology. From the correspondences he draws 
the conclusion that all behavior is not simply the expression of mental 
activity, but much more the mirror of all neurophysiological processes of 
stimulus and reaction. Nonetheless, the idea that he has of the structure of 
the conductors in the brain and marrow can be distinguished signif icantly 
from that of Flechsig. Flechsig’s topography was passionately against the 
democratization of the model of nerves in early research, which sought to 
replace the idea of a hegemonic soul. “It is not the republic, but the monarchy 
that is realized in the organization of the mental organs”, thought Flechsig.63 
He had presented the coordination through associative centers as “com-
mand hierarchies of the fabric of the nerves.”64
Bekhterev’s studies, on the other hand, especially concentrate on those 
tracts that run between the various nerve centers, convolutions, cores, 
functional joints, as if the hierarchical, monarchic structure from Flech-
sig’s model of the brain wanted to be rhizomatically undermined by new 
conductors. At any rate, determining some order in the nervous system, 
in which “the individual f iber tracts in the marrow and the brain lie in 
close contiguity without perceptible boundaries, often even commingling 
[…] or form meshworks, even sometimes intersections”,65 is not an easy 
task. Bekhterev viewed the “associative tracts” as “intrinsic f ibers” that 
internally interconnected the cells of the cerebellum or the cerebral cortex 
like a “functional collectivization of its various f iber systems.”66 Bekhterev 
structures the topology and functions of the brain as anarchy, against the 
position of his teacher, until he, much later, can describe the “function of 
the brain” as “the most important apparatus of relating in communication 
with the outside world.”67
As a last relay in the communication between inner and outer, nerves and 
surroundings, the question of transmission or contact between the nervous 
tracts had to be explained. Around the turn of the century there were two 
competing hypotheses: one that assumed the continuity of the nervous 
networks as a f ibrous mesh and the other being neuron theory, which, 
following the research of Forel, His, and Ramón y Cajal, assumed discrete 
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singular cells between which an impulse was transmitted. Bekhterev de-
fended the neuron model for the brain. The nervous current, the quality of 
which he could never explain, was to be understood as a series of successive, 
discrete signals:
I consider it much more correct to conceive of the nervous current as if 
it it were composed of a series of successive stimuli that each land in the 
individually following members of a nervous tract for development.68
When Bekhterev began to develop a psychology on the basis of ref lex, 
the discovery of each new nerve connection, each new cervical area was 
undiscovered territory in the topography of the body. Where before one 
had assumed the amorphous soul, now there were functioning structures. 
And so, as Bekhterev was assembling the reflexes, he was opening up new 
opportunities to produce, manipulate, regulate, or destroy sensations and 
relations. In this light it is possible to understand why Bekhterev’s concept 
of personality as a connection of reflex complexes was such a productive 
shock for the avant-garde of artists. The fact that the physical body and its 
movements could be seen as material disclosure of the subtlest movements 
and relations of nerves not only revolutionized the practice of acting, but 
the entire apparatus of theater and the emerging cinema.
Reflex Arcs
Unlike Pavlov, who reduced the processes of perception to a pattern of 
stimulus and reaction, Bekhterev researched the combinations of neuronal 
microprocesses in order also to be able to understand thinking, speaking, 
and remembering using the methodology of objective psychology. In the 
last book that appeared during his lifetime, he designates reflexes as the 
“correlative activity of individuals” in order to free them f inally from the 
connotation of passive interconnection.69 Acting is the traversing of reflex 
arcs, and reflexology is meant to become a universal science, in which “the 
social interrelations between human beings” would be analyzed.70
As an homage to Flechsig, Bekhterev called the combined nerve priming 
“associative”, which includes “all our gestures, such as laughing, crying, and 
other physical movements.” Association was also conceived in the logics of 
neuronal priming: “Every impression, no matter how it is called up, leaves 
a certain trace in the nerve centers that can be reanimated, then appear-
ing as as associative or psycho-reflex.”71 The topography of these traces is 
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personal experience, life experience, on whose traces, which determine 
and therefore alter the following reactions of the organism as external 
stimuli, new experience are laid down as new physiological nerve tracts. 
So every personality develops a unique combination of nerves according 
to the experiences that it has.
Bekhterev considers the experiences inscribed in the body to be socially 
transferable as well, for a tradition to be reproduced without the conscious-
ness of the carrier. The science of physiologically stored stimulus receptions 
and their processing by experiences thus becomes cultural theory:
Here it is about a particular way of inheriting, to be called psychic inherit-
ance, which in any case contributes more to f ixing psychic acquisition 
in posterity than does the factor of physical heredity. The descendants 
of a genius can die out, but his mental creations are taken up by many 
and become f ixed through psychic inheritance in those who come after 
him, thus becoming the possession of a whole series of generations.72
Here at the very latest Bekhterev goes beyond what can be considered a 
reflex arc in science today, which only inherited Pavlov’s coup from reflexol-
ogy. In nerve interconnections communication with the surroundings is 
opened up as complex behavior, extended, and – this links Bekhterev with 
the biologists and neurologists at Harvard – fed back: “the cortex of the 
cerebrum, in association with lower centres, establishing a correlation of 
the organism with the environment on the basis of individual experience.”73
Reflex tracts function through a physiological constraint as a storage 
space. Thinking and remembering fall under these processes of correlation 
that are interpreted and postponed with time. “The associative processes 
influenced by operations of constraint often demand a signif icant time 
interval until the reaction is triggered, so that in certain cases the reaction 
can appear to be an independent appearance.”74 So what can be considered a 
motor reflex is not only the act of speaking, but also complex operations like 
giving speeches, reading letters, writing books, or earning money. This ex-
pansion of the understanding of reflex was of course contested.75 Bekhterev’s 
hypothesis that “consciousness”, “ego”, and all personal activity were made 
up of reflex combinations, which could be completely explained through 
biochemical processes, was not entirely original. Bekhterev would have 
been able to draw on, for example, the teachers of Freud as predecessors 
of reflexology: even Brücke, Meynert, and Exner had seen the foundations 
of the ego as a thinking subject in the reflexes and their connections in a 
system of cortical tracts.
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What was new in Bekhterev’s proposal was that he followed the path of 
stimuli and reactions beyond any anthropomorphic framework. Thanks to 
objective examination aided by apparatuses, a complex view of reflex inter-
actions in living creatures was opened up. In this case the cinematograph 
is the aid to the objective psychologist. By enlarging motion, the camera 
can make visible that the operations at the basis of nerve transmission are 
the same in all living creatures:
Cinematic representation of the movements of plants produces, as is well 
known, the impression of quick animal movements. […] we should see, 
if our eye were constructed like a microscope, that growing stems and 
roots execute groping movements, and, in any case, we should discover 
prompt reactions as results of stimulation.76
Quite in the sense of Londe, the camera shows what the naked eye can-
not recognize. In the series of these tropisms, ref lexology f inally also 
places the behavior of human beings in those “complicated forms that 
are conventionally described as acts.” These series of reflexes, which are 
guided by a goal, “that is, by a stimulus”, can be traced back to “offense, 
defense, concentration, and in certain cases to imitation and symbol-
ism.” Neurological modal and cinematic illustration prove in turn to be 
complementary. They provide, if they transcend the unity of the single 
individual, the same discrete basic signals, from which the movement of 
life itself is composed.
“Feelings and emotions” are good examples of such reflex complexes. 
Movements of an “emotional character” are called mimic ref lexes in 
Bekhterev’s systematics. They are only partly observable: for instance as 
facial gesture, breaking out in a sweat, blushing, or speeding up the rate of 
breath. Mimicry is “obviously a very complicated and peculiar association 
of the motor, secretory, and blood vessel reactions of the organism, which 
can be distinguished in their complexity from simple reflex movements. 
Nonetheless, these appearances run exactly as mechanically as do ordinary 
reflexes”,77 wrote Bekhterev in 1913, when he formulated psycho-reflexology 
for the f irst time as a “teaching.” Psycho-reflexological methods show ex-
actly which physiological processes belong to an emotional complex. The 
analysis of mimic movements is more complicated if the organic-reflex 
movements appear as components of associated movements. The various 
organic reactions were measured in Bekhterev’s laboratory according to 
time, intensity, and in their phylogenetic and individual emergence, and 
reflex mimicry was physiologically classif ied according to the perceiving 
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surfaces that they originated from.78 More complex associative reactions 
come into being through the fact that an external impulse, for instance a 
message arriving, is linked to life experience, to the traces of experience 
in the brain. In every laugh and in every cry can be seen a mimic dissolve 
of our biography as bodily experience.
Obviously Bekhterev used photography at the Psychoneurological 
Institute, but not serial photography or cinematography, which by then 
was widely used in neurology. It is, however, possible that there are 
archives in Bekhterev’s institute that have not yet been viewed. Unlike 
Münsterberg, Bekhterev, who could have been an eyewitness to one of the 
creative phases of cinema, was obviously not interested. But the theory 
of technological illustration as reflex analysis or psycho-analysis can be 
rediscovered in the works and kinoki manifestos of Dziga Vertov. Vertov 
transformed Bekhterev’s thesis – that associated ref lex movements are 
supra-individual, non-anthropomorphic, and can be bridged and linked by 
means of technological apparatuses – into f ilm technique. In his Man with 
a Movie Camera collective reflexology is realized in f ilm.
Media or Homeostatic Processes
After Bekhterev had disassembled the personality into the discrete single 
parts of its basic neuronal functions, he f inally attempted to construct a 
theory of relativity of the psychic process.
But if matter is a f iction, and only energy is real, there is no ground for 
the contraposition of the psychic to the material, and vice versa, and we 
have ask ourselves: Is it not possible to reduce psychic activity, too, to 
physical energy?79
Only after he had taken the analysis of nerve connectors as far as the 
methods of natural science allowed, and after he had reconstructed the 
transmission qualities of the nerve tracts in the laboratory and clini-
cal practice and newly integrated them into his therapeutic forms did 
Bekhterev publish his global theory of relations of a worldwide network 
of nervous current, which might appear a metaphysical paranoia, but 
he could actually prove the functions of all the individual connectors in 
experiments. Bekhterev’s anarchism included the idea that vision was not 
conceived as the world on a wire, but as a multiplicity of relations, which 
animate reality as a f low of energy between parts, which are smaller than 
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electrons, and between complexes that are larger than the planetary 
system.
In this way, also, the external world – of course, not that which we 
perceive and imagine, but that which exists in reality –is subject to 
the law of causality or, more accurately, to the laws of relations. And 
when we prosecute our analysis to the end, we must acknowledge one 
fundamental and f irst principle of all being, and this we call energy. 
In the concept of energy we have the idea of various manifestations 
of movement under the form of great masses […]. To the basis of this 
movement, a basis which must be common to all phenomena of nature, 
including ourselves as a part of the universe, we give the name universal 
energy.80
In this universality energy is reminiscent of Schreber’s rays. Paranoia and 
science always lay side by side.
Assuming a universal form of energy was nothing extraordinary at 
the turn of the century. There were numerous models of nervous energy, 
which were analogous to physical models and theories and were only 
provisionally proposed in order to link up organic functions and mental 
phenomena. Extending from Bergson’s philosophy of life, Pierre Janet had 
proposed the “function de réel” as an effect of nervous energy on external 
objects. Freud’s f irst neuron-machine model for the psyche, as he describes 
it in Project for a Scientific Psychology, also runs with an energy that he 
initially calls “quantity.” C.G. Jung’s somewhat later reform of the libido 
as a form of energy also belong to these models.81 Bekhterev’s variant is 
distinguished by letting the bodies simply become energy-transformers, 
despite any Wagnerian tonic notes. When energy penetrates bodies, follows 
ref lex arcs, establishes new connections, and then moves on, it leaves 
behind experiences as the relay of energy. “But people are, i.e., they must 
be regarded as energy accumulators resulting from their past individual 
experience and hereditary influences”,82 is written in Collective Reflexol-
ogy, the book that, as the second volume in the series “Contributions to 
Mass Psychology” posthumously sent Bekhterev’s outrageous message 
into the middle of Europe, to Halle. With his relativizing system of a world 
energy, which is propagated by discrete impulses, as he had studied in 
nerve stimuli, Bekhterev proposes a universal medium of transmission, 
which at the same time conveys messages and links relations, which forms 
personalities and at the same time turns them into the batteries for the 
whole system. Neuronal circuits are linked to bio-social networks by 
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apparatuses. Every transmission alters both the experiential structure 
of the body and the energy structure of the surroundings. The nerve 
impulses therefore meet the def inition of signals, and the world-energy 
that Bekhterev imagines is a network of messages that is far superior to 
Siemens’s telegraph system, because it will one day process the structure 
of the network itself. Bektherev’s mass psychology is a very early project 
for a theory of technological media. Since there is a link between organs 
of sense perception and expression by apparatuses, they also alter the 
subjects of experience.
In 1927 in Ohio Bekhterev’s lecture on feelings and emotions begins 
surprisingly dramatically. Suddenly and without warning, opium and 
hashish clearly showed how emotional states can be inf luenced by 
external means. These drugs produce euphoria, just as adrenaline can 
trigger fears or other poisons can precipitate depression. Just as abruptly, 
Bekhterev raises the next topic: krov, blood. “Thus we see that the basis 
of these states designated as feelings and emotions is alterations in the 
composition of the blood.”83 This opening is more than a simple nod to 
the institutional reorganization of psychological research at Wittenberg 
College in its merger with chemistry. Bekhterev had also emphasized the 
role of metabolism as part of the universal energetic system in a variety 
of passages in his General Principles of Human Reflexology. Not only is 
the human being nourished through metabolism, but it is also connected 
to the universal energy through the sense organs and the nerves. The 
biochemical side of Bektherev’s research, however, has always only been 
a subordinate part, and the fact that he opened his lecture this way gives 
an indication of the actual addressee of the message. If Bekhterev makes 
controlling somatic-mimetic ref lexes by controlling blood composition 
the secret topic of his lecture, extending the neuronal ref lexology to 
include chemical ref lexology, it is clear that he, whether present or not, 
was speaking to Walter Cannon, and that he was trying to position his 
bio-social studies in the context of the biochemical experiments by 
the physiologists at Harvard Medical School. In his lecture, Bekhterev 
continues:
The glands can, and undoubtedly do, react to the chemical composi-
tion of the blood (chemical reflexes). Thus there is established a sort of 
equilibrium between the various glands, due to the direct effect of the 
chemical composition of the blood upon the chemical elements of the 
glands themselves.84
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Using the word “equilibrium”, Bekhterev was speaking to what interested 
him in Cannon’s research. Cannon had advanced the f irst thesis on ho-
meostatic processes in the human body and experimentally verif ied them. 
Even the term homeostasis was his. Cannon was, on the one hand due 
to his own research, which regarded the body as an ecological interac-
tive environment, and on the other as the teacher of the Mexican Arturo 
Rosenblueth, with whom Norbert Wiener collaborated, the pioneer of 
cybernetics on both the medical and biological side. In 1956 Wiener wrote 
in his autobiography:
Walter Cannon, going back to Claude Bernard, emphasized that the 
health and even the very existence of the body depends on what are 
called homeostatic processes. […] That is, the apparent equilibrium of life 
is an active equilibrium, in which each deviation from the norm brings 
on a reaction in the opposite direction, which is of the nature of what we 
call negative feedback.85
The f irst experiments on physiological feedback, which brought together 
the physician Rosenblueth, the physiologist Cannon, and the mathemati-
cian Wiener, were, incidentally, those on the impressions of muscular 
joints, body specif ic responses to the state of the organs in movement, 
the old dancer problem, which Bekhterev had also and independently 
researched and had described in his Objective Psychology.86 According to his 
own statements he had been dealing with this topic for some time already. 
“Since the beginning of the eighties, my attention has been focused on the 
functions of equilibrium or of the organs serving static coordination, which 
at the time was a question that had not been examined much.”87 The nerve 
physiologist wanted to f ind this principle of equilibrium and balance in the 
body for all bodily processes. Both Rosenblueth’s American experiments 
and Bekhterev’s were aimed at researching nerves as control systems, in 
order then to f ind out that they could be affected and, according to their 
physiological surroundings, also modeled. From this developed the concept 
of a neurology that would at the same time be social technology. Cannon 
had examined the biochemical side of these processes and his studies 
on voodoo death were meant to show what happens when homeostatic 
systems are taken out of equilibrium by purely social actions, a curse in 
this case.
In his lecture Bekhterev also explained that affective and emotional 
reactions that were seemingly outdated phylogenetically, such as threat-
ening gestures, or even blushing or sweating, are also completely sensible 
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ref lexes since transmitting impulses between individuals were encour-
aged or obstructed by this. Even in social situation, intra-physiological 
or inner-physiological control systems communicate with one another 
in order to instigate the optimal exchange of energies. “Feelings and 
emotions”, or “somatic-mimic ref lexes” as they are called in Objective 
Psychology, represent a complicated and delicate corporal system of com-
munication, and the individual need not know anything about in order 
for it to work. In this context Bekhterev had advanced the thesis that 
the corresponding ref lex tracts or channels are not only so for biologi-
cal impulses and signals, but also social ones. “In the case of man the 
sources of excitation are to be found not only in biological, but in the 
social environment, especially the latter. It is these social excitations that 
make man a bio-social being.”88
In the twenties this research was still “questions that had not been 
examined much”, and there were not many centers in the world where they 
were so intensively examined than at the Medical School at Harvard or at 
MIT. And there was hardly anywhere that this research was so systemati-
cally pursued in clinical practice than at the Psychoneurological Institute 
in Leningrad. Alongside a few attempts with psycho-pharmaceuticals 
Bekhterev’s practice primarily focused on hypnotic group therapy, which 
was meant to initiate intersubjective homeostasis – similar forms of 
therapy, following systematic, cybernetic models, were developed for 
schizophrenia patients in the USA only in the sixties by Gregory Bateson 
and his colleagues.89
Bekhterev was very familiar with Cannon’s research, including his 
most recent experiments on altering the concentration of adrenalin in the 
blood, and he was obviously attempting to create a connection to his own 
experiments. In Ohio in 1927 Bekhterev wanted to make contact with those 
whose research was the most advanced at the time, and to speak about the 
science that – as the signif icance of the Macy Conferences would show in 
the forties – was to be the science of the future. His lecture in Ohio was 
obviously an attempt to consolidate neuronal and biochemical homeostasis 
into a theory of the biosocial – or at least to discuss the possibility of such 
a “fundamental basis for everything that exists.” World energy, according 
to Bekhterev’s wish, was meant to be a scientif ic fusion of east and west, a 
homeostatic force.
Cannon took the call from the Soviet Union seriously and posed two 
questions following Bekhterev’s lecture that show that he had clearly carried 
out similar experiments with different results. In his own lecture Neural 
Organization for Emotional Expression, a short history of the uses and abuses 
244 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
of f its of rage, he had only cited Bekhterev from very old experiments from 
his time with Flechsig. He seemed not to be familiar with the new develop-
ments from Leningrad or, worse, they did not interest him. The historical 
encounter between the two proto-cyberneticists ends in the darkness of 
the protocol: “Dr. Walter B. Cannon requested that the following question 
may be submitted to Dr. Bekhterev”, we read, then the daily minutes end. 
And while in Ohio chemistry and psychology were being fused, in the name 
of hormones and vitamins, into a single science that was meant to control 
feelings in a more contemporary way than opium and hashish, in Moscow 
power was being seized in the old style.
Bekhterev’s last work, Collective Psychology, is an elegant synthesis of 
all his research, at once mass psychology, war psychology, psycho-history, 
political theory, and – social critique from the perspective of objective 
psychology. What Bekhterev opposes to Flechsig’s “ethics grounded in physi-
ology”90 as the coming project of a biosocial society are accumulator-bodies, 
linked to one another but at the same time freely developing, which learn 
and learn to learn in exchange with their surroundings, much like anti-
authoritarian cyberneticists like Bateson and von Foerster will imagine and 
try out much later. If we take Cannon’s and Bekhterev’s research seriously, 
feelings would be chemo-neurological complexes that guide social life, an 
“autopoietic” variant of reflexology according to Maturana and Varela. In 
1913 Bekhterev had imagined that
the organism, due to its neuropsychic activity, represents a machine that 
is in a certain sense self-determinant and self-actuating. This is why its 
outward reactions are not only determined by the external qualities of 
the source of the stimulus, but also by its relations to the organism, which 
has been shaped under the effect of inherited and acquired conditions.91
The utopia of a society mediated by feelings and emotions remained 
Bekhterev’s dream: “Like a living organism, society represents a dynamic 
equilibrium rather than something static.”92
No one wanted to know anything about any good-natured application of 
multifaceted feelings, about any collective dance of the spheres of bodily 
feeling. Much less about their abrupt mass feelings. In the Soviet Union 
this ended after Bekhterev’s death in quite coarse propaganda assaults on 
the people. In the USA the results of research were ref ined. Emotions were 
simply supposed to be what cannot be decoded in the media transmissions 
of the enemy. At the beginning of the Second World War the Off ice of War 
Information provided its directors with the following:
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‘How to arouse emotions of the apathetic, and direct the energies of the 
frustrated into the war effort, is the informational Challenge.’ That was 
domestic information from the OWI, with an emphasis on emotion and 
not intelligence or education which its Soviet or Nazi counterparts could 
have easily understood.93
Not much was left of all the research, all the high-ranking symposia, all 
the publications. All that “feelings and emotions” attested to now were 
the remaining traces of the human in the function of the medial. And yet, 
cinema people turn up over and over again that bring the dream of the 
unknown Bekhterev to the screen.
dziga vertov, Jumping Top. Private Collection.
eisenstein, still from the Film The General Line (UdSSR 1920).
Part IV

1. The Truth Won by Means of Film
Everyone who cares for his art seeks the essence of his own technique.
– Dziga Vertov, 1922
Signals
Many of Bekhterev’s students were artists, including the writer Isaac Babel, 
the directors Grigori Boltanski and Abram Room and, one of the most 
famous, Dziga Vertov.1 This has been pointed out by Herbert Marshall, 
who had worked as Joris Ivens’s assistant in the Soviet Union and who 
had been personally acquainted with Vertov since his visit to Germany in 
1929. Marshall was in fact surprised that many artists had studied at the 
Psychoneurological Institute with no intention of becoming physicians, 
but then maintains Viktor Shklovsky’s claim that the institute was the only 
place that had not restricted access to Jews through quotas, thus providing 
an opportunity to assimilate into Russian society by means of an academic 
degree.2 This explanation established the connection for f ilm history be-
tween Vertov’s theory of the kino-eye and the experiments that Bekhterev 
was conducting in his laboratories. In Vertov’s journals and workbooks, 
however, there are a handful of revealing comments about how much his 
f ilms and his theories are indebted to the methods of objective psychology. 
When he began working at the Moscow Film Ministry immediately after the 
October Revolution, Vertov noted in the third person – observing himself:
He went there after having a few experiences in the areas of language 
and sound. From the artistic recording ‘The Sawmill,’ to montages of 
stenograms and audio recordings and the creative workshop ‘Laboratory 
of Hearing’; from the recordings of various ‘chastushki’3 to stenographed 
confessions; from primitive interceptions of truth to attempts at mind read-
ing; from self-experiments at the Leningrad Psychoneurological Institute 
(recordings of thoughts, reactions, forms of behavior) to reflections about 
surprise recordings for attaining truth; from observing the Pathé newsreels 
at the cinema to thinking about visually recording the visible world, about 
the visual shape of the world, about the truth to be won by means of f ilm.4
This list is Vertov’s biography as a series of recording experiments and 
consequently a very brief media history of a Kinopravda. As a student he 
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had experimented with using letters to write down the sound of a sawmill 
and sounds of nature. The outcome of these attempts to depict reality in 
a symbolic order had above all clarif ied for him the limits of writing as a 
recording technology, which could only manage more or less successful 
reductions in the realm of acoustic events with its possible combinations 
of 32 Cyrillic, preordained individual elements. Vertov then bought an 
old phonograph, with which he could record, store, and manipulate the 
vibrations of the noises of the world on cylinders, still without a microphone, 
according to frequency and amplitude.5 In this continuous analogue record-
ing Vertov made his own cuts and edited the noises and voices into audio 
plays. Initially he recorded human language in traditional literary form 
and then as free speaking. Liberated by phonographic recording from the 
compulsion of rhyme or rhythm, the old mnemomics, language could then 
become voices, breathing, faltering, or hoarsely croaking like a sawmill in 
the distance.
The experiments at the Psychoneurological Institute ultimately led 
to Vertov’s theory of documentary f ilm. Just as the reflexologists turned 
thoughts – which, according to Sechenov and Bekhterev, are inhibited 
reflexes – reactions, and behaviors into objects of objective psychological 
examination as processes that can be observed, measured and stored by 
means of apparatuses, Vertov replaced the old recording technology of 
writing, which had implemented its transformative rule as a spirit in things 
and people, with technical media that could work without introspective 
additions, without the poetry of self-perception, because they stored 
acoustic and optical reality in their physical qualities. Using experimental 
and applied psychology, the human being – just like things and animals 
– was transformed into the events and dimensions of data, which were 
transformed according to the corresponding new rules. A new image of 
people could only be realized through this transformation, and Vertov was 
one of the most careful of its engineers.
Vertov’s study of psychic reactions and reflexes in his self-experiments, 
that is, his attempts at self-portrayal with the camera, make it possible to 
calculate the “ego” on f ilm and to “relate it to the machine.” Thus arose 
an ego-kino-eye or a kino-eye-ego, which could move through the world 
beyond the limits of the old consciousness. A kino-eye that speaks from the 
manifestos in the first person, like in the text entitled “Kinoks-A Revolution”:
Now I, a camera, f ling myself along their resultant, maneuvering in the 
chaos of movement, recording movement, starting with movements 
composed of the most complex combinations. Freed from the rule of 
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sixteen-seventeen frames per second, free of the limits of time and space, 
I put together any given points in the universe, no matter where I’ve 
recorded them. My path leads to the creation of a fresh perception of the 
world. I decipher in a new way a world unknown to you.6
Human being and machine form a new optics, which dismantles the staged 
presentation of the world into the individual parts of its movement, thus dis-
covering and displaying how the historical treatment of reality-data at the 
basis of human perception works. Vertov transfers the signal character from 
his experiments with acoustic recordings to f ilm. The “zhizn’ vrasplokh”, 
the life caught unawares, or, to go back to Walter Benjamin’s anti-bourgeois 
methodology of observing history, life viewed as “non-intentional”, shows 
the historical reality by technical means. Sophie Küppers, the wife of El Lis-
sitzky, translated the texts for Vertov’s trip to Europe in 1929 and introduced 
once and for all the term “überrumpeltes Leben” [“life caught unawares”] 
into German literature for Vertov’s technique of documentary f ilm.7
From the beginning Vertov’s technique was not only seen as an attack 
on bourgeois conventions and tragedies [Trauerspiele], but on the bourgeois 
subject of seeing. The truth exposed by the “life caught unawares” are the 
multiple, universal reactions and relations that remain unconscious – al-
though still visible and measureable – when staging the everyday. The truth 
of this “zhizn’ vrasplokh”, of the life unconsciously caught unawares, means 
that all seeing and measuring of social relationships is based on historical 
technologies. The truth of depiction cannot be other than an analysis of the 
character of the technology through which it is produced. That this is no 
tautology in the practical work with apparatuses, but becomes epistemol-
ogy, was repeated by Godard when he calls f ilm truth 24 times per second 
in Le Petit Soldat. Vertov experienced this with own body.
Vertov described his f irst foray into f ilm history as a self-experiment in 
the terms of objective psychology. In 1918 he jumped from a height of one 
and a half stories behind the f ilm committee’s palace, while a cameraman 
f ilmed the jump in slow motion. Vertov’s different emotional states on the 
way down could then be analyzed using this f ilm. While in real time all that 
could be seen was him bowing, smiling, and jumping, the slow motion of the 
f ilm established the physical sequence of fear and indecisiveness, embar-
rassment, growing conviction, and so on. These were basic organic-reflex 
types that the associative-reflex physicality of the heroic could be traced 
back to, according to the experiments at Bekhterev’s institute. Manipulat-
ing the time axis allowed for about 18 truths per second in 1918. The time 
became relative, so that even the terms “time lapse” and “slow motion” were 
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exchangeable depending on the standpoint taken. Vertov analyzed his fall, 
which can be considered the origin of a Kinopravda, in 1935:
From the viewpoint of the ordinary eye you see untruth. From the 
viewpoint of the cinematic eye (aided by special cinematic means, in 
this case, accelerated shooting) you see the truth. If it’s a questions of 
reading someone’s thoughts at a distance (and often what matters to us 
is not to hear a person’s words but to read his thoughts), then you have 
that opportunity right here. It has been revealed by the kino-eye. It is 
possible, by means of the kino-eye to remove a man’s mask…8
When Vertov jumped, the truth of observation was still invoked against 
the culture of writing from the old bureaucracy, which sought to grasp 
and censor the spirit of artworks and artists. Storing human data on f ilm 
was established precisely in opposition to the bureaucratic version. In 1935, 
when Vertov wrote down his memories of the jump, and when his f ilm Three 
Songs about Lenin was not explicitly censored, but was put aside by the 
distribution off ices, it had thus already become a bureaucratic technique 
to censor without words and writing. There was plenty of opportunity “not 
to hear a person’s words but to read his thoughts.”9 What is essential about 
Vertov’s discovery, however, is that the truth of f ilm does not lie on its visual 
surface, but in the processing of discrete individual images, through which 
new qualities of reality appear that are invisible without f ilm. Vertov’s 
experiments situate f ilm exactly between its signal character, which allows 
for manipulating the time axis, and the visual character, which causes all 
kinds of shapes to appear on the surface.
In the tradition of the experiments at the Psychoneurological Institute, in 
which Vertov placed his f ilm experiments, the self-experiment corresponds 
to an experiment from the series of “physical reflexes”, with which move-
ments and reactions could be tested “that characterize the inner state under 
certain conditions.”10 It strictly adheres to the psycho-ref lex method of 
rejecting introspection, but giving free reign to subjective processes in order 
to compare them with the results of simultaneous objective observation. 
Bekhterev had written:
It is thus clear that the method of reflexology maintains the possibility 
not only of studying the processes of human association-reflex from the 
objective side, but also to explain the relationship of subjective processes 
to them. Such a research method is very valuable when conducted on one’s 
own person, particularly with regard to the mimic-somatic processes…11
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The ideal of psycho-reflexology research is to combine subjective and objec-
tive protocols of experimentation: such as a written working journal and a 
simultaneous f ilm recording, or even better, the “journal of a cameraman”, 
which itself is f ilmed at the same time, a journal with “impressions on 
celluloid in six rolls” attached, as is stated precisely in the intertitle of the 
famous Chelovek s kinoapparatom from 1929. In early f ilm theory, not only in 
Vertov, the cinematic apparatus was advanced to an epistemological device. 
The special consequence that Vertov draws from this is that the cinematic 
apparatus is thus no longer any kind of representational apparatus, but, 
as a visual medium of storage and transfer, is an instrument for analyzing 
and synthesizing, producing a new reality of perception. The enduring 
debate about whether Vertov’s f ilms are documentary or f iction films comes 
unraveled if we understand them as universalizing labor conditions. Film-
ing becomes an experimental construction for directors, camera operators, 
editors, and – as Rouch and Morin would later claim for French cinema as 
well, in Vertov’s name – it changes them as well.
Despite the critique of the f ilm bureaucracy, Vertov holds fast to the 
scientif ic character of the kinoglaz research. In his notes for a conversation 
from July 28, 1935, presumably with the photo correspondent from the 
newspaper “Prozhektor”, he writes: “I work like Pavlov’s laboratory and not 
like a department at the f ilm chronicle… ”12 At the main building of Pavlov’s 
Biological Station in Koltushi near Leningrad, one can read, chiseled in 
stone: “Observation and observation.” This was only the half-truth of the 
laboratories, the other half was produced previously by the experimental 
set-up and the apparatuses. Bekhterev had also called his own ability to 
observe into question, more methodically than Pavlov had, in his Objective 
Psychology, and then again in relation to the observation instruments. 
Vertov, who also did not want to rely on his own eyes, thus is methodologi-
cally closer to him than to Pavlov. But in 1935 it was still permitted to name 
the Nobel Prize winner to describe his own working method as methods 
from reflexology. Bekhterev, on the other hand, who preferred to leave what 
the essence of the human being is and could be up to the essence of the 
apparatus and to the essence of relationship produced by them, had been 
deemed unutterable since 1927.
Agitations
Although the whole arsenal of optical illusions, animations, and manipula-
tions were played out in the f ilms of the Kinoki, although Vertov considered 
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animation filming one of the “chief positions”13 in the Kinoki’s work, he views 
his method as a way to explain reality. He harshly criticizes practices that 
obfuscate the consciousness of the population. He thus vilif ies, moralizingly 
and unexpectedly misogynistically, the hypnosis so valued by Bekhterev 
in therapy by calling it an infamous trick from the arsenal of the feature 
f ilm and all other art forms that constrict consciousness. In the manifesto 
Kinoglaz he writes of the f ilm drama:
Stupefaction and suggestion – the art-drama’s basic means of influence 
– relate to that of a religion and enable it for a time to maintain a man in 
an excited unconscious state. We are familiar with examples of direct sug-
gestion (hypnosis), with examples of sexual suggestion, when a woman in 
exciting her husband or lover can suggest any thoughts or acts to him.14
Just as Bekhterev had drawn the public’s attention to the inf irmity of their 
consciousness under neuro-physiological points of view in his Petersburg 
lectures, Vertov also showed the audience how consciousness can be de-
ceived in the cinema, and self-awareness can also be disappointed. Vertov’s 
f ilms, above all Man with a Movie Camera, present cinematography as a 
technology in all its manipulative possibilities in order then to raise aware-
ness of the “magic” of everyday life.
Only consciousness can f ight the sway of magic in all its forms.
Only consciousness can form a man of f irm opinion, f irm conviction.
We need conscious men, not an unconscious mass submissive to any 
passing suggestion.
Long live the class consciousness of the healthy with eyes and ears to 
see and hear with!
Away with the fragrant veil of kisses, murders, doves, and slight-of-hand!
Long live the class vision!
Long live kino-eye!15
Both f igures, Bekhterev and Vertov, battle with the paradox of recognizing 
media technologies as not enabling conscious choices, but as having to 
use it nonetheless to fulf ill their mission to enlighten. What is common to 
both is the attempt to make consciousness itself to appear as foreign and 
different by means of the outside of the apparatus, and thus to be able to 
judge oneself as different. This is also why the title Celovek s kinoapparatom 
should be translated quite literally not as Cameraman nor as Man with a 
Movie Camera, but more exactly as Person through the Cinematic Apparatus, 
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who then turns up as a kind of causa formalis. What is shown is the person 
produced according to objective psychology through the cinematic ap-
paratus in his or her objective truth.
The paradox of wanting to produce a self-awareness from unconscious, that 
is, by means of film tricks or hypnosis not accessible due to the technical bases 
of conscious perception, from which a “man of firm opinion, firm conviction” 
can be formed, persists at any rate as an ambiguity of technical suggestion and 
enchantment. Over and over again, the montage sequences of the Kinoki films 
intoxicatingly circle around the topic of ecstasy, of shamanistic practices, of 
stirring rhythm, of madness, and of the dance, like around the blind spot 
of their own theory. An example is the beginning of the f irst Kinoglaz f ilm: 
One sequence is called “Kino-Eye, At the Church Holiday, “or”, The Effect of 
Homemade Vodka on the Village Women”, and all the opium of the masses 
is vilif ied in images of women dancing madly. Until it becomes clear that, 
for the spectator, the village women’s frenzy is solely due to the frenzy of the 
editing and thus to the cinema as a Platonic opium den. The succession of the 
f irst 58 short shots shows that they are enhanced by a pattern of constantly 
accelerating repetitions into a rhythmic crescendo of their own.16
What the art drama is meant to display as religious madness, “stupefac-
tion and suggestion”, is here conducted by the anti-drug agitation itself 
by means of the technology of cinema. The women’s stupefaction, which 
is announced in the caption as an example of misdirected ecstasy, has 
too much momentum for an anti-alcohol campaign – or, as it is called in 
more technical terms in the Kinoki manifestos, “rhythm of movement, 
slowed and accelerated” – indeed, precisely that momentum that, from 
so-called gypsy music to the music of Kusturica’s mad Balkanites, has time 
and again been considered corrupting by orderly states and has thus been 
banned. Just as the limbs of marionettes sway logorhythmically to the 
mental lines of dancers, bottles sway in the hands of intoxicated female 
dancers, and their bodies in turn sway logarhythmically to the gazes that 
go into the camera-eye, constant and unflinchingly direct, like a steadfast 
axis. The vilif ication of the dancing women turns into a sermon straight 
from the mouth of a preacher that is itself intoxicated and intoxicating: the 
cinematic apparatus. The question is whether, with so much movement and 
excitement, for agitation is nothing other than that, it is ultimately only 
rhythmic interference patterns that arise in the spectator’s perception in 
place of a healthy class consciousness, and whether it is even possible to 
speak of objectively analyzing reality anymore. In fact, the goal of analyzing 
reality seems to have yielded once and for all to synthesis. In the Provisional 
Instructions to Kino-Eye Groups from 1926 we read:
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I can point to the dancing of the drunken peasant women in the f irst 
section of Kinoglaz as an example of a montage moment not limited by 
time and space. They were f ilmed at different times, in different villages, 
and edited together into a single whole. The beer house and the market, 
actually all the rest[…] were also done through montage.17
The truth of reality can therefore be experienced less by consciously re-
producing events than by exposing the recording and editing techniques, 
that is, the conditio humana in the age of its f ilm reproducibility.18 And 
here it is not only about presenting the bare functionality of the device, 
but about the effects of its functioning, the way that it conceals connec-
tions or brings them to the light of sense. The condition of this awareness, 
however, is that the agitating attraction, the “Verblüffen” [“mystif ications”], 
as Sophie Küppers described it, is followed by an external view of one’s 
own perception. The class morale of the sequence is meant to disappear 
behind the question of “seeing class”, which means that the circumstances 
that relativize all perception are brought to the screen in their interfer-
ences. That these functionalities produce new technical intoxications is 
something that Dziga Vertov the enlightener would not wish to deny, Dziga 
Vertov the director would be delighted, and Dziga Vertov the cultural 
revolutionary would have known it already anyway. It was presumably not 
a transcendental human being that Vertov wanted to bring to life, but one 
that could enter into a new relationship to itself and the world by means 
of the new technologies. At the Psychoneurological Institute Vertov had 
been interested in “apparatus medicine” as a contemporary technology of 
neurologists. For him the essence of reality cannot be separated from the 
essence of the technology that places it into a constellation, thus creating 
it in the f irst place.
Vertov did not assume, just as Bekhterev had not, that there was such a 
thing as a stable, identical self-consciousness from which knowledge could 
be set. The truth is that human beings are in constant exchange with the 
molecular movements of their surroundings, which carry them along in 
the form of symphonies or drinking women. Spectators are supposed to 
learn not with their own eyes, but with kino-eyes, and thus also learn to see 
themselves. They themselves can therefore be physiologically intoxicated 
before they learn how the circumstances are constructed from the relations 
of montage. For Vertov this is no support for conventional objectivity, but 
is a violent split from an imagined subjectivity. In “Kinoki – A Revolution” 
from 1923 the kino-eye, speaking in the f irst person again, explains how 
the spectator’s attention is guided through space and time.
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I make the viewer see in the manner best suited to my presentation of 
this or that visual phenomenon. The eye submits to the will of the camera 
and is directed by it to those successive points of the action that, most 
succinctly and vividly, bring the f ilm phrase to the height or depth of 
resolution.
Example; shooting a boxing match, not from the point of view of a specta-
tor present, but shooting the successive movements (the blows) of the 
contenders.
Example: the f ilming of a group of dancers, not from the point of view of a 
spectator sitting in the auditorium with a ballet on the stage before him.
After all, the spectator at a ballet follows, in confusion, now the combined 
group of dancers, now random individual f igures, now someone’s legs – a 
series of scattered perceptions, different for each spectator.
One can’t present this to the f ilm viewer. A system of successive move-
ments requires the f ilming of dancers or boxers in the order of their 
actions, one after another… by forceful transfer of the viewer’s eye to the 
successive details that must be seen.
The camera ‘carries’ the f ilm viewer’s eyes from arms to legs, from legs 
to eyes and so on, in the most advantageous sequence, and organizes the 
details into an orderly montage study.19
This montage study is not so much for editors as it is for spectator brains, 
which themselves are brought to dance. “For the f irst time, we feel that the 
obvious drawback of such a film screening can be found not on-screen but in 
the theater”, was Rudolf Arnheim’s attempt in 1929 to explain this odd state 
in Vertov’s cinema.20 The regularity of this exercise is one in which percep-
tion is imposed as something from outside, as a rule of movement-intervals, 
a synthetic manipulation of the brain. The kinoks manifesto continues: 
“The result of this concerted action of the liberated and perfected camera 
and the strategic brain of man directing, observing, and gauging – the 
presentation of even the most ordinary things will take on an exceptionally 
fresh and interesting aspect.”21 The attempt to wire up apparatus and brain 
and therefore to use f ilm tricks to get around consciousness, since it is 
moving on the familiar pathways of experience, was still an experiment 
for the kinoks themselves in 1923, and its outcome could only vaguely be 
prognosticated as “fresh and interesting.”
Many years later Rudolf Arnheim, who himself had done his doctorate 
in Gestalt psychology on physiognomy and the problem of expression 
and its interpretation, could not make rhyme or reason out of the lack 
of any meaning on screen.22 Vertov’s f irst sound f ilm, which bears the 
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title Enthusiasm, which is signif icant for the ecstasy complex, was heav-
ily criticized by Arnheim in the “Weltbühne” on September 29, 1931. It is 
not by chance that Kleist’s formulation of marionette movements, “fairly 
artif icial”, is brought into the mix, and he is annoyed by the “flickering”, 
which Münsterberg would have been particularly pleased about: “Montage 
alone is supposed to provide the f ilm’s structure, and this quite artif icial, 
theoretically thought-out restriction results in an editing overload – a 
flickering of images, held only loosely together, which strongly taxes the 
viewer’s nerves.”23 Using the puzzling formulation that the f ilm Enthusiasm 
remains an “unmodified structure”, perhaps Arnheim wished to aid Vertov’s 
intention to assert its rights of not making reality available randomly, but 
to construct an optics in which reality becomes viewable in its various 
patterns. For Arnheim, however, all this was glowing splinters that showed 
the nerves all that remained as movement: an attitude toward life, the 
good “vibrations” of the Soviets, which Arnheim was justif iably calling 
into question in 1931. But in doing so the documentary quality of the kinoks 
operation was obscured. Vectors and power relations, movements and the 
method of results seemed only to be empty claims before a party hierarchy 
that had solidif ied into a block of matter. This caused what was new in 
Vertov’s discovery, that the nerves could be moved without implying any 
statement or contents, to disappear behind the critical mistrust that he was 
trying to arouse enthusiasm for a corrupt system. In 1931 Soviet art was no 
longer the great hope it had once been.
At the same time, Vertov’s aesthetic theory and practice, which he had 
essentially formulated at the beginning of the twenties, was still, or rather 
once again, far ahead of his contemporaries. The camera-eye shows a truth 
that also holds outside the cinema, namely that the human eye is disengaged 
from the position of power and control that the Renaissance was able to 
promise the bourgeois individual with its optical tricks. What is deceived in 
this case is a psychology that, despite all experimental research, holds onto 
the biographical concept of a coherent individual with a soul, and draws its 
conclusions from the introspective method. It is this subjective psychology 
from which Vertov also distances himself, as a result of his years of study-
ing and experimenting at Bekhterev’s Psychoneurological Institute. In the 
text “We: Variant of a Manifesto” from 1922 he writes: “The ‘psychological’ 
prevents man from being as precise as a stopwatch; it interferes with his 
desire for kinship with the machine.”24 In 1931 Arnheim was not the only one 
who refused to dignify the sensory-motor movements that Vertov’s f ilms 
spin and cast as collective, intersubjective, and metasubjective as a positive 
and productive step. “Vertov does away very radically with everything that 
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is individual – even with the human individual.”25 He sees Vertov’s demand 
for kinship with the machine as above all a kind of technology fetishism, as 
the critic Lenoble had attested fairly paradigmatically as Vertov’s psycho-
ideology already in 1929: “Vertov’s work comes very close to the perception 
of the world and the outlook on the world of the technical intelligentsia, 
who are characterized by precisely the anti-psychological and technical 
approach.”26
An “anarcho-indiviualist”27 who seeks to merge, not with power but in the 
new circumstances of time, space, matter, and movement, however, cannot 
balk at harmonizing the human mind with matter and its physical laws. It is 
the prerequisite for f ilm epistemology, the “documentary cinematic decod-
ing of both the visible world and that which is invisible to the naked eye”,28 
as he put it in the article “Kino-Eye to Radio-Eye”. Vertov follows Bekhterev’s 
principle that science “does not consist in exploring the essence of things 
themselves, but is aimed at pursuing the reciprocal relationships between 
appearances.”29 In Bekhterev’s tradition, he had laid the foundations for a 
new understanding of the medial unconscious, which, at least in western 
f ilm criticism, had not been pursued further. The relationship between the 
“conscious” and the “unconscious” in f ilm operations is not only contested 
in Vertov, it is one of the most common causes for bewilderment in f ilm 
theory. Vertov and his kinoks practice is only one fundamental example 
of f ilm as a technology and f ilm as a describable complex of signif ication 
coming into contradiction and conflict. But the debates in f ilm studies 
about intoxication and enlightenment in what is called “Russian cinema”, 
which will repeat more or less similarly for the American f ilm avant-garde 
of the forties, show that the most developed critics went mad due to the 
distinction between the medial consciousness and the media unconscious 
precisely because cinema works beyond conscious perception.
The open questions begin with what depiction means in the f irst place. 
Siegfried Kracauer, for instance, after he had seen Man with a Movie Camera, 
clearly before its German premiere, wrote in the Frankfurter Zeitung on 
May 19, 1929:
All is movement, a single powerful movement that encompasses the 
heretofore fragmented aspects, and all the elements […] flow together 
and fuse so completely with each other that they enter into the rhythm 
of the whole.[…] There are, therefore, two principal actors in the f ilm: the 
ensemble of things and people in the city, and the “man with a movie 
camera” who takes control of them all. The material world on the one 
hand, and on the other, the “cinema-eye.” The relationships between them 
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determine the content of the f ilm. The results are utterly remarkable; in 
any case, the cameraman presents anything but mere copies of objects.30
By describing Man with a Movie Camera as a f ilm made up of movements 
and relationships, Kracauer very precisely described Vertov’s procedure. In 
this f irst review Kracauer shows himself to be enthused, elevating Vertov’s 
procedure above even that of Walter Ruttman in Berlin: Symphony of a Great 
City: “While Ruttman’s associative linkages, however, are purely formal 
throughout[…] Vertov uses montage to extract a meaning from the connec-
tions between the fragments of reality.”31 Once again, credit is given to sense. 
Kracauer, who would afterwards write his “psychological history of German 
f ilm” in the tradition of a sociology founded in ideology critique, did not 
wish to have the psychological, social, and thus also political implications 
of the sense-less kinoks method overlooked, perceived, or disavowed. Over 
the course of time Kracauer’s initial enthusiasm waned. By the time of his 
book From Caligari to Hitler, which he wrote in New York, Vertov is merely 
mentioned as a propagandist:
Vertov, infatuated with every expression of real life, produced weekly 
newsreels of a special kind from the close of the Civil War on, and in 
about 1926 began to make feature-length f ilms which still preserved a 
def inite newsreel character.[…] Like Ruttmann, he is interested not in 
divulging news items, but in composing ‘optical music.’32
Looking back, Kracauer is very reserved in his evaluation of Vertov. What 
he once considered enlightening now seemed to him as purely formal 
questions. In 1929 Vertov’s discovery of circumstances by cinematographic 
means had still been illuminating: “Vertov interprets (the juxtaposition) 
through his presentation.”33 In the course of his writings in exile, in the 
course of the political developments of the forties, Kracauer’s sympathetic 
understanding disappears. Kracauer’s own critical theory posed the ques-
tion of technology as only secondary. What he sought to explain in his 
analyses, namely “those deep layers of collective mentality which extend 
more or less below the dimension of consciousness,34” has nothing to do 
with what Vertov, in the tradition of the ref lexologists, was presenting 
in the cinema as the unconscious mechanisms of human perception and 
making visible by reflecting on technology. Kracauer’s examination of the 
unconscious in the cinema also does not require any technical precision in 
the apparatuses that was demanded by the objective psychologists in their 
experiments on the nervous system, and that the kinoks realized in their 
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experiments in cinema. In the US, Kracauer only mentions Vertov and the 
montage of the kinoks at all in a comparison with Ruttmann, as if his initial 
enthusiasm now only seemed to him to be an error and an infatuation at 
the urging of the communists: “Vertov’s continued survey of everyday life 
rests upon his unqualif ied acceptance of Soviet actuality.”35
In 1947, however, in the middle of the discussion in New York about 
surrealism, avant-garde f ilm, and the techniques of political propaganda, 
a critical examination by Siegfried Kracauer would surely have resulted in 
Vertov, who at the time was once again working under miserable conditions 
in Moscow for the weekly newsreels, being discovered as a precursor to a 
f ilm practice that critically put the effect of the media itself to the test. Of 
course, immediately following the war propaganda that had precisely been 
so much about media in its planning, this topic would have been highly risky 
and awkward for an asylum seeker. Kracauer, however, never examined 
f ilm technologies in relation to – and possibly as in contradistinction to – 
political topics, neither then nor later. Ideology critique was not supposed 
to be concerned with neuronal manipulations and flicker analysis, but with 
the part of the cinematic that was capable of making conscious choices. 
Nonetheless, as early as 1948 Kracauer displayed a fascination similar to the 
one he had once shown for Vertov when discussing the f ilms of Maya Deren, 
who was interested in just those aspects of the cinema that could manipu-
late psychology and perception. Here as well, he qualif ies his enthusiasm 
with the words “the problem is only what the meaning itself amounts to.”36 
Deren’s idea of the unconscious and here critique of psychoanalysis might 
also have helped him – or seduced him – to f ind a new way to approach 
the unconscious in and through cinema. But he remained steadfast. As he 
had already done with Vertov, he refused to view the media process itself 
as social or even political practice. For this reason, Kracauer has always 
been considered a steadfast antipode to all media theory, and not only in 
American f ilm theory.37
Explosions
Walter Benjamin, who was a Russia traveler for love, tried to make the 
phenomenon of the cinema understandable to the bookish set. In the f irst 
version of his work of art essay in 1935, Benjamin attempted, albeit without 
mentioning Vertov, the Kinoglaz f ilms, or Chelovek s kinoapparatom, to 
negotiate between human and apparatus, between subjective and objective 
psychology, and between the the function of media and that of aesthetics.38 
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Like Kracauer, he also takes issue with the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious, but whereas Kracauer restricts himself to a “more or less 
below”, Benjamin let the space of conscious and unconscious structures 
get permeated, almost in a kind of cubistic manner. The human being 
is – according to Benjamin in his preliminary work on a media theory, 
which he would only work out in its various successor texts – not called 
into question by the apparatus, but can extend his or her knowledge of the 
ego, of the self, by means of the new technological apparatus. The example 
that he uses for the optical unconscious is directly comparable to Vertov’s 
f ilm jump. (And the reflexive “self” used by the later Frankfurt School social 
researchers is seen to be something more than the storing and collecting 
rear guard of the ego-function.):
The most important social function of film is to establish equilibrium be-
tween human beings and the apparatus. Film achieves this goal not only in 
terms of man’s presentation of himself to the camera but also in terms of 
his representation of his environment by means of this apparatus.[…]With 
the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended.[…] 
Clearly it is another nature which speaks to the camera as compared to 
the eye. “Other” above all in the sense that a space informed by human 
consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious. Whereas 
it is a commonplace that, for example, we have some idea what is involved 
in the act of walking (if only in general terms), we have no idea at all 
what happens during the split second when a person actually takes a 
step.[…] This is where the camera comes into play, with all its resources for 
swooping and rising, disrupting and isolating, stretching or compressing 
a sequence, enlarging or reducing an object. It is through the camera 
that we f irst discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the 
instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis.39
It should be noted that in the second version of the essay, which Benja-
min only f inished after the start of the war in December 1939, there is a 
harsher syntax used to subject the human being as a subject to f ilm. The 
corresponding section XIII about f ilm and apparatus now begins with the 
formulation:
Film can be characterized not only in terms of man’s presentation of 
himself to the camera but also in terms of his representation of his envi-
ronment by means of this apparatus. A glance at occupational psychology 
illustrates the testing capacity of the equipment.[…] A similar deepening 
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of apperception throughout the entire spectrum of optical – and now 
auditory – impressions has been accomplished by f ilm.40
The bookish soul cannot get back to the world of its own bookish sensation. 
The apparatuses have yanked apperception into depths from which it can 
only come back to its senses with the help of science and psychoanalysis. The 
following passage from the second version of the Work of Art essay justif ies, 
quite differently from the first, above all the objectivity of f ilm as a scientific 
instrument and, in parallel, the scientif ic quality of psychoanalysis as an 
objective system of storing traces. On the one hand this lends more weight 
to technology. “Demonstrating that the artistic uses of photography are 
identical to its scientific uses – these two dimensions having usually been 
separated until now – will be one of the revolutionary functions of film.”41 On 
the other hand, in this second version the possibilities of f ilm is pointedly 
placed in light of a disillusionment with the emancipatory power of art. 
The enthusiastic experiences that Benjamin had described with the Rus-
sian, Nordic, and American cinema as avant-garde in anti-fascist art must 
have softened the insight that fascist artists knew how to use f ilm just as 
well. Although he himself never wrote any further f ilm criticism, and in 
particular despite never taking account of Vertov’s intentions, Benjamin 
had nonetheless laid the foundations of a media critique that had taken up 
a different “unconscious” than the individual-psychological one had been. 
The “unconsciously affected space” that is screened in the cinema with 
slow motion, time lapse, close-ups, fades, and cuts initially transcends the 
known and conscious human in this technological sense.
Benjamin’s most famous formulation, however, is found in both the 1935 
and the 1939 versions: “Hopeless” is how Benjamin describes the familiar and 
common spaces, the bars, railroad stations, streets, off ices, and factories 
that enclose human beings. “Then came film and exploded this prison-world 
with the dynamite of the split second, so that now we can set off calmly 
on journeys of adventure among its far-flung debris.”42 In this sentence he 
formulates the simultaneity of liberation and horror that affects anyone 
who allows the intervention of f ilm into the basic structure of perception 
to become a conscious experience. In Benjamin’s formulation of calmly 
move through the wreckage of the world we might already see one source 
of McLuhan’s thesis that media might have anaesthetizing effects. At any 
rate, Benjamin’s analogy is about an exploding out of habit and certainty 
by the ego-feeling and its sensations, which had been raised by the new 
technology in its origins. This is why cinema is also always a confrontation 
with the fragments and the fragmentary in the world, even if involuntary 
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brain functions and imaginary energy force the split seconds into artif icial 
contexts.
Writing about the explosive force of f ilm, Benjamin provides a significant 
objection to that theory that sees cinema as a form of the Platonic cave, in 
which spectators feel suspended due to the structural “sous-motricité” and 
“sur-perception” in the movie seat, because in this mimicry of those bound 
in Plato’s cave the reminiscence of the blissful imaginary experience of the 
small child is actualized, the experiences of corporal unity are granted 
in the optical-visual realm, while every real experience and especially 
the violent breakthrough to reality is displaced by imaginary baggage.43 
For Benjamin, on the other hand, precise perception under cinematic 
circumstances signif ies the expulsion from the familiar as a chance to 
discover the relations between consciousness and technology, between 
the unconscious and the technical basis for how it works. In contrast to 
later f ilm theorists, Benjamin saw this attack on identity and the process 
of identif ication in the cinema spectator not only as disturbance, but also 
as a necessary, fragmenting analysis, which releases from the familiar 
and common educational processes of the subject.44 Frighteningly, we 
can assert in the cinema that every identif ication has a technological and 
perception-psychological prelude, and that not only works of art, but also 
identities fundamentally change with forms of media depiction in the 
passage of time.
But Benjamin cannot maintain the confidence of this statement in the 
second version of his text. Under the impositions of history he had lost hope 
that f ilm might establish “equilibrium between human beings and the 
apparatus”, this “equilibrium” that became the shibboleth of the anarchs 
among the cyberneticists, who still dreamed of a scientif ic and artistic 
extension and connection of human organisms with the world.
Intervals
Vertov’s montage theory of intervals is the production of relations between 
the smallest common units of the appearances of matter by the cinematic 
medium. While the debate about the alternative between music and math-
ematics has so far concerned Vertov’s interval theory,45 here a physical 
option will be brought to play as well. Vertov’s intervals have a strong aff in-
ity to the Lebesque integral, which revolutionized pre-war mathematics as 
much as Einstein’s theories of physics had – and which, in 1919 (when Vertov 
wrote the f irst version of his interval theory), led a young mathematician 
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daydreaming at the window at MIT to want to calculate the surface of 
the River Charles in its movements. The theory of the Lesbesque integral 
allows for calculating irregularly moving points on surfaces and bodies by 
combing the sequence of intervals.46 One signif icant requirement among 
others for cybernetically determined prognoses: technology offered a view 
to the future that could be seen, computed from the relations, interferences, 
and sequencing of events in the past, in a surprisingly new quality: “shins 
vrasploch.”
It is only in this context that intervals not only describe and signify 
circumstances, but can become operators of a changeable world. The mov-
ing art of the cinema in meant to take apart the world into intervals, not 
in physiological movements, but in substructures of units of physical 
movement and their transitions. Vertov describes the transition from 
cinematography to edited f ilm as a relation of intervals: “Intervals (the 
transitions from one movement to another) are the material, the elements 
of the art of movement, and by no means the movements themselves. It is 
they (the intervals) which draw the movement to a kinetic resolution.”47
Unlike Eisenstein’s later interval montage, Vertov wanted to edit the 
elements of the world as the camera records them as unmoved elements of 
motion, and as the projector again turns them into moved images. Vertov 
proposed a montage of illustrations as derivations in the mathematical 
sense of movement. The relations of movements on the screen is meant 
to replace the systematic gap between the cinematic image and the f ilm 
signal. Vertov’s procedure is a non-hierarchical montage, which initiates 
equal and reciprocal relations between the most heterogeneous elements. It 
does without any “dominant”, like the one Sergei Eisenstein wants and must 
maintain for his overtonal montage in f ilm. So, as Vertov breaks, but does 
not interrupt the intoxication of perception by reflecting on manipulating 
this perception through technology, he takes up the law of movements 
and follows it without letting it interrupt its path through the borders of 
anthropomorphic shapes.
This movement of movement is an exact continuation of the principle of 
transferal, which Bekhterev had examined for world energy. It was taken up 
again, much later, by Gilles Deleuze in his f irst cinema book The Movement 
Image, in which he initially gives an account of Henri Bergson’s reflections 
on movement from Matière et mémoire: “Our error lies in believing that it is 
any-element-whatevers, external to qualities that moves. But the qualities 
themselves are pure vibrations which change at the same time as the alleged 
elements move.”48 Already in Bergson’s book from 1896 there is the idea 
of a movement that is realized through bodies and identities. In light of 
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this tradition Deleuze examines the structures of perception in Vertov’s 
f ilms, the relations of movement as interrelations and intervals of material 
perception itself:
In Vertov the interval of movement is perception, the glance, the eye. But 
the eye is not the too-immobile human eye; it is the eye of the camera, as 
it extends from a point where an action begins to the limit of the reaction, 
as it f ills the interval between the two, crossing the universe and beating 
in time to its intervals.49
The eye of matter thus functions like human vision in the cinema. It syn-
thesizes impulses and connects action and reaction to a material reflex 
arc, albeit one that transcends the boundaries of the individual. If Deleuze 
distinguishes between camera-eye and human-eye in his description, then 
he only does so to mark the break at which human perception can become 
material, just as it had been imagined in reflexology. It is not the human 
eye, but the human gaze that can f ind itself cinematically interrelating to 
the world. At any rate, it gets lost, itself tossed about back and forth by the 
reciprocally affecting light and reflection punctures of the matter, so that 
there is no center any longer in which the old human being could maintain 
his position. It is only the multiple ways and movements of actions and 
reactions that become a recognizable model of a world in which everything 
possible can be conveyed. This would also be a correct description of the 
social circumstances in the relational logic of Bekhterevian collective 
reflexology.50
Deleuze therefore points precisely to the sticks of Benjaminian dynamite 
in cinema, showing which f ilms consciously dismiss an old view of the 
human being and which scientists and artists from the beginning of the 
twentieth century had already distanced themselves from the anthropology 
of the nineteenth century – which was often simply science in the service of 
colonial and imperial power. The new structure and communication of mat-
ter, which had made visible a “truth by means of f ilm”, realized movements 
and connection beyond the shapes and boundaries of individual bodies:
We have seen that the gap, the interval between two movements sketches 
out an empty place which pref igures the human subject in so far as he 
appropriates perception to himself. But, for Vertov, the most important 
thing was to restore the intervals to matter. This is the meaning of mon-
tage, and of the ‘theory of intervals,’ which is more profound than that 
of movement. The interval is no longer that which separates a reaction 
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from the action experienced, but, on the contrary, that which – an action 
being given in a point of the universe – will f ind the appropriate reaction 
in some other point [point quelconque], however distant it is.51
This explains why Vertov, with his concept of universal and reciprocal 
matter-connections, of universal reflex-arcs, should be treated as a political 
outsider in the new Soviet state, which was then in the process of making 
the heterogeneous homogenous and hierarchical. But the interval theory 
is even more radical than what the f ilm agencies understood by it. In the 
context of interval theory, Vertov’s temporary exclusion of “man as a subject 
for f ilm” because of “his inability to control his movements”52 is no mere 
anti-humanism.53 It once again refers to an unconscious that has noth-
ing to do with suppressed fantasies, but with the unconscious movement 
of perception and of desire – in the technology of the cinema and in the 
structure of the gaze, permeated with desire. This is why Vertov embraces 
the non-human as liberating from an oppressive, desireless human reality. 
This is also a lesson from Bekhterev’s arsenal, which butted up against all 
acceptable conventions with its view of being good citizens with Collective 
Reflexology.54 Vertov wanted to liberate the cinema from its anthropomor-
phism, constituted from the symbolic remains of the culture of writing, in 
order f inally to let the dancer merge with the dance. If even he speaks of a 
“new man” who “will have the light, precise movements of machines, and … 
will be the gratifying subject of our films.”55 Vertovs concept makes a distinc-
tion from the new man demanded by socialism. The model of this new man 
is Dziga Vertov, as artif icial as the name referring to the man jumping from 
the heights. Instead of a hero, cinema shows someone hesitating, balking, 
wavering.56 According to this model, the analysis-apparatus ‘cinema’ was an 
anti-heroic model, proposed as a universal transformation machine, just as 
the personality had also been conceived by Bekhterev as a transformation 
machine for global energy. From this perspective Deleuze defended the 
Vertovian truth of matter against the reproach of anti-humanism:
…each – even the most charming peasant woman or the most touching 
child – was presented as a material system in perpetual interaction. They 
were catalysts, converters, transformers, which received and re-emitted 
movements, whose speed, direction, order, they changed, making matter 
evolve towards less ‘probable’ states, bringing about changes out of all 
proportion to their own dimensions. It is not that Vertov considered 
beings to be machines, but rather machines which had a ‘heart’ and which 
‘revolved, trembled, jolted about and threw out f lashes of lightning,’ as 
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man could also do, using other movements and other conditions, but 
always in interaction with each other.57
What the “life caught unawares” – the declared goal of the cinematic organi-
zation of the world in the Provisional Instructions to Kino-Eye Groups from 
1926 – conveys in the facial expression and gestures of the physiological 
analysis to the cinema-lab worker corresponds to the truth of objective 
psychology. This is why Vertov so disdained the cinema under the direction 
of bourgeois psychology: “We consider the psychological Russo-German 
film-drama – weighed down with apparitions and childhood memories – an 
absurdity.”58 It does not observe with analytical apparatuses, kino-eyes, but 
f ilms what had been written, dramatized according to the logic of literary 
souls. It remains the cinematic illustration of a Bildungsroman. Vertov’s rage 
at f iction f ilms can also be explained by the fact that in 1935 writing and 
text were still an unavoidable reference medium for f ilm artists, and served 
as the basis for distributing production funds or imposing censorship. Only 
previously written-down observations were permitted, after approval, to 
be f ilmed. Any direct recording with the camera, however, was forbidden, 
since the bureaucracy of the time had no censorship laws for celluloid. The 
journal writer Vertov writes about the director Vertov: “To observe – all of 
Pavlov’s students are allowed to do it, even all scholars and writers, but 
he is not allowed. To him they say he has to write everything down in the 
script, the script is the primary thing.”59
Experiences
Chelovek s kinoapparatom, proclaimed a “f ilm without intertitles”, does 
not, however, manage to get by completely without some sort of written 
notice to the audience. But it is also possible that it was not permitted 
to appear without titles. The spectator’s attention is discretely drawn to 
her position as a test subject, as is always the case in the cinema. Later 
this is experienced with the spectator’s own body. In the opening credits 
The Man with a Movie Camera is called a “f ilm experiment”, Dziga Vertov 
is introduced as the “author-supervisor of the experiment”, the goal of 
the experiment is “the cinematic transmission of visual phenomena” and 
indeed exclusively by means of cinema. The announcement continues its 
offensive not only against the competing arts, but against f ilms that this 
one is indebted to.
The TruTh won by means oF Film 269
This f ilm is an experiment in cinematic communication of real events
Without the help of intertitles
(a f ilm with no intertitles)
Without the help of a story
(a f ilm with no story)
Without the help of theater
(a f ilm with neither actors nor sets)
This experimental work aims at creating a truly international language 
of cinema based on its absolute separation from the language of theater 
and literature.60
After the other f ilm technicians have been introduced, there are in fact 
no more intertitles for the next 92 minutes. The reciprocal relationship 
between the images and the flickering, which now begin, are less anarchic 
than Deleuze’s description would have them be. In one of the first sequences 
the projector is introduced in the f ilm, and the sequence is edited with 
other shots into a motif of beginning. The f ilm seeks to f ind the moment 
between motionlessness and the introduction of a movement, between 
rest and restlessness in the gears and the masses of people. Finally, there is 
a shot showing two carbon pencils concurring in the image, and the light 
of the arc lamp starts to shine, starting up the projection. This montage 
blends into moments of awakening, of rising, of the visual movement of 
opening and of the optical opening of perspectives and gazes. The motifs 
metaphorically repeat what the technology is realizing.
Just as the principle of the interval is introduced into the montage, one 
sequence shows – to put it into words after all – “traff ic, movement, and 
seeing movement.” The cameraman presented in the f ilm throws himself 
into the capital’s traff ic, and the “invisible”, f ilming camera follows him. 
Already at the beginning of the sequence unconscious perceptions and 
effects of cinema have appeared, effects which work beneath conscious 
perception in correspondence to one another, so that human vision itself, 
in a parallel to all the images, becomes the object of observation. A relativ-
ity of seeing movement is gradually built up in the cinema. While at f irst 
we only see simple movements in the image, these are then also taken 
up by a moving vehicle so that two movements become relativized on 
screen. Finally, the whole constellation itself is taken up in traveling, that 
is, jolting, so that what is actually invisible, namely the camera that is 
f ilming, becomes visible through its own movements. The brief cutaway 
to the locomotive wheels introduces a new kind of movement: the tracks 
that, in contrast to the carriage do not jolt, and thus also make it possible 
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for the camera to travel without drawing attention to itself. To this day, 
tracks allow for cameras to move unnoticed in the cinema as effects of the 
spectator’s perception, as Münsterberg had described for artif icial atten-
tion. In the last long wide shot the viewing of images gets entangled with 
the past impressions of the different movements produced by f ilm. Every 
movement that is seen becomes relative to all others and is at the same time 
entangled with the new knowledge about how movements are produced. In 
part this is a conscious reflection, in part it remains an unremarked shift 
in perspective, which allows the spectator barely any conscious inferences 
about his or her own seeing. Any f ixed spectatorial standpoint is dissolved 
in what optically comes from the screen. The spectator’s gaze gets lost in 
the chaotic movements of the traff ic.
–  Close-up: Wheels of a locomotive slowing starting up (4”)
–  Wide shot of the f ilming camera in motion, from behind the staged 
cameraman, who turns the crank and records another carriage with 
people in it riding in parallel (or simulates this for the footage) (5”)
–  Close: the wheels of the locomotive in motion (6”)
–  Wide shot from the f ilming camera to the staged cameraman, who is 
f ilming the people in the carriage (4”)
–  Medium shot: Train from below, that accelerates and drives away (3”)
–  Medium shot: people in the carriage from the perspective of the staged 
cameraman (3”)
–  People from the perspective of a (second?) cameraman (5”)
–  Medium shot of the staged cameraman on the carriage (6”)
–  Medium shot to other people in carriages (6”)
–  Close-up: the staged cameraman as he is shooting (2”)
–  Close-up of two women in the carriage, one of them imitates the 
cranking motion of the staged cameraman (2”)
Already the thematizing of traff ic feeds back into the cinematic analysis 
of movement and the synthetic, illusionary perception of movement. “The 
essence of the cinematic movement-image lies in extracting from vehicles 
or moving bodies the movement which is their common substance, or 
extracting from movements the mobility which is their essence”,61 noted 
Deleuze in a different context, but it shows how well armed the gaze is in 
the cinema and how it can recognize itself as so armed.
Over the course of the sequence the confusion of moving gazes is pushed 
even further. If at f irst the two perspectives of the cameramen were built up 
and differentiated, now they are intertwined, and the spectator’s gaze can 
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no longer distinguish which camera-eye she is looking with or through. She 
can only know that she is seeing cinema. This is the aim of montage: The 
camera can assume any standpoint and simulate any gaze. It can take on 
any gaze and anyone can apprehend the standpoint of the camera from the 
screen. From the gesture of a passenger in the coach, however, who imitates 
a cranking motion with his own head, the gaze of the – or of a – cameraman 
becomes present on screen. In the movements of seeing the logic of the 
gaze is now also interlaced as that of the other. Always and still “caught 
unawares”, we are those who are being looked at in the traff ic of the world. 
The f ilm plays out in the intervals of the movements and gazes.
–  Medium shot of the staged cameraman on the carriage, the f ilming 
camera lets him get closer. In the background the carriage with the 
people
–  Close-up of the people in the carriage, children, in the wind of the 
ride (2”)
–  Medium shot: the galloping carriage horse (3”)
–  The staged cameraman on the carriage, cranking, driving in relation to 
the the f ilming camera through the image, forward and backwards (2”)
–  Medium shot: The galloping horse as above… after 3 seconds “frozen” 
into a still picture (4”)
In the unconscious navigation of gazes in the cinema, and in the un-
conscious relation and reversal of human gazes in the street traff ic, the 
unconscious deception of the senses then gets mixed in as a trick of the 
cinema itself, namely the artif icial animation of spectator brains, which 
see movement in still images. In the image of the galloping horse, which is 
frozen on screen by a trick, the f ilm leads back to the primal scene of f ilm 
in the experiment at Palo Alto. Once again, everything is maintained in the 
staging of the cinema-eyes: illusion and disillusion. Frustrating the illusion 
of movement in the cinema by showing a still image, from which motion 
is created in the f irst place, is at the same time a double deception, for a 
still image on the screen can only be generated by showing a succession of 
identical images in the intermittent course of the projector. Any conscious-
ness that tries to keep up with its own imaginative effects here will be lost. 
Only someone who allows herself to be deceived can be enlightened by the 
cinema-eye – about the fact that she herself is continually transformed 
in every inevitable identif ication and – consciously – cannot see herself 
seeing. The truth lies somewhere in between, around 20 times a second.
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More still images follow, introducing us to the technology of the editing 
room:
–  Still: Medium shot of the people in the carriage (4”)
–  Still: Wide shot of the avenue with passersby (3”)
–  Still: Medium shot of two women in the carriage (4”)
–  Still: Wide shot from above to a broad street, a market, or a large square 
full of people and traff ic (4”)
–  Still: Portrait of a woman with a pitiful expression
–  Still of frames from a f ilmstrip, on which is depicted the portrait of a 
young girl (5”)
–  Still: tight close-up of a young woman looking sternly into the distance 
(5”)
–  Still of frames from a f ilmstrip, on which is depicted the portrait of a 
different young girl (5”)
–  Medium shot: strips in front of a light box, 17 f ilmstrips are sorted and 
form patterns (5”)
–  Shelves with sorted f ilm material (writing in Ukrainian) (2½”)
–  Close-up: the spool on an editing table, still (2½”)
–  Filmstrips, images of a girl, sideways, as they would be placed on the 
editing table (2½”)
–  Close-up: the spool on the editing table, now turning and winding a 
roll of f ilm onto it (2½”)
–  Medium shot, from the side, of an editor at the editing table, she is 
cranking the machine (2½”)
–  Close-up: on the editing table above the light box runs a f ilmstrip 
without intermittent equipment, that is, no picture can be seen, only 
patterns that change with the speed. The strip is stopped, a pair of 
scissors appears and makes the… cut (6”)
The elements of f ilm technology appear in the image, and we see how neces-
sary technology is to create a moving image in perception. Single images, 
strips, the nearly invisible difference between the pictures in succession, the 
various speeds on the editing table, the order of the f ilm strips, the editing 
and the splicing make clear how much every depiction abstracts and has to 
be made open to montage in the individual frames before it can be turned 
into a moving form of reality in the cinema. What is demonstrated is that 
no image can be seen if the f ilm runs continuously. The invisible intervals 
are necessary for an image to emerge. What is also demonstrated is that 
quite different images – as in the case of a cut – can be put together by the 
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brain, like the almost identical images of a still photo: only the movement 
pattern and the intervals have to be right.
–  Medium shot, from the side the editor, Svilova, at the editing table, 
tapes two f ilmstrips together (3”)
–  Still: Portrait of a young girl (3”)
–  Medium shot of the editor from below, in the background are the strips 
in front of the light box, the editor is looking for a strip (3”)
–  Sequence of the young girl, who we have just seen as a still, in full 
motion: the girl starts to laugh (3”)
–  Medium close-up, the editor at the editing table cranks and looks at 
the strips (2”)
–  Still: f ilm strip showing two boys in portrait (4”)
–  Sequence of the two boys running in full motion (4”)
–  Medium close-up, the editor at the editing table cranks and looks at 
the strips (2”)
–  Still of two other children as f ilmstrip (4”)
–  Sequence of them in full motion (4”)
–  Still of the portrait of the old woman who was already seen earlier (1”)
–  Still: Wide shot of the large square that was seen earlier (1”)
–  The two children just seen as a still, now in motion. The are watching 
something, half afraid, half laughing…
–  Wide shot of the large square now in motion: Traff ic and passersby (6”)
–  The old woman in the portrait now moving, arguing with a woman 
at the market (4”)
–  Medium shot, the editor at the editing table cranks and looks at the 
strips (1”)
–  Filmstrips run in a grey blur over the light box, stopping at… (2”)
–  Still: Medium shot of two women in a carriage (1”)
–  The two women in the carriage as a moving image (3”)
–  The young woman, seen previously in a still as portrait, now laughs, 
speaks to the f ilming camera, f lirts, look into the camera…
In this last part of the sequence the analysis of watching cinema becomes 
an analysis of interpersonal perception, a psycho-analysis in the sense of 
objective psychology. It goes back to Vertov’s origin, his jump. The still 
images, like that of the old woman, the young woman, or the various chil-
dren with their particular facial expressions, with their “somatic-mimic 
reflexes”, are shown f irst so as to communicate these reflexes as emotion 
and perception. As they get treated by f ilm technology this impression is 
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frustrated, but also extended. If Bekhterev and Vertov had technologically 
held and disassembled the complex reflexes and emotional movements of 
expression in the early experiments, here they are presented as synthesis. 
Once again the technical intervention is a treatment of what the naked 
eye cannot see. The pitiable facial expressions of the old woman become, 
in motion, those of a haggling market woman, but the other way around, 
in the image of the unpleasant old woman there still exists what once had 
aroused pity. Likewise, after being re-animated by movement, the young 
woman, who seems dismissive in the still photo portrait, starts to speak and 
to flirt with the camera, while all the earlier and contradictory components 
of her expression are still maintained in this new movement. The children 
continue changing their facial expressions, but the in the still photos one 
could see that their exuberance also contained fear, surprise, amazement, 
or timidity.
The f ilm in the cinema is always simultaneously an analyzing and syn-
thesizing movement of a reality. It is never about how something would 
be, but about how it can be brought into a reflexive and reversible motion 
so that new relations are produced and the unknown in the world can be 
recognized. The kinoki had realized what Bekhterev had promised from 
reflexology: “The ultimate goal of psychoreflexology is thus to study the 
relation of the organism to the outside world in connection with existing 
experience, quite independently of subjective experiences that one might 
presume in the organism with external effects according to the analogy 
with oneself.”62
Centers or centrifuges
Somewhat puzzlingly, it is Vertov, with his montage theory, who is seen 
as an agitator in western, and in particular German f ilm criticism.63 
In a constant confusion of messenger and message, the demonstration 
how power structures the gaze is taken for a power ploy itself. This is 
exactly why Vertov explicitly replaced the subjective human eye, whose 
logic cannot be seen objectively, with the mechanical kino-eye, whose 
movements in the cinema can be traced and whose traces can be ensured. 
This operation will be denounced as dogmatism in his successors, for 
instance Godard, who invoked Vertov in his own work.64 The corrosive 
and calculating Vertov is constantly opposed to the dialectical, musical 
Sergei Eisenstein, whose work focuses on the human being as a hero f igure 
corrected by historical materialism.
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Eisenstein, on his search for a scientif ically grounded effect aesthetics 
of f ilm, had also thoroughly studied the works of the reflexologists and 
in particular of Bekhterev, as well as the writings of the most important 
psychological schools.65 In 1924 Eisenstein defended his theater theses on 
the Montage of Attractions, which had appeared in 1923 in the same publica-
tion of the LEF – “Levy Front Iskusstv” – as Vertov’s manifesto Kino-Eye, and 
adapted it for the cinema. At the time Eisenstein held reflexology in high 
esteem: “The method of agitation through spectacle consists in the creation 
of a new chain of conditioned reflexes by associating selected phenomena 
with the unconditional ref lexes they produce.”66 While Bekhterev had 
sought to show how observing and analyzing using technology leads to 
different results in psychology than the subjective conclusions of analogy 
do, and thus had used, among other things, snapshots in order to correct 
subjective, pseudo-analogous, introspective psychology, Eisenstein orients 
himself to Theodor Lipps’s thesis that emotional experiences can be had and 
conveyed directly by the psyche, for instance “the emotional understand-
ing of the alter ego through the imitation of the other.”67 Furthermore, 
Eisenstein invokes Hermann Nothnagel’s physiological examinations of the 
brain, which had showed that different nerve tracts are used for imitation 
depending on whether the stimulus is voluntary or involuntary.68 Only 
stimulation by affects reaches the thalamus in the brain directly, main-
tained Eisenstein, and this direct path to the brain of his spectators was the 
only thing that interested him. Later he turned, unlike Vertov, to classical 
psychology and psychoanalysis in order f inally to orient himself to Piaget’s 
theory, which he knew from Lev Vigotsky.69 For Eisenstein montage was 
not about psychological traditions, but simply about eff icient dramaturgy. 
“Reforging someone else’s psyche is no less diff icult and considerable a task 
than forging iron.”70
Although Eisenstein’s experiments were no less inventive than Vertov’s, 
their f ilm methods are completely different. Eisenstein was interested in 
techniques that might change people, and he must have presumed that the 
desired ideal, the goal of all education, which served as the basis for all artis-
tic modelings, was already well established, for it is not what emerges in the 
course of the f ilm process. The demand for the “model actor”, as he called 
actors, was “the healthy organic rhythm of normal physical functions”,71 so 
that the conveyance of feelings can run smoothly. It is hard to imagine two 
goals of processing human feelings on f ilm being more different. Whereas 
Vertov begins to disassemble the great and heroic feelings cinematically 
and to cause the boundaries between normal and pathological to collapse 
276 Cinema, TranCe and CyberneTiCs 
in the multiplicity of elements and movements that establish a bodily state, 
Eisenstein struggles with f ilm to create a healthy social body.
For Eisenstein, f ilm serves to convey affects through facial expression 
and gesture, not unlike in theater. The special technical aspects of the 
cinema that store and synthesize reality in images is not of particular 
concern to him. Movements interest him as the movement processes 
of human bodies and not – here he is following Meyerhold and biome-
chanics – as perceptual problems in the cinema. The cinematic method 
corresponds to biomechanics because human movements, which by this 
time had come under the inf luence of Taylorism, can be absorbed in 
cinema as ergonomic – ref ined and systematized by analyzing working 
processes historically and dialectically. Eisenstein relates all movements, 
even the eccentric movements of a jazz musician, to a virtual center and 
precisely to the “healthy organic rhythm of normal physical reactions.” 
Film is not, as Vertov had proposed in his manifestos, an opportunity to 
discover something new in the f ield of vision and to displace an “ego” and 
its identity within familiar spatio-temporal conventions, but only one 
among a variety of insuff icient methods to depict, to regulate, and f inally 
to sort out the human historically.
In 1929 Eisenstein ref ined his theory of montage according to the model 
of the kabuki theater, which does not simply stimulate the various sense 
organs with various impulses, but aims for “the f inal sum of stimulants 
to the brain.”72 Correspondingly, in his article “The Fourth Dimension in 
Cinema”, Eisenstein organizes his forms of montage into classes of impulses. 
He names the more complex of them after musical structures: tonic and 
dominant, major and minor, dissonance and consonance, without ever 
explaining the transfer of these acoustic relations into f ilm technologies, 
for instance into focal lengths, f ield sizes, or editing rhythms. He sticks 
with illustrations using atmospheric images: so “major” is harvesting in 
the sunshine, “minor” harvesting in rain or the port in fog, etc. Like in 
acoustics, Eisenstein f inds overtones and undertones in f ilm as well, that 
is, visual “aberrations, distortions, and other defects”73 that accompany a 
f ilm sequence.74 He then understands the optical impulses illustrated in 
musical metaphors as complex and reflex:
That distinctive montage complex within the shot that arises from the 
collisions and combinations of the individual stimulants inherent within 
it, of stimulants that vary according to the ‘external nature’ but are bound 
together in an iron unity through their reflex physiological essence.75
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This interpretation of reflexology assumes that nerves function in an analo-
gous way to the physical qualities of the sense surroundings, meaning that, 
to stick with Eisenstein’s examples, “a grey-haired old man, a grey-haired 
old woman, a white horse, and a snow-covered roof”76 also exhibit constant 
similarities in nerve physiology. But the particular possibilities of f ilm trans-
mission, as Vertov had developed them from neurological research, precisely 
do not consist in banging out parallel visual qualities in the sense organs – to 
speak euphemistically, to use visual metaphors – but in activating brain func-
tions through optical deception and in switching them on against viewing 
habits. Another possibility might be to directly introduce an impulse to the 
nerves through effects of movement and light in order to produce emotional 
values. This would be the flickering, shimmering, and jittering in the cinema, 
which transmits emotions that are neither coded nor decoded metaphorically, 
and that expose the visual value, the motif, or the symbol in their various 
possibilities of association or relation. Here it once again becomes clear why 
Vertov insists that the cinema must f irst abandon producing images based 
on the model of the human eye in order to experience its own traits and the 
particular effects of the medium and its technology.
When Eisenstein enumerates his four fundamental techniques of mon-
tage as the metric, the rhythmic, the tonal, and the overtonal, he gets lost 
in analogies. Poetry, music, and painting provide the terms for naming 
f ilm techniques, but once again the parallels are only vague at best. The 
precision of the meter “joins the ‘pulse-beat’ of the f ilm and the ‘pulse-
beat’ of the audience ‘in unison.’ Without this there can be no ‘contact’ 
between the two.”77 But Eisenstein does not introduce f ilm montage as 
electro-technologically as it is formulated here. For all his seemingly psycho-
physiological ref inements, he always calculates the immediate effect on 
the spectator, not the mediated one.
Eisenstein’s example for overtonal montage is the “Gods” sequence in 
his f ilm October. At the latest with this example, which is “assembled on a 
descending intellectual scale” and shows “the notion of god back to a block 
of wood”, it can be seen that the efforts to bring reflexology and psycho-
physics into the f ield are completely unnecessary to explain Eisenstein’s 
forms of montage, since it is precisely the “reaction of tissues” that require 
impulses that are encoded as streams. Eisenstein sticks to divine metaphors. 
His famous montage of the gods rhythmically places still photo depictions 
of religious artworks in succession. The accelerating editing of the series is 
conceived as a descending line, from the architectural example of a Russian 
Orthodox church to sculptures from the Far East and ritual African masks.78 
The theory of intellectual overtone montage, which is supposed to be carried 
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out as “attack into the very heart of objects and phenomena”,79 merely il-
lustrates a literal and highly museum-like arrangement of sacred objects.
The differences between Vertov’s and Eisenstein’s theories of montage 
lies above all in differing concepts of how human perception relates to 
its technological conditions. The “sorts of vibrations”80 that Eisenstein’s 
cameraman Tissé put into the work as the true virtuosity of the medium by 
means of camera movements, f luctuations of light, various focal lengths, 
gradations, and motivic tensions must, under Eisenstein’s direction, 
always remain connected to fundamental dominants in terminology. 
Vibrating itself can no longer be a f ilm effect, it must remain hidden, like 
the famous dwarf in his chess machine, and the truth of the cinema has 
to resign itself to the law of dialectical materialism. Eisenstein counters 
the skeptics of his montage theory with a striking argument from Lenin’s 
Conspectus of Hegel’s Book “The Science of Logic”.81 The new man need not 
be able to recognize the technical conditions of his own existence if only 
he understands the dialectic. Eisenstein does not explain f ilm starting 
from f ilm technology, but proposes it in networks of signif ication for 
persons of the Gutenberg galaxy. His f ilms reenact this position. The well-
known example of the three marble lions that rise up after one another 
in Battleship Potemkin is a “movement” that only stands metaphorically 
for cinematic perception. Unlike Vertov’s demonstration of watching 
movement in f ilm, Eisenstein leaves his spectators with an indication 
of what has happened psycho-physically. Psychoanalysis and literature 
will lead Eisenstein ever closer to ecstasy than to a “certain f lickering” in 
the image.82 But they also do not get him any closer to the conditions of 
his own perception.
While Eisenstein wanted to reforge the essence of the Soviet man, 
Vertov experimented with technology itself to experience the essence of 
the new man. But he had to run the risk that he, if he wanted to experi-
ence the essence of technology, would no longer be the one to have this 
experience. Anyone who goes so far into relativity can no longer ask what 
he has lost:
We fall, we rise… together with the rhythm of movements – slowed and 
accelerated,
running from us, past us, toward us,
in a circle, or straight line, or ellipse,
to the right and left, with plus and minus signs;
movements bend, straighten, divide, break apart,
multiply, shooting noiselessly through space.83
Part V

1. After All: Return to Receiver
Cybernetics is the art of creating equilibrium in a world
or possibilities and constraints. – And I would suggest
that this is also a viable def inition of the art of living.
– Ernst von Glaserfeld, 1996
In the darkness of projection, in a state that, as Maya Deren wrote, so much 
resembles sleeping or perhaps dreaming, our lunatic eyes f ind themselves 
on the dark side of a cultural technology, on the far and weightless side of 
the optical doors of perception, and at the same time, as Deleuze stresses 
with Vertov, “the eye of matter, the eye in the matter”, that gaze which 
has – just barely – formed us. Just barely, for who knows, perhaps soon 
there will no longer be any imaginary people, Morin’s hommes imaginaires, 
because other machines will aff iliate themselves with other types of egos 
in order to form people in their own image, getting them to dance. Until 
then, however, all endings, whether hallucinated, projected, described, or 
sung, will always also be visions and faces that are recorded in the form 
of darkness and light, movement and blur, projected on movie screens, 
subjected to our desires, spellbound beyond every ending. This is why 
these somewhat twisted shapes appear, waiting for summer rains in 
wild Italian landscapes, when The End is mentioned. Roman wilderness 
spreads out in cinema and pop music where in the Renaissance the f irst 
city was mapped, where mathematically and optically new knowledge, 
nuova scienza, is meant to relocate spaced out subjects back in space. 
Roma contra amor.
Until other machines affiliate themselves with other types of egos, we will 
continue to pose the question of cinema as a technique, we will question the 
fast, rhythmic, or logarithmic swinging movements it imposes on us, and we 
can ask whether cinema couldn’t be considered a ritual or trance technique, 
because with all its stories, dramaturgies, and dialogues, it always also cuts 
into accustomed motor-sensory circuits modifying behavior through more 
complex routines of relating to others and to new complexes of movement. 
At the beginning was the question of a particular, and in the sense of Fech-
ner’s protocol, a f leeting historical subjectivity, its sensual entrapment and 
constitution under the conditions of the ecstatic technology of the cinema, 
as it was constituted in Paris, Leipzig, and Leningrad, the effects of which 
were later experienced in Bali and in New York, in Haiti, in Niger, and once 
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again in Paris, and were then deconstructed, depersonalized, and analyzed 
right away again thanks to image-producing apparatuses.
In the end it is about exposing the circular-causal qualities in cinematic 
perception in light of the early neurological and psycho-physical research 
that had always accompanied the invention of cinema. At the intersection of 
the disciplines, the knowledge of cybernetics and cinematography meshes 
up to networks in which a historical cultural technology appears as texture 
of power relations – sometimes murderous, but always also as the possibility 
of an improbable formation and encounter at the cross-roads: “The most 
important social function of film is to establish equilibrium between human 
beings and the apparatus.” Not as mediation, but as existential provocation. 
Both are challenged at the cross-roads: human beings and apparatus.
At the beginning was the question: To what end, for what possible 
goal, for what sense, telos, or state could cinema govern the behavior 
and interrelations of human beings and apparatuses? For this would be 
the prerequisite to assuming cybernetic processes. At the beginning of 
cybernetic history the f irst shadow community of the new science posed 
the question of possibly recognizing purpose or teleology in the behavior 
of animals, human beings, machines, or human-machines. The radicalism 
of this epistemological program was not immediately clear. “One of the 
essentials for understanding it, was to have been brought up in the age when 
[…] purpose was a total mystery.” It was still a mystery for the participants 
at the f irst Macy Conferences, who wanted to learn how to discover in 
expressions, as Rudolf Arnheim had expressed it, or in behavior, no matter 
how lunatic it seemed, an anticipatory and feedback relation of a particular 
individual to its surroundings. Every behavior brought past experience up 
to the present because these were reflected emotionally or humorally in a 
specif ic bodily form or communication, as Norbert Wiener had speculated: 
“I have a strong suspicion […] that there are two modes of communication in 
the human body, the one that belongs to the neuronal system strictly and the 
‘to whom it may concern messages’. I suspect that the ‘to whom it may concern 
messages’ are a) closely associated with emotion and b) at least partly humor-
ally carried.” Especially if it is integrally guided by feelings and emotions, 
behavior cannot at all be described as simple, goal-oriented, greedy reaction, 
but as cultural reaction, supra-individual, as one that creates relations, one 
that is implemented into our bodies in an odd and, as we know from Kleist, 
dancing way, innocent, unaware, bear-bellied, puppet-like, or divine. In a 
similar way, older cultures of possession have incorporated historical and 
social knowledge, cultural relationships and behavioral forms according to 
divine models of behavior in a precision that is quite incomprehensible to us.
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On the search for cybernetic forms of thinking which might save the 
planet, Gregory Bateson, high above the Pacif ic in Big Sur, believed that 
he could identify supraindividual and integrated models of behaving as 
functions of the gods: “One of the things that man has done through the 
ages to correct for his short-sighted purposiveness is to imagine personified 
entities with various sorts of supernatural powers, i.e. gods. These entities, 
being fictitious persons, are more or less endowed with cybernetic and circuit 
characteristics.” Bateson, we know, learned from cinema. His divine func-
tions can be thought of as cinematic functions from beginning to end.
The fact that it was cinematography, and not the universal Turing 
machine that was the prerequisite for all behavioral research is of course 
not mentioned by the avant-gardes of cybernetic thinking, but it was cin-
ematography that turned behavior into an object for science in the f irst 
place, placing even its interweaving of past and present into a measurable 
order. Cinematography could record, store, and analyze behavior as a 
complex interaction between arbitrary points in the universe, open it up 
to combination, to repetition, to restaging. In the cinema behavior became 
visible as a visible transformation of states, of circumstances, of sensations 
and reactions nascent on the axis of time.
Cinema would be the art of combining behavior, which had been turned 
into discrete data with the help of chronophotography, into new forms and 
formations. This happens all the more precisely and poetically, that is, 
counter to the cinema’s history of control and discipline, the more exactly 
art moves in the matrices and registers of the medium. This is why in the 
end we have dealt with films that were about the historical dispositif cinema 
in the image, or at least of artists that went cinematic with the help of 
transformation processes of shooting and editing.
For cyberneticists, not supermen of science, as Guilbaud emphasizes, 
but simply people at the cross-roads of the disciplines, behavior, if it is 
cybernetic, will bring all the points of the universe into equilibrium. “… for 
cybernetics is the art of creating equilibrium in a world of possibilities and 
constraints. – And I would suggest that this is also a variable definition of the 
art of living.” There is nothing homely about this, no self-suff iciency and no 
getting comfortable in a safe spaces. Finding equilibrium, in a cybernetic as 
well as a cinematic sense, would mean entering into an extreme exchange 
with the surroundings or the universe, and one that is decentering for the 
individual. It is never a matter of binary relations, much less of exchange 
values. Rarely were the travelers to Africa, the explorers of possession 
techniques, the disturbers of behavior oriented as to where their journey 
was going. It was nonetheless clear that the violence that is still hidden in 
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the decolonialized body cannot become visible in any other way than by 
the means of those f ilms which also decenter the observer. It was only the 
doppelgängers of trance and their blinking paraphernalia, allowing the 
light to flash and flicker in disturbing time periods, that were able to bring 
photographing strategies of identity formation to light. And only with the 
help of the movie camera those mechanical processes become visible in 
which men and cameramen turn into organless or multi-organic energetic 
complots and complexes, whether consciously or unconsciously.
The equilibrium in question demands of anyone looking to salvage it to 
put oneself in danger, to risk jumping into the unknown of a technologically 
manipulated time and its dark intervals, to risk crashing or overdosing, 
or pirouetting into the spirals of one’s own ego, endlessly running around 
the tracks of the measuring stations in the Bois de Boulogne only to learn 
that the truth presented in statistical traces and recordings is a truth about 
absences. “…in art doing something means doing away with something, begin-
ning with oneself.”
In the decenteredness in which “movements shoot noiselessly through 
the room”, the meshes of the disintegrating or networking individual, its 
obsessive, neurotic, and nefarious mental statements may therefore be 
understood as a gift to the surroundings. “Mental life is not only a sum of 
subjective experiences, but always also gives expression to a certain series of 
objective appearances. These objective experiences are what the personality 
uses to enrich its external social surroundings.” These objective appearances 
in the form of sheen, f lecks of light and bright spots on the screen, create 
new kinds of homeostasis which connect us as spectators medially to a 
degenerated, exploited global village gone off balance, and they teach us to 
understand cinema as a production of perception, “in matter, as it extends 
from the point where an action begins to the limit of the reaction, as it fills 
the interval between the two, crossing the universe and beating it time to its 
intervals.” This means we are summoned into the cinema in order to realize 
crises in our sensory-motor reactions, to incarnate crises and to enter into 
circumstances that connect us in ways that the ego had not previously 
imagined. The unpredictable and unimaginable states that arise in the 
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and compared the work there with the latest research “from the Anglo-
American countries, from Scandinavia, Holland, and France.” Kulenkampff 
(1967), 126.
3. Deviations
1. Leiris (1992), 34: “Pour oublier leurs médiocres petites ‘manières de blancs’ 
(ainsi qui disent certains négres) et ce qu’ils s’imaginent être leur personne 
d’intellectuels.” 
2. Rouch (1978), 5.
3. Rouch (1978), 6.
4. Deleuze (1989), 158. 
5. In the pop culture of the eighties it would be “Phase, lock, loop!” Electronic 
Front Populaire.
6. Rouch’s commentary in: Moi, un Noir (France, 1957).
7. Cf. Rouch (1954), 54f.
8. Deleuze (1989), 147.
9. Deleuze (1989), 148.
10. Deleuze (1989), 214.
11. Cf. Stoller (1992), 59.
12. Cf. Stoller (1992), 38.
13. Rouch (1978), 11.
14. Cf. Rouch (1978).
15. Rouch (2003b), 44.
16. Rouch (1978), 24
17. Interview with Rouch from the sixties, in Bazin/Labarthe (1995). Since this 
is not a dialogue where Rouch is touting some big program, it has often not 
been understood correctly by media studies scholars. “Certainly he wants 
to dialogue the research process, a call that he is not alone in making in 
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ethnology; he wants to understand a recognition of the equality among the 
differences of human cultures, and here as well he can count on the support 
of a good number of his colleagues. But that it is precisely the medium of 
film that ethnology is supposed to need so desperately to effect changes in 
this direction is something that can be doubted.” Hohenberger (1988), 251. 
Certainly it must be doubted that film is a means of dialoguing. Film is – 
and this would have been clear to Rouch, as a scrupulous reader of Lacan’s 
“Écrits techniques de Freud” – at least a trialoguing medium. 
18. Rouch (1978), 25.
19. Rouch (1978), 25. 
20. Rouch (1978), 25.
21. Rouch (2003a).
22. Rouch (1978), 28.
23. Rouch (1978), 25.
24. Rouch (1978), 28.
25. Deren (1941), 10.
26. Rouch (1978), 19.
27. Deren (1941), 10.
28. Rouch (1978), 20.
29. Rouch (1978), 25.
30. Rouch (1996) and Hohenberger (1988), 235, as well as Stoller (1992), 26ff., 
who in particular cites Sembène’s verdict that Rouch shows Africans as 
insects. 
31. Rouch (1978), 31.
32. Rouch (1996).
33. Foucault (2006), 340.
34. Rouch (1978), 31.
35. Rouch (1996).
36. Cf. Kittler (2013), 67.
37. Rouch (1978), 31.
38. Rouch (1978), 31.
39. Rouch (1954), 51. 
40. Rouch (1978), 31.
4. Compressions
1. Cf. Wolff-Heidegger/Cetto (1968), 111-114. 
2. This nickname is circulated by Ellenberger (1973/1985), 151.
3. Charcot (1881), 97. 
4. Quoted in Foucault (1978), 56. 
5. Freud (1962), 284.
6. Charcot, quoted in Didi-Huberman (2004), 187.
7. Foucault (2006), 341. 
8. Foucault (1978), 56. 
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9. Foucault (2006), 339-340.
10. Ellenberger (1973/1985), 152.
11. Richer, in the appendixes to Didi-Huberman (2003), 297-298.
12. Schneider (1988), 151.
13. Bernard/Gunthert (1993), 100.
14. Charcot (1991), 3.
15. Freud (1962), 276.
16. Cf. Londe (1899), 282.
17. Bourneville cited in the appendices to Didi-Huberman (2003), 284.
18. Charcot (1991), 12. 
19. Cf. Bernard/Gunthert (1993), 150.
20. Foucault (1980), 194. 
21. Cf. Lorenz (1987), 108ff. and Didi-Huberman (2003): “For there was a 
remarkable complicity, tacit and impeccable, between the Salpêtrière and 
the Préfecture de police. Their photographic techniques were identical and 
sustained the same hopes. The techniques were equally implicated in an 
art.”, 51.
22. Cf. Sekula (1986), 17.
23. Londe (1888), 23.
24. Londe (1893), 5.
25. Contrary to all insinuations and allusions of Didi-Huberman, who would 
prefer to see Londe characterized, along with Galton and Bertillon, as an 
administrational type. 
26. Londe (1893), 15.
27. Londe (1893): “On pourrait, il est vrai, assurer leur position au moyen 
de l’appui-tête, comme on le fait fréquemment dans la pratique pho-
tographique, mais ce moyen nous paraît mauvais a priori. Il est indispensa-
ble de saisir le malade dans son attitude vraie et il ne faut pas immobiliser 
dans une position qui peut ne pas être naturelle.”, 66.
28. Londe (1893), 98.
29. Londe (1893), 84.
30. Cf. Bernard/Gunthert (1993), 30.
31. An extensive discussion of this can be found in Bronfen (1982), 89ff.
32. Freud (1962), 276.
33. Israel (1976/1993), 25. 
34. Israel (1976/1993), 118.
35. Israel (1976/1993), 270.
36. Israel (1976/1993), 29.
37. Foucault (2006).
38. Londe (1888), 3.
39. Freud (1957), 2211.
40. Bernard/Gunthert (1993), 125.
41. Charcot (1874), 167. 
42. Freud (1962), 276.
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43. Charcot “Apropos de six cas de hystérie chez l’homme,” quoted in: Bernard/
Gunthert (1993), 127f.
44. Charcot, quoted in Didi-Huberman (2003), 29.
45. Cf. Ellenberger (1973/1985), 139ff.
46. Cf. Charcot/Richer (1887). 
47. Foreword by Richer, Gilles de la Tourette, and Londe, quoted in: Bernard/
Gunthert (1993), 129.
48. Charcot (1886), 39.
49. Londe (1893), 99
50. Londe (1893), 114.
51. Ellenberger (1981), 99. 
52. Cf. Ellenberger (1973/1985), 157.
53. Marey (1885), 2.
Part III
1. Mental Apparatuses
1. Cf. Schäfer (1989), 160.
2. The two giants of the optics industry emerged in the middle of the nine-
teenth century: Carl Zeiss founded his factory in 1846 in Jena and Ernst 
Leitz formed his company in Wetzlar in 1849.
3. Virilio (1986) traced cinema technology back to its origins in the pool of 
military equipment. The practical alliance between military and medical 
research is evident. To this day advanced research in every scientific field 
are only permitted by military-industrial joint ventures.
4. Benjamin (2003), 350. 
5. Benjamin (2003), 328.
6. Bernard (1865), 35.
7. Bernard (1865), 38.
8. Pavlov (1957), 488.
9. Bernard (1865), 11.
10. Bernard was one of the most notorious practitioners and defenders of vivi-
section. Public campaigns were led against him, which in part were financial-
ly supported with large sums of money by his own wife. Cf. Braun, (1992), 10.
11. Cf. also Bernard (1865): “Chez tous les êtres vivants le milieu intérieur, qui 
est un véritable produit de l’organisme, conserve des rapports nécessaires 
d’échanges et d’équilibres avec le milieu cosmique extérieur.”, 110.
12. Bernard (1865), 102.
13. Bernard (1865), 173.
14. Braun (1898), 1, Foreword.
15. Cartwright (1995), 44.
16. Foucault (1975), 243. 
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17. In 1854 the debate about materialism in Göttingen was carried out with 
the belated verve of the political critique of 1848. Following a formulation 
of Carl Vogt’s, according to which the brain did not exude its thoughts any 
differently than the liver did bile of the kidneys did urine, the alternative 
would be called “soul or secret.” Cf. Vogt (1847) and (1855). Instead of schol-
ars from the humanities, it was now physiologists, chemists, and physicists 
who were debating the idea of the soul, and all partisanship had political 
and institutional consequences. The physiologist Carl Ludwig, after trave-
ling from Zürich to the meeting of German natural scientists and doctors 
in Göttingen, did not receive the appointment to a professorship in Bonn, 
which had been previously considered all but certain. 
18. Wundt (1874), 10.
19. Cf. Boring (1950), 68ff.
20. Fritsch and Hitzig, quoted in: Rothschuh (1964), 276.
21. Degen (1954), 271.
22. The complete list of Ludwig’s famous students can be found in Schröer 
(1967), pp. 287-293. Joravsky (1989) also includes Vladimir M. Bekhterev 
among Ludwig’s physiology students in Leipzig. 
23. Bauereisen (1956/57), 104.
24. Schröer (1967), 107.
25. Schröer (1967), 107.
26. Cf. Braun (1992), 327.
27. Quoted in Schröer (1967), 110.
28. Quoted in Mattenklott (1984), 173.
29. Hegel (1807/1967), 142. 
30. Fechner (1860), vol.2, 13.
31. Cannon (1945), 135.
32. Freud (1953), 969.
33. Freud (1953), 971.
34. Freud (1953), 973.
35. Bernard/Gunthert (1993), 30.
36. Helmholtz (1850), 14ff. 
37. Helmholtz (1883), 867.
38. Helmholtz (1883), 870.
39. Helmholtz (1883), 880. Underscoring in the original.
40. Helmholtz (1891/1996), 29.
41. Helmholtz (1895), 149.
42. Helmholtz (1855/1896), 111.
43. Helmholtz (1868/1896), 365.
44. Helmholtz (1895), 43.
45. Helmholtz (1895), 7 and 53.
46. Helmholtz (1895), 6.
47. Helmholtz (1895), 6.
48. Helmholtz first describes it in his lecture “On Human Seeing,” which he 
gave on February 27, 1855 in Königsberg; Wundt published it first in his “Lec-
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tures on the Theory of Sense Perception” from 1858-1862, but had already 
formulated it previously. Cf. Boring (1950), 316ff. and 329ff. 
49. Wundt (1902), 27. 
50. Cf. Boring (1950), 145ff.
51. Wundt (1912), 5. 
52. Wundt (1912), 34. 
53. Wundt (1912), 5-6. 
54. Thus it was also possible to demonstrate that cinematic projection, in the 
speed of the old projectors at 18 frames per second, would just be percepti-
ble as a sequence of single images if the blade shutter did not subdivide it 
into two phases.
55. Cf. Deren (1953), 233-239.
56. Wundt (1912), 53.
57. Wundt (1912), 56.
58. Wundt (1902), 344-360.
59. Wundt (1874), 863.
60. Deren (1941), 10.
2. Psycho-Motor Activity
1. On Marey’s biography and life work, cf. Braun (1992).
2. Marey (1894/1994), 277.
3. Marey (1885), 15.
4. Marey (1885), 4.
5. Marey (1894/1994), 78.
6. Marey (1894/1994), 147.
7. Marey (1894/1994), 181.
8. Marey (1894/1994), 182.
9. Leuba (1994), 15.
10. Cf. Berg (1995), 72.
11. Painlevé (1991), 73 and 85.
12. Cf. Kracauer (1960), 270 and Cartwright (1995), 40 and 178.
13. Ernst (1948), 21. 
14. Dalí (1998), 134. 
3. Psycho-Drama
1. In Leipzig Paul Flechsig had dismissed his assistant Kraepelin in part 
because he was neglecting his work at the station and spending too much 
time on the experiments at the laboratory, or even: at the neighboring insti-
tute with Wilhelm Wundt, with whom he eventually wrote his Habilitation 
thesis. Cf. Steinberg (2001), 252-256.
2. Kraepelin (1909), 689.
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3. The negatives of Marinescu’s film series on pathological ways of human 
movement were restored some years ago and clips from them were pub-
lished in a historical collection, edited by the Italian film historian Virgilio 
Tosi. In co-produciton with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 
in Meudon, the Istituto Luce, SpA. in Rome, and the Institut des Wissen-
schaftlichen Films in Göttingen, Tosi published Marinescu’s images along 
with other examples in a series about early scientific cinematography. One 
of the disconcerting issues in this publication is Tosi’s presumably scientific 
commentary, which does not delve into the staging of illness by film using 
camera and lighting technologies, but which simply repeats the diagnoses 
staged in this way nearly a hundred years later, when he announces “record-
ings to analyze abnormalities in movement, generated by advanced ataxia”. 
4. Camillio Negri’s film is included in the IWF compilation Nr. 193 “The Origins 
of Scientific Cinematography – First Applications”, and once again Virgilio 
Tosi’s attention as a film historian is sympathetic to Negri’s intention, not 
to the technological film tricks of the staging, when he comments: “Negri 
produced this film to give students the opportunity to learn by means of a 
documentation of unusual cases”.
5. Hennes (1910), 2013.
6. Weiser (1919), 95.
7. Weiser (1919), 113.
8. Weiser (1919), 113-114.
9. Dr. Kirchhof is to the day the author with by far the most titles in the medi-
cal catalog of the Institut für Wissenschaftlichen Film in Göttingen. His 
works do in fact span the regimes. The work on his film “Peripher nervöse 
myopathische und strukturelle Störungen im Spiegel des Gesichtes” extends 
from 1939 to 1957. Since the early sixties Kirchhof films on toxicology, on 
diseases of the movement apparatus, on diseases of the brain, of the spinal 
cord, and of the nervous system have come to Göttingen, initially from 
Izmir in Turkey. These include footage from the Third Reich, which were 
compiled and published later in Izmir. During the seventies Dr. Kirchhof’s 
productions were once again coming from Bonn and Berlin. The presum-
able innocence of the shooting process protected Kirchhof from ethical 
and medical judgments of his work. He is simply considered a good teacher 
of the medical gaze. For more on Kirchhof, cf. the recent book by Schmidt 
(2001). 
4. Psycho-Technology
1. Lehmann (1917) quoted in Weiser (1919), 43.
2. Weiser (1919), 41.
3. Lehmann (1917) quoted in Weiser (1919), 43.
4. Lehmann (1917) quoted in Weiser (1919), 43.
5. Weiser (1919), 41.
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6. Hacking (1995), 209.
7. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 41.
8. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 41.
9. Kittler (2013), 82. 
10. Münsterberg (1889) Heft 1, 55.
11. Münsterberg (1909), 5.
12. Münsterberg (1909), 70.
13. Münsterberg (1909), 77-78.
14. Münsterberg (1914/1920), 14.
15. Münsterberg (1914/1920), 7.
16. Münsterberg (1914/1920), 159.
17. Münsterberg (1914/1920).
18. Solomons/Stein (1896), 499.
19. Solomons/Stein (1896), 502.
20. Solomons/Stein (1896), 506.
21. Stein (1937/1993), 274-275.
22. Stein (1937/1993), 275.
23. Solomons/Stein (1896), 507.
24. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 29.
25. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 22.
26. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 24.
27. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 33.
28. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 24.
29. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 41.
30. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 48.
31. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 45.
32. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 45.
33. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 48.
34. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 50.
35. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 53.
36. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 52.
37. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 55.
38. Kracauer (1947/1974), 79.
39. Deren (1941), 4.
40. Bleuler (1921), 256.
41. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 95.
42. Münsterberg (1916/1970), 96-99.
5. Psycho-Reflexology
1. Cf. Reymert (1928).
2. It had been Cattell who gave Wundt a typewriter, “one of the first in Ger-
many”. Avenarius had described this as a Trojan horse, since Wundt would 
have written twice as many books with it as without it.
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3. Ellenberger (1973/1985), 1145.
4. Freud (1961), 4466.
5. “It was only during the 1910s and 1920s, with the important researches of Wal-
ter B. Cannon, that a shadow community of emotion-attentive physiologists 
began to congeal. Cannon’s extensive investigations of emotions in different 
organ systems and functions put emotions themselves, rather than specific 
organs or functions, at the center of attention. […] Instead of discussing 
emotions in the context of a particular organ, system or function, Cannon 
pursued the emotions in different organs, systems and functions of the body.” 
Dror (1999), 218. In Dror’s multifaceted studies of a science history of the 
emotions, Cannon’s research is presented in great detail in the context of the 
transformation of the meaning and function of feeling in physiology.
6. Puente (1995), 510; Joravsky (1989) finds the source dubious: “the hearsay 
report.” (314). Etkind (1996) pursued the legend further. In the period of 
glasnost, doctors and historians debated indirect clues that could support 
the hypothesis that Bekhterev was purposefully poisoned. Cf. Literatur-
naja Gazeta, December 9, 1987 and September 28, 1988; Ogonek 1988, 11, 7; 
Medicinskaja Gazeta, November 11, 1988, 143. 
7. Kharms (1936/1983), 5. Many thanks to Peter Urban for the reference.
8. Brozek/Diamond (1982), 125 and cf. also Ellenberger (1973), 1145.
9. CF. Ponomareff (1986) and Ziferstein (1966).
10. Joravsky (1989), 83 and Bechterev (1927).
11. It is indeed a bit paranoid how the science historian Alexandre Métraux 
insinuates dark scheming to Bekhterev: “It is known that, before taking up 
his position in Kazan, Bekhterev had traveled around outside of Russia for 
more than a year for the purpose of study. […] Study travels also served the 
purposes of laboratory spying.” Wundt, because his position as the founder 
of experimental psychology was only confirmed through the many succes-
sor institutions, had never applied for a patent on his laboratory. What is 
important about Métraux’s comment, though, is that reflexology is not any 
Russian specialty, but has its origins in Central Europe and its, in Métraux 
words, “institutional platform” was also in the devices that could measure 
the mind as psyche. Métraux (1986), 91.
12. Freud (1958), 2386-2448.
13. Kittler (2013), 67.
14. Schreber (2000), 20-21.
15. Wundt (Festschrift), 15-16. 
16. Flechsig (1896 R), 19 and 35.
17. Flechsig (1896 R), 34.
18. Bechterev (1905), 90.
19. “The cramp-like movements observed in people appear in three forms. 
Relatively seldom they appear in screaming, laughing, sobbing, anguished 
emission of tears, swallowing, belching, and other convulsive symptoms of 
minor hysteria. Most commonly, however, cramps indicate the character of 
the rhythmic and imitative movements peculiar to major hysteria, which 
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correspond to various progression and customary movements and which as 
a rule are marked by complete uniformity in one and the same individual.” 
Bechterev (1905), 81.
20. Bechterev (1905), 96.
21. Bechterev (1905), 72.
22. Cf. Gauld (1995), 420ff.; Kulenkampff (1967); Eichhorn/Stern (1977); Pon-
omareff (1986). And Bekhterev his autobiographical sketch: “I had already 
begun the scientific study of hypnosis and suggestion in 1892, when the 
subject was not yet being taken seriously in Russia, all the more so since 
the practical application of hypnosis was subject to certain restrictions by 
a provision of the medical board. These restrictions were only lifted at the 
turn of the 20th century at my request.” Bechterev (1927), 4.
23. Bechterev (1902), 6.
24. Bechterev (1902), 16ff.
25. Bechterev (1905 A), 218.
26. CF. Maturana/Varela (1984/1987), 111.
27. Bechterev (1902), 131. 
28. Bechterev (1902), 31.
29. Cf. Urban (1997), 331. 
30. Bechterev (1908), 194.
31. Bechterev (1905), 11.
32. Bechterev (1905), 12.
33. Libich (1947), who found the manuscript, quoted in Eichhorn/Stern (1977), 581.
34. Eichhorn/Stern (1977), 579 and 584.
35. But the clinical practice in Eastern Europe, which hardly anyone in the west 
is aware of, seems to have been relatively open. One visitor from the USA, 
Dr. Ponomareff, described psychiatry in the Soviet Union in the presumably 
dark eighties, emphasizing in particular the circumstances at the Bekhterev 
Institute: “[…] psychiatrists a the Bekhterev favor a more restrictive definition 
of schizophrenia and see mental illness as primarily a result of interpersonal 
stresses.” Cf. Ponomareff (1986), 282. Ponomareff especially stresses the good 
relationships of the patients to the doctors: “In general they were knowledge-
able about their illness and seemed to view their relationships with their 
physicians as collaborative ones.” Ponomareff (1986), 285. Caspar Kulen-
kampff as well, then director of the psychiatric clinic in Düsseldorf, who later 
brought Bateson’s studies on schizophrenia to Germany, found the “thera-
peutic-rehabilitative” efforts and the clinic and the research at the Bekhterev 
Insitute in Leningrad to be exemplary in 1967. Cf. Kulenkampff (1967), 127.
36. Eichhorn/Stern (1997), 578.
37. Bechterev (1927), 4.
38. Bechterev (1927), 5.
39. Bechterev (1906), 3.
40. Bechterev (1927), 48. 
41. Bechterev (1906), 26.
42. Bechterev (1906), 132ff. 
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43. Ditschek (1989), 153.
44. Ditschek (1989), 154.
45. Bechterev (1905), 18.
46. Foreword by the Russian state press in Bechterev (1926), xii. 
47. When Bekhterev called his theory of reflexes “objective psychology,” he 
wanted to underscore his distance to classical psychology on the one hand, 
and at the same time to distinguish his methodology from pure nerve physi-
ology. Starting in 1912 he called his work psycho-reflexology, later human 
reflexology, and finally, in his posthumously published political master text 
it was called: Collective Reflexology. 
48. Bechterev (1913), iv. 
49. Bechterev (1913), 3.
50. Bechterev (1913), 6. 
51. Bechterev (1913), 2.
52. Bechterev (1913), iii.
53. Bekhterev (1973), 380.
54. Bechterev (1912), 1486.
55. Bekhterev (1973), 20.
56. Bekhterev (1973), 19.
57. Bechterev (1906), 16.
58. Bechterev (1896/1899). 
59. Cf. also Joravsky (1989), 497f. 
60. Bechterev (1913), 25. Cf. Flechsig (1896), 26 and footnotes on 75ff. Here Flech-
sig localizes the the processes of consciousness and mental operations that 
illustrated the structure of the brain, and not the other way around. “In the 
construction of our spirits, in the great, persistent traits of its stratification, 
we can clearly see the architecture of our brains reflected.” Flechsig (1896), 3.
61. Cf. Breidbach (1997), 225.
62. Flechsig (1896), 33f. Friedrich Kittler has pointed out that this is the ana-
tomical anticipation of Lacan’s description of the formation of an ego-func-
tion in the mirror stage. Kittler (1993), 70. 
63. Flechsig (1896), 68.
64. Breidbach (1997), 224. 
65. Bechterev (1896/1899), 2.
66. Bechterev (1896/1899), 421. 
67. Bechterev (1926), 404. The fact that Bekhterev was interested in the rela-
tions, connections, and circuits of the microstructure in the brain addition-
ally prevented him from adopting the biologistic gender assessments of the 
time, which had their outgrowth in the secure macro area of phrenology. 
Nowhere in Bekhterev’s work are there allusions to a physiological distinc-
tion in the intellectual achievements or the multiplicity of personality 
structures between men and women, and there were always many female 
researchers working in his laboratories.
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68. Bechterev (1896/1899), 616. Unfortunately, however, this discrete form of 
impulse transmission, with its nice reference to contemporary messaging 
technologies and which might have made it possible to seamlessly integrate 
Bekhterev’s nerve theory into the apparatuses of cinematic perception, is 
oddly syncretically linked to other models. With the precision of discrete 
connection controls, the explanation of the transfer of the impulse itself in-
volves a rather psychedelic idea: By virtue of the ability of the protoplasm to 
contract, the dendrites can be expanded or shortened and thus take up or 
break off contact, thought Bekhterev. The “amoeboid movement” provides 
the explanation for “the influence of habit and practice, the arousing or 
calming substances on the nervous system.” Bechterev (1896/1899), 618. In 
as much as these explanations are remote from the model of synapsis and 
its electrochemical transmission function, they still allow us to recognize 
the discrete elements of an impulse transmission for the nerve conduction 
of the paths and courses in the central nervous system.
69. Bekhterev (1973), 139. 
70. Bekhterev (1973), 116.
71. Bechterev (1913), 105.
72. Bechterev (1908), 234.
73. Bekhterev (1973), 166.
74. Bechterev (1913), 33.
75. Cf. Joravsky (1989). 
76. Bekhterev (1973), 120.
77. Bechterev (1913), 281.
78. Bechterev (1913): “1. Organic (conditioned by inner stimuli), 2. Muscular, 3. 
Gender, 4. Touch, 5. Taste, 6. Smell, 7. hearing, and 8. Seeing mimic.”, 289.
79. Bekhterev (1973), 98.
80. Bekhterev (1973), 98-99.
81. Cf. Ellenberger (1973), 515ff., 655ff., and 935.
82. Bekhterev (2001), 65. 
83. Bechterev (1928 E), 271.
84. Bechterev (1928 E), 271.
85. Wiener (1956), 291.
86. Bechterev (1913), 76.
87. Bechterev (1926), 13. 
88. Bechterev (1928 E), 276. 
89. In light of this bold and careful psychoneurological research from the 
beginning of the 20th century, all the current excitement that recent find-
ings mean that the perceptual system may prove to be plastic, “to facilitate 
association, to be modulated by experience” seem somewhat belated. Cf. 
Breidbach (1997), 24.
90. Flechsig (1896 R), 34.
91. Bechterev (1913), 86.
92. Bekhterev (2001), 93. 
93. Short (1983), 4.
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Part IV
1. The Truth Won by Means of Film
1. Cf. Marshall (1983), 64 and Tode/Gramatke (2000), 203. Jörg Bochow (1997), 
in his study on subject and religiosity in early Soviet film, for which he col-
lected and translated many previously unknown documents, has pointed 
to the effects of objective psychology or reflexology, and in particular to 
Bekhterev’s concept of mimic reflexes for Kuleshov’s idea of a new actor, 
of the ‘naturshik’. The chapter on Vertov and religious ecstasy presents the 
connections between Vertov’s musical inspirations and film montage.
2. Marshall (1983), 236, cites Viktor Shklovsky, “Abram M. Room: Life and 
Work”, Moscow 1929, 6. 
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